



French Institute
of International Relations

The Barents Sea: Towards a new “great game”?

Viviane du Castel

October 2005

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to express her gratitude to the following for their assistance:

Bard BREDROP-KNUDSEN, Director, Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Oslo

Julie CHRISTENSEN, Member of the Storting, researcher and editor of report no. 30 to the Storting (2004-2005) "Opportunities and Challenges in the North", Oslo

Alda Morice CHRISTENSEN, Secretary, The Royal Norwegian Embassy, Paris

Rolf Einar FIFE, Director General, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Legal Affairs, Oslo

Eiler Nils FLEISCHER, First Secretary (Political Affairs), Royal Norwegian Embassy, Paris

Sverre JERVELL, Senior Consultant, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Section for the Northern Zone, Arctic Issues and Nuclear Safety, Oslo

Dr Kai LIE, Norwegian Ambassador, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo

Arild MOE, Deputy Director, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker

Rune RAFAELSEN, Secretary General, Norwegian Secretariat of the Barents Council, Kirkenes


Pernille RIEKER, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo

Peter Joan SCHEI, Director, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker

Jonas Gahr STØRE, Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Secretary General of the Norwegian Red Cross

CONTENTS

<u>I- LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES THAT ARE IMPEDING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE BARENTS SEA</u>	7
<u>1- Necessary legal organisation</u>	7
<u>A- The delimitation of maritime areas and the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty</u>	7
<u>B- The rights of the indigenous peoples</u>	10
<u>I-2- An energy policy that respects the environment</u>	11
<u>A- The new “great game” of hydrocarbons</u>	11
<u>B- An urgent need to conserve the environment</u>	14
<u>II- THE MAIN TRENDS OF NORWEGIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY</u>	16
<u>II- 1 A neighbourhood policy aiming at stability</u>	16
<u>A- Necessary good relations with Russia</u>	16
<u>B- Integration for regional cooperation</u>	17
<u>II-2 An “interested” look from two major players</u>	19
<u>A- Pursuit of stronger links with the European Union</u>	19
<u>B- A new basis for relations with the United States?</u>	21
<u>APPENDICES</u>	22
<u>I- Norway – Key facts</u>	23
<u>II- The Arctic Ocean Regime</u>	25
<u>III- Regional Cooperation in the High North</u>	26
<u>IV- Main Norwegian research centres on the Barents Sea</u>	30
<u>REFERENCES</u>	31



The Barents Sea: towards a new “great game”?

On the occasion of the centenary of Norwegian independence, the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), in collaboration with the Norwegian Embassy in France, is organising a day's workshop on strategic and security issues in the Barents Sea.

With this in view, this study sets out to present several analytical elements concerning the Barents Sea region, its need for stability and its efforts to find alliance systems, before considering some of the legal uncertainties that are impeding energy development in the Barents Sea, and reviewing the major trends in Norwegian foreign and security policies.

The study endeavours to formulate various future scenarios for each topic, any one of which can provide a potential subject for further study.

Between the need for stability and the search for allies

Throughout the cold war Norway¹ managed to maintain a strategic doctrine that combined loyalty to NATO (of which Norway is a founding member) and a "policy of trust" vis-à-vis the USSR. The High North² remains very important in the context of current geostrategic considerations, even after the end of bipolarity, and even if Norway is predisposed to see a reduction in regional military and strategic threats (especially in view of the current weakness of the Russian Northern Fleet³) in order to concentrate on environmental risks, ethnic issues or economic disparity. While developing a dialogue with Russia, Norway accepted the installation on its territory, at Vardø, of an American advanced warning system radar as part of the Missile Defense (MD) programme, and has lifted its moratorium on the organisation of NATO exercises in this region.

The end of the cold war changed the geopolitical status of the European continent with particular consequences for Norway. The nuclear dimension persists in the High North⁴,

¹ See Appendix I.

² The High North of Europe includes the northern areas of Norway, Sweden and Finland and North-western Russia.

Since the dissolution of the USSR (1989-1991) we have seen two major developments:

- Immigration coming from the Russian Federation
- The relative depopulation of the bordering Russian region, for a number of structural economic reasons.

The High North region in this context covers the Norwegian Arctic region, which can be broken down into: the Spitsbergen/Svalbard archipelago (64.000 km²), the western part of the Barents Sea (ice-free even in winter), the island of Jan Mayen and its surrounding waters. This region is of great importance to Norway, in particular in view of the considerable natural resources that have been found here, and which are the driving force behind the region's industrialisation.

³ The Russian Northern Fleet: 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 2 frigates, 10 corvettes, 12 SSBN submarines and 22 other submarines.

Source: "The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Nordic security", "The Military Balances" Oslo, 2003.

⁴ Following the progressive establishment by the United States of a nuclear strategy for the North, Norway played an active role in European détente, in order to avoid becoming too embroiled in the strategic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. Nonetheless, the country's security system had the following structure:

- The United States guaranteed maritime and air security
- NATO dominated Norway's multilateral commitments (prior to 1991, neither the United Nations nor the CSCE offered adequate guarantees of security)

primarily due to the strong Russian military presence. NATO's interest in the region appears to be gradually diminishing. The European Union, on the other hand, is strengthening its internal cooperation on matters of security, especially in the military area, with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, Norwegian public opinion, deeply indifferent to defence matters, is against joining the Union. As a result of this situation, Norway structures its policies around four primary objectives⁵:

- to keep NATO as an “insurance policy”,
- to seek to become a participating party to the ESDP while remaining outside the European Union,
- to keep the balance between moving towards a European security identity and preserving transatlantic ties,
- to prevent the political marginalisation of Norway in the regional security of the North.

The two mainstays of its policy are:

- the establishment of a dialogue on the High North with the West,
- the gradual development of bilateral cooperation with Russia.

The “energy battle” in preparation in the High North is leading to a revived interest in this region on the part of many countries and non-state actors (oil companies, NGOs, multinational institutions etc.). As for Norway - the country is no longer convinced of the closeness and firmness of its ties with the United States, fearing a sudden reversal of American policy as recently happened in the case of Saudi Arabia. Norway thus finds herself facing both an energy challenge, which is taking on a new dimension, and a diplomatic challenge, involving clarifying its relations with Washington and defining its relations with the EU, as a near-member, but still not a member.

- Norway does not participate in European political cooperation, as the country is not a member of the European Union.

⁵ « Relevant Force – Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces », Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 2004.

I- Legal uncertainties that are impeding energy development in the Barents Sea

1- Necessary legal organisation

A- The delimitation of maritime areas and the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty

The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty guaranteed Norway full and complete sovereignty over the archipelago on specific conditions⁶.

The Norwegian government prioritises maritime safety in the waters of Svalbard⁷, where navigation is often difficult⁸. Moreover, due to the increasing numbers of cruises around the archipelago, numerous measures have been taken in recent years to improve maritime safety⁹.

The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty failed to silence all protest against Norwegian sovereignty, as the region has an important strategic position and great energy potential. The treaty is, however, open to all parties wishing to accede to it, with the aim of consolidating peace in Europe as well as protecting the interests of the signatories.

Since 1974, the Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian Federation have adhered to the principle of dividing the waters of the Barents Sea by sector lines, while Norway advocates application of the median line principle. An area of about 155,000 km² separates these two lines (i.e. about half of the total area of mainland Norway).

<u>The Russian position</u>	<u>The Norwegian position</u>
The rule that applies is that of the sector line ¹⁰ , stipulated in 1926. Sovereignty over the land areas has not yet been clearly defined.	The rule that applies is that of the median line . It is important to take all the time necessary to find a solution that is both fair and politically acceptable to all parties.

The question today is whether the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty is still fair. Although Norway's sovereignty over the archipelago was recognised by the 1920 treaty, contemporary developments in the area of maritime law (Montego Bay Convention of 1982) might well entail an extension of the rights of the signatory states, with potentially difficult consequences for Norway, as regards the fisheries, petroleum, the environment etc. Indeed, one of the risks

⁶ See articles 1, 2 and 3 in particular.

⁷ Svalbard (the Norwegian name for the archipelago of which Spitsbergen is the main island) is situated more than 650 kilometres north of North Cape, half way between Norway and the North Pole. Prior to the 1920 treaty, Spitsbergen was not recognised as Norwegian territory. (See also Appendix II)

⁸ There are many potential accident hazards: ice, wind, light, depth conditions, etc.

⁹ Example: making the Harbour Act applicable to Svalbard.

¹⁰ In this connection see Appendix II- The Arctic Ocean Regime.

lies in the fact that some of the signatory states¹¹ intend to exploit the natural resources of the Barents Sea around the Svalbard/Spitsbergen archipelago, including in the Norwegian fishing zones that have still not been completely delimited. Iceland, in particular, is asserting this right.

Norway's position in discussions about the different zones is based on the rules for maritime delimitation set out in international law of the sea¹². Recent case law established by the International Court of Justice in The Hague has confirmed that a provisionally drawn median line can be used as a starting point, and thereafter probably adjusted or shifted in light of relevant geographical factors. In addition to discussing ways of delimiting the zones, the parties to the treaty are also seeking to find cooperation arrangements that are fair and acceptable to all parties, in particular with regard to energy and the fisheries.

Current delimitations of the different zones in the Barents Sea¹³

<u>Names of the zones</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Fisheries Protection Zone – Svalbard (1977)	One of the key purposes of this zone is to assure the management and protection of living resources, since this sector is one of the most important breeding grounds for fishery stocks ¹⁴ .
Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles (1976 and 1984) ¹⁵	This is a maritime zone of 200 nautical miles ¹⁶ , extending beyond the territorial waters, over which the bordering State exercises sovereignty rights of an economic and functional nature.
Continental Shelf (since 1970) ¹⁷	Prolongation of the continent under the sea, delimited by the continental slope and extending at depths of less than 200 metres. The great majority of seafloor and marine resources are to be found in this zone.
Grey Zone: provisional fishing zone ¹⁸	The grey zone in the southern part of the Barents Sea is a region for which Russia and Norway have signed a treaty concerning the application of the regulations for fishing by third countries. It covers 41,500 km ² of disputed waters, as well as 23,000 km ² of

¹¹ Examples: Iceland, flags of convenience.

¹² See Montego Bay Convention of 1982.

¹³ See report to the Storting (Norwegian parliament) no. 30 (2004-2005), « Opportunities and Challenges in the North », Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2005.

¹⁴ See report to the Storting no. 12 (2001-2002): “*Protection of the riches of the (Barents) Sea*”, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2002.

¹⁵ The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a zone extending for 200 nautical miles seawards from the coast of a state, in which the state, pursuant to the Montego Bay Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), is entitled to exploit the marine and seafloor resources and assumes responsibility for their protection.

¹⁶ 1 nautical mile = 1,852 metres.

¹⁷ Bases: North Sea Agreement with the UK and Denmark (1965), Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (1958), and several bilateral agreements with Norway's neighbouring countries.

	undisputed Norwegian waters and 3,000 km ² of undisputed Russian waters, i.e. a total of 67,500 km ² . A fisheries protection zone of 200 nautical miles was established round Svalbard on 3 June 1977. The Jan Mayen zone is a fisheries zone that was proclaimed in 1979 and enforced from 28 May 1980.
Zone of Overlapping Claims	The agreements of 1974-1976 concern the management of the fisheries resources in the zone of overlapping claims. A joint Russian and Norwegian commission meets one a year to decide on the final total quotas, taking account of the freedom of choice as regards prices. A legal solution that is acceptable to both parties has still not been found for this zone.

Norway attaches a great deal of importance to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the 200-mile zone in the Barents Sea. She wants an agreement that takes the interests of all parties into consideration¹⁹. An agreement on a delimitation line would release an unprecedented potential for cooperation relating to the zone of overlapping claims, which covers 176,000 km². This is particularly important in the case of petroleum-related issues. The Norwegian and Russian governments have agreed that no petroleum-related activities are to begin in the area of overlapping claims until a delimitation agreement has been signed. This moratorium applies to both exploration and exploitation. Pragmatic modalities for cooperation do, however, exist, and formal cooperation can start as soon as the delimitation agreement becomes effective.

Even if the questions of principle remain unresolved, practical solutions have nevertheless been implemented to solve the problems as they arise, without prejudice to the final legal solution. Norway and Russia have therefore favoured bilateral contacts (numerous and positive) to keep in touch with the realities in this connection.

¹⁸ Right to control and restrict shipping: the Norwegian fishermen and vessels are inspected by Norway, and similarly, the Russians inspect their own vessels. In the case of third states, Norway is the inspecting authority. Norway imposes no compulsory measures on Russia, and Russia imposes none on Norway.

¹⁹ Declaration of foreign policy to the Storting, by Jan Petersen, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2005.

Given these conditions, how is it that the two countries cannot manage to reach an equitable and acceptable agreement? In the view of the Norwegians, the main reasons are to be found in the internal political climate in Russia rather than in legal standards. The Russians still need to be convinced that such an agreement would not be tantamount to a loss of territory or power for them.

B- The rights of the indigenous peoples

Norway has developed numerous programmes to promote the rights of indigenous peoples and wants to concretise its efforts at the international level through the adoption of a “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”²⁰. The importance of the Arctic Council²¹ should be mentioned in this connection. The indigenous peoples have permanent member status on this Council, and their participation also extends to ecological problems and the different communities living in the High North.

In Norway, the Sami population (formerly known as the Lapps) is estimated to number between 30,000 and 40,000. In 1989, the Sami obtained their first parliament (the Samediggi), which has its seat in Karasjok. Their territory extends across the Arctic regions of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia (the Kola Peninsula).

Possible future scenarios

Agreement on questions of energy, security/ safety, the environment, or the process of building regional cooperation is hampered, or even blocked, by unresolved legal issues.

- Pragmatic regulation of the outstanding legal issues seems to offer a realistic approach. Problems are resolved as they arise. Recently, a more intensive use of legal language has become evident in relations between Norway and Russia. It might appear that the Russians are beginning to understand that Norwegian policy does not aim to remove them from Svalbard/Spitsbergen. And Norway would seem to be resigned to living with the Russian nuclear facilities insofar as they form a basis of Russian power politics as well as the country’s energy policy.
- The signing of agreements between certain non-Norwegian oil companies (e.g. Total, German companies) and Norwegian companies could provide a model for concluding similar agreements with Russia. Despite the fact that the oil boom is obviously starting, the Russians’ management of time remains an uncertainty factor:
 - o Russia can take all the time it needs,
 - o but Norway has the technology and the capital.

²⁰ In this work, Norway is assisted by the Sami parliament, the University of Tromsø, the University College of Bodø, the University College of Kautokeino and the Association of World Reindeer Herders.

²¹ See Appendix III for more details.

- The signing of agreements with the European Union within the framework of regional or neighbourhood policies might suit both the Norwegian Government and the public opinion in the country. The Norwegian politicians may have to convince their electorate of the need to join the European Union.

*

I-2- An energy policy that respects the environment

A- The new “great game” of hydrocarbons

Norway awarded the first production licence in the Barents Sea in 1980, but the whole of the southern Barents Sea was not formally opened for petroleum operations until 1989. So far a total of 41 production licences have been awarded and more than 60 exploration wells have been drilled in this area²².

Estimates of as yet undiscovered resources indicate that about a billion cubic metres of oil equivalents still remain to be discovered in the southern Barents Sea, representing about a third of the total unproven resources on the continental shelf and the area around the Lofoten Islands.


There have been promising new discoveries of gas in the Barents Sea (off the Norwegian counties of Troms and Finnmark, primarily in the Snøhvit, Albatross and Askeladd fields). These offshore discoveries will necessitate transport by pipeline, preferably to Haltenbanken²³. Important reserves have also been proven on the Russian side, in the Barents and Pechora Seas. Russia has recently announced its intention of exploring new fields in the Barents Sea and on land, in the Shtokman field in particular.

Since December 2003, exploration activities have extended to Bjørnøya, Tromsøflaket and to areas around the polar ice cap and off the coast of Finnmark. In 2003, the Norwegian Government carried out a complete reorganisation of the licensing system, introducing a new system for awarding production licences (from January to October each year). In December 2004, a production licence was awarded in this area to the licensees of Snøhvit²⁴.

²² Norwegian petroleum reserves that have been proven in Norway amount to 12.8 billion m³, while the gas reserves of the new Snøhvit field are estimated at 210 billion m³. Gas has not been exploited in the Barents Sea.


²³ The construction of a liquefaction plant on Melkøya is part of this process.

²⁴ See report no. 14 to the Storting (2004-2005) on safety at sea and the oil pollution emergency response system, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2005.



The Barents Sea: towards a new “great game”?

To Find Potential



Source : EXXONMobil Development, 2004


The Norwegian companies have built up a great deal of expertise in partnership with Russia. Future petroleum cooperation in this region should have a favourable economic impact on both countries, but for the moment the problem of delimitation of the respective jurisdiction zones still remains to be solved.

Oil and Gas

Legend :

The table is in millions of barrels per day (in 2004)

- 1- Demand for oil and gas
- 2- New production
- 3- Existing production



Kilde: ExxonMobil Development

The Barents Sea: towards a new “great game”?

The concept of an “international transport corridor” across the northern area of Norway, Sweden and Finland (the region known as Nordkalotten – the Northern Cap) includes the port and railway system of Narvik²⁵, and may contribute to regional development, relieving the tensions. The harbour town of Kirkenes could thus become a bridgehead for maritime transport to and from Murmansk and the rest of North-western Russia²⁶.

Possible future scenarios

Demand for oil and gas is growing continuously, in particular in China and India, while world production is barely managing to keep abreast of developments.

- Thanks to recent discoveries of oil and gas deposits, the hydrocarbons in the Barents Sea may enable us to avoid a new oil crisis.
- In parallel with the exploitation of these deposits, Norway may develop its energy diversification policy (hydropower²⁷, wind power...). Such restructuring will no doubt prove necessary in the long term.
- Development of hydrocarbon exploitation in this area also appears to offer a substitute to geopolitical tensions and energy dependence, particularly in relation to the Middle East.

B- An urgent need to conserve the environment

Even if the environment seems to be generally well respected in the region, it nevertheless remains vulnerable. At present, the threats to the ecosystem of the Barents Sea and the Arctic can be broken down into four major risk areas²⁸:

- Conservation of fishery resources: Despite control and regulation measures, intensive fishing continues beyond the biological limits. Moreover, there is competition between the autochthonous (native) and allochthonous (non-native) species, which could lead to a reduction in stocks for commercial exploitation²⁹. However, the general state of fishery stocks is fairly satisfactory.
- Risk of pollution in connection with oil and gas activities: There is a major risk of pollution from exploitation of the deposits that have already been discovered (and those still to be discovered), as well as from the increase of maritime traffic on the “Northern Sea Lane”.

²⁵ Town in Norway with a population of 18,577, known for the export of Swedish iron ore.

²⁶ Kirkenes is close to the heavy industry on the Kola Peninsula. Industrial interests are behind the current plans to construct a railway from Kirkenes to Nickel.

²⁷ Norway has the greatest hydropower potential in Europe. The country produces 99% of the electricity it consumes.

²⁸ See report from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), autumn 2004.

²⁹ This concerns competition between the old and new species of fish.

- Radioactive pollution³⁰: The Murmansk region has the largest accumulation of radioactive waste in the world. Although it must be stressed that the current levels of radioactivity are low and as such do not pose a risk to the population and the environment, it will nevertheless be advisable to draw up a long-term strategy for the storage and handling of this waste.
- Risks provoked by climate change³¹: Global warming and the melting of the ice are disturbing phenomena and the subject of many studies by a great number of bodies and institutions such as the International Arctic Research Centre at the University of Alaska at Fairbanks, the International Polar Year (IPY), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and also the Arctic Council. The Kyoto Protocol, which was signed, among others, by Norway and Russia, is due to become effective in 2012.

Norway is gradually introducing new regulations for the Barents Sea within the framework of international environmental agreements, and is seeking to reinforce them.

Possible future scenarios

The question of the protection of the environment in the Barents Sea region is a central concern of the Norwegian policymakers and economists.

- The establishment of a coherent policy that can be applied by all parties is a matter of urgency. The degradation of the environment and global warming will have increasingly severe consequences unless a sound regulatory policy is adopted and respected.
- The institution of a form of “sustainable development” will be imperative. A balance between people, renewable resources and the effects of activities on our planet presupposes the implementation of policies that are often perceived by public opinion as being *a priori* incompatible with economic development.
- Given the present state of the Russian military materials, the prospect of a “radioactive waste dump” or a new Chernobyl is still present.

*

* *

³⁰ Radioactive waste, unsecured stocks of irradiated fuel, Russian nuclear-powered military vessels in an advanced state of dilapidation in the Barents Sea, in particular in Murmansk, on the Kola Peninsula and in Arkhangelsk.

Recent examples of accidents and shipwrecks involving Russian ships and submarines:

- 12 August 2000: sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine
- 30 August.2003: sinking of the decommissioned K-159 submarine while it was being towed to the scrap-yard
- 24 March 2004: serious accident involving the nuclear-powered cruise missile launcher, Pierre le Grand.

³¹ There are many research stations on Spitsbergen. Germany, the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan have installed permanent stations, particularly in Ny Ålesund. Scientific and technical cooperation with France is developing primarily thanks to The Franco-Norwegian Foundation for Scientific Research (research into climatology and nuclear pollution).

II- The main trends of Norwegian foreign and security policy

II- 1 A neighbourhood policy aiming at stability

Norway has an active policy of fostering good neighbourly relations with Russia (delimitation of the continental shelf and fishing zones, nuclear cleanup). It is anxious to strengthen regional cooperation in the Barents Sea.

A founding member of the United Nations, Norway, was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2001-2002. Since the Oslo Agreements, Norway has been greatly involved in the Middle East, as well as in regional conflicts in Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Nepal and Sudan.

A- Necessary good relations with Russia

Bilateral cooperation with Russia is developing favourably and covers a large range of areas³²:

- Direct cooperation on the Barents Sea between the authorities of the two countries is generally good.
- Cooperation in the private sector is less dynamic. The volume of trade between the two countries increased by 30% in 2004, but stable and applicable conditions still have to be established, this depending primarily on the Russian authorities.
- The development of petroleum resources in the High North involves new legal remedies and collaborative practices between the Norwegian and Russian companies.
- Future exploitation of the onshore and offshore hydrocarbon resources in the Barents Sea could form a basis for future economic cooperation
- Norway would like to give a predominant position to environmental issues and to matters relating to energy resources, at the bilateral level as well as in the Arctic Council and within the framework of the cooperation between the Barents Sea regions.
- The delimitation of the continental shelf and the zone of 200 nautical miles in the Barents Sea are important issues for both countries.
- The bilateral cooperation should concern the fishery stocks in the Barents Sea, and therefore general economic relations, scientific research and fisheries management (control of catches) as well as scientific research expeditions.
- The cooperation on nuclear safety³³ has two objectives: to safeguard health, the environment and economic activity from radioactive pollution and to prevent radioactive and fissile material from falling into the wrong hands. With the end of the threat and military tensions, the Russian military presence on the Kola Peninsula³⁴ and

³² Declaration of foreign policy to the Storting, by Jan Petersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2005.

³³ In particular concerning radioactive nuclear waste, nuclear submarines, the risk of accidents in the Russian nuclear power stations, the processing of spent reactor fuel, the plant and reprocessing at Mayak, stocks etc.

³⁴ The Russian Kola Peninsula is situated north of Karelia. Its main city is Murmansk, where there is an air and submarine base. The harbour of Murmansk is open all year round. The activity in this harbour is closely linked to

in Arckhangelsk³⁵ has been reduced, but remains considerable. The headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet – strategically important for Moscow – is still in Murmansk.

Possible future scenarios

The cooperation between Norway and Russia could develop in a positive direction for all concerned.

- The energy policy could become a means of righting the economic imbalance, while stabilising political relations.
- A policy of cooperation could help to maintain a moderate and balanced position between the United States and the European Union.
- This cooperation could constitute a counterweight to the growing power of China. The great majority of American think tanks estimate that the growing power of China is the major political issue of the XXI century. Consequently cooperation between Russia and Norway could help to alleviate the relative weakening of Russia while securing the Barents Sea in own favour.

B- Integration for regional cooperation

Norway does not wish to be perceived as an isolated nation but as an integrated part of a larger community. With this in view, the country has developed a number of regional cooperation channels³⁶. A brief presentation of the different institutions will serve to demonstrate the importance of this cooperation to regional stability.

- The Barents Council³⁷: The Barents Cooperation was formally established on 11 January 1993 by the Declaration of Kirkenes, following a Norwegian initiative³⁸. The aim of the Barents Council is to promote individual contacts and economic development, and also to create good conditions for inter-regional exchanges.
- The Nordic Council³⁹: Nordic cooperation has developed a great deal, especially since Denmark, Sweden and Finland joined the European Union. This cooperation, which

the army. It is also the end port of the “Northern Sea Lane” which follows the Russian Arctic coastline and provides access to Vladivostok. Apatite (from which phosphates are extracted), iron and rare metals are mined in this area, which is therefore very polluted.

³⁵ Russian port on the White Sea. Population: 376,178. Its primary activities are fishing and the timber industry.

³⁶ See Arne Olav Brundtland, “Norwegian security policy after the cold war” Oslo, Norway, 1996. This document can be accessed on the information website of the Norwegian ministries: www.odin.dep.no

³⁷ See developments appended.

³⁸ Norway is chairing the council for the period 2003-2005.

³⁹ See appendix for developments.

for the most part is based on the Nordic Council⁴⁰, endeavours to maintain informal collaboration through mechanisms that allow governments to confer in essential areas. The European Union is involved in the Barents region since Sweden and Finland members, and also because of its economic and political importance in the overall relations between Russia and western countries. In this connection, the EU has an interest in developing its cooperation with Russia through already existing programmes, such as the “Nordic Dimension 2004-2006” and the neighbourhood policy, or by participating in regional cooperation bodies (Barents Council, Regional Council, Council of Baltic Sea States, Nordic Council).

- The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS)⁴¹: Since collective security is one of its primary objectives, this Council addresses political issues. The CBSS acts as a general regional forum, focusing on the need for greater cooperation and coordination between the countries bordering the Baltic Sea.
- The Arctic Council⁴²: The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum aiming to address the challenges facing the Arctic States: protection of the environment and improvement of living, economic, political, social and cultural conditions in the countries concerned.

This multidimensional and multi-institutional cooperation allows these various forums to formulate pragmatic solutions to the issues raised, as they occur, with the agreement of all the parties concerned.

The Barents Institute⁴³, which will be operational from January 2006, will consider the Barents region as the central periphery of Europe. In the long term, this institute aims to become the specialist in border issues. It will specialise in resource research cooperation in the border regions⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ In 1990, the Nordic Council of Ministers established the “Nordic Environment Finance Corporation” (NEFCO), which an important instrument in the efforts to reduce pollution from North-western Russia. NEFCO coordinates the projects of the Barents Council and the projects of the Arctic council.

⁴¹ See appendix for developments.

⁴² See appendix for developments.

⁴³ As from January 2006 the Barents Institute will develop its activities in coordination with the Norwegian secretariat of the Barents Council, while still remaining an independent institution. The University of Tromsø, the University College of Alta and the University College of Bodø will be privileged partners. The new Norwegian Government has not yet confirmed its final status.

⁴⁴ See “The Barents Institute- “Borderology”- Research on Resources and Cooperation in Border Regions “, Project description draft, Kirkenes, January 2005.

Possible future scenarios

- The regional cooperation might be enlarged to include the European Union, using the Barcelona process as a model⁴⁵
- Cross-border cooperation on the concerns of the various players in the region would seem to be a pragmatic solution, which might make it possible to reach a fair solution for everyone as a result of informal cooperation.
- The university centres linked to the various cooperation councils could constitute an interesting channel for dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, thereby facilitating regional stability.

*

II-2 An "interested" look from two major players

Since 1 May 2004, the attention of the European Union has shifted towards the East. Moreover, the relative strengths of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)⁴⁶ (4 members) and the EU (25 members), have changed dramatically, and the influence of Norway in the EU has been weakened even further. On the other hand, unlike the EU, Norway reaps the benefits when the dollar rate and the price of petrol are high.

A- Pursuit of stronger links with the European Union

After Norway's first refusal to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1972 (53.6% against), the Norwegian "No" of the 1994 referendum (52.2% against) appeared to be a strong signal from Norwegian public opinion. However, Norway joined the European Economic Area (EEA)⁴⁷ in 1994 and the Schengen⁴⁸ area in 2001. Despite deep divisions on the subject in political circles, the question of EU membership was raised again during the campaign for the general election of 12 September 2005⁴⁹.

⁴⁵ The Barcelona Process (1995) includes the governments of 27 countries, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. A Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was established with the overall objective of turning the Euro-Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity.

⁴⁶ The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in Geneva in 1960, on the initiative of the UK, for European states that did not wish to be members of the EEC. Today, EFTA has only four remaining members: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

⁴⁷ The European Economic Area (EEA) is based on the principle of the four freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital and persons.

⁴⁸ The Schengen area is an area in which there is free movement of persons between the signatory states of the Schengen agreement.

⁴⁹ The left-wing opposition (the Labour Party of Jens Stoltenberg and its two allies, the Socialist Left [opposed to prospecting for petroleum in the Barents Sea] and the Centre Party) won the election, defeating the centre-right coalition of Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik (including the Christian Democrats, the Conservatives and the Liberals).

Norway has very close ties with NATO, but also has expressed the wish to participate, as an ally and non-member of the Union, in drawing up a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)⁵⁰.

Norway's participation in a number of European forums and processes makes the country seem more and more near-member, yet not a member of the European Union. This situation is uncomfortable for Norway as the country finds itself in an awkward position on many points that are essential to its internal and international policies.

- Limitation of its ability to influence the European decision-making processes (Norway is subject to the decisions of Brussels without being able to participate in their formation).
- Non-participation in the common policies of the European Union (the Euro, back-seat position in the EU- Russia- United States dialogue).
- Limited influence in relations between the EEA and EFTA on the one hand and the EU on the other (withdrawal of Denmark and Austria from EFTA, withdrawal of Switzerland from the EEA, etc).
- Unlike the EU, the EEA has no legal competence in areas that are vital to Norway (economic and monetary union, common agricultural policy, European fisheries policy, common foreign and security policy, etc.)

The concept of the *Northern dimension* of European politics was launched in 1997 by the Finnish Prime Minister. This initiative resulted in the adoption by the EU's Council of Ministers of an action plan for the period 2000-2003⁵¹. This document defines the area that is covered, which is Iceland, the Barents region and the Arctic area⁵².

The Nordic dimension⁵³ is a framework constructed to encourage political dialogue and cooperation in northern Europe. It was launched by the EU, adopted by the European Council of December 1997, and has become an integral part of the EU's regional cooperation.

Possible future scenarios

There are three possible scenarios for Norway:

- Continuation of the gradual inclusion of Norway in the various European structures (doubtlessly the most probable),
- Freezing of integration into the European structures,
- Withdrawal from the EEA, amounting to the virtual dissolution of this organisation, whose only remaining members would be Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Iceland (unless these countries followed the example of Norway).

⁵⁰ Among other things, Norway participated in the "Concordia" operation in Macedonia.

⁵¹ <http://www.baltinfo.org/eu>

⁵² The Arctic cooperation is primarily represented by the Arctic Council (1996). See Appendix III.

⁵³ The Nordic dimension covers the Baltic, Arctic and West-Russian areas. Its purpose is to find solutions to challenges that are specific to these regions and to increase the cooperation of the European States. The primary areas of cooperation are the environment, nuclear safety, energy cooperation, the Kaliningrad Oblast, infrastructure, economic cooperation, social development, etc.

B- A new basis for relations with the United States?

Since the changes set in motion by September 11th, 2001, the United States has been showing renewed interest in the Barents Sea region, based more on its importance in the energy field than on geostrategic considerations. This tendency has become more pronounced recently due to significant new factors with long-term consequences, i.e. the continuous increase in the price of a barrel of oil (maybe up to 100 dollars) and the cyclone that hit the South of the United States and the Gulf of Mexico on 29 August 2005.

Since energy investments are both expensive and risky, as well as requiring long-term commitments, both the American oil and gas companies and the American Government, are endeavouring to strengthen their own energy security. For this reason, in December 2004 the United States and Norway opened a “dialogue on the High North”, concentrating on the major challenges, which are:

- cooperation on the protection of the environment,
- addressing the problems of non-proliferation and nuclear cleanup,
- developing the energy sector.

Norway is striving to adapt to the new geopolitical order and to keep a rational view of its possibilities, while informing its partners of its options, for example by creating programmes targeting the VIPs of key countries, in particular the United States⁵⁴ and European countries. It is developing information and cooperation policies in the areas it deems to be vital: culture, politics, health, education, the environment, nuclear issues, etc. In the interest of its own international recognition, Norway needs to be more present in the institutions of the European Union, and its opinions.

Possible future scenarios

- The new energy map will doubtless permit Norway to consolidate its international positions.
- Many researchers in Norway are wondering whether the new Norwegian diplomacy is not in danger of being implemented first by the Norwegian oil and gas companies, on the basis of economic rather than political considerations.
- A strategic reorientation by Norway could lead to a strengthening of the Arctic and of the Northern dimensions. The culmination of this reorientation for Norway could be membership of the European Union, after lengthy preparation of public opinion. The accession of Norway to the European Union would certainly strengthen the energy position of the EU.

⁵⁴ Example: Hillary Clinton’s visit to Spitsbergen in 2005.

APPENDICES

I - Norway- Key facts

II- Arctic Ocean Regime

III- Regional Cooperation in the High North

- Barents Cooperation
- Arctic Council
- Nordic Council
- Baltic Sea States Council

IV- Main Research Centres

I- Norway – Key facts

Norway is situated in the western part of the Scandinavian Peninsula and is Europe's northernmost country⁵⁵. Its total area (386,958 km², including the islands of Spitsbergen (62,700km²) and Jan Mayen (373 km²)) makes it the fifth largest country in Europe. It has a population of 4,552,200. Norway has strong democratic traditions⁵⁶ and great political stability. The great stability of its political and economic position attracts businesses and investors, as the country presents no commercial risk.

	<u>Facts</u>
Area (km ²)	386,958 including Spitsbergen : 62,700 and Jan Mayen: 373 km ²
Three seas	- The North Sea in the South-West - The Norwegian Sea in the North-West - The Barents Sea in the North.
Borders	with Russia: 196 km with Finland: 727 km with Sweden: 1,619 km
Population	4,552,200 (including a Sami minority of 0.5%)
Population distribution	75% live south of the 62 nd parallel
Population density (inhabitants/km ²)	14,9

Norway lies on the outer edge of Europe, adjacent to Russia. Norway is a member of many international organisations⁵⁷, but its deep-rooted Atlanticism leads it to keep close ties with the United States, a relationship that forms the cornerstone of its security policy. Norway therefore emphasises the Barents cooperation, but it also relies on cooperation with the United States⁵⁸, Canada, Germany⁵⁹, the United Kingdom, France⁶⁰ and the European Union (EU).

⁵⁵ Norway extends over a length of 1,752 km from the North Sea to the Barents Sea (where the presence of a permanent population is made possible by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream). The country has a total coastline of 21,925 km (3,419 km of mainland coastline, 2,413 km around the big islands and 16,093 km around small islands and fjords).

⁵⁶ Norway is a constitutional monarchy (based on the Constitution of 1814). The sovereign has symbolic authority only. The Prime Minister is responsible to the parliament (Storting), which is elected by direct ballot for a four-year term.

⁵⁷ UN, OECD, IBRD, IMF, WTO, NATO.

⁵⁸ This cooperation primarily targets future oil and gas supplies from the Barents Sea and environmental issues.

⁵⁹ The dialogue with Germany started at the political level in 2004. Germany is the biggest buyer of Norwegian gas. Germany cooperates closely with Russia in many areas, which could form a basis for greater cooperation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea.

⁶⁰ Since 2002, Norway has been the France's primary supplier of oil and gas. Source: André Lambert (Head of the Economic Mission in Oslo), "Exporteur en Norvège", ("Exporting in Norway") ed. Ubifrance, Paris, 2004 (p.39).

These countries are developing a growing interest in this region, especially in view of its existing and potential energy resources⁶¹.

Norway's defence and security

At present there is strong bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The East-West conflict been replaced by the East-West cooperation. The aim of this participation is tripartite:

- to safeguard Norway's interests,
- to maintain political stability,
- to resolve cross-border problems⁶².

The official objectives of Norwegian security for the period 2005-2008⁶³ are as follows:

- to prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to Norwegian and collective security.
- to contribute to peace, stability and the further development of the international rule of law.
- to uphold Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights and interests, and protect Norwegian freedom of action in the face of political, military and other kinds of pressure.
- together with our Allies, to defend Norway and NATO against assault and attack.
- to protect society against attack from state and non-state players.

⁶¹ Petroleum, the environment, forests, fishery resources, etc.

⁶² By way of illustration we can mention the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC).

⁶³ « Relevant force- Strategic concept for the Norwegian armed forces », Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Oslo, 2004.

II- The Arctic Ocean Regime⁶⁴

In order to prevent claims being asserted on a “no-man’s land”, the president of the Canadian Supreme Court had proposed the **sector theory**, based on the principle of contiguity: a territory without an adjacent owner is regarded as a natural prolongation of a state territory. The Soviet Union supported this theory in 1926 but the other bordering states (Denmark, Norway, the United States) oppose it, which means that this theory has not been accepted by the international community.

The Arctic Ocean has no specific regime and legal matters are governed by the Law of the Sea as defined by the Montego Bay Convention of 10 December 1982, with the bordering states exercising their sovereignty over their territorial sea for a distance of 12 nautical miles seaward of the baseline, and having exclusive rights to the natural resources with the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles from the baseline. Waters beyond these limits are defined as high seas; they are not under national jurisdiction and are freely accessible to all, subject to the regulations of the Montego Bay Convention and international law in general.

The “Paris Treaty on Spitsbergen” (Svalbard Treaty)⁶⁵ signed in 1920 applies to the islands between the longitudes of 10° East and 35° East and the of latitudes 74° North and 81° North. It has been signed by forty nations and grants Norway sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago⁶⁶. Businesses and private individuals of the signatory states are entitled to conduct certain economic activities on the same conditions as the Norwegian companies. The establishment of fortifications or naval bases is forbidden throughout the archipelago, which has a demilitarised status. The Act of 1925 on Svalbard recognises that the archipelago is an integral part of the Kingdom of Norway.

Norwegian continental shelf legislation⁶⁷ applies to the whole region, with the exception of the territory of Svalbard and its internal waters, which are governed by the Treaty of Svalbard of 1920.

⁶⁴ See Jean-Paul Pancraccio, « Droit international des espaces » (International Law of Spaces), Armand Colin, Paris 1997 and Emmanuel Decaux, « Les eaux mêlées de l’arbitrage et de la justice (droit de la mer et règlement des différends) », (“The mingled waters of arbitration and justice (the Law of the Sea and regulation of disputes)”) in « La mer et son droit » (“The Sea and its Law), Ed. Pedone, Paris, 2003.

⁶⁵ Spitsbergen was the official name at the time.

⁶⁶ The islands of Svalbard form a Norwegian archipelago lying in the northern part of the Arctic Ocean, to the west of Greenland. It covers an area of 62,700 km² (with 60% of its surface covered by glaciers) and has a population of 2,977 (2,500 of whom (mainly Russians) are non-Norwegian). The archipelago is composed of four large and several smaller islands. Spitsbergen (39,400 km²) is the largest island, accounting for more than half of the total area of the archipelago. The main towns of Svalbard are Longyearbyen (administrative centre of Svalbard with a population of 1,100), Ny Ålesund, Barentsburg and Pyramiden. 95% of Svalbard belongs to the public domain, and the rest is divided between various licences belonging to the mining companies.

⁶⁷ The term continental shelf refers to the subsea boundary of a state, delimited:

- either by a distance of 200 nautical miles seawards of the baseline
- or by the outer edge of the physical continental margin (the maximum breadth being 350 nautical miles).

The continental shelves of these zones collectively form a single shelf extending towards the north of the continent to Svalbard and beyond the archipelago.

III- Regional Cooperation in the High North

Barents Cooperation: Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)

The Barents Cooperation was formally established on 11 January 1993 by the Declaration of Kirkenes, following a Norwegian initiative⁶⁸.

It operates on two levels:

- The Barents Euro-Arctic Council operating at the intergovernmental level
- and its Regional Council operating at the regional level.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Council: Intergovernmental cooperation.

This intergovernmental cooperation is divided between different councils and committees:

1- The Barents Euro-Arctic Council:

Founded: 1993 on a Norwegian initiative

Aim:

Forum for intergovernmental cooperation in the Barents region. It brings together the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states and has a rotating chairmanship.

Members:

Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Russia and the European Commission. France has observer status.

Areas of competence:

Environment, economy, transport, culture and infrastructure.

Organisation:

The parliamentary conferences are attended by the member states of the BEAC and representatives of the regional and Sami parliaments.

2- The Barents Regional Council:

This council is composed of representatives of each of the territorial communities and authorities: the three Norwegian counties (Nordland, Troms, Finnmark), two Swedish counties (Norrbotten and Västerbotten), three Finnish counties (Kainuu, Lapland and Oulu)

⁶⁸ Norway has chairmanship for the period 2003-2005.

and five Russian regions (the Oblasts⁶⁹ of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, the Republics of Komi and Karelia and the Nenets Autonomous Area), as well as a representative of the indigenous peoples. The aim is to maintain and promote cooperation and development in the Barents region.

3- The Barents Regional Committee:

This committee is composed of county officials from its member states and a representative of the indigenous peoples. It is responsible for the meetings of the Regional Council, attending to the preparation of the meetings and to the execution of the Regional Council's decisions.

4- The Committee of Senior Officials of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council:

This committee meets between the meetings of the BEAC convening the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states, every second year. It is composed of officials representing the member states and the European Commission.

The Barents Secretariat:

The Barents Euro-Arctic Council has two secretariats:

- 1- The Norwegian Barents Secretariat
- 2- The Swedish Barents Secretariat (SBS)

*

The Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes has played a significant role in the regional cooperation efforts and may well contribute to further extending cooperation in the Barents Sea region. The Barents Cooperation provides a political framework for concrete measures in the fields of trade and industry, transport, energy, environmental protection, resource management, health, education and culture, and also for the management of emergency services or the fight against organised crime. The Barents Institute, which is currently under formation⁷⁰ will be a research centre and will also work in all these areas.

⁶⁹ The Russian word for region.

⁷⁰ The Barents Institute will start to operate in January 2006.

Other cooperation bodies⁷¹

Arctic Council

Founded: 1996 on a Canadian initiative.

Members:

Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faeroes), United States, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Sami Council and the Aleut International Association are full members. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland and the Nordic Council have observer status.

Organisation:

Each participant country is represented by a “Senior Arctic Official” who meets his or her opposite number at least twice a year.

The Arctic Council is convened every two years and attended by the ministers of foreign affairs.

It has five working groups under it, mainly concerned with monitoring environmental protection

- AMAP: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme;
- CAFF: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna;
- EPPR: Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and response;
- PAME: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment;
- SDWG: Sustainable Development Working Group.

Aim:

The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum for addressing challenges facing the Arctic states: protection of the environment and improvement of living, economic, political, social and cultural conditions in the countries concerned.

The cooperation focuses on ways of improving the economic, social and cultural welfare of the indigenous peoples of the High North.

⁷¹ The cooperation bodies are relatively numerous and will therefore not all be named. The following are some examples:

- The Nordic Forum: a body aiming to improve the quality of life of the Nordic peoples by providing the heads of state of the Nordic countries with an opportunity to share their knowledge and experiences in the face of common challenges, and also to promote the development and implementation of socio-economic initiatives.
- The Nordic Environment Finance Corporation: is a risk capital institution financing environmental projects in Central and Eastern Europe.
- Norden Association (Pohjola Norden): a non-governmental organisation established in all the Nordic countries, aiming to stimulate and improve Nordic cooperation, for example in the fields of the labour market, education, culture, industry, the media, international aid, the environment, etc.
- The Calotte Academy: space for dialogue between researchers, specialists, students and members of the civil society.
- Tornedalsrådet/Tornionlaakson neuvosto: aims to preserve the cultural heritage of the region and to promote international and national cooperation.

Norwegian chairmanship of the Arctic Council⁷², which starts in 2006, will coincide with the International Polar Year 2007-2008⁷³.

*

Nordic Council

Founded: 1952

Members :

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden.

Aim:

Economic, social and cultural cooperation.

Nordic cooperation has developed greatly, especially since Denmark, Sweden and Finland joined the European Union. This cooperation seeks to maintain informal collaboration by the mechanisms that allow the governments to have optimal dialogue solutions on positions deemed to be of primary importance.

*

Council of Baltic Sea States

Founded: 1992

Members:

Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, The European Commission.

Aim:

To consider security as one of its core objectives and address some political questions, such as processing of the Russian nuclear waste.

⁷² The member states assume chairmanship of the Arctic Council in rotating order for two-year terms: 1996-1998: Canada; 1998-200: United States; 2000-2002: Finland; 2002-2004: Iceland; 2004-2006: Russia.

⁷³ The International Polar Year (IPY) targets polar observation and multidisciplinary research and analysis in the polar regions.

IV- Main Norwegian research centres on the Barents Sea

- Norwegian universities of Tromsø, Trondheim, Oslo and Bergen
- The Norwegian Polar Institute
- Institute of Marine Research
- Polar Environment Centre including several institutes:
 - o The Norwegian Institute of Polar Research
 - o Akvaplan-Niva A/S (aquatic research)
 - o A section of the Foundation for Nature Research and Cultural Heritage Research (NINA-NIKU)
 - o A section of the Norwegian Institute for Air Research (NILU)
 - o A section of the Geological Survey of Norway (NGU)
 - o The Sami Heritage Council
 - o A section of the Norwegian Mapping Authority
 - o A section of the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT)

The Aim of the Polar Environment Centre: the study of water, air, land and living organisms in the northern regions.

- Centre of university studies on Svalbard (UNIS)

REFERENCES

I- General works

- Arne Olav BRUNDTLAND, “Norwegian Security Policy after the Cold War”, Oslo, 1996.
- Bjorn BRUNSTAD, Eivind MAGNUS, Philip SWANSON, Geir HONNELAND, Indra OVERLAND, “Big oil playground, Russian bear preserve or European periphery? The Russian Barents sea region towards 2015 “, Eburon, Academic Publishers, Delf, Pays-Bas, 2004.
- Emmanuel DECAUX, « Les eaux mêlées de l’arbitrage et de la justice (droit de la mer et règlement des différends », (“The mingled waters of arbitration and justice (the Law of the Sea and regulation of disputes))” in « La mer et son droit » (“The Sea and its Law), Ed. Pedone, Paris, 2003.
- André LAMBERT, « Exporter en Norway » (“Exporting in Norway”), Ed. Ubifrance, Paris, 2004.
- Arild MOE, “The Northern Areas- Resources and Interests”, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, November 2004.
- Jan PANCRACIO, « Droit international des espaces » (“International law of spaces”), Armand Colin, Paris, 1997.
- Jan PETERSEN, “Declaration of foreign policy” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Storting, 15 February 2005.

II- Collective works

- “The Barents Institute – «Borderology» Research on resources and cooperation in border regions” Project description draft, Kirkenes, January 2005.
- Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 1982.
- “The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Nordic security”, “The Military Balance”, Oslo, 2003.
- Report no. 12 (2001-2002) to the Storting, “A Clean and Rich Ocean” (Barents)” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2002.
- Report no. 14 (2004-2005) to the Storting, “Safety at sea and the oil pollution emergency response system”, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2005.
- Report no. 30 (2004-2005) to the Storting, “Opportunities and challenges in the North”, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2005.
- UNEP report, UN, New York, autumn 2004.
- “Relevant force- Strategic concept for the Norwegian armed forces”, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2005.
- Spitsbergen Treaty, Paris, 1920.
- “US Perspectives on Barents Sea energy issues- Russian – Norwegian oil and gas conference”, Stavanger, 26 January 2005.

III- Websites

- European Free Trade Association: www.efta.int
- French-Norwegian Chamber of Commerce: www.ccfno.no
- Arctic Council: www.arctic-council.org
- Council of Baltic Sea States: www.cbss.st
- Barents Euro-Arctic Council www.beac.st
- Nordic Council: [www. Norden.org](http://www.norden.org)
- European Economic Area: <http://secretariat.efta.int/webLegalCorner/>
- Fridtjof Nansen Institute: www.fni.no
- Official Norwegian portals: www.odin.dep.no
www.norge.no
- European Union: www.europa.int

IV- Press

- Aftenposten
- Les Echos
- L'Express
- Le Figaro
- Le Monde
- Le Nouvel Observateur
- La Tribune