

# *Centre Energie - Centre for Energy*

## **Global and regional energy security revisited: old trends, new paradigms**




**Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega, Director**

Trilateral Forum, Council of Europe, 25/03/2019

# World on a $> 3^{\circ}\text{C}$ track, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions keep rising, mounting pressure for a 2050 strategy with a deep decarbonization


Fossil CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by country between 1990 and 2017 (Mt CO<sub>2</sub>)



## Challenges for the global and European energy transitions

# Renewables expanding almost everywhere

Expansion of renewable electricity generation capacities in key countries/regions (GW)




Source: IEA Renewables 2018, Market Report Series


***EU aims at reaching a share of 32% of renewable energy sources in final energy consumption by 2030***

# 2017 renewable investment high but too little in Africa, especially solar PV where the potential is strongest

Global RES investments in 2017 in key countries  
(\$ billion)




Global RES investments in 2017 by technologies  
(\$ billion)




# Falling deployment costs but higher connection costs, integration challenges and resistances

Global levelised costs of electricity from utility-scale renewable power generation technologies, 2010-2020<sup>e</sup> (\$/kWh)




Share of renewables in final energy consumption in 2017



Source: European Environmental Agency

# + 230 GW renewables have not pushed gas fired power generation in the EU

Evolution of selected power generation indicators in the EU, Base 100, Reference year 2007




Source: BP Databank

*Following cold weather, low hydro, problems with nuclear and UK coal phase out, and stronger GDP growth, gas fired power generation has nonetheless bounced back since 2015*


# UK coal phase out: 80% coal generation decrease only leads to 30% gas generation increase as renewables pick up

Evolution of electricity generation in the UK by type of fuel, base 100 Reference year 2007



# Spain: large renewables deployment pressures gas, yet demand varies depending on wind & hydro availability + GDP

Evolution of Spanish gas demand and share of renewables in total power generation (2008-2018)




Source: ENTSO-E, Spanish regulator

*The key challenge for energy systems in transition is flexibility. Intermittent renewables and variable hydro require much more flexible gas demand patterns... and are harder to predict.*

# EU's coal fired power generation matters but is little compared to Asia


Split of installed coal power capacity in the world, January 2019 (MW)



Source: Global Coal Plant Tracker

# Coal-fired power generation is a key source of EU emissions

Energy-related CO2 emissions in the EU in 2017(e)




Source: Ifri based on IEA WEO2017 and Global Energy & CO2 Report 2018, Sandbag 2018, National statistics databases from France, Germany and the UK

# Progress in reducing coal-fired power generation, yet coal well entrenched notably in Germany


Electricity generation from coal sources (% of total) in 2011

Electricity generation from coal sources (% of total) in 2016




# EU expected to phase out 65% of coal fired power generation by 2030, raising gas demand by about 20 bcm/y

EU power generation mix in TWh (2010-2017)



Source: Eurostat, Agora Energiewende & Sandbag

Installed coal power generation capacities in 2019 (GW)



Source: ENTSO-E Transparency Platform

*Yet the call for CCGTs can also be offset by larger hydro availability, very productive renewables with large wind and solar generation, as well as demand side management measures*

# EU emission allowance prices rise, no good news for gas unless it is more competitive than coal

EU ETS settlement prices, March-2018 to February-2019 (€/tCO<sub>2</sub>)




Source: Market Business Insider, European Energy Exchange, Market Data, 13.03.19


- EUA prices at 7 years high
- Around 20€/ton since mid-August 2018
- The best-performing « commodity » in 2018

# The global battle for batteries: is the EU loser?

Annual lithium-ion battery cell production capacities by 2021




# The strategic role of critical metals: vulnerabilities must drive recycling & substitution policies




# Egypt's population is booming, so is electricity demand, fueling energy insecurity in past years

Evolution of Egypt's population, 1990-2050e



Source: UN. World Population Prospects 2017

Total Electricity Consumption (TWh) & GDP (\$Bn)




Source: IEA, World Bank

## The future of gas in Europe and gas supply security

# Outlook to 2030: demand overall flat until 2025, before progressively & slowly declining

Evolution and estimate of EU-28 gas balance, 2007-2030 (bcm)




## Future of natural gas in Europe

- EU gas demand will overall remain steady until 2030
- Natural gas can further expand in power generation and develop in the transport sector
- Gas demand will decline in the residential sector, most probably also in the industrial sector
- There is a likely growing volatility/seasonality in gas demand which requires flexibility
- It is likely that the deep decarbonization will face serious challenges and delays so that gas can help fill the gaps
- Competitive gas prices is key for securing demand
- The role of natural gas will have to sharply decrease towards 2050 in a near net zero emissions trajectory
- Producers need to use the next ten years to prepare for the decarbonization of gas:
  - Reducing carbon footprint in modernizing infrastructure
  - Biomethan and hydrogen injection
  - CCUS

# Greening the gas: biomethane + H<sub>2</sub>O soften the fall in natural gas production and help support demand

Development of biogas and biomethane plants in the EU, 2011-2017




Source: European Biogas Association

- 2 bcm/y production in 2018
- 65 GWh electricity production
- New push in Italy, France, Denmark, UK...
- Costs in France must fall to reach 22 TWh by 2028

*EU green gas production reaches 23 bcm in 2030 and helps to push gas use in the transport sector (CNG and LNG) will increase from 2 bcm currently to 20 bcm/y by 2030, including 10 bcm of LNG, driven by heavy duty transport.*

# Gazprom's push for volumes has benefitted itself, Naftogaz with robust transit volumes and EU industry buyers

Gazprom's exports to EU -S - zone\* and comparison with other import sources, 2007-2018 (bcm)



Source: Ifri, Gazprom, Platts

*Russian gas can remain strong and grow further in the EU S zone if Gazprom so wants and can. Yamal LNG will add Russian gas volumes to European markets*

# Egypt turns into gas hub, Noor & Calypso discoveries can unlock Leviathan phase 2 + Aphrodite + Exxon's Glaucus-1

East Mediterranean gas infrastructure and projects




# Can Russian gas exports be diminished by competition from other suppliers in the period 2020-2030?

- **Norway:** NO (resources)
- **Algeria:** NO (resources)
- **Libya:** NO
- **Iran/Turkmenistan** by pipeline: NO (sanctions, resources, costs)
- **Azerbaijan:** max + 10 bcm/y from Shah Deniz 2 (politics and resources)
- **East Med:** 20 bcm/y > 2025
- **LNG increasingly coming to the EU as Asian prices down:**
  - HH prices remain in the 2,5-3\$/Mbtu range
  - EU spot prices recover beyond 5\$/Mbtu
  - Summer and winter are mild in Asia
  - Demand from emerging economies does not surge
  - No geopolitical disruption in the Middle East
  - China's import growth slows, and if Russian pipe exports grow
  - Japan restarts nuclear, reduces its LNG imports
  - Another LNG export wave comes from the US (but trade war has negative implications) + Russia (Arctic 2, Sakhalin-2) or pipeline (Altaï)+ East Africa + Canada for China
  - If Germany builds LNG import terminals

# Russia and China, as well as Russia and Saudi Arabia, increasingly influencing global oil and gas prices


Evolution of China's gas balance, 2010-2030



*China's gas market will become as large as the EU gas market by 2030, yet trade tensions and economic hurdles could revigorate coal to gas and coal to liquids projects*

# Demand and import outlook to 2030: Russian pipeline exports robust until 2023, then declining to 2015 level

Evolution of EU S gas balances, selection of indicators, 2007-2030<sup>e</sup> (bcm)




*EU S gas demand seen steady until 2026 around 2016 levels following the partial coal/nuclear exits in DE, before declining progressively as the transition deepens. Gas import levels increase yet at moderate pace.*

Source: Ifri

# Ukraine transit: fall to 0 in all scenarios, but with variations, especially if Nord Stream 2 is not fully loaded

Evolution of gas transit via Ukraine in different scenarios, 2020-2030 (bcm)



Source: Ifri

— Transport UA route: Scenario NS corridor @ 102 bcm/y by 2021, Yamal @ 25 bcm/y

— Transport UA route: Scenario NS corridor @ 90 bcm/y by 2021 and Yamal @ 20 bcm/y and TS to EU @ 13 bcm/y (2023)


— Transport UA route: Scenario NS corridor @ 102 bcm/y by 2021 and Yamal @ 25 bcm/y and TS to EU @ 30 bcm/y (2024)

— Transport UA route: Scenario NS corridor @ 102 bcm/y by 2021, Yamal LNG @ 5 bcm/y, Baltic LNG @ 5 bcm/y (2022), Yamal @ 25 bcm/y until 2022 and 10 bcm/y after and TS to EU @ 13 bcm/y (2023)


## Oil supply security issues

# OPEC+: Saudi Arabia is the swing supplier, growth in non-OPEC supply meets 4/5 of incremental global demand

Evolution of liquids production by leading global suppliers, 2016-2018 (in kbd)




Oil market structure in % of global supplies and trade, 2015-2018




# Boom in North American exports can compensate for sharp drop of Iranian exports by May, supply squeeze could backlash

Evolution of US crude oil exports, 2015-2018, kbd




# Shifting geopolitics of global petroleum trade: China and India face new vulnerabilities in the Middle East


Change in crude imports of India, China and EU, 2010 and 2018 (mb/d)



China's 2017 oil imports by country (in % of value) (8,4 mb/d)




India's 2017 oil imports by country (in % of value) (4,4 mb/d)



Source: EIA, statistical data from countries' customs

# OPEC+ producers' economies hit by the fall of oil prices in 2015 and saved by its rebound in 2017


GDP growth, selection of OPEC+ producers, 2012-2017



Source: IMF


# Most producers are vulnerable yet pay no credible effort to economic diversification especially since prices recovered

GDP growth, selection of OPEP+ producers, 2012-2017




# Russia's economy is stagnating, cautious budget but can public spending foster sustainable growth?

Evolution of Russia's GDP and oil prices, 2002-2018




# Demand peak not near, but could come quicker than many expect, while demand growth already slows

Share of EV or hybrid vehicles in the total global fleet, 2010-2050e




# Saudi Arabia is working to free up more oil for exports, which creates new opportunities

Power generation mix, 2000




Power generation mix, 2016




# 31 GW of oil fired power generating capacity that could be progressively reduced to a summer peak load tool

Installed electric power capacity by fuel in %, 2017    Installed electric power capacity by fuel in GW, 2017 (including desalination)




Oil Natural Gas Solar



Natural Gas Oil Solar

# Saudi Arabia's power mix transformation will add spare export capacity & foster security but question its OPEC role


Potential longer term energy mix, summer and winter (GW)



## **Sustainable energy access in Africa**


# Africa is big in demography but small in energy and still marginal in greenhouse gas emissions

Comparison of Africa's and USA's share in global TPES and population, 1980-2016




# Explosive cocktail: surge in population, combined with climate change, water shortage, lack of access and poverty

## Population Dynamics



# Sustainable electricity for cities, public transport and energy efficiency will be key, especially with soaring cooling needs and air pollution

Population growth in Africa's main cities




# The threat of inefficient air-conditioning equipment with growing cooling needs

- Economical development, higher incomes, urbanization and global warming are all factors that will contribute to the surge in demand for fans (in a first time), and AC in middle and upper class homes and commercial spaces.
- Air conditioning tends to create demand peak which put strain on an already unstable electricity network
- In Africa today, less than 5%\* of the population own an AC (large potential market, LG just launched its last AC energy efficient conditioner tailored for the Nigerian market).
- Energy use per capita for space cooling in 2016 was of 35kWh\* for Africa and more than 500 kWh\* for the Middle East.




# Electricity access challenge unaddressed: around 550 millions without access, 700 million without clean cooking

Access to electricity (% of population) in 2016




# Sub-Saharan Africa: Population increase is stronger than energy access progress

Number of people with and without electricity in Sub saharan Africa (without South Africa)




# Tiny installed power generation capacity, less than Germany

Installed capacity, actual and projected population



# 2,5 times more power sector investments needed per year, private sector investment is dominated by South Africa

Power sector investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2013-2016 (\$ billion)



## International initiatives helpful but only private sector investments can scale up electrification

- ✓ UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015)- Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All), hosted by ADB
- ✓ NEPAD, Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (African Union/ADB), focusing on eight African regions
- ✓ World Bank
- ✓ Power Africa
- ✓ Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa
- ✓ African Development Bank (ADB)/ The New Deal for Energy in Africa (2015): full electricity access by 2025
- ✓ Electrification Financing Initiative (ElectriFI) – European Union
- ✓ Partenariat Afrique-UE pour l'énergie (PAEE)
- ✓ Bilateral development aid and support programmes (Afd, Norad, GIZ, DevCo)

All key to provide funding and structure bankable projects, but slow, inefficient, insufficient...

## Scaling up and accelerating RES is now possible, need of greater private investment

- ✓ No silver bullet, no unique solution: combination of technologies, business models tailored to specific needs
- ✓ Combination of demand side and supply side measures needed!
- ✓ Technical conditions are in place: innovations, technology costs are down, business models work, best practices and numerous pilot projects & larger scale deployment exist
- ✓ Foreign aid, grants, guarantees and credits are important but will not be enough and cannot be enough
- ✓ Need for much greater private investment
- ✓ Need to make more cheap funding available
- ✓ Private entrepreneurship is already successful !
- ✓ Need of greater coordination among donors and greater focus on Sub-Saharan Africa
- ✓ Need to overcome the finance bottleneck with a reform of the global financial system

## Local governments must do more, need for strategic approach with climate adaption

- Governance of public institutions and state-owned companies
- Investment framework: robust banking and financial sector
- Regional cooperation and interconnections, capacity building at the local, national and regional level
- Regulation, land registries
- Need for tariff reforms
- Improved tax collection, higher saving rate, higher share of domestic investments key, especially of pension funds



ifri

*institut français des relations internationales*

[eylmazzega@ifri.org](mailto:eylmazzega@ifri.org)

**Ifri Centre for Energy**

27, rue de la Procession, 75740 PARIS CEDEX 15  
Tél. +33 (0) 1 40 61 60 00 • Fax : +33 (0) 1 40 61 60 60  
[www.ifri.org](http://www.ifri.org)