

Russia and Turkey: Rethinking Europe to Contest Outsider Status



Richard Sakwa

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Summary

International relations in Europe are now entering a period of flux as the legacy of the cold war wanes and the “outsider” countries, notably Russia and Turkey, are rethinking their mutual relations as well as their place in the world. The current stalemate in Russia’s relations with the European Union is accompanied by a broader impasse in the global role and status of both Russia and the EU. Turkey’s aspirations to enter the EU remain contested both at home and abroad. In this context new ideas are emerging that offer a way out of the current stagnation. Notable among them are neo-revisionist Russian ideas about a “Greater Europe,” shared in part by Turkish thinkers, suggesting a new vision of continent-wide European unity that transcends traditional interpretations of the insider/outsider dialectic. At the institutional level this is accompanied by a revival of “pan-European” ideas for integration, including a restructuring of European security and the creation of a “union of Europe” encompassing the EU, Russia, Turkey and others as equal members of a new political community.

Introduction

Integrative projects in Europe have reached a plateau, and in some aspects there has been a noticeable decline. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty within the European Union (EU) represented a significant watering down of the ambitions vested in drafts of the European Constitution that it came to replace. Russia's relations with the EU are characterized by a lukewarm embrace that at times becomes a chilly estrangement. No common language or common purpose has been found in relations between the two. The enlargement agenda is no longer the focus of relations with contiguous countries, and although there will be some continued enlargement, notably in the Balkans, the emphasis has shifted to managing relations with neighbors. The prospect of Turkish membership is receding, while the membership aspirations of Ukraine and other eastern European countries have been placed on hold indefinitely.

To counter the bleak picture of West-centric representations of Europe, the idea of Greater Europe is being explicitly developed by Russia and implicitly by Turkey.¹ The idea is to devise an alternative vision of the European idea; one that has not been “privatized” by the EU, which in Russian eyes has made the illegitimate attempt to claim the right to define what European identity should mean. The Greater European idea encompasses Turkey, and it puts Russia, not surprisingly, at the heart of an alternative project. It does not deny the EU, but it seeks to look at the question of Europe from less of an institutional perspective and with more focus on broader civilizational ideas. The idea of Greater Europe is accompanied by revived ideas of pan-Europe, the attempt to establish a dynamic in which a Greater European vision could be institutionalized. Mikhail Gorbachev's dream of a common European home stretching from Limerick to Vladivostok lives again.²

¹ T. Bordachev, *Novyi strategicheskii soyuz. Rossiya i Evropa pered vyzovami XXI veka: vozmozhnosti “bol'shoi sdelki”* [A new Strategic Alliance. Russia and Europe against the Challenges of the XXIst Century. Possibilities for a ‘Grand Bargain’], Moscow, Evropa, 2009. For analysis of the changing tides of Turkish domestic and foreign policy thinking, see H. Bağci, *Zeitgeist: Global Politics and Turkey*, Ankara, Orion Publications, 2008.

² The substantive content of this “common European home” has of course changed, since Gorbachev hoped for a convergence between the Soviet and European social models to sustain a “humane and democratic” form of Soviet socialism, whereas today little is said by Russian commentators about the social content of Greater Europe, and thus neo-liberal ideas are given a free run.

The Outsiders

The notion of “outsiders” is increasingly used in the literature to describe the uncomfortable position that Russia and Turkey, and to a lesser extent Ukraine, Belarus and other “in between” countries, find themselves in the broader process of European integration. However, the language of outsiders makes a number of assumptions about the dynamics of European politics that are increasingly questioned, not least by the putative outsiders themselves. Russia and Turkey have become the core of a new category of “outsiders,” but this is no longer simply a group based on exclusion but one which has elements of a voluntary character. The notion of outsiders, assumes that there are insiders. Clearly today membership of the EU is the great prize and the token of becoming a core member of Europe, but a new pattern of alliances and orientations is beginning to emerge. We often think of Europe in terms of concentric rings; that is precisely the model that is now being challenged. New patterns of the insider/outside dialectic challenge EU-centric representations of political and geopolitical reality in the wider European space.³

Deeper patterns of European history are beginning to reassert themselves against the integrationist agendas of the post-cold war era, and even the patterns of European politics as they took shape during the cold war are losing their power. Turkey for example has been a member of NATO since 1952, so in terms of security was clearly an insider in the post-war era, yet today in terms of relative prestige, NATO is no longer quite what it was and Turkey is reverting to its classic “outsider” status. This of course is nothing like the exclusion of earlier eras, and Turkey enjoys strong customs and other relations with the EU and other European institutions. In the long-term historical perspective, however, Turkey and its predecessor state have been on the margins of Europe, and the elements of neo-Ottomanism and Turkey’s regional ambitions that are creeping back today remind us of this fact. We are witnessing, as a recent Russian study puts it, “the return of Turkey.”⁴

Russia’s status as an outsider is rather less contested. It is a member of neither the EU nor NATO, and does not look likely to join

³ Cf. V. Baranovsky, “Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart From Europe?” *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3, 2000, p. 443-58.

⁴ T. Torosyan, “The Return of Turkey: Ankara in the South Caucasus after the Russian-Georgian War,” *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 3, July-September 2009, p. 120-129.

either organization in the foreseeable future. More than that, its relationship with both is laced with suspicions, threat perceptions and fears. The Russian military doctrine adopted on 5 February 2010 made no bones about identifying NATO as the main “military danger” (although not “threat”).⁵ Negotiations to frame the successor to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), which formally expired in December 2007, have advanced with tortuous circumspection, and for long there was no basic agreement on what the new treaty should be called. There are limits to Russia’s outsiderness, however, and Russia remains a member of the Council of Europe (CoE), and in civilizational terms, considers itself closer to certain representations of Europe than Turkey. At the same time as Turkey’s EU membership negotiations entered the doldrums, even the most optimistic of views of Russo-EU relations spoke of a partnership that would enjoy everything except shared institutions. At most this would entail a visa-free regime (in other words, an extended Schengen Zone) and a common economic space reinforced by a free trade zone, with few expectations that this would lead to the creation of some sort of new political community.

The challenge is accompanied by recognition of the danger that Russia and Turkey could easily become part of an “axis of the excluded.”⁶ Nevertheless, “the rapidity and extent of the rapprochement between these traditional rivals have been dramatic.”⁷ With the end of the cold war no stable and sustainable pattern of EU-Russian integration has yet been devised. Both Russia and Turkey remain the “other” in contemporary European identity development, and not even necessarily constitutive ones.

New dynamics of European international politics

Historically, the attempt by outsiders to break into the charmed inner circle has been accompanied by disruption and war, including the destruction of the circle itself. There has been much discussion recently about the “rise of the great powers,” featuring in particular China and Russia, with historical comparisons drawn with the rise of Germany and Japan in the late nineteenth century. These two became radically revisionist powers. Dissatisfied with the status quo and generating ideological justifications for a reordering of the great power system—by force if necessary—that particular challenge heralded a

⁵ *Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii* [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], <www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html>.

⁶ F. Hill and O. Taspinar, “Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?” *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 1, spring 2006, p. 81-92.

⁷ G. Winrow, *Turkey, Russia and the Caucasus: Common and Diverging Interests*, Chatham House Briefing Paper, Russia and Eurasia/Europe Programme, November 2009, REP/EP BP 2009/01, p. 3.

half century of world wars. This is not the situation today. Russia and Turkey do not seek to challenge the existing world order, but only the place accorded to them in that order. Hence rather than being revisionist powers, they are neo-revisionist.

Russia's foreign policy initiatives are bound up with domestic changes, while in Turkey social developments have weakened the stranglehold of Kemalist ideas on the polity. A new conservative Anatolian middle class is challenging the Istanbul secular elite; while at the same time Turkish Islam, one of the foundations of Turkish national identity, is rapidly secularizing.⁸ Turkey has re-emerged as an independent foreign policy actor and as a pivot in regional international politics, and with the end of the cold war is no longer locked into the American alliance as it once was.⁹ Its "zero-problem" foreign policy dates back to when Ismail Cem was Foreign Minister between June 1997 and July 2002. However, under Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was chief foreign policy advisor to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Prime Minister since 2002 at the head of the Justice and Development Party, AKP) until becoming Foreign Minister on 2 May 2009, it has become systematized. Davutoğlu's major academic work, *Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik)* of 2001, advocated a foreign policy that reassesses Turkey's Ottoman past as part of his idea on the importance of "flow" in history. These factors came together to provide the intellectual and social foundations of a more flexible Turkish foreign policy, including the attempt to normalize relations with Armenia. The voice of the military in foreign policy, which had previously advanced the policy of alliance with Israel, is losing its force and allowing other regional priorities to gain strength.¹⁰ Equally, the EU as a driver of Turkish foreign and domestic policy is losing traction, reflected in declining popular support for EU membership, although in official discourse accession remains a central goal.

The leverage that the EU and other European institutions can exercise over Russia has always been relatively weak (although far from negligible), and it is precisely this factor, which combined with the absence of linkages, has helped propel Russia on an authoritarian course.¹¹ In Turkey this leverage remained strong as long as EU membership remained a prospect, but in Russia, however, domestic factors ultimately are determining. Its self-image as a great power

⁸ For a detailed analysis, see M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

⁹ G.E. Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

¹⁰ For a detailed study of the interaction between domestic changes and foreign policy, see A. Carkoglu and E. Kalaycioglu, *The Rising Tide of Conservatism in Turkey*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2009.

¹¹ S. Levitsky and L. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, Chapter 5.

establishes a pattern of domestic and foreign policy interactions shared only by America and China today.¹²

Gleb Pavlovsky, the pro-regime political strategist at the head of the Effective Politics Foundation, notes that Russia “wants to be a nation-state, but with an imperial culture, imperial breadth, an imperial style.” But, he hastens to add, he could identify no group “that would like to create a real empire and would be ready to pay for that or to risk for that.”¹³ Russian aspirations at most stretch to the creation of a proxy empire, a region in which Russia’s “privileged interests” would be recognized. One could go further and suggest that Russia’s assertive foreign policy stance betokens not the resurgence of neo-imperial ambitions in any substantive sense but a type of “mimetic imperialism,” where the form of external ambition is preserved, above all as a system-shaping power accompanied by the demand for recognition of status and respect, but where these ambitions are derived by the desire to emulate the most successful of the existing powers rather than to achieve a fundamental reordering of the system in its entirety. The notion of empire in this context is that described by Hardt and Negri;¹⁴ based not on a colonial model of the exertion of direct power but a generalized form of international activism reinforced by cultural claims to superiority over smaller powers.¹⁵ This does not amount to an attempt to revise the existing balance of power or to reorder the international system, but it does operate within the logic of modification that we call neo-revisionism.

The neo-revisionist stance is reflected in behavior. Russian negotiators are notorious for their hard bargaining, yet those who have engaged in the process, notably EU and other officials from international organizations, stress that Moscow seldom seeks to derail the whole exercise, and thus constructive practices temper their overblown rhetoric. This applies equally at the conceptual level. Russia’s main critique of the universalistic agenda of human rights and democratic standards is not that they are inappropriate, but that they have been appropriated by the hegemonic powers and applied selectively. After all, Russia in 1991 engaged in a democratic revolution whose fundamental aim was to incorporate these norms into the new political order, building on Gorbachev’s proclamation of “new thinking” and a “common European home,” and the 1993 constitution thereafter gave these aspirations institutional form.

¹² For an analysis of these interactions, see P. Rangsimaporn, *Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

¹³ G. Pavlovsky interviewed by J. Tolson and D. Galperovich, “Kremlin Political Consultant Sees Medvedev as Best Choice for 2012,” RFE/RL, *Russia Report*, 21 January 2010.

¹⁴ M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2001.

¹⁵ On this, see M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, London, Penguin Books, 2005.

Application has at best been partial since 1993, with democratic formalism undermining the spirit of political pluralism, diversity and competitiveness; yet Russia does not present itself as the source of an alternative set of norms. Certainly Russia balked at becoming a passive norm-taker, insisting that it was a co-author of the post-cold war order; but this does not mean that it has become a full-scale norm innovator. Rather than becoming a norm-maker, Russia has positioned itself as a norm-enforcer.¹⁶ Its fundamental concern is to ensure that the normative arena has a capacity to incorporate civilizational diversity and cultural difference. Thus Russia advances a pluralistic approach to the application of universalism, a program that is the essence of its neo-revisionism. Russia's ambitions as a norm-maker are limited, although it does emphasize the sovereignty of states and a multipolar international order. These are hardly revolutionary positions, let alone wholly revisionist, and are to a large degree shared by Euro-skeptics in Britain and elsewhere.

A new marginality?

In a certain sense all of Europe is becoming a global outsider. While the Russians now talk of "Greater Europe," this is taking place precisely at a time when the continent as a whole is becoming a "lesser Europe." When the idea of a European Constitution was first mooted it was intended to provide a formal framework for European ascendancy. However, the bruising experience of failure, followed by the adoption of the rather modest Lisbon Treaty appears now to be a response to relative decline. The Lisbon Treaty, moreover, appears to have done little to remove confusion about leadership in domestic and foreign policy in the EU. Although the EU has a total combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) equal to that of the US (14.5 trillion US dollars), its strategic marginalization derives not just from a lack of unity but also from the absence of common resolve. Both Russia and the EU have begun to suspect that they are on a relative downward slope in terms of global power, and that the continent as a whole is in danger of being marginalized. The multidimensionality advocated by Davutoğlu and Turkey's opening to the Middle East reflects this shift in global power accompanied by the rise of neo-Ottomanism.¹⁷ As a

¹⁶ For a discussion of the issue, see H. Haukkala, "A Norm-Maker or a Norm-Taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia's Place in Europe," in T. Hopf (ed.), *Russia's European Choice*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 35-56. See also: H. Haukkala, "The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 9, November 2008, p. 1601-1622.

¹⁷ For a critique of the existing world order and the shift in global power, see A. Davutoğlu, "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1997-February 1998, <www.sam.gov.tr/perceptions/volume2/december1997-february1998/davutoglu.pdf>. For an overview of neo-Ottoman ideas, see C. Hoffmann, "The Pax Ottomanica from

report on the draft of the new European Security Treaty put it: “For the first time in centuries, Europe is not a global center in the system of international relations.”¹⁸

With the end of the cold war there has been a relative American military disengagement from Europe as it focuses on new global challenges, heralding a new post-Atlanticist era. In this spirit the Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev argues that “The Obama presidency has shown that the USA is no longer a European power in the classic sense of that term. The alliance with NATO states is not going to disappear, but now America no longer considers Europe to be the place where the conflicts of the future are to occur.”¹⁹ China’s rise has been accompanied by a flood of literature suggesting that it represents “the end of the Western world.”²⁰ Thus not only Russia and Europe are entering, according to some commentators, an era of unaccustomed marginality, but the whole epoch is becoming “post-Western.” Europe is becoming a new periphery, a position it has not held for at least half a millennium.

This applies to geopolitics, but there is also a more profound erosion of the continent’s traditional civilizational values. In both Russia and Turkey there is a renewed critique of Enlightenment ideas of unilinear progress and development, ideas that had been at the heart of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The consolidation and implementation of these ideas by the Bolsheviks and Atatürk, of course, were mediated by numerous contingent concerns, but that does not deny their common roots in what became Comtean positivistic visions of unilinear human progress. The tensions today in both Russia and Turkey between secularism and attempts to reinsert a religious dimension into public affairs share a common position in the backwash of vigorous modernization projects that sought to shake off the influence of their respective religious traditions.²¹

Turkey remains shaped by the Kemalist vision of national modernity in which the various contradictions between state, society

the 19th to the 21st Century: On the (im)possibility of Turkish Regional Hegemony,” Research in Progress Seminar, 16 November 2009, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex.

¹⁸ S. Karaganov and T. Bordachev, *Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture*, Report of the Russian Experts for the Valdai Discussion Club conference, London, IISS, 8-10 December 2009, published in Moscow by RIA Novosti and the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, p. 9.

¹⁹ I. Krastev, “Europe Moves to the Periphery,” *Yaroslavl Forum: Smart Policy in Post-Western World*, special edition of the Russian Institute, 12 January 2010, p. 16.

²⁰ For example, M. Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World*, London, Allen Lane, 2009.

²¹ For a general overview of the Turkish case, see W. Hale and E. Ozbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey*, London, Routledge, 2009. For Russia, see J. Garrard & C. Garrard, *Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2008; and Z. Knox, *Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism*, London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.

and religion continue to be worked out.²² Erdoan made the AKP the most successful party with an Islamist genealogy in the history of the Turkish Republic.²³ The party has avoided a hard-line ideological position and has instead presented itself as a conservative democratic force.²⁴ In Russia claims to a post-democratic exceptionalism are being voiced increasingly vigorously.²⁵ The two countries share, however, a concern with the spiritual bases of a political community, reflecting a backwash against the radical secularist modernization agendas that shaped them in the twentieth century.

²² O. Kerem, C.J. Kerslake and Ph. Robbins (eds.), *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

²³ A. Can Kumbaracibasi, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy*, London, Routledge, 2009.

²⁴ This is argued by Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, op. cit. [8]

²⁵ For example, V. Tretyakov, the former editor of *Nezavisimaya gazeta* and now the editor of *Politicheskii Klass*, argues for the restoration of the old estates (*soslovie*) in a new form of post-electoral corporate society.

Towards a Greater Europe

The ambiguities and tensions in the relationship with the EU have prompted Russia to try to shift the parameters of the discussion. For most of the post-cold war period the terms of engagement between Russia and Europe were established by Brussels and the west-European powers, or so it seemed in Russian perceptions. From the late Putin period there were attempts to shift the terrain of discussion in a way that would make the basis for relations more equitable. The various concrete proposals that have emerged on this basis are a secondary effect of this ontological shift, and it is for this reason that too often they appear rudimentary and even ill-considered. As far as the elite are considered, the reassertion of Russia's status as an existential equal is as important as any of its concrete manifestations.

A neo-revisionist agenda

Russian analysts like Sergey Karaganov, the head of the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP) and head of the Department of World Economy and International Relations at the Higher School of Economics, argue that Europe's relative weakness is not in Russia's interests, although it could be useful in a tactical sense in that it cuts Europe's pretensions down to size and makes possible engagement with Russia on the basis of common interests.

The Europeans are developing a realization that they are failing and that their reliance on the US—even the US with Obama as President—is growing increasingly illusionary. They are developing the awareness that a rapprochement with Russia, albeit in the condition in which this country exists today, and a rapprochement devoid of haughtiness, offers Europe virtually the sole chance for keeping a place for itself in the premier league of global politics.²⁶

In these circumstances, a turn to Asia would be appropriate, but not as an alternative to a European reorientation but to complement the creation of a Greater Europe:

²⁶ S. Karaganov, "Proshedshii god i predstoyashchee desyatiletie" [Last Year and Coming Decade], *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 15 January 2010, p. 11, <www.rg.ru/2010/01/15/karaganov.html>.

At this point, Russia's best possible geopolitical orientation would look as follows: a speedy and governable economic rapprochement with Asia and not only with China; a social and political rapprochement with Europe and elimination of the lingering rudiments of the cold war from relations with it, as the ultimate goal of this rapprochement is the emergence of a new system of European security and the Union of Europe (between Russia and the EU on the basis of common humanitarian, energy and economic spaces); a rapprochement with America in the strategic sphere, in order for Russia to become a third power in the emerging Sino-American duumvirate of future world governance.²⁷

This was not a modest strategic vision yet it was not totally unrealistic, but only if Russia could engage the other “outsiders” in this project, and above all Turkey.

New ideas are emerging to reinterpret and broaden the definition of what it means to be European, which at the same time change the relationship between insiders and outsiders. The first of these ideas is the notion of Greater Europe. Like many of Russia's neo-revisionist ideas the notion remains little more than a vague aspiration and an ideal than a developed program. Yet it does provide some indications of an alternative model of European politics. If the EU's integration project is based on conditionality, Russia's approach to non-accession states repudiates conditionality as a mechanism. Russia's various integration projects, notably the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), reject the need for a positive normative basis for such projects. Indeed, a negative norm is advanced, namely non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and a Westphalian notion of sovereignty, accompanied by the assertion of multipolarity.

The concept of Greater Europe reflects Russia's attempt to shift the terms of discourse. The idea is to develop an alternative vision of the character of European unity based less on full-scale institutional integration than a variable geometry of engagement. It also contains a geopolitical objective. Europe in its present manifestation, represented above all by the EU, is frequently lambasted in Moscow for its inadequacies on the international stage: its inability to devise an independent policy of its own, its excessive fealty to the United States that reduces it to little more than a “little brother,” and its lack of consistency in propounding its own proclaimed norms.

One of the most eloquent exponents of the idea of Greater Europe is Timofei Bordachev, a scholar at the Higher School of Economics working in Karaganov's department. In his various works he builds on the position advanced by Karaganov, that some sort of strategic vision is required to underpin the Russo-European

²⁷ Loc. cit.

relationship. Bordachev argues that this can take the form of a “strategic alliance.”²⁸ The relationship in his view had deteriorated to little more than “peaceful coexistence” by 2004; that is, premised on a fundamentally competitive relationship, and thus the task was not to provide the political framework for interdependence but to manage conflict. By contrast, Bordachev insists that the “the parties require a fundamentally new level of confidence,” and the historical division of Europe will only be transcended if “Russia and the EU form an alliance genuinely oriented to the future.” This would be an alliance based, in his view, on mutual advantage, since the EU objectively “needs Russia economically and politically to advance its interests on the international stage,” while Russia, facing “complex geopolitical encirclement,” also needs the EU.²⁹ Thus a “grand bargain” is required to place Russian-EU relations on a sound footing, which in the long-run would establish an “international regime” from Limerick to Vladivostok, “living according to its norms and rules.” This would be a system based on “intergovernmental cooperation” that would provide Eurasia with “structural stability.”³⁰

The proposal builds on the present system of competitive relations, and within that framework seeks to find an effective way of regulating the present Eurasian international order. Bordachev insists that the sovereignty of the main actors would not be infringed, and suggests that the states of the present EU retain their full sovereignty. Technically this is indeed the case, but clearly the EU is a system of shared and pooled sovereignty. Bordachev does not go far enough, since ultimately the only viable relationship between Russia and the EU is one which can establish a transformative dynamic that begins to transcend the present order. The first step could indeed be a strategic alliance, but ultimately elements of the visionary idealism that created the EU in the first place are required. The stakes could not be higher. The EU was created to prevent France and Germany going to war again, so today a Eurasian Union is required to ensure that the cold peace that now exists is overcome. The twenty-year period of cold peace after 1918 and the end of the Great War culminated in another calamitous conflagration, and there is no objective reason why this cold peace should end any differently.³¹

Russia’s vision of the Greater Europe lacks an institutional dynamic (this is reserved for pan-European ideas, see below) and instead the idea of Greater Europe to date is little more than an attempt to broaden the debate, and to show that Russian neo-revisionism has a positive dynamic. The degree to which there is a transformative element remains questionable, or even whether there is a mutually

²⁸ T. Bordachev, “Towards a Strategic Alliance,” *Russia in Global Affairs*, Vol. 4, No. 2, April-June 2006, p. 112-123.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 113.

³⁰ T. Bordachëv, *op. cit.* [1], p. 18.

³¹ R. Sakwa, “‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 2, March 2008, p. 241-167.

beneficial dynamic. It would not be out of keeping with traditional Russian foreign policy practices for this to be little more than an instrumental attempt to mobilize European public opinion behind a new sectarian agenda. However, this would be to belittle what is a genuine attempt to provide an intellectual framework for a new “union of Europe.” This idea has considerable resonance in Turkey as long as it remains firmly rooted in practical interests and eschews grand schemes for the restructuring of global geopolitics. The more fanciful “Eurasianist” notions of civilizational jihad against the West are entertained by only a small part of the Turkish elite.³²

Pan-Europe

The idea of Greater Europe is accompanied by revived ideas of pan-Europe. Leaving aside the various pan-European projects of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi in the inter-war years, Greater Europe today faces many of the dilemmas of the early post-war years. The failure of the European Defence Community in the early 1950s was countered by the establishment of the supranational European Coal and Steel Community by the Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951, and today the debate over a new security treaty for Europe reprises some of the themes of the earlier discussion, but this time on a pan-European scale. The debate also harks back to Gorbachev’s idea of a common European home advanced during perestroika, sentiments echoed by François Mitterrand. The idea of Greater Europe, it must be stressed, is not the same as pan-Europe. The former focuses on ideas and the expression of the abstract ideal of European commonality and unity, whereas the latter is more of an institutions based project. The initial phase of post-Communist pan-Europeanism between 1989 and 1999 was based on an idealist view of the EU providing the integrative framework, working with the CoE, buttressed from 1994 by NATO enlargement. From 1999 it was clear that NATO enlargement would face Russian resistance, while the limits to the growth of the EU became more vocalized.

At the same time, from 2007 the EU entered a post-enlargement phase, although this does not preclude Croatia’s (or Macedonia’s) accession and the gradual extension of the EU in the Balkans. In a broader perspective, however, existing forms of EU-centered integration have perhaps reached their limit. Already in 2004 Herman Van Rompuy—who was selected President of the European Council in November 2009 in conformity with the Lisbon Treaty—asserted that “Turkey is not a part of Europe and will never be part of Europe.” Van Rompuy went on to suggest that “An expansion of the

³² M. Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire*, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 188-201.

EU to include Turkey cannot be considered as just another expansion as in the past. The universal values which are in force in Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigor with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey.” Upon his appointment, Turkish MP Suat Kiniklioglu, argued that Van Rompuy had been chosen to keep Turkey out of Europe.³³ Once in office, Van Rompuy’s more circumspect comments on the question could not entirely dispel lingering suspicions that Turkish membership would transgress his vision of Europe. Turkish membership of the EU as presently constituted may well be considered an anachronistic project that is in the interests of neither the EU nor Turkey. Since Russia has never formally sought membership, concerns have not been articulated in quite such a harsh manner, yet as we have suggested above, throughout history there have been concerns about the *finalité* of Europe, with Russia typically on the far side. Turkey occupies a rather fuzzier position on the borders of Europe. The travails attending its full integration into the EU reflect this fact.

Russia remains outside the core institutional governance of Europe. The relationship between Russia and the European heartland has shifted to a narrow interest-based pattern of interactions, but this satisfies neither side. The doldrums period from 1999 was marked by the reassertion of the values-based agenda by the EU, and implicitly this has forced Russia back to the language of interests, yet this is not a sustainable stance by either side. The interests/value dialectic in the EU is more complex than some of its more idealistic partisans would suggest: Russia cannot avoid engaging with the normative dynamic of its own actions; while the EU is not quite the epitome of “normative” power that some of its most idealistic partisans would suggest.³⁴ Equally, Russia’s definition of a great power entails a normative dimension based on a type of order enshrining sovereignty, non-interventionism and a pluralism of regime types. All of this brings to the fore some rethinking about a new interpretation of pan-Europeanism in this new phase.

At its most basic this entails rethinking the existing security system. The accession of a number of post-Communist “revanchist” states in 2004 and 2007 diluted the EU’s original peace-building rationale and it is in danger of becoming an instrument for the perpetuation of the cold war by other means.³⁵ This is not the EU that a

³³ R. Tait, “Van Rompuy Chosen to Keep Turkey Out of Europe,’ Says Influential MP,” *Guardian*, 21 November 2009, p. 8.

³⁴ For a critique of the EU’s normative power, see D. Chandler, “EU Statebuilding: Securing the Liberal Peace through EU Enlargement,” *Global Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4, October 2007, p. 593-607, and the subsequent discussion in Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2008, p. 507-29. For a succinct examination of the dilemmas, see J. Zielonka, “Europe as a Global Actor,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 3, 2008, p. 471-484.

³⁵ The most militant of these states have indeed been dubbed the “new cold-warriors,” M. Leonard and N. Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations*, Brussels, European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2007, p. 48-49. The

whole generation of idealists, scarred by the memory of European civil wars, sought to build. It has also deeply alienated Russia, accompanied by the disintegration of the old European security regime. The idea of a new European Security Treaty, announced by President Dmitry Medvedev in a speech in Berlin on 5 June 2008, is a sign that new ideas are required, even though this initiative was greeted with at best polite condescension by the western powers. For Karaganov a review of the existing security arrangements on the continent was essential:

The cold war was proclaimed finished and, indeed, the ideological and military confrontation was gone. But the old geopolitical rivalry, which was always waiting in the wings, has again come to the fore. But Russia has learned its lesson. It is no longer ready to join Europe as a respected apprentice. Now it wants to join as a powerful ally, or not at all.³⁶

The pan-European dimension is one that is increasingly mooted as a possible framework for both Russia and Turkey. This is a half-way house: providing some sort of institutional framework for ideas of Greater Europe; but falling short of a fully-fledged supranational transformative agenda. For Russia this means integration without accession, something that may in the long-run provide a framework also for Turkey's relations with the EU. This was made explicit in Nicolas Sarkozy's European Parliament election speech in Nimes on 5 May 2009. He spoke against Turkey's accession to the EU, arguing that Turkey "is not intended to become an EU member," but Ankara should nevertheless be linked to the EU in both economic and security terms. In a significant innovation, he placed Russia and Turkey on an equal footing, noting that both countries should establish "an economic and security common area" with the EU. A new bloc would thus be created "of 800 million people who share the same prosperity and security."³⁷

This is a visionary idea and offers a prospect not only for integrating Russia and Turkey with Europe, but also a way for Europe to redefine itself. The old European integration model is exhausted; Europe sets itself up as a proto-great power bloc, in which form it would inevitably come into confrontation with Russia and, possibly, with America and China as well. Instead various configurations of pan-Europe are possible. One of these is the creation of a grand "Pan-

whole report, moreover, is imbued with a cold war geopolitical spirit that perpetuated rather than transcended historic divisions within Europe. The security dynamic underlying the accession of some of these states is explored by L.S. Skáldnes, "Geopolitics and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union," in F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (eds.), *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, London, Routledge, 2005.

³⁶ S. Karaganov, "Why Europe Needs a New Security Pact," *The Security Times*, 19 February 2010; reprinted in *Johnson's Russia List*, No. 36, 2010, Item 24.

³⁷ N. Sarkozy, "Discours de M. le Président de la République," [Speech of the President of the Republic] Nimes, 5 May 2009, <www.elysee.fr>.

Eurasian Union” in which the EU, Russia, Turkey and other “outsiders” would join as equal sovereign powers but in which a supranational Eurasian Commission would be created. In the first instance this would be concerned with managing a pan-Eurasian energy system, reconciling the interests of producers and consumers, but in due course “spillover” into other sectors could be anticipated. A genuine energy partnership could serve as the foundations of an integrative process akin to the role played by the European Coal and Steel Community of the early 1950s. As Mikhail Margelov, the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Russian Federation Council, argued: “A strategic union between Europe and Russia is possible only on the basis of an energy union.”³⁸

A grand bargain in the present circumstances is unlikely, since both sides are too firmly embedded in their present stance of “coexistence.” What is needed is a discussion that recognizes the dangers of a competitive dynamic becoming consolidated in Eurasia. Already the development of the Eastern Partnership from May 2009, however benign in intention, provoked renewed fears about the clash of “near abroads” in the new “lands in-between.” To overcome this competitive dynamic the grand bargain proposed by Bordachev needs to be complemented by a grand: the establishment of a Eurasian Union. This Union would have a type of Commission, beginning with relatively limited powers but establishing a dynamic of supranationalism. Intergovernmental arrangements are helpful, but the genius of Jean Monnet and the early European founding fathers was the understanding that this was not enough. The accumulation and preservation of sovereignty is an understandable process, but a counter-dynamic is required to ensure that our continent is not once again plunged into war.

³⁸ M. Margelov, “A Strategic Union with Europe Based on an Energy Union,” *Russian Journal*, No. 3 (45), 18 February 2010, p. 11.

Conclusion

Russia and Turkey are at the same time both partners and rivals, especially over influence in the region and in the energy sphere. However, after the Russo-Georgian war Russian commentators suggested that Turkey would be turning to Moscow as part of a fundamental geopolitical reorientation.³⁹ Russo-Turkish rapprochement has particular appeal for the Russian military. The parallels between the Turkish intervention in northern Cyprus in 1974 and the Russian intervention in the south Caucasus in 2008, followed in due course by the recognition of the respective entities, has forced a rethink of strategic alliances. There is also information about the existence of a group of Russophiles with anti-western views in the Turkish military, mockingly dubbed by some the “Young Russians.” Their bottom line appears to be that “America has betrayed Turkey, the country will never fit into the EU, and to avoid isolation Turkey should become a member of a Eurasian alliance that will be built around a resurgent Russia.”⁴⁰ The unthinkable is now being thought, reflecting the unblocking of the geopolitical logjam following the long end of the cold war. However, there is a no less powerful lobby in Turkey that argues the country has to reinforce its alliance with the West to keep “Russia’s strategic ambitions in check.”⁴¹ By the same token, Russian strategists are wary of Turkey’s ambitions in the south Caucasus and as a regional power in the Middle East.

As the two major “outsider” powers in Europe, there is an inevitable geopolitical commonality that has the potential to become the basis for a long-term rapprochement. Rapprochement with Russia is sometimes seen in Turkey as an alternative to EU accession. However, both Russia and Turkey are aware that an “alliance of the outsiders” would be catastrophic for both, reinforcing their marginal status and condemning them to a fruitless international politics of opposition. The two countries are certainly not planning to create an “axis of the excluded,” and there is no attempt to create a systemic balancing organization, but the “odd coupling” of Turkey and Russia in international politics is based on substantive issues. “Turkish anger at

³⁹ I. Torbakov, *The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations*, Washington DC, The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, p. 25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 27.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 31.

US policy in Iraq ... dovetails with longer-term Russian disgruntlement over America's encroachment on Moscow's sphere of influence.”⁴²

Both are aware of the new opportunities, accompanied by the burden of the historic legacy including a large diaspora in Turkey of peoples once subjugated by the Russian empire. Both share borders with a region that is increasingly unstable and which is becoming the object of geopolitical contestation.⁴³ Both are set to become regional powers, and closer alliance between the two acts as a “hedge,” “if not outright alternative, to trans-Atlantic and European ties”.⁴⁴ Russia now faces a range of similar issues in its relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, whose independence it recognized on 26 August 2008, as Turkey does with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. With the EU and other Western powers insisting on the territorial integrity of Georgia in circumstances where it is almost inconceivable to envisage the territories returning to Georgian sovereignty, the problem looks all set to become as intractable as the Cyprus question.

Russia's discussion of Greater Europe and pan-Europe is an attempt to transcend the competitive logic of a divided Europe, while retaining distinctive spheres of interest. However, Russia's refusal to accept the logic on which western European integration was based, the view that “European peace would ... be assured not by diplomacy between nation-states, but by dismantling the political economic sovereignty of nation-states, albeit gradually and only in selected areas,”⁴⁵ means that unresolved tensions remain in its project of a Greater Europe. Some common pooling of sovereignty, in energy and some other selected sectors, would represent precisely the first step in a transformational European policy that its neo-revisionist critique of the existing order demands. As explored above, new ideas are emerging to reinterpret and broaden the definition of what it means to be European, changing insider/outsider dynamics. The idea of Greater Europe provides both Russia and Turkey an escape from the burden of history and marginality, and to create a positive post-enlargement agenda of European inclusion. Schemes to give pan-European aspirations concrete form offer a way of making the Greater Europe once again a great Europe.

⁴² F. Hill and O. Taspinar, *op. cit.* [6], p. 81.

⁴³ J.W. Warhola and W.A. Mitchell, “The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations: Motives and Implications,” *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p. 127-143.

⁴⁴ F. Hill and O. Taspinar, *op. cit.* [6], p. 85.

⁴⁵ J.P. Burgess, “The Evolution of European Union Law and Carl Schmitt's Theory of the *Nomos of Europe*,” in L. Odysseos and F. Petitio (eds), *The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order*, London, Routledge, 2007, p. 185-201, at p. 199, fn3.