

## Saving the Liberal Order from Itself

By **Jennifer Lind**

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The election of Donald Trump is a symptom of a general crisis in international liberal order. Its costs have been seriously underestimated: relocations breaking the social contract, migratory flows poorly assimilated by societies, divisions between the elites and the masses (the so-called “losers” of globalization), electoral and political crises. Societies should adapt the liberal order to their deep-rooted characteristics, and not accept it as a global and obligatory reality.

politique étrangère

Hanover, New Hampshire. On November 9, 2016, Dartmouth College was quiet with shock. For months my colleagues and I had been amused or appalled by Donald Trump’s statements and behavior, but took solace in our knowledge that his election was an impossibility. He had just been elected the President of the United States. Stunned and numb, I walked across campus to teach my class. I encountered groups of students standing together, a few of them weeping, friends awkwardly patting their backs. Colleagues walked zombielike past me, and we paused to exchange a few hopeless words. Something had died; the campus was grieving.

One dream that died that day, in the eyes of many, was the liberal international order: the order that candidate Trump had pledged to dismantle. Since his election, he has indeed weakened this order; he undermined allies’ trust in American leadership; he withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement on climate change; he has threatened to withdraw the United States from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and from the disarmament agreement on Iran.

While Trump is no friend of the liberal international order, his ascent is not the cause but a symptom of its problems. The greatest threat to the order is the order itself: more specifically, the people who, over the

past few decades, it has dislocated and antagonized. The liberal project has grown into a vast *prix fixe* menu with items on it that many countries would prefer to skip. To stem the backlash to the liberal order, its leaders need to rein in these ambitions and allow countries to order à la carte. It may be the only way to keep the establishment in business.

### **Liberal order: the cost of free-trade**

The liberal international order refers to a set of ideas and institutions after World War II.<sup>1</sup> Free trade and free capital flows have encouraged the outsourcing of production. More open borders have allowed extensive migration particularly from the developing “south” to the advanced industrialized “north.” The order also rests upon a set of universal liberal beliefs and values, such as about freedom and human rights. A set of institutions – negotiating and establishing norms and rules in trade, finance, and many other issues – link these ideas together.

As the order succeeded, it expanded. The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade over time tackled an increasing number of trade barriers. After the Cold War, allies refashioned NATO – an alliance designed to contain the Soviet Union – into a liberal security community that expanded into Eastern Europe. Treaties to protect human rights have evolved into a “responsibility to protect” that advocates say justifies military intervention within sovereign countries. In Europe, what began as the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community has since styled itself into a customs union, monetary union, court of justice, and leader for environmental protection and human rights. In the 1995 Schengen agreement, several members of the European Union opened internal borders and adopted a common asylum policy. In these ways, the liberal order expanded significantly beyond its modest origins.

Clyde, Ohio. Three thousand employees at a Whirlpool factory build 20,000 washing machines per day. Whirlpool is the largest employer in the county; its employees eat at the local restaurants, worship together at St. Mary’s and First Presbyterian; their taxes support Community Park and the Clyde schools.

Whirlpool has appealed to the Trump Administration for trade protection, arguing that its competitor, Samsung, engages in dumping (selling below costs). Whirlpool’s CEO argues that on a level playing field,

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1. G. J. Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014.

the company could create over a thousand jobs.<sup>2</sup> But Samsung blames Whirlpool for failing to innovate and adapt to changing consumer tastes. Shara Aranoff, an attorney for Samsung, likens the situation to Japanese competition in the U.S. auto industry. “American auto makers have become much more competitive, foreign auto makers have established U.S. production creating thousands of American jobs, and consumers have more and better choices.” She declared, “Today we’re all better off.”

Advocates of the liberal order understood the benefits of free trade. Multilateral institutions removed barriers to the movement of capital, enabling firms to relocate factories from industrialized countries to developing countries with much lower labor and other operating costs. Low tariffs (negotiated in organizations such as the GATT, later World Trade Organization, or WTO), allowed firms to export around the world. Innovations in shipping (such as containerization) drove down transportation costs. For all of these reasons, the cost of consumer goods plummeted. Consumers benefited, and many countries lifted their people out of poverty.

The costs of free trade were also clear; everyone understood that some people stood to suffer from free trade. For centuries the working class benefited from rents conferred by geography: because of capital restrictions and high shipping costs, firms located factories near major markets. Workers nearby were more highly compensated (and unification facilitated this process). Globalization removes these rents. But, the story goes, displaced workers would enjoy lower priced goods, and would move out of failing industries and localities. To help dislocated workers, the welfare state will expand.<sup>3</sup>

What actually happened? Many people and countries indeed benefited immensely from globalization. But two things did not go as planned: at least in the United States, the state failed to uphold the social compact of free trade, and workers had a much harder time than anticipated adapting to dislocation.

Many European countries, where social democracy thrives, created welfare programs to buffer workers from trade dislocation. In the United States, however, the past several decades have been a story of liberalizing trade along with cutting taxes and welfare benefits. For example, one of Ronald Reagan’s major goals was to slash Trade Adjustment Assistance;

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2. A. Tangel, “Trade’s Test Case: Your Washing Machine,” *The Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 2017.

3. D. Rodrik, “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” *Journal of Political Economy* 106 (1998): 997-1032.

he and the Republican party saw welfare programs as inimical to entrepreneurship and innovation.<sup>4</sup> In an irony particularly painful for American liberals, Republicans abandoned American workers, then in 2016 campaigned and won on the populist platform that politicians had abandoned American workers.

**The state did not  
comply with the  
social contract  
of free-trade**

Free trade with China hit U.S. workers particularly hard. Bill Clinton celebrated China's entry into the WTO in 2001: he and other liberal internationalist elites told Americans that engagement with China would give it a stake in the liberal international order (thus encouraging the country's peaceful development), and would create a Chinese middle class who would demand liberalization. Economists forecast that the benefits to the U.S. economy would be high, and the costs to dislocated workers modest.<sup>5</sup>

Things did not work out that way. To be sure, a trend toward greater automation was a major contributing factor. But economists estimate that the "China Shock" cost the U.S. economy over 2 million jobs. As one study notes, "The consensus that trade could be strongly redistributive in theory but was relatively benign in practice has not stood up well to these new developments. Nor has the belief that trade adjustment is relatively frictionless."<sup>6</sup>

"Friction" is a neutral word. Plants closing – feared by Whirlpool's workers in Clyde – means people cannot provide for their families. Factory closures ripple out to restaurants and shops; the decreasing tax base means fewer resources for schools, fire and police departments, and local social services. Stress soars and incomes fall as people often replace a higher-paying job with temporary work or with multiple part-time jobs. In the United States (until recently), people also frequently lost health insurance. Unemployment creates a loss of self-esteem and social status, contributing to depression, drug use, alcoholism, and suicides among the groups hardest hit.<sup>7</sup> Social services strain to keep up with an explosion in demand. In short, for many workers and communities, "friction" meant

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4. M. Munro and C. Hendrickson, "Disrupting the Conservative Platform," *The Boston Review*, October 5, 2017, available at: <<http://bostonreview.net>>.

5. J. Weissmann, "Waking the Sleeping Dragon," *Slate*, September 28, 2016.

6. J. Weissmann, "Waking the Sleeping Dragon," *op. cit.* D. H. Autor, D. Dorn, and G. H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade," *Annual Review of Economics* 8 (2016): 205-240.

7. P. Gillespie, "The Opioid Crisis Is Draining America of Workers," CNN.com, July 27, 2017, available at: <<http://money.cnn.com>>.

irrecoverable disaster. So when they heard a candidate talk about their pain, and lambast American leaders for negotiating “bad deals,” they listened – and cheered.

### Open borders and migration

St. Denis, France. Writer Ben Judah takes a walk in a suburb transformed by immigration. Most residents are of North African, Arab, and South Asian descent. Judah talks to a woman, Maria, emerging from a Catholic church there. “Immigration changed everything,” she tells him. “The people changed. You can just see it for yourself. The French have all left Saint-Denis. Look around you.” Judah notes that “Since 2012, stabbings, shootings and car rammings have taken place every few months, punctuated by slaughters such as *Charlie Hebdo* and the Bataclan.”<sup>8</sup> Immigrants themselves resent a thicket of regulations that keeps unemployment in their communities high; they suffer discrimination and anti-immigrant violence, and endure police harassment.

The scale of recent immigration to the United States and Europe has been massive. In the United States in 1970, the number of immigrants was 9.6 million (about 5 percent of the US population). By 2015, this number had quadrupled to 43.3 million (13.5 percent of the population). Furthermore, the number of immigrants living illegally in the United States rose from 3.5 million in 1990 to about 11 million today.<sup>9</sup>

Europe also recently experienced “one of the most significant influxes of migrants and refugees in its history.”<sup>10</sup> In Britain after 1997, under the leadership of Tony Blair and the Labour party, the country accepted twice as many immigrants than it had accepted over the previous fifty years. One wave of immigrants came from Eastern Europe after several countries there joined the EU in 2004.

Europe has taken in millions of migrants who fled poverty and conflict (primarily from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria). The number of refugees surged in 2015, and that year Germany accepted a total of over a million immigrants – nearly double the number of the previous year. Sweden (with a population of 10 million people) accepted 163,000 refugees in 2015 alone.

8. B. Judah, “Islam and the French Republic: From the Banlieues to Le Pen Land,” *Standpoint Magazine*, July 8, 2016.

9. J. Zong and J. Batalova, “Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, March 8, 2017; also “The Facts on Immigration Today: 2017 Edition,” Center for American Progress, April 20, 2017.

10. “Why Is EU Struggling with Migrants and Asylum?,” BBC.com, March 3, 2016.

Immigration on this scale has fueled concerns across Europe. National crime rates remain generally low. But people are alarmed by terrorist attacks and episodes of horrific violence (such as sexual assaults against women in Cologne, Germany on New Year's Eve in 2016). Sweden is experiencing "gang warfare, shootings, car burnings...in the suburbs of its three largest cities, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo."<sup>11</sup> As Pew Research Center finds, most Europeans (76 percent in Hungary; 61 percent in Germany; 52 percent in the UK) agree that "refugees will increase the amount of terrorism in our country."<sup>12</sup>

People are also concerned about economic effects. Large numbers of low-skilled immigrants push wages downward. While proponents argue that immigrants create tax revenue, critics argue that this ignores spiraling demands for social services, and future demands for health care and pensions.<sup>13</sup> Britain, argued Frank Field, a British Labour parliamentarian, must work with the EU to curb immigration: "The alternative is to practise the economics of madness."<sup>14</sup>

Europeans are also concerned about assimilation. The optimistic view expects that immigrants move to a country because they embrace its culture, traditions, and values (or will learn to do so). They will put down roots and learn the language; their talents and energies will contribute to the society and economy. At the same time, immigrants' home cultures and traditions broadens and enriches the idea of what it means to be French/Swedish/German, in ways consistent with those countries' values.

**How can migrants become integrated?**

But what if it doesn't work that way? As Angela Merkel famously commented, in Germany, multiculturalism "utterly failed."<sup>15</sup> In Britain, notes commentator Benjamin Schwarz, surveys show that two-thirds of British Muslims only interact socially with other Muslims. A British Home Office report studied northern mill towns, with areas dominated by Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations. It found, "Separate educational

11. R. Milne, "Norway Minister Sparks War of Words with Sweden over Immigration," *The Financial Times*, August 30, 2017.

12. R. Wike, B. Stokes and K. Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs," Pew Research Center, April 11, 2016.

13. J. Slack, "Expert Behind Migrant Report Was Man who Said Just 13,000 Would Come From Eastern Europe," *The Daily Mail*, November 6, 2014.

14. F. Field, "We're Adding a Migrant City the Size of Birmingham Every 30 Months," *The Daily Mail*, November 30, 2014.

15. M. Weaver, "Angela Merkel: German Multiculturalism Has 'Utterly Failed,'" *The Guardian*, October 17, 2010.

arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives.”<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, rather than societies and immigrants assimilating in mutually pleasing ways, critics worry that immigrants will bring – and retain – values that threaten what the country holds dear. In surveys of the British Muslim population, 28 percent say they want Britain to become a fundamentalist Islamic state. Half said that homosexuality should be illegal, and a third favored legalizing polygamy for Muslim men. 37 percent believe British Jews are “a legitimate target as part of the ongoing struggle for justice in the Middle East.” About a quarter to a third of British Muslims believe that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by the U.S. and Israeli governments; that the British security services orchestrated the 2004 London 7/7 bombings.<sup>17</sup> Among French Muslims, too, “a significant minority have deeply conservative and sometimes hostile views about the French state and society, with more than one-quarter believing Islam’s Sharia law supersedes state laws.”<sup>18</sup>

The combination of soaring immigration with evidence of such illiberal views has led many to express alarm. France’s Marine Le Pen warns of *Le Grand Remplacement* – the great replacing, in which high immigration and high fertility among immigrant communities threatens the survival of traditional French culture and values. Commentator Douglas Murray argues that Europe’s precious liberal values are under threat; “Europe is committing suicide.”<sup>19</sup>

Across Europe and the United States, these different concerns have unleashed a political backlash to immigration. Donald Trump emerged victorious in 2016 after a campaign dominated by promises to build a “big, beautiful wall.” Right-wing parties have gained influence in France and Sweden. In the recent German elections, the nationalist Alternative for Germany (condemned by many as anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic) gained in what was called “nothing short of a political earthquake.”<sup>20</sup> As seen most recently in the Austrian elections, among

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16. B. Schwarz, “Unmaking England,” *The American Conservative*, January 11, 2016.

17. F. Perraudin, “Half of All British Muslims Think Homosexuality Should Be Illegal, Poll Finds,” *The Guardian*, April 11, 2016.

18. L. Bryant, “Survey Shows Muslims Integrated, But a Minority at Odds with Secular France,” VOA News, September 18, 2016.

19. D. Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*, London, Bloomsbury, 2017.

20. L. Halligan, “Germany’s Election Result Is not so much the Cry of the Dispossessed as Discontent with the EU,” *Unherd.com*, September 25, 2017.

“middle Europe,” “increasingly, their dominant political sentiment is antithetical to, even contemptuous of, the liberal, pro-integrationist ideals of the European Union.”<sup>21</sup>

### **The elites and the “losers” of globalisation**

Primrose Hill, London. The lads – a mix of Americans, British, Japanese, and an assortment of other Europeans – are running football drills. As practice winds down, the dads (and occasional mom) arrive, watch the boys run around, and chat amiably. Most of them are in finance; some are in high-tech or entertainment. Amidst them appears the odd journalist (or, like my husband and me, academic).

Life is good. Our kids go to the same schools and New England summer camps. We went to the same universities. Do you know my friend Helen? She was at Berkeley/Yale/Chicago then. Let’s get coffee after you get back from Zurich and I get back from Dubai. They are clever, kind, great parents, globally minded. They are horrified at Brexit, appalled by Trump.

Those on the Primrose Hill football pitch are the winners of the liberal international order. Globalization has made their production costs plummet, their markets balloon, their industry profits soar. Since the 1980s, incomes for the top one percent of American households rose 275 percent.<sup>22</sup> “With a global economy, people who have extraordinary skills... whether they be in financial services, technology, entertainment or media, have a bigger place to play and be rewarded from.”<sup>23</sup> Even me, a mere academic on this Fortune-500 sideline: universities are booming as their intellectual property is demanded by a larger market than ever before.

While fortune smiled upon Primrose Hill, others suffered. Since 2000, real income for the American middle class is down 7.5 percent. Poorer Americans fared still worse; real incomes for the fourth quintile fell by 10 percent, and the bottom quintile was the hardest hit, with incomes falling by 16 percent.<sup>24</sup>

At university, elites learned about the enlightened liberal order that emerged out of the chaos of economic depression and war. We learned about the benefits of free trade, and supported it for our country because

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21. J. Lloyd, “Middle Europe Turns its Back on the EU,” Reuters, October 20, 2017 and P. Hockenkos, “The Austrian Elections Should Terrify Europeans,” CNN.com, October 17, 2017.

22. S. J. Markovitch, “The Income Inequality Debate,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 3, 2014.

23. A. Censky, “How the Middle Class Became the Underclass,” CNN.com, February 16, 2011.

24. Data from U.S. Census Bureau, 1967-2014.

we learned that a rising tide would lift all the boats. We supported the liberal order because we sincerely believed that the spread of freedom and human rights was good for the world. We embraced diversity and encouraged the replacement of nationalist with cosmopolitan thinking. And over time we became increasingly isolated from, and even disdainful of, those who were skeptical of the liberal order.

Cosmopolitan elites' enthusiasm for immigration shows perhaps the largest gap between them and broader national views. As Ross Douthat notes, in the United States, most voters either want immigration cut (35 percent) or kept at about the same level (38 percent). But U.S. leaders have proposed amnesties for illegal immigrants, and recommended increasing the number of low-skilled immigrants.<sup>25</sup>

British elites have been even less responsive to the public. Schwarz notes, "while the professional class enjoys the benefits mass immigration has brought to Britain, it is largely sheltered from the costs — including the rapid transformation of the character of traditional neighborhoods, the downward pressure on wages, and the fierce competition for public services and housing — that fall nearly exclusively on the English lower-middle and working class." Schwarz notes, "a staggering 71 percent of the total voting-age population believe immigration is the most urgent problem facing the country; 76 percent want immigration reduced."<sup>26</sup> Notes Dominic Sandbrook, "there has never been an issue on which the political class has so consistently gone against the wishes of the British people."<sup>27</sup>

When their countrymen spoke out, the cosmopolitans were vexed that some people could be so uninformed or so racist to oppose the liberal project. People favoring trade protectionism, lamented elites, don't understand about the rising tides and boats. And opponents of immigration were racist. As MP Clive Lewis said, British opposition to migration "comes down to racism. It's ultimately about racism."<sup>28</sup> In Sweden, notes Fraser Nelson, debates about immigration are confined to an "opinion corridor": "Those who step outside, and talk about the immigration problems, risk being accused of bigotry."<sup>29</sup>

25. R. Douthat, "An Elusive Immigration Compromise," *The New York Times*, August 5, 2017.

26. B. Schwarz, "Unmaking England," *op. cit.*

27. D. Sandbrook, "Is Europe Committing Suicide?" *The Daily Mail*, May 20, 2017.

28. "Hard-Left MP: Fear of Open Borders Is Racist," *The Daily Mail*, September 25, 2017.

29. N. Fraser, "They Won't Admit it in Stockholm, but Donald Trump Is Right about Immigration in Sweden," *The Telegraph*, February 23, 2017. On this issue see P. Skerry, "Opposition to Immigration Wasn't Always Racist," *The Boston Globe*, April 16, 2017.

## “Nationalist patriots” against “globalists”

Ignored and disdained by the cosmopolitans, publics responded with fury. Trump won with a campaign that pitted “‘nationalist’ patriots against ‘globalist’ sellouts.”<sup>30</sup> Britain Brexit. As political scientist Leslie Vinjamuri argues, “Leave” voters seemed angrier at London than they were at Brussels. “People of this country,” noted Leave campaigner Michael Gove, “have had enough of experts.”<sup>31</sup> In Germany, people voted AfD because “they’re angry. Their fury is directed at the mainstream political parties which, they feel, don’t care about them.”<sup>32</sup> It wasn’t simply that voters disagreed with leaders. It was that they felt those leaders didn’t even represent them anymore – that they prioritized the liberal order above their own countrymen.

The spread of liberalism has been driving human progress for hundreds of years. Its reversal would indeed be disastrous. “Full-scale anti-globalization measures would be extremely damaging. Protected firms and their workers might benefit, but other firms, denied access to inexpensive imports, would be less profitable, and production cutbacks and layoffs would follow. If these firms instead were to pass on the increased cost of inputs through higher prices, consumers would take the hit.”<sup>33</sup> Protectionism and retaliation would reduce prosperity and increase competition among countries. This trend would be particularly dangerous given the broader competition playing out between the United States and a rising China – which has so far been tempered by their economic interdependence.

Fortunately, the backlash to the liberal order is less about its liberalism and more about its “order” – i.e., the specific rules and norms that have defined this manifestation of liberalism. Over time, this particular order has bundled together numerous liberal doctrines –the free movement of goods, the free movement of people, the breakdown of sovereignty – and insisted that members accept them all. But members are pushing back. To maintain the order, its leaders must allow countries to choose the elements of the order that their people favor. Of course, to participate in the “free-trade” part of the project, countries must open their own markets to imports. But embracing free trade need not require societies to accept other parts of the order: notably open immigration policies. Countries that want

30. S. Patrick, “Trump’s Wall Is a Symbol of America’s Sacred Sovereignty,” *The Hill*, October 12, 2017.

31. M. Deacon, “Michael Gove’s Guide to Britain’s Greatest Enemy... the Experts,” *The Telegraph*, June 10, 2016.

32. J. Hill, “German Election: Why so Many Voters in the East Chose AfD,” *BBC.com*, September 26, 2017.

33. M. Ezrati, “Globalization Can Be Good for America’s Workers,” *The National Review*, August 7, 2017.

to make themselves into safe havens for refugees should be able to do so. But, as has been made perfectly clear, many European countries disagree with this as a mandate for the EU more generally.

### **Liberalism à la carte**

Toranomon, Tokyo. We're enjoying dinner after a long day at a conference about Japanese foreign policy. Invisible waiters set down before us a grouping of tiny bites intricately arranged on pieces of weathered wood. A waterfall splashes in the garden outside. My American and European colleagues, other university professors, are scolding our Japanese hosts for Tokyo's failure to accept Syrian refugees. I listen, baffled and torn. One diplomat gently reminds the group that Japan's generous aid to refugees is second in the world only to the United States; he gets back a lecture about human rights and pulling one's weight. The senior official hosting us listens intently but his eyes are weary. He's torn too.

Liberalism transformed Japan after World War II. The Japanese embraced free market principles and used their entrée into the liberal trade and financial regime to fuel their postwar recovery. Their conglomerates brought Japan to the center of global finance, manufacturing, and design. Today Japan's people are among the world's freest, healthiest, and richest. As the country prospered, its people gave generously to and participated in the governance of the liberal order.

While liberalism transformed Japan, the transformation was always on Tokyo's terms. Japan has always ordered à la carte off of the liberal menu. The Japanese economic model, for example, routinely triggered controversy for its embrace of profoundly mercantilist principles: infant industry protection, subsidies, and state-directed capital to favored industries.

In the United States and Europe, the backlash to the liberal order has come from people dislocated by globalization; from people concerned about the recent scale of immigration; and from people who felt that their elites had betrayed them. While Japan's liberal partners convulse in populist revolutions, Japan remains calm. Why?

First, Japanese leaders upheld the social compact of free trade. At a time of massive structural adjustment from trade and automation, "The Japanese government basically bought itself political stability," writes commentator Yoichi Funabashi. "The social security budget has nearly

doubled since 1990.”<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, while Japan’s elites have embraced the liberal international project, domestic concerns remained paramount. Inequality is less a problem in Japan; Japanese elites don’t roll their eyes about “flyover states” or a battle between “Old” and “New” Japan. In fact, as Funabashi points out, Japan’s political system gives rural voters (“Old Japan”) disproportionate political power.

Furthermore, in Europe and the United States, cosmopolitan elites ignored the public’s desire to curb immigration; in Japan, the public’s skepticism about immigration translated into national policy. Strict immigration laws mean that only 1.5 percent of Japan’s population is foreign-born (most of them from Asian countries with linguistic and cultural similarities). As for refugees – the policy my colleagues were so exorcised about at dinner – in 2016 Japan accepted only 28 refugees out of 11,000 applications.<sup>35</sup>

Japanese culture values social harmony; leaders worry that immigrants will have trouble assimilating given Japan’s unique culture and difficult language. Leaders understand that the country’s low fertility rate and aging population portend demographic disaster. But leaders have been cautious to see immigration as the remedy. As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe commented: “I would say that before accepting immigrants or refugees, we need to have more activities by women, elderly people and we must raise our birth rate.”<sup>36</sup>

Deep structural and cultural impediments to change mean that “womonomics” is unlikely to solve Japan’s demographic problems — at least not for decades. And within Japan, cosmopolitan voices support more immigration. Kanae Doi, Japan director at Human Rights Watch, argues that Japan should take in more Syrian refugees: “While Japan is a strong Asian democracy, it is not showing global ethical leadership on human rights.”<sup>37</sup> So Japanese policy may grow more cosmopolitan over time. Meanwhile, it offers a promising example of à la carte liberalism – of a country committed both to liberal values and to retaining its sovereignty.

While cosmopolitan Americans grieved on November 9, 2016 that Trump would ruin the liberal international order, the order was already straining under its own ambitions. Ironically, by discrediting the nationalist

34. Y. Funabashi, “Japan, Where Populism Fails,” *The New York Times*, February 8, 2017.

35. “Japan Grants Refugee Status to 28 out of over 10,000 Applicants,” *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 11, 2017.

36. J. McCurry, “Japan Says it Must Look After its Own Before Allowing in Syrian Refugees,” *The Guardian*, September 30, 2015.

37. “Japan: Improve Migrant Treatment, Accept Refugees,” Human Rights Watch, January 12, 2017.

platform, Trump and other nationalist leaders may help the order survive. Marine Le Pen may fail to distance the National Front from her father's anti-Semitism and racist views. Germany's AfD attracted many moderate voters who favored its anti-cosmopolitan platform, but had to swallow their distaste at evidence of racism and Islamophobia. As the party gathers strength, its extremist wing may grow bolder, scaring away moderates who refuse (no matter how angry they are at elites) to empower a racist far right.<sup>38</sup>

Similarly, in the United States, the Trump administration's missteps and toxicity may reduce support for the nationalist platform. In fairness to Trump, he cleverly perceived a market for this product, developed and branded it, and has sold it (along with steaks, hotels, golf courses, and Ivanka's handbags). But with Trumpian nationalism one also gets racism (Mexico is sending "rapists" across the border) and sexism ("you can grab them by the pussy").<sup>39</sup> This package has repelled many people whom otherwise might have been interested customers.

A failure to take seriously the ideas behind this and other nationalist/populist revolutions will only empower another round of backlash, in which a more polished next generation could present a more serious threat to the liberal project. After all, perhaps Ivanka (like Marine Le Pen) will someday sideline her inconvenient father. Meanwhile, the best way for the liberal order to survive is to listen to the people within it, who are tired of elites disdaining them while hoarding its gains.




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### Mots clés

États-Unis  
Ordre libéral  
Mondialisation  
Migrations

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38. J. Mischke and S. Saeed, "Leader Frauke Petry to Quit Alternative for Germany As More Splits Emerge," *Politico* (Europe Edition), September 26, 2017.

39. K. Reilly, "Here Are All The Times Trump Insulted Mexico," *The Time*, August 31, 2016 and J. Taylor, "'You Can Do Anything': In 2005 Tape, Trump Brags About Groping, Kissing Women," NPR.org, October 7, 2016.



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