



# Rebooting the Entente

## An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

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### ► Key Takeaways

- As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship.
- As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation.
- Lessons need to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects.
- The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe.

## Introduction

The Franco-British Summit on March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions.

Leaders are expected to bring new impetus and trust into Franco-British defense bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and the two countries will aim to show joint leadership and a problem-solving approach in the context of the war in Ukraine. There are limits to what the two countries can and want to do together, so both will be careful not to overcommit and overpromise. But a number of pressing issues – from helping Ukraine win the war to re-building stocks of ammunition, shoring up influence with “middle ground” powers, and ensuring a meaningful contribution to Indo-Pacific security – would benefit from Franco-British solutions.

Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables.

## Franco-British Outlook on a New Strategic Environment

The past decade opened with a rare consensus between France and the United Kingdom (UK) regarding defense cooperation. Following the signing of the Lancaster House Treaties in 2010, Paris and London worked hand in hand on the Libyan file, fighting at the forefront of the coalition.<sup>1</sup> However, the relationship started to deteriorate in the mid-2010s, following the consecutive shocks of Brexit and the Trump administration, casting doubts on both European unity and the transatlantic link. While London and Paris came closer in their diagnosis of the need for Europe to do more for its own security, they took opposite directions regarding European integration and struggled to take a joint lead.

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1. A. Pannier, *Rivals in Arms: The Rise of UK-France Defence Relations in the Twenty-First Century*, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2020.

The 2021 announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) agreement dealt a serious blow to trust and cooperation between France and the UK, in a relationship already strained by years of Brexit tensions.<sup>2</sup>

As the bilateral relationship deteriorated, the strategic environment drastically changed. China gradually imposed itself as a major economic and strategic challenge for Western countries, and both France and the UK started investing more attention and resources in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>3</sup> The early 2020s saw a series of shocks, from the global COVID-19 pandemic to the end of long-standing overseas contingency operations – with the Allied troops departure from Afghanistan in 2021 and the end of Operation Barkhane in 2022. And, crucially, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine the same year, marked a turning point in European security and the severing of Europe’s remaining relations with Moscow, with deep repercussions whose final form is still unclear today.

As a new sense of cohesion spread throughout Western nations and the center of gravity of Europe’s security moved East, Franco-British cooperation remained relatively in the margin of latest developments. However, as the war continues, it clearly increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation and creates a space for much-needed bilateral convergence and the building of common objectives. The British participation in the newly established European Political Community (EPC) sends a positive signal to Paris regarding London’s openness to re-engage with the continent. The two sides should work closely to bring life into the EPC in the run-up to the 2024 meeting hosted by the UK<sup>4</sup>. Even if the two countries do not share the same long-term vision for the format, they agree that its core value is to organize and ensure cohesion among Europeans in the context of the war in Ukraine and key issues – from energy security to cyber threats and migration.

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Despite the recent British decision to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) military mobility project, the association of the UK to European Union (EU) defense mechanisms such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and the European Defence Investment Program (EDIP) is still lacking due to both EU regulations and UK policy, and therefore only happens on a case-by-case basis.<sup>5</sup> At the Sandhurst summit in 2018<sup>6</sup>, both countries had agreed on the importance of keeping UK

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2. S. Monaghan and P. Morcos, “UK-France Defense and Security Relations Need a Reboot”, CSIS, November 23, 2021, available at: [www.csis.org](http://www.csis.org).

3. A. Billon-Galland and H. Kundnani, “UK and France should collaborate on Indo-Pacific security”, Chatham House, March 26, 2021, available at: [www.chathamhouse.org](http://www.chathamhouse.org).

4. M. Rahman, “The European Political Community is a big deal – for EU-UK relations”, *Politico*, October 5, 2022.

5. I. Antinozzi, “UK-EU Defence Cooperation and PESCO’s Military Mobility Project”, RUSI, November 17, 2022, available at: [www.rusi.org](http://www.rusi.org).

6. “Security and Defence”, UK-France Summit, Sandhurst, 2018.

industry engaged in European Research & Technology (R&T) programs, but the political context quickly deteriorated and the red line for Paris remains that EU taxpayers money cannot go to British companies. Conversely, the UK is actively investing in NATO-led capability and innovation initiatives, such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA)<sup>7</sup>, which France fears may drive some EU member states away from similar EU programs. With upcoming progress on the Northern Ireland Protocol, positive political messaging from London and Paris could in time facilitate a more ambitious UK-EU defense agreement. However, France must be aware that, with the UK out of EU defense initiatives, London is necessarily seeking and shaping alternatives.

## A Strategic Rapprochement? Mitigating Franco-British Competition

Divergences between London and Paris will remain – mostly on Europe and the role of US global leadership – and their impact on the feasibility of future joint work should not be underestimated. As French and British views over the reliability of long-term US involvement in European security deviate, more joint discussions on the practical consequences of the US pivot to Asia and backfilling of US assets could be beneficial. Especially so in the new context of rising US protectionism – the repercussions of which both countries will have difficulties to grapple with<sup>8</sup>.

Overall, the “big picture” visions of both countries have come closer in recent years, for instance regarding Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine – as exemplified in France’s recently published *Revue Nationale Stratégique* and the upcoming refresh of the UK’s *Integrated Review*<sup>9</sup>. Deterrence and arms control regime also need urgent rethinking and are of particular interest to the UK and France as members of the P5 (UN Security Council’s five permanent members who all have nuclear weapons).

London and Paris should therefore create a space for more joint work, conscious of the fact that while their diagnosis and strategic cultures generally align, their preferred delivery mechanisms and strategic end goals may not (e.g. European/EU vs. Euro-Atlantic/NATO, Russia’s place in Europe’s security construct, US global leadership, or industrial competition). Squaring that circle will require the will to find common ground and joint purpose, to learn from past mistakes, and work constructively through disagreements. It will depend on continued trust and desire for joint leadership at the highest political level in both countries.

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7. NATO, “NATO Approves 2023 Strategic Direction for New Innovation Accelerator”, December 12, 2022.

8. G. Lanktree, “Brexit Britain Trapped in The Middle as US and EU Go to War On Trade”, Politico, November 29, 2022.

9. French Republic, “National Strategic Review”, 2022; HM Government, “Global Britain in a Competitive Age”, 2021.

Both sides need to move beyond their “incompatible theologies” and focus on a problem-solving approach<sup>10</sup>. What real-world problems need solving and what solutions can UK-France cooperation provide? The most pressing of these questions may be: what are the UK and France doing together to help Ukraine? Such a mindset would ensure that enhancing UK-France cooperation is not just an end in itself, but that it provides concrete results for European security – while keeping in mind that key capitals like Berlin, Rome, and Warsaw should be included sooner rather than later to enlarge bilateral dynamics.

Regarding Ukraine, London and Paris should, first and foremost, better coordinate their supplies of weapons, their messaging, as well as the complementarity of the UK and EU training missions for the Ukrainian armed forces.<sup>11</sup> They should debate their approaches and priorities ahead of the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July. They should discuss what security guarantees and Euro-Atlantic integration they envision for Ukraine in the short and medium term. These consultations can then form the basis of wider discussions in fora such as the G7 or NATO.

Moreover, both countries share the challenges of building strong relations with “middle ground<sup>12</sup>” powers in the Global South, while both dealing with heavy colonial baggage. Acknowledging that these countries are looking for alternatives and more equal partnerships, Paris and London could share their assessments, and identify relevant third countries with which to build constructive ways forward – in part to fight the Russian narrative about the invasion of Ukraine. In the context of increasingly contested international norms, joint UK-France work in international fora is crucial.

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## Learning the Lessons of Lancaster House

Thirteen years after the Lancaster House Treaties, which had launched many UK-France initiatives in the capability as well as in the operational cooperation realms, the results are somewhat mixed<sup>13</sup>.

The sharing of nuclear deterrence-related facilities in France (Teutates program) is a clear success, and so is the light anti-ship missile Sea Venom now equipping British (and soon French) naval helicopters. The Maritime Mines Countermeasures (MMCM) program

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10. A. Billon-Galland and H. Kundnani, “Breaking the Strategic Impasse: Franco-British Cooperation on European Defence”, *Revue Défense Nationale*, No. 834, 2020, pp. 133-138.

11. A. Brzozowski, “EU doubles training mission targets for Ukraine”, Euractiv, February 2, 2023.

12. M. Burrows, “Red Cell #2: Is the West losing the Global South?”, Stimson, December 10, 2022.

13. King’s College London and Institut Montaigne, “The UK-France Defence and Security Relationship: How to Improve Cooperation”, November 2018; A. Pannier, “Complementarity or Competition? Franco-British Cooperation and the European Horizon of French Defense Policy”, *Focus stratégique* No. 96, Ifri, April 2021.

is also a promising project that should enable both navies with state-of-the-art mine-hunting capability, making most of remotely operated autonomous technology. At the operational level, the two militaries fought together in Libya as well as in Iraq and Syria. The Royal Air Force lent three of its CH-47 Chinook helicopters to Barkhane, while a French company has been continuously deployed in the British-led battlegroup in Estonia, within the framework of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) agreed at Lancaster House, officially reached full operating capability in 2020, enabling progress on interoperability<sup>14</sup>.

However, many of the ambitious projects conceived in 2010 did not materialize. Aeronautics has been the most disappointing sector. Procurement plans vis-à-vis tactical drones were the first to fail, then the joint Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) program (Telemos) was abandoned, as was the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) which was meant to offer manned and unmanned replacement to both Typhoon and Rafale aircraft. France eventually turned to Germany and Spain for its own FCAS, while Britain rallied Italy, Sweden, and later Japan around the Tempest program<sup>15</sup>. Finally, the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) program is slowly moving forward to provide both countries with high-end standoff strike capability despite delays due to still contrasting views on military requirements and weapon systems.

The main lesson from respective achievements and failures may be that decade-long, ambitious, expensive, and structuring projects, such as large platforms and other pace-setting programs are less likely to succeed than shorter, pragmatic, budget-conscious, and ready-to-use projects. Large programs involve not only a rare synchronization of industrial cycles and converging capability needs but also far-reaching political alignments. This has proved problematic given French and British respective positioning on two issues: sovereign control and willingness to buy equipment from the shelf, in part to strengthen integration with closest allies – especially the US. This lesson should not be understated but taken as a given before considering any future joint project. The same can be said of joint operational deployments: questions remain as to where and when to deploy the 10,000 strong CJEF, which will likely need rearticulating and repurposing in order to be relevant in today's strategic context.

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14. Ministry of Defence and the Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP, "UK and France Able to Deploy a 10,000 Strong Joint Military Force in Response to Shared Threats", November 2, 2020.

15. J-M. Bezat, "Combat aircraft: an Anglo-Italian-Japanese Rival to the FCAS", *Le Monde*, December 10, 2022.

## Learning the Lessons from the War in Ukraine: Capabilities, Stocks and Industrial Capacity

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has dramatically changed the perception of operational and capability requirements of a high-intensity battlefield after decades of expeditionary operations and missions – even though this should not have come as a surprise given recent conflicts (Donbass 2014, Nagorno-Karabakh 2020).

Future operational requirements and force structures are now being reassessed in light of Ukrainian lessons learned and the end of long-standing overseas contingency operations, bringing about new or updated needs that may lead to further joint Franco-British cooperation given convergence in both strategic and operational cultures. Such joint endeavors could fall into two categories: on the one hand, joint procurement or capability development projects, and on the other hand, further operational cooperation, exercises, training, and joint deployments.

Of course, any future joint project needs to be set against the background of the current cost-of-living crisis and inflation, with future defense budgets about to be clarified in both countries. The French government has recently proposed a significant rise in the defense budget (with €413bn to be spent over the next seven years,

up from €295bn for the previous period) to modernize and adapt the military to high-intensity conflicts<sup>16</sup>. Similarly, the British government has recognized the need to increase the defense spending in line with the refresh of the Integrated Review, due to be published in March 2023. However, the current level of inflation and the difficult situation of public finances in the UK make any significant real increase rather unlikely<sup>17</sup>.

In the realm of capabilities, the lessons learned from Ukraine and the swift degradation of the strategic environment have stressed the urgent need to increase both French and British armed forces' readiness for high-intensity warfare scenarios. This has far-reaching consequences, including on the industrial model as pointed out by President Macron in his call for a "war economy<sup>18</sup>". As military stockpiles are dwindling quickly through deliveries to Ukraine, the need to produce more, faster, and possibly cheaper, is now a key demand by decision-makers. The first year of the war proved that London and Paris, just like other Europeans, are not as resilient as they hoped to be and that they cannot have surge capacity alone but need to work together.

16. L. Abboud, "Emmanuel Macron to Boost French Defence Spending in Response to Ukraine War", *Financial Times*, January 20, 2023.

17. M. Chalmers, "Reconsidering Pressures on UK's Defence Expenditure", RUSI, November 30, 2022.

18. E. Macron, "Visite du salon Eurosatory 2022", Élysée, June 13, 2022.

Future operational requirements and force structures are now being reassessed in light of Ukrainian lessons learned

France's cooperation with Australia to produce artillery ammunition is an example of the collaborative approach that should be fostered (combining orders, ensuring bigger and longer production rounds, etc.)<sup>19</sup>.

While one should be cautious not to mold every requirement after the Ukrainian experience, the ongoing war has convincingly demonstrated that, in a high-intensity environment, good enough' capabilities with adequate volume and logical support matter more than cutting-edge gear too scant in numbers or unsustainable in maintenance<sup>20</sup>. Stockpiles, spare parts, and robust supply chains are not a given, including for Paris and London, but strategic resources that need to be preserved<sup>21</sup>. Standardization is not a luxury but a much-needed necessity in a real-world high-intensity battlefield, as heterogeneous tailor-made equipment quickly translates into a logistical nightmare. This issue could benefit from Franco-British consultations and solutions.

To face such challenges, pragmatism is of the essence. Even if the domestic industry, as well as EU and US/NATO cooperation, will remain the preference for respectively France and the United Kingdom, specific areas for bilateral partnership (or band-wagoning) may prove relevant. France and the UK should not shy away from discussions on mutual market access, as well as the possibilities and limits of UK-EU defense industrial cooperation with, for instance, an Administrative Agreement between the UK and the European Defence Agency (EDA). Moreover, defense industrial issues are now global, and cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific (Japan, Korea, Australia) should not be underestimated going forward.

## Preparing for High Intensity: Procurement and Capability Opportunities

In the context of the high-intensity pivot, British and French military needs are converging even if, in the end, industrial preferences may differ. Building up from such cross-cutting needs, precise capability requirements emerge from the Ukrainian battlefield.

In the land domain, which has been excessively associated with "sunset capabilities" over the past years, indirect fires and deep precision strikes have suddenly become precious to both British and French armies<sup>22</sup>. They are now in short supplies after the UK and France delivered a quarter to a third of their systems to Ukraine. There may be room for closer short-term pragmatic cooperation on either platform or ammunition, even if the more structuring programs (respectively MFP and CIFS) remain on separate tracks.

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19.. V. Machi, "France, Australia to Jointly Send New Ammunition to Ukraine", *Defense News*, January 31, 2023.

20. M. Zabrodskyi, J. Watling, O.V Danylyuk and N. Reynolds, "Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022", RUSI, November 30, 2022.

21. C. Pietralunga, "French Military Lacks Ammunition for High-Intensity Conflict", *Le Monde*, February 18, 2023.

22. E. Tenenbaum et L. Peria-Peigné, "Ukraine : premiers enseignements militaires" in D. David et T. de Montbrial (dir.), *RAMSES 2023 : L'Europe dans la Guerre*, Paris, Dunod, 2022, pp. 96-102, 120-124.

The field of air defense is another area where the need is greater than previously expected. The proliferation of hypersonic threats would certainly justify joint development efforts of missile defense through European lead nations, for which the UK and France have solid competencies. These two countries could also play a role in ensuring that missile defense projects such as the German-led Sky Shield (ESSI) do not adopt a too narrow vision that would fail to properly factor in nuclear deterrence<sup>23</sup>.

Apart from such highly strategic programs, more pragmatic air defense needs may come forward. This is the case of shorter-range, mobile systems whose relevance is now reassessed, especially rapid-fire guns against both manned and unmanned aircraft<sup>24</sup>. Such a capability is currently absent from both French and British arsenals while readily available industrial offers exist that could be jointly explored.

As ones' air defense grows thicker, so does the enemy's. An increased need for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) is all the more probable that stealth technology may be seriously challenged in the future<sup>25</sup>. A joint, interoperable standoff munition such as the one discussed in FC/ASW program will obviously be key to such missions, but possibly not sufficient. Airborne offensive electronic warfare carried out by either manned or unmanned platforms may prove of great importance to both air forces and therefore open opportunities for joint capability development. A less demanding approach may consist in exploring options regarding expendable assets for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and/or depleting decoy systems able to penetrate air-denied areas. In the field of air combat, there should be opportunities for joint development to increase interoperability between Tempest, the Next Generation Fighter, and other elements of both nations' Future Combat Air Systems.

Although less visible in the public lessons from the war in Ukraine, the maritime domain is thriving with strategic challenges to which Franco-British cooperation could provide relevant responses. Beyond the already on-track MMCM program lies ample room for cooperation. As the two primary submarine powers in Europe, the UK, and France should invest in undersea warfare capabilities. The fast-developing field of autonomous and semi-autonomous undersea vehicles (UUVs) may prove a promising area, possibly leading to wider cooperation on the protection of undersea infrastructures. The same could also be said for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs).

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In the context of  
the high-intensity  
pivot, British and  
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needs are  
converging

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23. A. Brzozowski, "France Proposes Conference on 'Europe's Air Defence'", Euractiv, February 17, 2023, available at: [www.euractiv.com](http://www.euractiv.com).

24. J. Bronk, N. Reynolds and J. Watling, "The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence", RUSI, November 7, 2022.

25. J-C. Noël, M. Paglia and E. Tenenbaum, "Les armées françaises face aux menaces anti-aériennes de nouvelle génération", *Focus stratégique*, No. 86, Ifri, December 2018.

Finally, both navies will need to advance the development of sustainable power and propulsion technologies for platforms at sea<sup>26</sup>.

As warfare expands in cyber and outer space, these domains should be included in the Entente in a way that may not have been perceived back in 2010. Despite the national sensitivity of cyber defense and security issues, some degree of cooperation may be fostered in the field of digital forensics analysis sharing and countering hostile state cyber-attacks. The same can be said of space, with possibly more opportunity for cooperating on Space situational awareness and/or space tracking systems and facilities. Small and pseudo-satellites are also new areas where both state and private actors are heavily investing, with plentiful opportunities for bilateral as well as UK-EU cooperation.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, as artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled programs are making their way fast into data-centric command-and-control systems, French and UK armed forces could tomorrow cooperate more closely in this respect. Sharing good practices regarding military AI would be a starting point, but cooperation of open architecture software bricks could also be envisaged. At last, because AI systems need to be trained, the establishment of common military datasets through secure networks would be of great relevance.

## **Operational Prospects: New Frontiers for the Entente Cordiale**

However telling and politically meaningful they can be, joint procurement and capability development projects may not be the most immediate area for joint Franco-British cooperation going forward. Joint deployments, training, and operations could in fact prove a better demonstration of a common strategic culture and joint leadership.

The Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) enabled important progress on interoperability but the 2010 construct seems ill-fitted for the strategic and operational challenges of the 2020s. Beyond deployments, the concept could also be rejuvenated on a different footing with a more creative and open-ended perspective, used for horizon-scanning or wargaming exercises for instance.

The Euro-Atlantic area is and should remain the top priority for London and Paris, with increased French and British commitments to NATO's Eastern flank. Forward defense battlegroups are one way to make Franco-British unity more visible: just as a French company is embedded in the British-led battlegroup in Estonia, one could think of a reciprocal British company in the French-led battlegroup in Romania. A better understanding of London's ambitions and forward plans for the Joint-

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26. J. Bachelier and E. Tenenbaum, "Naval Combat Redux: A Renewed Challenge for Western Navies", Ifri, January 9, 2023.

27. M. Borowitz, "The Military Use of Small Satellites in Orbit", Ifri, March 4, 2022.

Expeditionary Force (JEF)<sup>28</sup> in the Nordic region would also be beneficial to ensure Franco-British overall strategic alignment, as well as a better mutual understanding of respective High-North strategies and objectives.

The Eastern Mediterranean, and even more so the Black Sea, is an adjacent theatre of operations of key importance to the defense and deterrence mission. It is an ideal region where to demonstrate Franco-British air and naval interoperability<sup>29</sup>, while keeping in mind Paris and London at times divergent views on Turkey – and somewhat different approaches – to an escalated risk with Russia.

The Indo-Pacific constitutes another logical item for Franco-British defense cooperation, as the two countries learn to better manage their competition and move beyond the AUKUS fallout<sup>30</sup>. The UK and France are the only two European countries with a historical military footprint in the region and have vowed to increase their relevance as security providers. Although their views of strategic engagement with China and the role of US-led security arrangements in the region may differ, a lot of missions could benefit from their complimentary capabilities and basing facilities.

A coordinated maritime presence – rather than a joint one – could enable a more regular and structured European presence in this mega-region. At the very least, coordination of maritime patrols among island states in the Pacific could defuse any notion of a Franco-British rivalry in the area<sup>31</sup>. The sharing of costs and access to naval and air facilities could also be imagined. France may welcome allies on their sovereign facilities in both Indian and Pacific oceans, while the UK may work at sharing their facilities in Southeast Asia with other European partners, provided host nations agree with it. Moreover, trilateral work and consultations with close regional partners such as Japan could be beneficial. More joint assessment and wargaming of how a crisis in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait would impact London, Paris, and their respective strategies would also be relevant.

Finally, Africa and the Middle East will remain key regions where both countries have lasting interests despite declining resources to dedicate to them, given competing priorities. As France finally closes its large military operation chapter in Africa, it strengthens the case for bilateral cooperation and synergies. British and French security forces assistance units as well as special operation forces could cooperate more closely on two intertwined and long-term challenges in both regions: countering the spread of violent extremism and the rise of malign competitors' influence, whether in the forms of supposedly private security companies such as the Wagner Group, or through

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28. S. Monaghan, "The Joint Expeditionary Force: Global Britain in Northern Europe?", CSIS, March 25, 2022.

29. NATO, "UK Fighters Cooperate with French Strike Group in the Eastern Mediterranean", December 19, 2022.

30. A. Billon-Galland and H. Kundnani, "UK and France Should Collaborate on Indo-Pacific Security", Chatham House, March 26, 2021.

31. J. Bachelier and C. Pajon, "France and AUKUS: Bouncing Back to Live up to Pacific Challenges", Ifri, November 3, 2022.

disinformation and propaganda networks<sup>32</sup>. Just like for the Indo-Pacific, the sharing of military facilities, the set-up of joint task forces, or at the very least the coordination of security assistance efforts should be within reach of joint efforts provided a common security policy construct exists to support it. Finally, a joint lessons-learned process about recent European operations in the region would be beneficial, as Europeans rethink their out-of-area objectives and ambitions for the region.

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32. N. Westcott, "Shared Fortunes: Why Britain, the European Union, and Africa Need One Another", European Council on Foreign Relations, *Policy Brief*, April 22, 2022.





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