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Strategic Shift in NATO's Support for Ukraine

A Study of NSATU and PURL Initiatives

Iryna KRASNOSHTAN

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Ifri

27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE

Tel. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 – Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60

Email: accueil@ifri.org

Website: ifri.org

Author

Iryna Krasnoshtan is an expert in foreign policy and security issues, with a particular focus on NATO-Ukraine and transatlantic relations. She is a Program Director at the International Center for Ukrainian Victory (NGO). From 2012 to 2023, she worked at the NATO Liaison Office and NATO Representation to Ukraine, including six years as a political analyst. Iryna was invited as an adjunct professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (2020-2022) and was a Transatlantic Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in 2022.

Abstract

This study analyzes a significant transformation in NATO's practical support to Ukraine, marked by the establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission and the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) funding mechanism. While NATO's support to Ukraine in 2022 was largely limited to non-lethal assistance and capacity-building measures, in 2025 it assumed a direct role in the coordination and provision of military support to Ukraine. This was influenced by several factors, and not least by the changing policy of the new US administration *vis-à-vis* Ukraine. NSATU currently coordinates more than 80% of all military support to Ukraine, while PURL became a key mechanism for the provision of critical air-defense capabilities—supplying 75% of all missiles for Ukraine's *Patriot* systems and 90% of the missiles used in other air-defense systems.

The first section looks at the origins of the establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and its interconnection with other pre-existing coordination formats, such as US European Command Control Center-Ukraine (ECCU), International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) and Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG). It also examines NSATU's core functions, such as the coordination and delivery of equipment, and the coordination of training and force development.

The second section focuses on the PURL mechanism and analyzes the dynamics of its implementation since its establishment in August 2025. In particular, it assesses key issues related to the sustainable funding of the initiatives, as well as burden-sharing among the Allies and political dynamics shaping participation in the initiative.

While highlighting the successes of NSATU and PURL in improving the coordination, predictability, and effectiveness of support to Ukraine, the study also identifies important limitations and risks. It argues that the long-term sustainability of these initiatives may be undermined by funding shortfalls, unequal burden-sharing and industrial capacity constraints. Growing political divisions between the United States and its European Allies represent another key source of vulnerability.

Résumé

Cette étude analyse une transformation majeure du soutien pratique de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) à l'Ukraine, marquée par la création de la mission *NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine* (NSATU) et du mécanisme de financement *Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List* (PURL). Alors qu'en 2022 le soutien de l'OTAN à l'Ukraine se limitait essentiellement à une assistance non létale et à des mesures de renforcement des capacités, l'Alliance a assumé en 2025 un rôle direct dans la coordination et la fourniture de l'aide militaire à l'Ukraine. Cette évolution a été influencée par plusieurs facteurs, notamment par l'évolution de la politique de la nouvelle administration américaine à l'égard de l'Ukraine. Aujourd'hui, la mission NSATU coordonne plus de 80 % de l'ensemble de l'aide militaire destinée à l'Ukraine, tandis que le mécanisme PURL est devenu un instrument essentiel pour la fourniture de capacités critiques de défense aérienne, en assurant 75 % des missiles destinés aux systèmes *Patriot* ukrainiens et 90 % des missiles utilisés par les autres systèmes de défense aérienne.

La première partie de l'étude retrace les origines de la création de la *NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine* et analyse son articulation avec les mécanismes de coordination préexistants, notamment l'EUCOM Control Center-Ukraine (ECCU), l'International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), le Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) et l'Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG). Elle examine également les principales fonctions de NSATU, notamment la coordination et l'acheminement des équipements, la coordination des activités de formation ainsi que le développement des forces.

La deuxième partie est consacrée au mécanisme PURL et analyse les dynamiques de sa mise en œuvre depuis sa création en août 2025. Elle évalue en particulier les principaux enjeux liés à la pérennité du financement de ces initiatives, au partage du fardeau entre les Alliés ainsi qu'aux dynamiques politiques qui façonnent la participation à ce mécanisme.

Tout en mettant en évidence les succès de NSATU et de PURL dans l'amélioration de la coordination, de la prévisibilité et de l'efficacité du soutien apporté à l'Ukraine, l'étude identifie également plusieurs limites et risques importants. Elle soutient que la viabilité à long terme de ces initiatives pourrait être compromise par des insuffisances de financement, un partage inégal des charges et des contraintes liées aux capacités industrielles. L'aggravation des divergences politiques entre les États-Unis et leurs alliés européens constitue également une autre source majeure de vulnérabilité.

Glossary of acronyms

CURL – Comprehensive Ukraine Requirements List

ECCU – EUCOM Control Center-Ukraine

EUCOM – United States European Command

EUMAM – European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine

HIMARS – High Mobility Artillery Rocket System

IDCC – International Donor Coordination Center

JATEC – Joint Analysis, Training and Education Center

JMTG-U – Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine

LEN-P – Logistics Enabling Node-Poland

LEN-R – Logistics Enabling Node-Romania

NAC – North Atlantic Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO HQ – North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters

NATO SecGen – NATO Secretary General

NSATU – NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine

OFDeF – Operational Force Development Framework

PURL – Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List

RDC-U – Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine

SACEUR – NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAG-U – Security Assistance Group-Ukraine

SHAPE – NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

UDCG – Ukraine Defence Contact Group

USAFE – United States Air Forces in Europe

Table of contents

INTRODUCTION	7
NATO SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING FOR UKRAINE.....	9
How NSATU initiative came into place.....	9
Coordination formats in support of Ukraine before NSATU	10
NSATU’s structure and mandate	11
Coordination and delivery of weapons and equipment	13
Coordination of training	14
Force development.....	15
NSATU Trust Fund	16
NSATU’s success and limitations.....	17
PRIORITIZED UKRAINE REQUIREMENTS LIST	19
How the PURL initiative came into place.....	19
How PURL works	20
PURL funding	21
Burden-sharing issues	23
PURL’s successes and limitations	27
CONCLUSION	31

Introduction

Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022—and for that fact since the outset of Russian aggression in 2014—NATO has been providing both political and practical support to Ukraine. However, the nature and the scale of the support have seen an important change between 2022 and 2025 with the establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) mission and a special funding mechanism called Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL).

Back in 2022, the Alliance’s response was guided by self-imposed restrictions concerning the provision of military aid to Ukraine. NATO, as an organization, was only providing non-lethal support and capacity-building measures to Ukraine. Any lethal military support to Ukraine was up to individual Allies.¹ Also, NATO, as an Alliance bringing together 30 countries from both sides of the Atlantic at the time (Finland and Sweden joined later), was not playing any coordinating role in the provision of support to Ukraine. Instead, several other bilateral and multilateral formats were created—the main forum being the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), set up in Ramstein under the US leadership.² Moreover, the activities of NATO’s office in Ukraine were very limited, as its international staff was evacuated from Kyiv. Generally, NATO tried to stay out of any direct involvement in the security assistance to Ukraine in line with a policy of non-escalation and in an attempt to avoid the direct confrontation between NATO and Russia.

Currently, NATO is directly and actively involved in fundraising and coordination of critical weapons provision to Ukraine through its PURL initiative. It also has a dedicated military command directly involved in coordination and provision of support to Ukraine: NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). The Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) was also established as the first NATO-Ukraine institution to identify and apply lessons from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Furthermore, NATO HQ is taking over a more active role in ensuring the smooth operation of the UDCG format. Finally, NATO Representation to Ukraine has not only fully resumed its work, but it has grown significantly.

1. L. Cook, “As Russia’s War on Ukraine Drags On, What Is NATO and What Is It Doing to Help?”, *AP News*, July 11, 2023, available at: <https://apnews.com>.

2. L. C. Baldor, “NATO Agrees to Take on Coordination of Some Ukraine Security Support. How That Will Work”, *AP News*, July 11, 2024, available at: <https://apnews.com>.

These changes came into place due to several reasons. First, Ukrainian resilience and determination in fighting Russian aggression—Ukraine did not fall in three days, as some predicted, but continues to fight the “second strongest army in the world”.³ Second, the assessment of the Russian threat to NATO and Europe has also changed—Russia is recognized as a direct and immediate threat to NATO, and therefore, the understanding of Ukraine’s role in ensuring security for Europe has also grown. And very importantly, third, the political situation in a number of countries has changed, also influencing a change in the policy. Thus, the US and Germany—for different reasons—changed their positions, which allowed for the initiatives like NSATU and PURL to come into place at a critical time.

Both former and current NATO Secretary Generals have played a role in leading these changes—NSATU was established under Jens Stoltenberg and PURL under Mark Rutte. The shift in the US Administration’s policies towards its European Allies and support for Ukraine in particular was also a determining factor.

While this study primarily researches the establishment and implementation of two initiatives—the NSATU mission and the PURL mechanism—as key elements of NATO’s revised approach towards support to Ukraine, it also assesses how the growing split among the Allies affects their long-term sustainability.

3. Before the Russian full-scale invasion, the Russian army was commonly referred to as the second strongest army in the world after the US. According to the Global Firepower Index, Russia remains in second place. However, this could be attributed mainly to its lethal capabilities.

NATO security assistance and training for Ukraine

This section examines the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine from its origins to its implementation. It begins with outlining the genesis of the initiative and the coordination formats that preceded it, before analyzing its structure and mandate. It further reviews NSATU's core missions—coordination and delivery of security assistance, coordination of training and force development, as well as covers the specific NSATU Trust Fund. Finally, it provides an assessment of NSATU's success and limitations.

How NSATU initiative came into place

NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)⁴ is a NATO command that coordinates the provision of military equipment and training to Ukraine by NATO members and partner countries. It was agreed by NATO Leaders at the Washington Summit in July 2024. Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg was the one promoting the idea for some time,⁵ but it was the shadow of the upcoming American elections in 2024 that persuaded the Allies to finally accept it.

The rationale behind this was simple—the existing formats of coordination and delivery of support to Ukraine were majorly US-led, and it was unclear whether, after the American election, they would remain intact. So, NSATU was supposed to become an unofficial “insurance” measure, some even called it “Trump-proof”.⁶ Moreover, existing support mechanisms were established *ad hoc* and expanded over time, requiring better institutionalization. It was logical to bring them under NATO's command—giving a stronger mandate for coordination among Allied nations, increasing efficiency of donors' support and providing a clearer framework and structure.

4. “NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)”, Relations with Ukraine, NATO, updated June 26, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

5. “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine”, NATO, April 29, 2024, available at: www.nato.int.

6. D. Brennan, “NATO Preparing ‘Trump-proof’ Plan B for Ukraine: Report”, *Newsweek*, July 2, 2024, available at: www.newsweek.com.

Coordination formats in support of Ukraine before NSATU

Within a few days after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—once it became clear that Kyiv did not fall and Ukrainian forces fiercely stood up to the enemy—the US European Command (EUCOM) quickly set up a 24/7 operations center called EUCOM Control Center-Ukraine (ECCU) aimed at coordinating the delivery of military aid to Ukraine from different donor nations.⁷ Americans soon merged efforts with the team from the UK, who were trying to do the same, forming the International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC), hosted by EUCOM Headquarters in Germany.⁸

In addition to the Americans and the British, the cell included officers from a number of donor countries, as well as from Ukraine. Ukraine was identifying its requests for specific equipment, and participating nations were identifying what they could provide.⁹ The equipment and weapons were then delivered to one of three nations at the Ukrainian border (mainly Poland, and to a lesser extent Romania and Slovakia, with subsequent transportation through Ukraine's territory ensured by Ukraine. While the newer NATO weapons and systems started to get donated, the cell also started to coordinate the training efforts for the Ukrainian military.¹⁰

Around that time, the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin also started the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG), also known as the Ramstein group, by the name of the US Ramstein Air Base, where the inaugural meeting of the format took place in April 2022.¹¹ It was the US-led voluntary initiative bringing together the “nations of goodwill” to coordinate military assistance to Ukraine.

In November 2022, with additional funding for Ukraine approved by the US,¹² the need became clear to put on a more sustainable footing the process that was rapidly set up.¹³ The Pentagon therefore decided to establish a dedicated headquarters, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine

7. A. Mahshie, “What is EUCOM’s Ukraine Control Center?”, *Air & Space Forces Magazine*, April 29, 2022, available at: www.airandspaceforces.com.

8. V. Machi, “Inside the Multinational Logistics Cell Coordinating Military Aid for Ukraine”, *Defense News*, July 21, 2022, available at: www.defensenews.com.

9. Ibid.

10. J. Garamone, “European Command Group Strives to Get Ukrainians What They Need”, United States European Command, July 7, 2022, available at: www.eucom.mil.

11. C. T. Lopez, “Austin Meets with Nations to Intensify Support for Ukraine”, U.S. Department of War, April 26, 2022, available at: www.war.gov.

12. D. G. Ware, “Pentagon Announces Another \$400 Million in Military Aid to Ukraine, Establishes Headquarters in Germany to Handle Shipments and Training”, *Stars and Stripes*, November 4, 2022, available at: www.stripes.com.

13. O. Liebermann and B. Starr, “Pentagon Working to Form New Command to Coordinate Arming and Training Ukraine”, CNN, September 29, 2022, available at: <https://edition.cnn.com>.

(SAG-U), in US Army Garrison at Wiesbaden, Germany.¹⁴ SAG-U was tasked to provide “long-term, focused organizational structure to oversee the security assistance” for Ukraine,¹⁵ including both shipments and training. It was also based at the EUCOM alongside the IDCC.

NSATU's structure and mandate

After the July 2024 Summit decision, NSATU officially became operational in December 2024 and took over the responsibilities from both the IDCC (fully) and SAG-U (partially).¹⁶ The command continues to be based in Wiesbaden, Germany and is led by an American three-star general (Lieutenant General Curtis A. Buzzard)—his deputy being a German two-star general (Major General Ulf Häussler)¹⁷—reporting to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), also an American (General Alexis G. Grynkewich). NSATU's Commander is dual-hatted and also serves as the SAG-U commander.¹⁸ Despite fears of American disengagement, the United States remained highly involved in the new structure, ensuring continuity and a smooth transition under NATO command.

The Commander has three Assistants—one-star generals from Poland, Canada and the UK—each responsible for one of the three main NSATU's divisions. Brigadier General Witold Bartoszek is responsible for the Support Division¹⁹ (equipment coordination and logistical support), Brigadier General Patrick Robichaud for Training,²⁰ and Brigadier General Richard Bell for Force Development Support.²¹ Commander also has an American Senior Enlisted Advisor.

14. M. Myers, “Long-term Assistance Command to Oversee Training Mission with Ukraine”, *Military Times*, November 9, 2022, available at: www.militarytimes.com.

15. “Press Release - Security Assistance Group - Ukraine Change of Command”, US Army Europe and Africa, August 5, 2024, available at: www.europeafrica.army.mil.

16. “NSATU Assumes Responsibilities to Support Ukraine”, SHAPE, December 18, 2024, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

17. “NSATU Leadership”, SHAPE, retrieved May 5, 2026, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.


18. “Press Release - Security Assistance Group - Ukraine Change of Command”, op. cit.

19. “Strengthening Ukraine's Frontline: Nations and Industry Unite at 5th Capability Sustainment Working Group”, SHAPE, February 6, 2026, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

20. “United in Training: Multinational Effort Shapes Ukraine's Future Force”, SHAPE, December 1, 2025, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

21. “Understanding Modern Warfare on Ukraine's Battlefield”, SHAPE, September 19, 2025, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

Figure 1. NSATU Organizational Chart



Source: SHAPE.

As of 2026, NSATU is manned by 350 military personnel in Wiesbaden, coming from 30 nations—most of them NATO Allies, as well as several partner nations, like Australia and New Zealand. Ukraine has a special role within NSATU—as a nation for which the mission was established—and it has its liaison presence in Wiesbaden. Additional personnel are located in NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, as well as at the logistics hubs. NSATU is planned to reach around 700 personnel overall.

NSATU essentially serves as a Clearing House and is focused on coordination. It gives higher visibility to Ukraine's needs in terms of equipment and training, and matches them with what Allies and operational partners can provide. It has three main focus areas: support and logistics, training and force development.

Coordination and delivery of weapons and equipment

First, NSATU ensures coordination of donations with Allies and partners, and their delivery.²² It identifies Ukraine's needs together with Ukrainian partners based on the battlefield situation and operational requirements, matches them with individual NATO Allies and partners making the donations or purchases and ensures their delivery to the logistics hubs close to the Ukrainian border. NSATU has fully taken over this function from IDCC.

Ukrainian requirements are formulated and transferred to the donors through a unified system called *Korovai*—developed by Ukraine. *Korovai* is a key software tool used to coordinate military support with international partners, according to a Decree of the Government of Ukraine.²³ *Korovai* is the most comprehensive database of all of Ukraine's operational needs—including both equipment and training. Moreover, *Korovai* is one of the systems used to monitor the shipment and delivery of the donors' donations to Ukraine.

By now, NSATU has coordinated the supply from donors of tens of billions of euros worth of military donations, such as Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missiles and Leopard 2 main battle tanks,²⁴ as well as the delivery of weapons and ammunition that are provided via the PURL initiative. NSATU also helps to coordinate the repair and maintenance of equipment and to source the necessary spare parts and ammunition, making sure that equipment remains efficient on the battlefield.

The deliveries are enabled through the logistics hubs in the eastern part of the Alliance, with the caveat that NSATU only operates on Allied territory and is not involved in the delivery of aid into Ukraine itself. NSATU currently operates through two logistics hubs, a large hub in Poland and a smaller one in Romania.²⁵

The Logistics Enabling Node-Poland (LEN-P) in Rzeszów-Jasionka manages the reception and onward movement of approximately 18,000 tons of donated military equipment per month.²⁶ In January 2025, NSATU took over the command and control of the air defenses over LEN-P from the US with the German *Patriot* unit.²⁷ In addition, NSATU assumed

22. "Equipment Coordination and Logistical Support", SHAPE, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

23. Cabinet of Ministers Decree of February 13, 2024, N168, Kyiv, Parliament of Ukraine, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua>.

24. "NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU)", NATO, available at: www.nato.int.

25. Y. Matiushenko, interview with Mike Keller, NSATU Deputy Commander, Ukrinform, August 29, 2025, available at: www.ukrinform.ua (in Ukrainian).

26. "SACEUR on Support for Ukraine: We Are Moving as Quickly as We Can", SHAPE, July 28, 2025, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

27. "NSATU: The German Armed Forces in the NATO Support Mission for Ukraine", Bundeswehr, available at: www.bundeswehr.de (in German).

control over the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine (RDC-U), used for maintenance and repair of the equipment donated to Ukraine, also located in Jasionka and previously administered by the US. According to the Special Inspector General Report to the US Congress, as of June 1, 2025, all activities in Jasionka were transitioned to NSATU or permanent locations elsewhere. Poland has assumed a substantial portion of the operational work, and France, Germany, Norway, Romania and the United Kingdom have taken on multiple activities.²⁸

The Logistics Enabling Node-Romania (LEN-R) within the 71st Air Base Câmpia Turzii is being scaled up in Romania. In 2025, it was undergoing expansion and modernization works.²⁹ In the past, the LEN-R was used by the US Department of State for transferring support to Ukraine, and it was under the command of the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE).³⁰ In October 2024, the Romanian Parliament approved the participation of the Romanian army in NSATU and agreed to provide the equipment and infrastructure of its LEN-R facility.³¹ And in September 2025, it approved for LEN-R to become a component of NSATU with the status of Allied command.³²

Coordination of training

Second, NSATU ensures coordination of the training of Ukrainian forces provided by NATO Allies at various facilities in Allied countries.³³ It took this function over from SAG-U. There are a number of training missions delivered by different countries outside of Ukraine. It includes the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Ukraine), supported by many European countries, the Interflex operation led by the United Kingdom, the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JPTG-U) led by the US, Operation Legio led by Norway, and Operation Unifier led by Canada, among others.

NSATU itself does not deliver any training. Its role is to coordinate this work—it identifies the needs on the Ukrainian side and matches them against what Allies could provide, aiming to ensure better effectiveness of these

28. Special Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, Operation Atlantic Resolve, April 1, 2025–June 30, 2025, Office of Inspector-General, US Department of State, retrieved May 5, 2026, available at: www.stateoig.gov.

29. “Extension and modernization of the Câmpia Turzii base, completed ahead of schedule”, Defense Romania, January 23, 2025, available at: www.defenseromania.ro.

30. Evaluation of Security and Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred to Ukraine Through Romania (Report No. DODIG-2025-019), Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, November 12, 2024, available at: www.dodig.mil.

31. Decision No. 25 of October 1, 2024, Romanian Legislative Portal, available at: <https://legislatie.just.ro> (in Romanian).

32. Decision No. 41 of September 30, 2025, Romanian Legislative Portal, available at: <https://legislatie.just.ro>.

33. “Training”, SHAPE, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

efforts.³⁴ By late 2025, NSATU has coordinated and enabled the training by its partners for over 45,000 members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.³⁵

Force development

Third, NSATU provides support to the long-term development of Ukraine's Armed Forces.³⁶ The Force Development division aims to help Ukraine ensure a longer-term planning horizon, extending it to 24 months. It enables Ukraine and Allies to look beyond the urgent needs and improves Ukraine's ability to match its future force generation with the new capabilities that international partners can provide through various mechanisms. It also ensures Ukraine's further integration and increased interoperability with NATO.

This work is mainstreamed through a process called Operational Force Development Framework (OFDeF)³⁷—launched in September 2024 and refined in early 2025—which enables the synchronization of Ukraine's armed forces requirements across different capabilities areas—both for short-term operational needs, as well as for an extended planning horizon. The framework is based on a 16-week planning cycle with three main conferences a year.³⁸ It is driven by Ukraine, supported by NSATU and involves a number of other partners, like SAG-U, EUMAM, JATEC (Joint Analysis, Training and Education Center³⁹), etc.

OFDeF and NSATU's work on Force Development is closely linked to the work of the Capability Coalitions under the UDCG format, established in February 2024.⁴⁰ To make support to Ukraine more streamlined and focused on particular areas, eight coalitions were formed: air force, armor, artillery, demining, drones, integrated air and missile defense, information technology security, and maritime security.⁴¹ In January 2025, eight roadmaps for each capability area were approved, with a timeline running until 2027, trying to strike a balance between Ukraine's urgent battlefield

34. Y. Matiushenko, interview with Mike Keller, NSATU Deputy Commander, Ukrinform, August 29, 2025, available at: www.ukrinform.ua (in Ukrainian).

35. Ibid.

36. "Force Development Support", SHAPE, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

37. "Forging the Future of Ukraine's Combat Power: One Year of Force Development", SHAPE, October 2, 2025, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

38. "Ukraine, Allies and Partners Meet to Better Align International Military Support", SHAPE, February 10, 2025, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

39. JATEC is another new NATO-Ukraine organization established after the 2024 Washington Summit. Located in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and directly subordinated to NATO Allied Command Transformation, it aims to increase NATO-Ukraine operability and contributes to strengthening both NATO's and Ukraine's deterrence and defense, including by identifying and applying lessons from the Russian war against Ukraine.

40. "Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing on the Outcomes of the 19th Ukraine Defense Contact Group Meeting", U.S. Department of War, February 16, 2024, available at: www.war.gov.

41. T. Martin, "Eight 'Capability Coalitions' Are Rushing Arms to Ukraine. Here's Who Will Donate What", *Breaking Defense*, May 9, 2024, available at: <https://breakingdefense.com>.

needs and future force development.⁴² In April 2025, the ninth Coalition was established, focused on electronic warfare⁴³.

Figure 3. Capability Coalitions under the UDCG format

Name of Capability Coalition	Lead Nation(s)
Air Force Coalition	United States, Denmark, Netherlands
Integrated Air and Missile Defense Coalition	France, Germany
Maritime Capability Coalition	United Kingdom, Norway
Artillery Coalition	France, United States
Armored Vehicles and Maneuverability Coalition	Poland, Germany, Italy
IT Coalition	Estonia, Luxembourg
Drone Coalition	Latvia, United Kingdom
Demaining Capability Coalition	Lithuania, Iceland
Electronic Warfare Coalition	Germany

Source: Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

Another related process is the Interoperability Roadmap for Ukraine, which was endorsed at the 2024 Washington NATO Summit.⁴⁴ In this process, NATO supports Ukraine by incorporating interoperability requirements into its long-term capability development plans. The work under the Interoperability Roadmap is even more long-term focused. The roadmap has a timeline of 10 years, while the OFDeF operates under a two-year timeline, similar to the one adopted by UDCG.

NSATU Trust Fund

In April 2025, during the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting, the establishment of the NSATU Trust Fund was announced, and the UK

42. "Participants of Ramstein Meeting Approve Eight Roadmaps to Support Ukraine through 2027", Ukrinform, January 9, 2025, available at: www.ukrinform.net.

43. "Five New Countries Have Joined the Electronic Warfare Coalition", Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, June 5, 2025, available at: <https://mod.gov.ua>.

44. "On Ukraine's Interoperability Roadmap", NATO in Ukraine Facebook page, July 26, 2024, available at: www.facebook.com/NATOinUkraine.

became the Lead nation.⁴⁵ This financial instrument is not at all related to the operational side of the NSATU command.⁴⁶ The Trust Fund aims to close the gaps in Ukraine's urgent needs that are not covered by other bilateral or multilateral donations, for example, for spare parts. Nations contribute funds, which are passed to the UK,⁴⁷ which manages the finances and procures equipment, which NSATU then helps to deliver to Ukraine. There is no publicly available information on the full budget of the Trust Fund, but among the contributing nations are Sweden, Norway, Canada, Denmark, Iceland and New Zealand.

NSATU's success and limitations

Overall, the establishment of NSATU allowed the provision of military support to Ukraine to be ensured despite the political turbulence in the US, as this framework provides a bigger role for the European nations. Currently, NSATU coordinates more than 80% of all military support to Ukraine.⁴⁸

The command also significantly improves coordination of international support and puts in order rather chaotic *ad hoc* processes that existed before. It also gives higher visibility to Ukraine's needs and attempts to increase predictability, ensuring a longer-term planning for Ukraine. Moreover, through direct coordination with Ukrainian partners, various working formats and conferences, NSATU also opens opportunities for mutual learning between the Allies and Ukraine. Recent public reports from the NATO exercise "Hedgehog-2025" in Estonia⁴⁹ revealed how much NATO nations and partners have yet to learn from the Ukrainians on the nature and speed of modern warfare.

However, there are several limitations identified. One could have expected that with the creation of NSATU, the whole ecosystem of coordination of military support to Ukraine would be unified. However, this is not the case, as other elements established back in 2022 continue to exist, leaving a need for an additional layer of coordination between these coordination formats and, subsequently, risks for potential duplications.

As described above, NSATU took over only a specific portfolio from SAG-U, which continues to play its role, mainly focused on US assistance. Moreover, UDCG also continues to operate as a larger political forum, involving more than 50 nations, including partners outside of NATO

45. "NSATU Trust Fund", NATO Security Assistance Ukraine, SHAPE, available at: <https://shape.nato.int>.

46. NSATU and NSATU Trust Fund operate independently from each other.

47. The Trust Fund is administered by the UK Ministry of Defence.

48. R. Kot, "Interview with Ukraine's Ambassador to NATO, Aliona Hetmanchuk", RBK-Ukraine, January 23, 2026, available at: www.rbc.ua.

49. A. Olech, "Two Battalions 'Destroyed'? The Truth about NATO's Exercise", Defence24, February 17, 2026, available at: <https://defence24.com>.

(compared to 30 nations in NSATU). After the change of administration in the US, and obvious disinterest of the new US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in continuing his predecessor's work, UDCG chairpersonship was taken over by European Allies—first by the UK in February 2025,⁵⁰ joined by Germany in April 2025.⁵¹

In October 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced that NATO and its Secretariat will be more involved in the UDCG work,⁵² from hosting the meetings at the NATO HQ—as it has already done on a number of occasions—to providing analytical support and ensuring the continuous work between the meetings. Ukraine has also voiced its interest in further reforming the format, ensuring there is a tracking of the contributions announced at UDCG and their implementation, which was not done in the past, allowing some countries to repeat the same contributions.⁵³ It is possible that this function would be performed by NATO's Secretariat. This means, on one hand, that NATO's role in UDCG format is growing, and on the other hand, it limits NSATU to the role of a practical implementer of the political decisions taken at the UDCG level.

It can also be argued that NSATU only provides a more shiny “packaging” to the existing lines of effort—it now coordinates things that have already been provided by the other nations or organizations. Moreover, at times it can create unnecessary complexity, trying to build additional processes over those that already exist.

NSATU, as a coordinating body, does not essentially prioritize the needs, and it does not determine who gets what. In practice, it often means that the focus is on the major Armed Forces requirements, while smaller needs could be overlooked. For example, Ukrainian Special Operation Forces—and their specific equipment requirements—lack visibility and can be easily overlooked among all the other needs, while this could be potentially a much smaller donation that could be more easily made by a nation.

50. “UK Leads Major Ukraine Summit and Announces £150 Million Firepower Package”, UK Government, available at: <http://gov.uk>.

51. J. Urbancik, “UK and Germany Take Over Chairmanship of Ukraine Contact Group”, Euronews, April 11, 2025, available at: www.euronews.com.

52. “Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group”, NATO, October 15, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

53. V. Uliianenko and R. Kot, “Ukraine Works on ‘Ramstein’ Reform – Ambassador”, RBK-Ukraine, January 23, 2026, available at: www.rbc.ua.

Prioritized Ukraine requirements list

This section first examines the establishment of the PURL mechanism and its implementation. It later analyses PURL's funding with particular focus on the issue of burden-sharing among the participating nations. Lastly, it concludes with the assessment of its successes and limitations.

How the PURL initiative came into place

After the US presidential elections in late 2024 and the inauguration in early 2025 of Donald Trump, it became clear that American foreign policy would be based on a transactional approach. President Trump immediately expressed that he does not want the Transatlantic relationship to be asymmetric and expects more from the European partners. He was also unhappy with the support that the Biden Administration provided to Ukraine and would no longer continue it. There were several episodes, when the existing US military aid to Ukraine was suspended, including the intelligence sharing.⁵⁴ Mark Rutte, who has maintained good personal relations with Donald Trump, took on a delicate mission to preserve the unity of the Alliance at all costs—at times through controversial choices—and at the same time to continue support for Ukraine.

At the end of June 2025, the NATO Summit in The Hague saw Allies agree to President Donald Trump's initiative to increase NATO's defense expenditures target to 5% of GDP—3,5% on the core defense expenditures and 1,5% on other defense and security-related spending. It is against that successful backdrop that Mark Rutte visited Washington, D.C. and agreed with the US President on a new initiative, which was announced on July 14, 2025.⁵⁵ The idea was that Ukraine would continue to receive essential military equipment from the US, funded by the Allies in Europe and Canada, and the effort would be coordinated by NATO. The initiative became known as the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL).

In the past, the US Administration used the Presidential Drawdown Authority to send the equipment to Ukraine from the existing US stockpiles. The last drawdown of \$500 million was made by former US President

54. L. Harding and D. Sabbagh, "US Stops Sharing Intelligence on Russia with Ukraine", *The Guardian*, March 5, 2025, available at: www.theguardian.com.

55. "NATO Secretary General Meets President Trump to Bolster Support for Ukraine", NATO, July 15, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

Joe Biden on January 9, 2025, with reportedly \$3.8 billion worth of Presidential Drawdown Authority still remaining for the next Administration to use.⁵⁶ However, the new administration had no intention to do it. Furthermore, in early July 2025, it once again halted the delivery of the equipment to Ukraine, agreed by the previous Administration, including *Patriot* interceptors.⁵⁷ Therefore, PURL became the only possible way to unblock the delivery of urgent American gear to Ukraine, which was essentially ready to go under the Presidential Drawdown.

The speed with which PURL came into reality was still impressive, especially for such a big bureaucratic machine, as NATO—from high-level political agreement in mid-July to first funds flowing in at the beginning of August and the first deliveries to Ukraine in early September. Notably, unlike NSATU,⁵⁸ PURL did not require going through the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval process, as it is a voluntary effort and does not have a common NATO funding.

How PURL works

NATO and the participants of UDCG use what is called the Comprehensive Ukraine Requirements List (CURL). This is a comprehensive, consolidated list of Ukrainian requests for military support from international partners. It is a more tailored version of the *Korovai*—explained in the earlier section. While *Korovai* represents all Ukrainian requests, CURL draws out the really urgent priorities and is checked against what is realistically available. PURL is the prioritized list of requirements that the US can only provide. This is equipment and ammunition, either unique to the US or which the US has readily available and in large quantities.

A special role in the process belongs to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). In a similar way to the NSATU commander, SACEUR is also dual-hatted—serving as the Commander of the US European Command (EUCOM). Therefore, SACEUR is uniquely positioned to identify packages of equipment and munitions that the United States can provide, coordinate them with other NATO Allies and validate them against Ukraine's needs.

Nations—individually or in groups—agree to provide funding for these packages, each worth roughly \$500 million. The equipment and munitions are bought from the stockpiles; moreover, most of it is already stationed in Europe, which makes the deliveries rather fast and efficient.

56. "Joe Biden's Final \$500M Ukraine Package Leaves \$3.8B on the Table for Trump", *Newsweek*, January 9, 2025, available at: www.newsweek.com.

57. "Trump Withholds Some Air Defense Missiles from Ukraine", *AP News*, July 2, 2025, available at: <https://apnews.com>.

58. NATO's major military operations.

The actual delivery to Ukraine is also coordinated through NATO, specifically through NSATU.

PURL funding

The first four \$500 million packages were quickly funded through August 2025, raising \$2 billion: a first package fully funded by the Netherlands,⁵⁹ immediately followed by a second jointly funded by Denmark, Norway and Sweden;⁶⁰ a third—fully funded by Germany⁶¹ and the fourth one by Canada.⁶² It was reported that Ukraine began to receive its first US equipment via the PURL initiative in mid-September,⁶³ making the initiative quite time-efficient. The first packages included missiles for *Patriot* and HIMARS, as well as other equipment.

However, after this initial success, some challenges became visible. In September 2025, Ukrainian officials reported on the on-going coordination for the next packages. Ukraine expected to ensure additional funding of \$1 billion every month.⁶⁴ Similar expectations were publicly made by NATO SecGen during the December Foreign Ministerial meeting—he expected \$5 billion by the end of 2025 and \$12 billion for the next year.

Yet, no additional packages were funded by Allies between September and October 2025. Only in mid-November, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden announced a joint—fifth—\$500 million package.⁶⁵

The NATO HQ and Mark Rutte himself were working hard to secure more funds for the initiative, with particular pressure on the Allies who had not yet contributed. And at the last NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting of the year on December 3, 2025, more commitments were made and three new packages announced—each worth \$500 million. The sixth package was funded by Germany, Norway, Poland, the seventh by Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, and the eighth by Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain.⁶⁶

59. “Secretary General Welcomes First Package of U.S. Equipment for Ukraine Funded by the Netherlands under New NATO Initiative”, NATO, August 4, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

60. “NATO Allies Denmark, Norway and Sweden Announce \$500m Package of Support for Ukraine”, NATO, August 5, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

61. “Germany to Fund \$500m PURL Package for Ukraine”, NATO, August 13, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

62. “Canada to Fund \$500m PURL Package for Ukraine”, NATO, August 24, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

63. “Six Countries Have Already Contributed over \$2 Billion Through the PURL Initiative, and Six More Are Ready to Join”, Government of Ukraine, September 30, 2025, available at: www.president.gov.ua.

64. Ibid.

65. “Nordic and Baltic Allies to Fund Joint \$500m PURL Package for Ukraine”, NATO, November 13, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

66. “NATO Allies and Partners Fund over 4 Billion in PURL Packages for Ukraine”, NATO, December 10, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

Figure 4. PURL Packages Announced in 2025

Contributing Allies	Amount	Date
Netherlands	€500 million	August 2025
Denmark, Norway and Sweden	\$500 million	August 2025
Germany	\$500 million	August 2025
Canada	\$500 million	August 2025
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden	\$500 million	November 2025
Germany, Norway, Poland	\$500 million	December 2025
Germany, Netherlands and Norway	\$500 million	December 2025
Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain	\$500 million	December 2025

Source: NATO.

Some other Allies and partner nations—specifically Australia and New Zealand—have also declared their willingness to contribute to the initiative. After the UDCG meeting on December 16, Ukrainian Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal mentioned a few other nations that were preparing new pledges for PURL—including Montenegro, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania and Luxembourg.⁶⁷ On the last day of 2025, two more countries announced their contributions to PURL-Romania with €50 million⁶⁸ and Croatia with €15 million.⁶⁹

Despite a huge effort in contributions made in December 2025, the announced plan to provide the support worth \$5 billion by the end of 2025 was still short of \$700 million. The total amount of contributions to PURL in 2025 reached \$4,3 billion, as announced by President Zelenskyy on December 31, 2025.⁷⁰

If the funding has already been falling behind the expected timelines in the critical first year of the initiative, there are risks that it would be even harder for the Alliance to ensure the \$15 billion expected by both SecGen and President Zelensky in 2026.⁷¹ The Kiel Institute trackers put this

67. “Summary of ‘Ramstein’: Shmyhal Reveals What Aid Partners Promised for Ukraine’s Defense”, LB.UA, December 16, 2025, available at: <https://lb.ua> (in Ukrainian).

68. “Romania Joins PURL, Allocates EUR 50 mln within 2025 Budget”, Interfax-Ukraine, December 31, 2025, available at: <https://en.interfax.com.ua>.

69. “Croatia to Transfer EUR15 mln to PURL”, Interfax-Ukraine, December 31, 2025, available at: <https://en.interfax.com.ua>.

70. Ibid.

71. “Zelensky: Ukraine Needs \$15B Annually for PURL Program”, Ukrinform, December 8, 2025, available at: www.ukrinform.net.

dynamic in a broader context, highlighting that despite the introduction of PURL, military aid to Ukraine saw a “sharp decline” in July and August 2025.⁷² The latest report showed that the trend continued in September and October 2025, concluding that Europe has not been able to offset the drop in US military aid so far.⁷³

However, it should be noted that the PURL initiative was launched rather unexpectedly in the middle of the year, when many countries had already earmarked their funds and had to make adjustments on the way. It is possible that in 2026, the countries will ensure their financial planning, already taking into account their contributions to PURL. The first four months of 2026 demonstrated that the Allies continue to contribute to PURL, but not at the speed and volume Ukraine would have wanted. The contributions and pledges to PURL, announced mid-February 2026 at the NATO Defense Ministerial and UDCG meeting, amounted to \$584 million⁷⁴. This was followed in April by additional PURL funding secured during another UDCG meeting⁷⁵ and at an informal EU summit in Cyprus⁷⁶—yet no exact amounts were announced. Since the beginning of 2026, NATO has no longer been reporting publicly about new PURL packages, so it is unclear how many of them were funded in early 2026.

According to the author's calculations presented in the section below, as well as the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense update in April 2026, confirming the total amount of PURL funding has reached approximately \$5 billion since its establishment, it becomes clear that only around \$700 million—\$1 billion max. was contributed in the period of January to April 2026. This is significantly lower than the \$1.2 billion monthly contributions, which would have been needed for the ambitious annual goal of \$15 billion.

Burden-sharing issues

Another problem that PURL faced was that the contributions were not distributed evenly among Allies. At the end of 2025, it was reported that 24 nations took part in the initiative—22 out of 32 NATO nations and two partners. Out of 22 Allies, 10 made contributions or pledges in December: Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Greece, North Macedonia,

72. “Ukraine Support Tracker: Military Aid Falls Sharply Despite New NATO Initiative”, Kiel Institute, October 14, 2025, available at: www.kielinstitut.de.

73. “Ukraine Support Tracker: Europe Fails to Offset US Aid Drop”, Kiel Institute, December 10, 2025, available at: www.kielinstitut.de.

74. “Zelensky: Contributions to the PURL 2026 Program Reached \$584 Million”, Censor.net, February 18, 2026, available at: <https://censor.net>.

75. “Zelensky on Ramstein Outcome – Five Countries Announce New Contributions to PURL”, News Liga, April 15, 2026, available at: <https://news.liga.net>.

76. “Zelensky Secures New Contributions to PURL During Cyprus Summit”, Ukrainska Pravda, April 24, 2026, available at: www.pravda.com.ua.

Montenegro, Romania and Croatia, some of them only after huge pressure from the Alliance.⁷⁷ As of the end of 2025, the following NATO Allies did not financially take part in the mechanism: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

As of February 2026, top contributors to PURL were Norway, the Netherlands and Germany, followed by Canada, Sweden and Denmark⁷⁸—all of them are already quite big Ukrainian donors bilaterally, according to the Kiel Institute support to Ukraine tracker.⁷⁹ According to publicly available data, Norway contributed to PURL approximately \$835 million in 2025,⁸⁰ and with new contributions in 2026, the total amount increased to NOK 12,5 billion, which is around \$1,35 billion as of May 2026.⁸¹ It is followed by slightly less than \$1 billion total contribution by the Netherlands—its announced pledges amount to approximately \$989 million (€500 million in August 2025,⁸² €250 million in December 2025⁸³ and €90 million in February 2026).⁸⁴ Germany's total contribution could be attributed to approximately \$640 million (\$500 million standalone package in August 2025 and announced pledge of €120 million in November 2025,⁸⁵ which was likely the amount Germany contributed to two joint December packages).

Canada is another major contributor, whose recent announcement of an additional PURL contribution made in Yerevan in May 2026 brought its total to \$830 million⁸⁶ (and likely replaced Germany in the top three). Sweden reported its total amount to be at \$435 million with three contributions to joint PURL packages in August 2025, November 2025 and February 2026.⁸⁷ Danish approximate contributions are of \$138 million in

77. V. Jack and H. Cokelaere, "NATO Allies 'Punching Below Their Weight' Face Pressure to Buy Arms for Ukraine", *Politico*, December 2, 2025, available at: www.politico.eu.

78. "Ukrainian Ambassador Names Top Six Contributors to US Arms Purchases for Kyiv", *Ukrainska Pravda*, February 11, 2026, available at: www.pravda.com.ua.

79. "Ukraine Support Tracker", Kiel Institute, updated December 10, 2025, available at: www.kielinstitut.de.

80. "Norway Largest Contributor to PURL Military Support Packages for Ukraine", Government of Norway, December 3, 2025, available at: www.regjeringen.no.

81. "Norway Provides 2.8 Billion Kroner to Ukraine" (in Norwegian), *VG*, May 6, 2026, available at: www.vg.no.

82. "The Netherlands Pledges €500 Million in Ukraine Military Support", *DutchNews*, August 5, 2025, available at: www.dutchnews.nl.

83. "PURL Initiative – The Netherlands Will Provide Another 250 Million Euros", *News Liga*, December 1, 2025, available at: <https://news.liga.net>.

84. "Netherlands Provides Nearly EUR 90 mln Military Aid via PURL, incl F-16 Aircraft Simulators", *Interfax*, February 12, 2026, available at: <https://en.interfax.com.ua>.

85. "Germany to Buy €150m of Weapons for Ukraine through PURL, Pistorius Says", *Euronews*, November 11, 2025, available at: www.euronews.com.

86. "Contributions to the PURL Initiative and Efforts to Return Ukrainian Children Abducted by Russia: The President of Ukraine Met with the Prime Minister of Canada in Yerevan", Official website of the President of Ukraine, May 4, 2026, available at: www.president.gov.ua.

87. "Sweden Strengthens Ukraine's Defence with a Contribution of USD 100 Million to US Package", Government of Sweden, February 13, 2026, available at: www.government.se.

total (580 million kroner in August 2025⁸⁸ and 372.2 million kroner in November 2025,⁸⁹ both in joint packages).

Other pledges to joint packages further vary in size—for example, €7.2 million by Latvia,⁹⁰ €8 million by Iceland,⁹¹ €10 million by Estonia,⁹² €15 million by Luxembourg,⁹³ €15 million by Croatia, €20 million by Greece,⁹⁴ additional \$13 million by Estonia, \$29 million by Lithuania and \$29 million by Luxembourg in April 2026⁹⁵, \$30 million by Lithuania,⁹⁶ €43 million by Slovenia⁹⁷, €50 million by Portugal⁹⁸, €50 million by Romania, €100 million by Finland,⁹⁹ €100 million by Belgium in 2025¹⁰⁰ and the same amount in April 2026,¹⁰¹ €100 million by Spain,¹⁰² and \$100 million by Poland.¹⁰³ The amount of contributions of some remaining countries was not publicly available.

Figure 5. PURL approximate contributions by NATO Allies

88. “Sweden, Norway, and Denmark to Fund \$500M U.S. Weapons Package for Ukraine”, *The New Voice of Ukraine*, August 5, 2025, available at: <https://english.nv.ua>.

89. “Financial Donations to Strengthen Ukraine’s Fight Against Russia” (in Danish), Danish Ministry of Defence, November 11, 2025, available at: www.fmn.dk.

90. “Latvia Alongside the Other NB8 Countries Continues Supporting Ukraine”, MFA, November 13, 2025, available at: www.mfa.gov.lv.

91. Joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with the Prime Minister of Iceland Kristrún Frostadóttir, NATO, November 27, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

92. “Foreign Minister Tsahkna: Nordic and Baltic Countries’ Joint Contribution to NATO’s Ukraine Defence Funding Mechanism Is Especially Vital Ahead of Winter”, Embassy of Estonia in Copenhagen, November 13, 2025, available at: <https://copenhagen.mfa.ee>.

93. “Luxembourg to Contribute €15m to NATO’s Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List Programme”, *Cronicle*, October 16, 2025, available at: <https://chronicle.lu>.

94. “Greece Pledges €20 Million to NATO Fund (PURL) for Ukraine”, Keep Talking Greece, December 12, 2025, available at: www.keeptalkinggreece.com.

95. “Contributions to PURL, Air Defence Support and Deep-Strike Capabilities: Outcomes of the 34th Ramstein-format Meeting”, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, April 16, 2026, available at: <https://mod.gov.ua>.

96. “Nordic and Baltic Countries to Fund a Joint USD 500 Million PURL Package for Ukraine”, Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania, November 13, 2025, available at: <https://kam.lt>.

97. “Slovenia to Allocate €43 Million for Purchase of Weapons for Ukraine under PURL Initiative”, *The New Voice of Ukraine*, December 5, 2025, available at: <https://english.nv.ua>.

98. “Portugal to Contribute €50m to US Arms Purchase Initiative for Ukraine”, *Ukrainska Pravda*, December 21, 2025, available at: www.pravda.com.ua.

99. “Today Spain Joined the PURL Initiative, and Finland Announced a €100 Million Contribution – President”, Government of Ukraine, October 23, 2025, available at: www.president.gov.ua.

100. “Belgium Allocates Additional €100 Million for Ukraine”, *The Brussels Times*, August 29, 2025, available at: www.brusselstimes.com.

101. “Belgium Allocates Further 100M Euros to Ukraine Weapons Programme”, Belga News Agency, April 21, 2026, available at: www.belganewsagency.eu.

102. “One Hundred French Rafale Aircraft, Spain’s Contribution to PURL and the Allocation of Funds Within SAFE, and Securing Gas Supplies to Ukraine from Greece, the Outcomes of the President’s Visits to Paris, Madrid, and Athens”, Government of Ukraine, November 19, 2025, available at: www.president.gov.ua.

103. “Poland Pledges US\$100 Million for Missiles for Ukraine”, *Ukrainska Pravda*, December 3, 2025, available at: www.pravda.com.ua.

NATO Ally	Approximate contribution
Norway	~\$1,35 billion
Netherlands	~\$989 million
Canada	~\$830 million
Germany	~\$640 million
Sweden	\$435 million
Belgium	~\$235 million
United Kingdom *	~\$200 million
Denmark	\$138 million
Finland	~\$117 million
Spain	~\$117 million
Poland	\$100 million
Lithuania	\$59 million
Romania	~\$58.5 million
Portugal	~\$58.5 million
Slovenia	~\$50 million
Luxembourg	~\$46.5 million
Estonia	~\$24.5 million
Greece	~\$23.50 million
Croatia	~\$17.5 million
Iceland	~\$9 million
Latvia	~\$8 million
North Macedonia	no public information
Montenegro	no public information
Bulgaria **	no public information
Total amount (approx.)	~\$5.5 billion

*United Kingdom has long refused to participate in PURL (see below), but finally made a contribution in February 2026.

**It was announced that Bulgaria joined PURL in March 2026.

Source: author's calculations based on the publicly available data, as of early May 2026.

The Kiel Institute tracker further highlights the disparities between European nations, analyzing the overall military support to Ukraine in 2025 across the biggest European economies.¹⁰⁴ It shows that by monthly average (relative to the pre-war GDP), the “Nordic Four”—Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden—have been leading donors. Germany, the United Kingdom and France—while making significant allocations, still trail behind the Nordics in relative terms. And the support from Italy and Spain is very limited—Italy dropped 15% compared to its 2022-2024 levels, and there was no military aid from Spain in 2025 as of October. In December 2025, Spain finally made a contribution to PURL.

Three countries out of the mentioned “Big Five”—while being supporters of Ukraine—initially did not contribute to PURL at all, which also reflects negatively on the initiative that Ukraine considers quite vital for its defense efforts. The United Kingdom explained its non-participation by using other means of providing support to Ukraine (in February 2026, the UK changed its position in light of Ukraine’s desperate need for more intercepts against intensified Russian attacks in Winter 2026 and contributed \$200 million to a joint package). France, which has championed the concept of European defense autonomy, does not want to buy American weapons with European money. Moreover, France opposes the potential use of the EU’s €90 billion loan to Ukraine to buy American weapons – something Kyiv has expressed interest in. The situation with Italy is also complex – Italy’s Defense Minister signaled interest in October to provide funding through PURL, but this decision did not find support within the Italian government, despite the Italian Prime Minister’s close relationship with President Trump. At the end of the year, the government finally approved the decision to provide more military aid to Ukraine in 2026; however, there was no information about Italy’s possible participation in PURL.¹⁰⁵

PURL’s successes and limitations

Overall, the PURL initiative could be considered a success, at least from the perspective of ensuring urgent and critical support to Ukraine. PURL ensures rather timely and regular deliveries of the high-end, costly US equipment, which European partners can not provide at this speed and volume, or they simply do not produce it on their own. It includes highly needed air defense (such as missiles for *Patriot* systems), ammunition and other needed equipment to protect civilians and critical infrastructure.

104. “Ukraine Support Tracker: Europe Fails to Offset US Aid Drop”, Kiel Institute, December 10, 2025, available at: www.kielinstitut.de.

105. D. P. Mancini, “Italy Paves Way for More Military Aid to Ukraine in 2026”, Bloomberg, December 29, 2025, available at: www.bloomberg.com.

During his visit to Kyiv in February 2026, Mark Rutte underlined that since its launch, PURL supplied 75% of all missiles for Ukraine's *Patriot* systems and 90% of the missiles used in other air defense systems.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, Ukraine is highly interested in the sustainability of this initiative, which it considers vital.

For European Allies, this support would be calculated within the agreed objective of reaching 5% defense expenditures by 2035¹⁰⁷ and could demonstrate to the US the commitment towards burden-sharing and taking more leadership over European security ("This is Europe stepping up").¹⁰⁸ However, it also puts many European Allies in a sensitive position—balancing between the urgency of critically needed US supplies for Ukraine and strengthening their own defense industries.

Massive Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which left many Ukrainians without heating and electricity under extreme cold temperatures during the winter of 2026, and Ukraine's dire need for *Patriot* interceptors, were the reasons why the United Kingdom finally decided to change its position and make a contribution to PURL in February 2026.¹⁰⁹

This model is situationally helpful for NATO, as it tries to demonstrate transatlantic unity (even if elusive). The reality is more discomfiting, as the US gets financial benefits of being paid for the equipment and at the same time, is praised for "providing support to Ukraine", that someone else has paid for. Moreover, there are some worrying signals that the US may be selling the equipment to Europeans at a higher price—Scott Bessent, US Treasury Secretary, said in an interview that the US gets a "10% markup".¹¹⁰

In addition to funding and burden-sharing issues described above, there are a few other limitations related to the initiative. PURL is not only based on prioritization, but essentially on what is available and the nation's readiness to provide it. Another issue is related to the production capacities—currently, the equipment is provided out of the shelves, but what happens when the stocks get emptied?

The shortage of *Patriot* interceptors became an acute problem in the context of the US-Israeli war on Iran and Iran's retaliation attack on the Gulf states, which has seen long-term stocks of missiles being quickly burnt. According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in just three days of

106. "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with President Zelensky of Ukraine", NATO, February 3, 2026, available at: www.nato.int.

107. At the NATO Summit in The Hague, Allies agreed that direct contributions to Ukraine's defense and its defense industry will be included in the calculation of Allies' defense spending.

108. Quote from NATO SecGen Mark Rutte, "NATO Secretary General Meets President Trump to Bolster Support for Ukraine", NATO, July 15, 2025, available at: www.nato.int.

109. V. Jack and E. Webber, "UK to Join NATO's US Arms-buying Scheme for Ukraine", *Politico*, February 11, 2026, available at: www.politico.eu.

110. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, interview with Fox News, August 19, 2025, available at: www.foxnews.com.

fighting in the Middle East, more than 800 *Patriot* missiles were used—more than Ukraine has received altogether since 2022.¹¹¹ *The Economist* calculated that the Gulf States could have potentially used between 1,900 and 3,000 interceptors by mid-March (depending on the number of missiles used per target), with likely 90% of them being *Patriot* interceptors, most of which would be PAC-3 types.¹¹² While these figures are tentative, they go in sharp contrast to the available production capacities. In early 2026, Lockheed Martin reported their increased production of PAC-3 MSE interceptors to be a “record-breaking 620 missiles in 2025”, with plans to further increase the annual production capacity to 2,000 missiles in seven years.¹¹³

As of the end of March, the US,¹¹⁴ NATO¹¹⁵ and Ukrainian¹¹⁶ officials underlined that the PURL deliveries to Ukraine have not been affected by the war in Iran and have not been diverted to the Middle East. At the same time, the US Secretary of State admitted it could be the case in the future. Moreover, current deliveries to Ukraine are made through the previously approved and purchased packages, but the future deliveries could be under question.

Last but not least is the related issue of the initiative's political sustainability, as it fully relies on American “goodwill” to be part of it. At the core of the initiative is a very pragmatic—business-like—model, which is supposed to keep Trump’s administration in. Yet, any potential frictions within the Alliance may also reflect negatively on PURL.

For instance, with the Greenland crisis at its peak in January 2026, there were no new pledges to PURL until the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting in February 2026, when the Netherlands, the UK, Norway and Sweden jointly funded a new \$500 package.¹¹⁷ And this was against the backdrop of the increased intensity of Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. It is very difficult for the European leaders to explain to their taxpayers why they should be buying from a country that makes direct threats to another European Ally.

111. K. Hodunova, “More Patriot Missiles Used in Middle East in 3 Days, than in Ukraine since 2022, Zelensky Says”, *The Kyiv Independent*, March 5, 2026, available at: <https://kyivindependent.com>.

112. “Gulf States Are Burning Through Interceptors”, *The Economist*, March 13, 2026, available at: www.economist.com.

113. “Press Briefing Transcript: Under Secretary of War Michael P. Duffey and Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet Discuss Landmark Acquisition Transformation Agreement to Accelerate PAC-3 MSE Production”, Lockheed Martin, January 6, 2026, available at: www.lockheedmartin.com.

114. “Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press”, US Department of State, March 27, 2026, available at: www.state.gov.

115. “Rutte Denies US Weapons for Ukraine Will Be Diverted to the Middle East”, *The New Voice of Ukraine*, March 26, 2026, available at: <https://english.nv.ua>.

116. “US Tells Ukraine No PURL Military Aid Redirected to Middle East, Sybiha Says”, *The Kyiv Independent*, March 29, 2026, available at: <https://kyivindependent.com>.

117. “Netherlands, UK, Norway, Sweden Launch \$500M NATO PURL Package for Ukraine”, *United24 Media*, February 12, 2026, available at: <https://united24media.com>.

Another crisis followed shortly after, and it once again made PURL a hostage of the situation. Dissatisfied with the reaction of the European Allies to the war that the US has launched against Iran together with Israel, US President Donald Trump has threatened to withdraw from the PURL initiative if the European Allies do not engage in reopening the Strait of Hormuz.¹¹⁸

118. "Trump Threatened to Stop Weapons for Ukraine Unless Europe Joined Hormuz Coalition", *Financial Times*, April 1, 2026, available at: www.ft.com.

Conclusion

Through the new initiatives like the NSATU mission and PURL funding mechanism, NATO's role in the coordination of military support to Ukraine has grown significantly. NATO now has a more comprehensive overview of the international military support to Ukraine and is, therefore, in a better position to coordinate and align the immediate security assistance with the long-term efforts to support Ukraine's transformation through the initiatives on interoperability, defense and security sector reforms and capacity building, which are part of NATO's long-standing effort under the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.¹¹⁹

For the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO started to coordinate the provision of lethal military support to Ukraine. The efficiency of the support has also increased, as it is mainly based on Ukraine's requirements. NSATU and PURL play an important role in providing critical support to Ukraine, especially PURL, through which Ukraine continues to receive the highly needed air defense equipment to which there is currently no available European alternative. NSATU coordinates more than 80% of all military support to Ukraine, and 75% of all missiles for Ukraine's *Patriot* systems and 90% of the missiles used in other air defense systems were supplied through PURL.

However, as already observed during the Greenland crisis and the war in Iran, the tensions within the Alliance could have negative implications for such efforts. The unpredictability of the American administration and the degrading trust between the US and the rest of the Allies can make the support for Ukraine an easy hostage.

Therefore, the long-term sustainability of these efforts in the rapidly changing geopolitical reality is one of the key concerns, in addition to risks related to growing funding problems, capacity overstretching and potential duplication.

Lastly, the speed of these initiatives remains of the essence, as Ukraine continues to withstand the Russian aggression and intensified attacks against the civilian population and its critical infrastructure.

119. CAP is a framework through which NATO has been providing practical non-lethal support and capacity-building measures to Ukraine since 2016.



27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris cedex 15 – France

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