

# Religion, Moral Order, and the Resacralization of International Politics

By **Peter Mandaville**

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The question of the role of beliefs in international politics extends beyond that of religion alone. To an ever-increasing extent, the world is structured by competing normative projects, rather than straightforward civilizational blocs. With liberal universalism in retreat, religious traditions offer narratives, legitimacy, and international networks that support alternative visions of moral order, making the global system more pluralistic but also more unstable.

politique étrangère

For much of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, it seemed reasonable to assume that religion was gradually receding from the center of international politics. Modernization theory anticipated a process of secularization and the experience of Western Europe in particular appeared to confirm that trajectory.<sup>1</sup> As levels of religious affiliation and participation declined in parts of the North Atlantic world, it became easier to imagine that economic development, urbanization, and liberal democratic governance would progressively relocate religion to the private sphere. After the Cold War, this assumption was reinforced by a broader narrative of convergence: ideological rivalry had ended, and liberal democracy appeared not only institutionally durable but normatively ascendant.<sup>2</sup>

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1. P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York: Doubleday, 1967; S. Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

2. F. Fukuyama, "The End of History", *The National Interest*, No. 16, 1989; G. J. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Three decades later, that confidence looks overstated. Religious language is now woven into political discourse across a wide range of contexts. Russian officials frame aspects of their foreign policy in explicitly civilizational terms linked to Orthodoxy. Indian political rhetoric increasingly invokes a civilizational understanding of the state. In the Middle East, religious authority remains intertwined with regional alignments. In multilateral forums, debates over gender, religious freedom, and cultural sovereignty routinely draw on explicitly moral and, at times, theological arguments.<sup>3</sup> These developments are not confined to one region or one religious tradition. They cut across political systems and geographic boundaries.

It would be tempting to describe this shift simply as a “return of religion”. Yet such language obscures as much as it reveals. Religion never disappeared from international politics.<sup>4</sup> Religious institutions, actors, and narratives have long shaped transnational activism, humanitarian engagement, conflict dynamics, and state legitimacy. What has changed is less the presence of religion than the status of the liberal normative framework within which it operated for several decades.

The liberal international order that consolidated after 1945, and expanded after 1989, rested on more than material power.<sup>5</sup> It was sustained by a particular moral vision—one that emphasized individual rights, pluralism, and the procedural neutrality of secular governance. For a time, that vision enjoyed sufficient institutional dominance that it appeared self-evident. Today, it is more openly contested. Political leaders and movements in diverse settings articulate alternative understandings of authority, community, and sovereignty, often grounded in civilizational history and religious tradition.

In this context, the question is not whether the world is becoming more religious in a quantitative sense. Rather, it is how competing moral visions are reshaping international alignments and institutions. Religious traditions frequently provide the language, historical depth, and organizational networks through which these visions are articulated. Belief, in other words, matters not primarily as private conviction, but as a source of public claims about legitimacy and order.

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3. See debates at the United Nations Human Rights Council on “traditional values”, from 2009 onward.

4. J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

5. G. J. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, *op. cit.*

Understanding contemporary international politics therefore requires moving beyond a simple opposition between the secular and the religious. It requires attention to the ways in which moral projects—some liberal, some traditionalist, some developmentalist—compete to define the terms of global legitimacy. Religion figures prominently in this process, not as an autonomous force detached from politics, but as one of the principal resources through which political actors make sense of authority, obligation, and collective identity.

### The End of the Secularization Illusion

The assumption that modernization would gradually marginalize religion shaped much postwar social science and, by extension, parts of foreign policy analysis. Economic development, urbanization, and scientific rationality were expected to reduce the social and political authority of religious institutions.<sup>6</sup> Western Europe's trajectory—declining church attendance, the separation of confessional authority from public institutions, and the growing cultural prestige of secularism—appeared to offer empirical confirmation of this thesis.

Yet even at its height, this narrative rested on a selective reading of global experience. Across much of the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and the United States, religion remained deeply embedded in public life.<sup>7</sup> Political movements drew on religious symbolism; constitutions referenced divine authority; clergy and religious intellectuals intervened in debates over citizenship, education, and law. Even in formally secular states, religious identities often continued to structure social organization and political mobilization. The European pattern was influential, but it was not universal.

The end of the Cold War reinforced a second assumption that proved similarly partial. With ideological competition between liberal capitalism and communism resolved, liberal democracy appeared not only to have prevailed institutionally but to have secured a form of normative consensus.<sup>8</sup> International institutions expanded under the banner of universal human rights and rules-based governance. In this environment, religion was frequently treated as either a residual cultural variable or a potential

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6. S. Bruce, *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults*, *op. cit.*; P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, *op. cit.*

7. J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*

8. F. Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *op. cit.*

source of instability to be managed. Where it entered policy conversations, it did so largely in relation to extremism, interfaith dialogue, or development partnerships.

What this framing obscured was the extent to which religious traditions continued to provide comprehensive accounts of authority, obligation, and social order.<sup>9</sup> These traditions were not displaced by economic growth or constitutional reform. They adapted to new institutional environments and, in some cases, found renewed political relevance amid rapid social change. At the same time, liberalism itself was rarely recognized as a morally substantive project. Its emphasis on individual primacy, pluralism, and procedural neutrality often appeared self-evident to its proponents, rather than historically situated and culturally specific.<sup>10</sup>

Over the past two decades, developments across multiple regions have exposed the limits of the secularization narrative. In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Christian movements have shaped political mobilization and influenced state positions in international forums.<sup>11</sup> In India, the idea of the state as the political expression of a Hindu civilizational community (per Hindutva movement and discourse) has shifted from the margins toward the center of public debate.<sup>12</sup> In Russia, official discourse increasingly links geopolitical claims to a civilizational identity associated with Orthodox Christianity.<sup>13</sup> In Iran, networks of clerical authority remain intertwined with regional alignments, connecting domestic legitimacy to transnational solidarities.<sup>14</sup> In each of these cases, religious language does not displace strategic calculation, but it deepens the moral framing within which strategy is justified.

The significance of these developments lies less in doctrinal content than in the renewed salience of legitimacy claims. Religious traditions encode visions of the human person, the family, and political authority that differ in important respects from liberal proceduralism. As the latter's claim to universality has weakened—due to geopolitical shifts, economic crises, and internal contestation—alternative sources of moral authority

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9. T. Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

10. W. E. Connolly, *Why I Am Not a Secularist*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.

11. See studies on Pentecostal political mobilization in sub-Saharan Africa.

12. C. Jaffrelot (ed.), *Hindu Nationalism: A Reader*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.

13. See scholarship on the concept of "Russkiy mir" and the relationship between the Russian state and the Orthodox Church.

14. V. Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.

have gained confidence. The result is not a uniform “return” to premodern politics, but a more explicit struggle over the normative foundations of international order.

In this sense, global politics is undergoing not only a redistribution of power but also a redistribution of legitimacy.<sup>15</sup> Appeals to “sovereign equality” and “non-interference” are increasingly coupled with references to cultural and religious identity. Civilizational history is invoked as diplomatic capital. Political leaders insist that the language of universal rights must be situated within thicker accounts of community and obligation. Religion, in this context, functions less as an external force intruding upon politics than as one of the principal reservoirs from which competing moral visions draw.

### **Rethinking Huntington: Civilizations and Moral Alignment**

The renewed prominence of civilizational language in contemporary geopolitics inevitably invites comparison with Samuel Huntington’s well-known argument that the post-Cold War era would be structured primarily by cultural and civilizational divisions.<sup>16</sup> Huntington anticipated that ideological rivalry would give way to conflict between relatively coherent blocs—Western, Islamic, Confucian, Hindu, Orthodox—defined in large part by shared religious and historical traditions.<sup>17</sup> At first glance, certain contemporary developments appear to lend this argument renewed relevance.

Political leaders in diverse settings increasingly frame policy in civilizational terms. Russian officials speak of defending a distinct Orthodox world. Indian nationalist discourse invokes the idea of India as a Hindu civilization-state. Chinese political language emphasizes cultural particularity and rejects liberal universalism as historically contingent rather than globally binding. Islamist movements continue to articulate visions of transnational community grounded in shared religious identity. Civilizational rhetoric can be politically effective: it situates policy within historical memory and casts geopolitical disputes as struggles over identity and moral order.

Yet to interpret the present moment as a straightforward confirmation of Huntington would be misleading. Conflicts do not align neatly along

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15. On norm contestation in the international order, see recent work in international relations theory.

16. S. P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993.

17. S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

civilizational fault lines, nor are alliances consistently structured by shared religious tradition. Instead, a more complex pattern is emerging—one characterized by cross-civilizational alignments organized around specific normative commitments.<sup>18</sup>

Debates within multilateral institutions provide a useful illustration. In United Nations negotiations concerning gender norms, reproductive health, and LGBTQ rights, coalitions have formed that bring together actors from markedly different religious and regional backgrounds.<sup>19</sup> Orthodox Christian representatives from parts of Eastern Europe, Catholic actors in Latin America, Evangelical organizations in the United States and sub-Saharan Africa, and officials from Muslim-majority states have at times worked together to coordinate positions grounded in overlapping conceptions of family, authority, and sovereignty. These alignments do not reflect the cohesion of a single civilization. They are issue-specific formations structured around a shared moral grammar.

At the same time, actors grouped within the same civilizational category frequently diverge in their political orientations. Within Orthodoxy, religious authorities disagree about the theological interpretation of sovereignty and the legitimacy of violence in the context of the war in Ukraine.<sup>20</sup> Islamic political thought encompasses a wide range of positions regarding pluralism, governance, and international order. Even within liberal democracies, interpretations of rights and secularism vary significantly. Civilizational labels often conceal internal contestation that is politically consequential.

It may therefore be more useful to distinguish between civilizations as cultural repertoires and moral projects as political mobilizations.<sup>21</sup> Civilizations supply symbols, narratives, and historical reference points. Moral projects are organized efforts to institutionalize particular visions of order. These projects may draw on religious tradition, but they are articulated in response to contemporary institutional and geopolitical circumstances.

Seen from this perspective, contemporary geopolitics appears less as a clash of self-contained civilizations than as a field of overlapping moral alignments. Some actors defend liberal-pluralist understandings of individual rights and procedural governance. Others emphasize historically

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18. See the literature on norm contestation and transnational alignments.

19. Analyses of voting coalitions at the United Nations on gender and “traditional values”.

20. See scholarship on Orthodoxy and the war in Ukraine.

21. E. W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978; see also international relations scholarship on the discursive construction of civilizations.

rooted conceptions of authority and community, often articulated in explicitly religious terms. Still others prioritize order and developmental transformation over pluralist contestation. These orientations do not correspond neatly to civilizational “boxes”, and actors may align differently depending on the issue at stake.

Huntington was correct in anticipating that identity would remain central to global politics. Where his framework proves less adequate is in its treatment of civilizations as coherent geopolitical units. The present moment suggests instead a more fluid configuration in which religious and cultural traditions serve as reservoirs of meaning mobilized within transnational moral coalitions.<sup>22</sup> These coalitions reshape diplomatic alignments and reframe international institutions as arenas of normative contestation rather than neutral spaces of procedural coordination.

Understanding this shift requires moving beyond the binary of “West Versus the Rest”. It requires attention to how moral narratives travel across borders, how they intersect with state interests, and how they become institutionalized through networks of political and religious actors. Civilizational rhetoric is undeniably prominent. But its political effects are mediated by cross-cutting alignments that complicate any simple account of civilizational confrontation.

### **Religion as Geopolitical Infrastructure**

If contemporary international politics is increasingly organized around competing moral projects, religion assumes particular significance not because it determines state behavior, but because it provides institutional and symbolic infrastructure through which claims to legitimacy are articulated and sustained.<sup>23</sup> States continue to calculate interests, assess risks, and respond to material constraints. Yet the language in which those interests are justified, and the networks through which they are advanced, are often shaped by religious traditions.

One dimension of this infrastructural role lies in the narrative resources that religion provides. Religious traditions situate political claims within broader historical and, at times, transcendent frameworks. Appeals to sacred history or civilizational inheritance can deepen the resonance of geopolitical arguments by linking contemporary policy to collective

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22. See research on transnational conservative and liberal advocacy networks such as the World Congress of Families.

23. J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*; R. S. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

memory. In such settings, territorial disputes or sovereignty claims are not framed solely as matters of security or administrative control, but as questions of historical continuity and moral obligation. Religion does not replace strategic reasoning; it thickens the normative environment within which strategy is interpreted.

A second dimension concerns institutional reach. Religious organizations frequently maintain transnational networks that predate modern state boundaries and operate alongside formal diplomatic channels.<sup>24</sup> Churches, seminaries, religious charities, pilgrimage circuits, and diaspora associations create enduring connections across regions. These networks facilitate the circulation of ideas, resources, and personnel. In some cases, they align closely with state objectives; in others, they operate with a degree of autonomy. Either way, they shape the broader political ecosystem within which states act.

The relationship between the Russian state and the Orthodox Church illustrates one configuration in which religious institutions reinforce civilizational narratives associated with foreign policy.<sup>25</sup> In Iran, clerical networks and educational institutions connect domestic authority to regional alignments in ways that cannot be reduced to formal alliances.<sup>26</sup> Saudi Arabia's recalibration of its religious outreach in recent years has signaled broader adjustments in its domestic governance and external positioning.<sup>27</sup> In each instance, religion functions neither as a mere instrument nor as an independent geopolitical actor, but as part of the institutional landscape through which influence is exercised and justified.

Religion also plays a role in mobilizing constituencies. Political claims framed in explicitly moral terms often resonate more deeply than those grounded solely in efficiency or security. Religious communities may organize advocacy around issues ranging from migration and humanitarian assistance to sanctions and conflict resolution. In many societies, religious institutions are among the most trusted providers of education and social services. Their social legitimacy can translate into political influence, shaping both domestic debates and international engagement.<sup>28</sup>

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24. P. Mandaville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma*, London: Routledge, 2001.

25. See studies on the relationship between the Russian state and the Orthodox Church in contemporary foreign policy.

26. V. Nasr, *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, op. cit.

27. J. Hoffman, *Islam and Statecraft: Religious Soft Power in the Arab Gulf States*, London: I. B. Tauris, 2025.

28. See the literature on religion and development.

Finally, religion contributes to what might be described as symbolic sovereignty. In an interconnected global economy, states may face constraints in controlling material flows. Yet they retain the capacity to assert moral boundaries—through legislation on conversion, regulation of speech deemed offensive to religious sensibilities, or the elevation of religious heritage within constitutional frameworks. Such measures signal claims about cultural autonomy and political authority.<sup>29</sup> Religious language and ritual provide a vocabulary through which these claims are articulated.

None of this suggests that religion is uniformly stabilizing or destabilizing. Religious actors have, in different contexts, legitimated state power, challenged authoritarian rule, mediated conflict, and mobilized protest.<sup>30</sup> The point is more modest but consequential: religious traditions structure part of the terrain on which political legitimacy is asserted and contested. As liberal proceduralism faces sustained challenge, these religiously inflected claims to authority have become more visible and, in some cases, more central to diplomatic and geopolitical alignment.

### **Why Moralized Geopolitics Is More Volatile**

If international politics is increasingly structured by competing moral projects, one consequence is heightened volatility. Disputes framed in moral or civilizational terms often prove more resistant to compromise than those defined narrowly by material interests. This is not because moral claims eliminate strategic calculation, but because they alter the perceived stakes of negotiation.

Research in political psychology has highlighted the distinctive power of what are sometimes described as “sacred values”—commitments understood as non-negotiable and not readily convertible into material trade-offs.<sup>31</sup> When political claims are embedded in sacred narratives, compromise can appear not as prudent adjustment but as moral capitulation. Territory associated with religious history, for example, is rarely treated as interchangeable real estate. Legal norms perceived as violating divine command or civilizational continuity are difficult to reconcile through incremental bargaining.

Disputes over Jerusalem offer an obvious illustration.<sup>32</sup> Competing claims to the city are inseparable from theological and historical

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29. Debates at the United Nations Human Rights Council on “traditional values”.

30. R. S. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, *op. cit.*

31. S. Atran and R. Axelrod, “Reframing Sacred Values”, *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2008.

32. See scholarship on sacred space and political conflict, particularly regarding Jerusalem.

narratives that extend well beyond contemporary security considerations. Similar dynamics can be observed in South Asia, where conflicts surrounding religious sites intersect with national identity and civilizational memory. In such contexts, political leaders operate within symbolic landscapes that narrow the range of publicly acceptable concessions.

Moralized geopolitics is also transnational in character. Digital media enables local incidents—whether framed as blasphemy, cultural insult, or moral transgression—to circulate rapidly across borders. Religious and civilizational narratives travel with them, mobilizing constituencies far removed from the original event. Governments may find themselves responding not only to strategic incentives but to publics who interpret developments through shared moral frameworks. Leaders who adopt sacralized rhetoric can become constrained by it, as retreat risks being interpreted as betrayal.<sup>33</sup>

These dynamics interact with multilateral governance. International institutions were designed in a period when procedural consensus appeared attainable. Where underlying moral premises diverge sharply, procedural mechanisms can become arenas of contestation rather than coordination. Coalitions form around shared normative commitments, producing stalemates in areas such as gender policy, religious freedom, and cultural sovereignty.

It would be misleading, however, to suggest that moralization renders conflict intractable in every case. Religious traditions contain resources for coexistence and ethical restraint, and religious actors have contributed constructively to peace processes in various settings.<sup>34</sup> The point is instead that when disputes are framed as existential struggles over identity and moral order, the political costs of compromise increase. Negotiation remains possible, but it requires engagement not only with interests but with the symbolic and normative dimensions of conflict.

The volatility associated with moralized geopolitics therefore reflects a broader shift in the structure of international disagreement. As claims about legitimacy become more explicit, the management of global order demands greater sensitivity to the moral narratives that animate political actors. Ignoring these narratives risks misreading both the motivations and the constraints that shape state behavior.

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33. See work on religion, digital globalization, and transnational mobilization.

34. R. S. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation*, *op. cit.*

## Implications for International Order

If contemporary international politics is marked by the pluralization of moral authority, then the emerging order is multipolar not only in terms of power but also in terms of legitimacy.<sup>35</sup> Liberal universalism continues to shape many institutions and remains influential in large parts of the world. But it now coexists with more self-conscious alternative projects that contest its neutrality and its claims to universality.<sup>36</sup> International institutions consequently face not only coordination challenges but deeper disagreements about first principles.

For policymakers, particularly in Europe and North America, this shift carries several implications. First, it calls for greater reflexivity. Liberal norms are often presented as procedurally neutral or historically inevitable. Yet in many contexts, they are experienced as culturally situated and politically charged. Recognizing this perception does not require abandoning core commitments. It does require acknowledging that appeals to universality are themselves embedded in particular moral traditions.

Second, the current landscape underscores the importance of religious literacy.<sup>37</sup> If religion functions as part of the infrastructure through which legitimacy is articulated, then failing to understand religious dynamics can produce strategic blind spots. This involves more than identifying religious leaders as stakeholders. It requires attention to internal diversity within traditions, to the interaction between religious authority and political power, and to the ways in which moral narratives circulate across borders.

Third, diplomacy must adapt to fluid moral alignments. Alliances will increasingly be issue-specific. States that cooperate on trade or security may diverge sharply on questions of gender policy or cultural sovereignty. Conversely, actors divided by geopolitical rivalry may find common cause in resisting perceived moral encroachment. Mapping these cross-cutting alignments demands analytical flexibility rather than reliance on stable civilizational blocs.

States that advance civilizational-sovereigntist narratives face their own constraints. Moral mobilization can consolidate domestic support, but it

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35. See recent scholarship on multipolarity and the pluralization of international legitimacy.

36. O. Stuenkel, *Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order*. Cambridge: Polity Books, 2016.

37. See work on strategic religious engagement in foreign policy.

may also narrow diplomatic room for maneuver. When policy positions are sacralized, retreat becomes politically costly. Leaders who frame disputes as matters of civilizational survival may find themselves bound by the expectations they have helped to generate.

At a systemic level, the central challenge is whether competing moral visions can coexist without seeking comprehensive dominance. One possible trajectory is fragmentation into partially overlapping normative spheres. Another is a form of negotiated pluralism in which actors acknowledge deep disagreement while maintaining workable procedures for cooperation.<sup>38</sup> Such pluralism does not imply relativism. It recognizes that durable global governance may depend less on convergence around a single moral framework than on shared commitments to restraint, reciprocity, and institutional continuity.

Understanding what people “believe in” today therefore requires attention not only to doctrinal commitments but to the moral projects that shape political life. These projects draw on religious traditions, historical narratives, and national identities. They influence how authority is justified, how alliances are formed, and how conflicts are framed. Religion’s significance lies not in determining outcomes but in structuring the language and institutions through which legitimacy is contested.

The erosion of a once-dominant normative consensus has made these dynamics more visible. Belief has not suddenly re-entered international politics; rather, the moral diversity that was always present has become more explicit. Navigating this landscape demands analytical sensitivity to both power and legitimacy, and to the ways in which religious traditions continue to inform claims about order and political community in an increasingly plural world.



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38. See international political theory scholarship on negotiated pluralism and global governance.

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