IFRI
MEMOS

Center for Energy and Climate



NOVEMBER
16,
2026

Strategic Redundancy beyond Hormuz: Alternative Oil and Gas Corridors and Türkiye's Emerging Role

Hasan Selim ÖZERTEM
Ahmet Erdi ÖZTÜRK

Key Takeaways

- The Hormuz crisis has shown that building new infrastructure for strategic redundancy is needed to reduce the exposure to geopolitical disruption.
- While existing alternative crude oil routes through the East–West, Abqaiq-Duqm, and Habshan–Fujairah pipelines will be expanded, oil products and liquefied natural gas will have very limited alternatives.
- Iraq has the strongest geographic potential to diversify its crude oil export routes through Türkiye, Syria, and Jordan, while raising crude oil production to 10 million barrels per day (mbd) (up from 4.5 mbd).
- Türkiye could become a key link between Iraqi—and potentially wider Gulf—energy flows and markets in the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. Yet becoming an energy hub requires more than pipelines.

Introduction

The central question raised by the present crisis in the Gulf and the disruption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is not simply how quickly and lastingly normal flows can be restored, but whether the regional energy architecture can continue to rely so heavily upon a single maritime corridor. Recent developments suggest that vessels may face another challenge in passing Bab al-Mandeb, another chokepoint before the Suez Canal for cargoes destined for European markets or for tankers loaded at Yanbu headed for Asian markets.

A complete bypass of Hormuz is unrealistic, given that one-fifth of global energy flows pass through it. Thus, efforts towards diversification rather than substitution are being engaged in the medium term.

This involves projects that can be understood through the concept of strategic redundancy in parallel infrastructure, whose importance derives not simply from commercial efficiency under normal conditions but from its capacity to provide alternatives during periods of geopolitical disruption.

In this changing configuration, Türkiye, Syria and Jordan may acquire greater strategic transit significance as alternative and possibly competing routes develop.

This briefing evaluates ongoing projects and Türkiye's potential new role as a hub for hydrocarbon supplies from the region.

Beyond Hormuz: why diversification cannot mean replacement

The ongoing crisis in the Gulf is not only an energy-supply disruption but also a crisis of network concentration. Building strategic redundancy refers to the creation, rehabilitation, or expansion of parallel infrastructure whose value may exceed its immediate commercial efficiency because it provides alternative pathways during periods of disruption. Such infrastructure may appear economically unnecessary when existing routes function normally; however, its strategic value increases sharply when a dominant corridor becomes contested or inaccessible. In this sense, seeking new routes to access the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean (Med), or the Gulf of Oman should be understood not only as transport projects but as corridors of resilience and hedging.

Yet strategic redundancy also raises a difficult financing question. Infrastructure built partly for emergency use may not generate sufficiently high utilization rates under normal market conditions to attract private investment on purely commercial grounds. The financing burden is therefore likely to be shared among producer states, sovereign wealth funds, state-owned energy companies, and, where guaranteed throughput exists, international oil companies. For private investors, participation will depend on

predictable tariffs, long-term volume commitments, political risk guarantees and confidence that the infrastructure can operate across changing geopolitical conditions.

A key distinction must be made between crude oil and refined petroleum products. Most of the bypass infrastructure discussed below is designed primarily to transport crude. Moving diesel, gasoline or jet fuel requires further planning, including alternative access routes to regional refineries through logistical solutions or de-risking strategies that allow reshoring or friendshoring of some refinery capacity. Strategic redundancy is therefore considerably easier to establish for crude oil than for refined petroleum products.

Pipelines themselves are less vulnerable to maritime interdiction but remain exposed to sabotage, drones, missiles, and political disruption. The appropriate measure of an alternative corridor is therefore not merely whether it bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, but whether the entire route remains politically, commercially, and physically resilient under crisis conditions. Thus, the most plausible emerging architecture is consequently a layered system of energy routes in which Hormuz remains indispensable but is supplemented by alternative corridors capable of absorbing part of any disruption.

During the blockade, Saudi Arabia leveraged the 1 200 km East-West Crude Oil Pipeline linking the Abqaiq facilities to the Red Sea export terminal at Yanbu. Built as a hedging strategy in the 1980s, the pipeline had a capacity of 3 million barrels per day (mbd), which was increased to 7 mbd. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is investing in expanding the Habshan-Fujairah corridor capacity from 1.8 mbd to 3.6 mbd by building a second 380 km line by 2027. This outlet will see growing importance but is exposed to drone and missile attacks and has a possibly constrained ability to reach Western markets once the corridor via Bab-al-Mandeb or the Red Sea is blockaded.

Kuwait and Bahrain face even tighter structural constraints. Kuwait remains highly dependent on Gulf export terminals, while Bahrain's energy infrastructure is closely connected to Saudi Arabia. Over the longer term, both countries would rely less on nationally controlled infrastructure and more on access to corridors built by neighboring states. Kuwait could potentially connect to an expanded Iraqi network, while Bahrain would remain more closely linked to Saudi infrastructure. Though Baghdad's renewed pursuit of routes to Ceyhan, Baniyas, and Aqaba could reshape the region's energy geography, other actors may, in the long run, take advantage of it to reach the East Med or the Red Sea.

The emerging geography of alternative energy corridors

The search for alternatives to Hormuz is accelerated by the Iran war, but its underlying logic predates the present crisis. Middle Eastern pipeline history repeatedly shows that infrastructure has been redesigned in response to war, political fragmentation, and changing access to maritime outlets. For instance, the Suez-Med pipeline (SUMED), with a capacity of 2.5 mbd, emerged as an alternative route following the closure of the Suez Canal after the 1967 war.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE will reinforce existing routes

As noted above, the most immediately available alternatives are within Saudi Arabia and the UAE: the East–West pipeline and the Habshan-Fujairah corridor, which do not rely on a third transit state to bypass Hormuz. Saudi Arabia recently announced plans to expand capacity of the East-West corridor from 7 mbd to 10 mbd, converting a gas pipeline to transmit crude oil to the Red Sea.[1] However, the pipeline faces constraints due to Yanbu port's loading capacity, around 4.5 mbd. Thus, Saudi Arabia should also consider developing this capacity by adding additional loading and storage terminals. Additionally, the recent attacks on the East-West pipeline by the Houthis in September 2026 showed that relying solely on this corridor is not a sustainable strategy for Saudi Arabia, nor can it play a role in helping other Gulf States bypass the Strait of Hormuz unless the security of this corridor is sustained. Facing such challenges, Saudi Arabia is also working on another pipeline project that would connect Saudi Arabia's oil fields to Duqm on Oman's coast. The project is estimated to have a capacity of 5-7 mbd with a cost of $7 billion.[2] Similarly, the UAE is seeking to bypass the Strait of Hormuz via the Habshan–Fujairah corridor. It already provides direct access to the Gulf of Oman without passing through Hormuz, and the planned $3 billion investment to double its capacity from 1.8 to 3.6 mbd is therefore the most credible near-term Emirati response. Beyond pipeline expansion, the UAE is likely to deepen Fujairah's role as an integrated export, storage, refining and underground bunkering center.

Iraq will need to build new infrastructure heading north

Unlike Saudi Arabia or the UAE, Iraq's dependence on southern Gulf exports creates an acute incentive to develop outlets in several directions simultaneously. Iraq's crude oil exports fell sharply as the blockade on the Strait of Hormuz prevented vessels from exiting the Persian Gulf. The estimated cost between March and June is around $40 billion in a country with an annual GDP of $260 billion.[3] Baghdad is pursuing a three-direction diversification strategy to maximize export optionality. The emerging logic is a multi-corridor system in which Iraqi crude could ultimately move north towards Ceyhan, west towards Baniyas (Syria) and southwest towards Aqaba (Jordan) depending on security conditions, commercial terms and market destination.

Baghdad is pursuing a three-direction diversification strategy

1. "Saudi Arabia Eyes Raising its Pipeline Oil Export Capacity to 10 Million bpd, Energy Minister Says", Reuters, October 12, 2026, available at: www.reuters.com.
2. S. Alann Achard, "Saudi Arabia has Begun Work on Duqm Pipeline to Bypass Hormuz, Total Energies CEO Says", *Oil & Gas*, October 1, 2026, available at: www.oilandgasmiddleeast.com.
3. "Iraq Lost over $40B in Revenue During Mideast War: Official", *TRT World*, July 22, 2026; available at: www.trtworld.com.

The first option is the established northern route through the Iraq–Türkiye pipeline to Ceyhan. The second is westward through the proposed rehabilitation of the approximately 800-kilometer Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline towards Syria's Mediterranean coast. The third is the proposed Haditha–Aqaba connection, which would provide Iraqi crude with access to Jordan's Red Sea coast. The game changer will be the Basra-Haditha connection, which will bring in an extra 2.5 mbd of crude oil supply.[4] Combined with oil from Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) territory, these three outlets would give Iraq a total export capacity exceeding 4 mbd, with further growth possible as production increases.

The financial scale of this diversification strategy is substantial. The Basra–Haditha backbone alone is estimated to cost around $5 billion, and the Iraqi government approved a $1.5 billion budget for the first phase. Meanwhile, the proposed rehabilitation and expansion of the Iraq–Syria Med connection, extending to the port of Aqaba, has been discussed at a considerably higher cost. These costs reinforce a central point of this memo since strategic redundancy is not simply an infrastructure problem, but a financing and political-risk challenge. Projects will move forward only where governments and commercial actors can agree on who bears construction costs, guarantees throughput, and absorbs political risk. Still, the cost of not exporting oil, or of being forced to make discounts, exceeds the estimate above in economic and political terms.

Among these options, the Med routes have broader geopolitical implications. Initially, these pipelines directly bypass three chokepoints, the Suez Canal, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz, and reach the Med market. This gives access to Europe, which consumes over 10.5 mbd and 430 bcm/y of gas. Moreover, these outlets will link regional actors through interdependence.

Iraq wants to revive the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, which started pumping Iraqi oil to the Med in 1952 and was fully shut down after severe damage in the 2003 Iraq War. The pipeline's capacity was 0.3 mbd. In July 2026, Iraq and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding at the US-Iraq Business Council in Washington to revamp this pipeline.[5] The estimated cost is up to $15 billion and will take about 4 years, aiming to increase capacity to 2 mbd.[6]

A second alternative is the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. It has the advantage of relying on an established corridor with a nominal capacity of about 1.6 mbd. This pipeline also faced disruptions in the aftermath of the Gulf War I due to the embargoes on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, security dynamics in northern Iraq, and then the political problems in the aftermath of 2003. Currently, the pipeline transmits up to 0.75 mbd, but one line

4. "Iraq Starts Work on Basra-Haditha Oil Pipeline, State News Agency Says", Reuters, May 1, 2026; available at: www.reuters.com.
5. R. Iclal Turan and R. Abushamala, "Iraq, Syria Sign Deal in Washington to Revive Crude Oil Pipeline," *AA*, July 17, 2026, available at: www.aa.com.tr.
6. T. Azhari, F. Dalatey and S. Dang, "New Syria-Iraq Crude Pipeline Still Years Away, Sources Say", Reuters, August 17, 2026, available at: www.reuters.com.

remains redundant because of technical issues, and Iraq uses an average of 0.6 mbd.[7] Türkiye and Iraq are also discussing rehabilitating and expanding capacity to 2.5 mbd. A third option is the Haditha-Aqaba pipeline. Iraqi and Jordanian authorities have given impetus to discussions about building a 900 km pipeline linking Iraq's Haditha province to Jordan's Aqaba port. According to reports, the pipeline is expected to transmit up to 1 mbd of crude oil from Iraq's Basra province to Jordan's Aqaba port.[8] This option has been on the agenda since 1983, but financing hurdles and security challenges in Iraq's western provinces have stalled it. The estimated cost of the Haditha-Aqaba pipeline with the Basra-Haditha connection is around $9 billion. As noted above, the Iraqi government has already allocated $1.5 billion for the Basra-Haditha connection, and construction has started. However, the Aqaba connection has certain limitations because, once it reaches the Red Sea, the oil would need to pass through the Suez Canal or Bab al-Mandeb to reach consumers. Thus, the Haditha-Aqaba route remains a secondary option compared with the Kirkuk-Baniyas and Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipelines.

The viability of these corridors also depends on where crude can be stored, processed, and converted into petroleum products. Pipeline redundancy therefore needs to be understood alongside the geography of refineries and storage facilities, as is the case at Ceyhan, Yanbu or Fujairah. Ceyhan's strategic value lies not only in its Med location but also in its connection to Türkiye's wider refining and storage network. Similar downstream capacity would be required around Baniyas or Aqaba if these routes were to evolve from emergency crude-export corridors into more complete energy systems.

Qatar has no rapid and competitive alternatives

Natural gas presents the more difficult challenge. Unlike crude oil, Gulf gas cannot simply be redirected through existing infrastructure. Qatar faces a fundamentally different problem as its export model is overwhelmingly based on liquefied natural gas (LNG) passing through Hormuz. Before the blockade, Qatar's LNG model gave it export flexibility in destination and the ability to scale production. Thus, with 170 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of production in the country and dependence on Hormuz, disruptions cannot be offset without new pipelines and liquefaction infrastructure in the Gulf of Oman. The Dolphin offshore gas pipeline can transmit only up to 20 bcm/y of Qatari gas to the UAE and Oman.

By rescaling the Dolphin pipeline, Qatar may transmit gas to Oman and onward to Asia if it installs additional liquefaction capacity, which would require aligning Omani interests. Another alternative is Syria, but it would again require transmitting gas by pipeline from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Syria's shores and building liquefaction capacity on Syria's coast. Compared with the pipeline connection project via Türkiye, this offers

7. A. Salem, "Iraq's Oil Exports Hit 3 mbd", *Iraqi News*, September 23, 2026, available at: www.iraqinews.com.
8. "Jordan and Iraq Discuss Advancing the Basra–Aqaba Oil Pipeline Project", *Jordan News*, July 16, 2026, available at: www.jordannews.jo.

flexibility for Qatari gas in Europe, but financing the pipeline and LNG infrastructure investment will raise costs, along with uncertainty about Syria's political transition dynamics. Any overland alternative would require new high-capacity pipelines, compression facilities, long-term supply commitments, transit agreements, and substantial investment in connecting infrastructure.


A Qatar–Türkiye gas corridor is therefore at present an option to be considered rather than a mature project under implementation. Its logic would be to move Qatari gas northwards through one of several possible overland routes and connect it to Türkiye's existing gas network and onward links to European markets. Such a project would require, at minimum, a politically viable route, most plausibly through Saudi Arabia and either Syria or Iraq, binding intergovernmental agreements among all transit states, guaranteed long-term volumes from Qatar, and financing arrangements capable of supporting a cross-border pipeline with an estimated cost of $10 billion. It would also have to compete commercially with Qatar's existing LNG model (and global LNG trends), which gives Doha greater flexibility in supplying Asian and European buyers by sea.

A Qatar–Türkiye gas corridor is therefore at present an option

However, such a route may provide access to alternative markets; via the Arab Gas pipeline, Qatari gas can also feed markets in the Levant. In fact, Qatar's UCC Holding recently announced that it started construction of a 186-km pipeline between Homs and Aleppo, which will finish in 22 months and allow bidirectional gas transmission through Syria, linking a wider geography between the Eastern Med and the Caspian. The 186-km pipeline is a missing part of the Arab Gas pipeline that links Egypt to Syria before reaching Türkiye. After the fall of the Baath regime, in collaboration with Azerbaijan and Qatar, Türkiye restored the Kilis-Aleppo connection and started pumping Caspian gas to Syria in August 2025.[9] Thus, once the Aleppo-Homs connection is ready, gas transmission between the Caspian and the Eastern Med will be possible bidirectionally.[10]

9. "Export of Azerbaijani Gas to Syria via Türkiye Has Commenced", SOCAR, August 2, 2025, available at: https://socar.com.tr.
10. "UCC Holding Starts Construction of 186-km Arab Gas Pipeline Section in Syria", Global Flow Control, October 1, 2026, available at: https://globalflowcontrol.com.

Figure 1: Middle East oil and gas corridors
Existing and projected crude oil and natural gas pipelines



Boundaries follow UN-recognised international borders: Cyprus undivided; Golan Heights shown as Syrian territory; West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza shown as the State of Palestine; Somaliland shown as part of Somalia; Egypt–Sudan boundary along 22°N, with the disputed Hala'ib and Bir Tawil administrative lines dashed. **Routes** are schematic; projected routes are indicative. **Capacities:** where two figures are shown, the first is existing capacity and the second the target; the Arab Gas Pipeline and IGAT figures are design (nameplate) capacities. **Base map:** Natural Earth (public domain), Lambert conformal conic projection.

Source: Map drawn by Claude Opus 5.5 based on the prompts provided by the authors.

The Türkiye–Iraq energy bargain

The significance of the Türkiye–Iraq corridor lies increasingly less in the physical existence of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline than in the possibility of embedding it within a broader political economy of interdependence. The one-year crude-oil transportation arrangement concluded in August 2026 between BOTAŞ, SOMO, and the North Oil Company is therefore important as a bridge towards a more comprehensive energy relationship. The route currently carries only a fraction of Iraq's export potential. Flows through Kirkuk-Ceyhan were around 0.17–0.2 mbd in spring 2026. Still, the corridor initially accounted for roughly 5–6% of pre-war export volumes of 3.3 mbd, potentially rising to around 15% if the 0.5 mbd target is reached.[11] Its strategic value nevertheless exceeds its current volume because it gives Iraq direct access to the Med without relying on Hormuz under current conditions. That importance will grow further if Baghdad succeeds in raising production substantially after 2030[12], making diversified and politically reliable export outlets increasingly necessary.

Ankara is increasingly seeking participation not only in the transportation but also in the production and commercialization of Iraqi energy. TPAO's acquisition of a 15% interest in BP's Kirkuk-centered upstream project,[13] involving several major northern Iraqi fields, illustrates this gradual movement towards vertical integration. If sustained, such investment would give Türkiye a stake in several stages of the value chain rather than leaving it merely as a recipient of transit fees.

> Incorporating Basra's production would change the functional meaning of Turkish-Iraqi energy cooperation

An infrastructure network capable of incorporating Basra's production would change the functional meaning of Turkish-Iraqi energy cooperation. Instead of organizing the export of northern Iraqi and Kurdish crude primarily, the corridor could begin to connect Iraq's principal southern producing areas with the Mediterranean. Turkish officials have gone further by raising the possibility that crude originating in Kuwait or other Gulf producers might eventually feed into an expanded Iraqi system directed towards Ceyhan.[14] In October, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar also discussed expanding the relationship to infrastructure development, resource exploration and production, refinery capacity, petrochemicals, and electricity during a meeting with Iraq's Oil Minister Muhammad Khudair.[15] Such ambitions remain politically and commercially uncertain, but they signal an important strategic

11. M. Hameed, "Iraq Exported 10 Million Barrels Oil Through Strait Hormuz", Reuters, May 16, 2026, available at: www.reuters.com.
12. "Can Iraq Turn a 10 Million bpd Oil Ambition into Economic Power?", *The Arab Weekly*, September 4, 2026, available at: https://thearabweekly.com.
13. "Türkiye Has Become a Partner with BP in the Fields in Kirkuk", Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, July 28, 2026, available at: https://enerji.gov.tr.
14. "Türkiye Eyes New Gulf Energy Routes through Iraq", *Hurriyet Daily News*, August 5, 2026, available at: www.hurriyetdailynews.com.
15. Alparslan Bayraktar's social media posting, available at: https://x.com.

development. Backed by Türkiye, the UAE and Qatar, the Development Road project aims to link Iraq's Faw port in Basra to Türkiye and then Europe via highways and railways in the north-south direction. Türkiye pushes to expand this connectivity project beyond logistics into a broader corridor that carries pipelines and fiber-optic cables and connects the Gulf and Europe.

Türkiye's upstream position in Iraq remains relatively modest. Thus, its significance lies more in the direction of travel towards deeper involvement in production, transportation and commercialization than in its present size. Türkiye should not assume that its geography automatically makes its territory the primary corridor choice for international companies. Syria is emerging as a competing Med option, while Jordan offers another route towards Aqaba. International producers are likely to judge these alternatives according to transport costs, available capacity, security, contractual stability, access to storage and terminals, political risk guarantees and the reliability of long-term transit arrangements.

BP's renewed investment in Kirkuk creates an obvious interest in maintaining reliable northern export capacity. Chevron's involvement in evaluating an Iraq–Syria-Med route suggests a parallel interest in expanding export optionality rather than dependence on a single corridor. TotalEnergies has a stronger southern Iraqi position, linking oil, gas, electricity and infrastructure investment, while Chinese companies are likely to attach particular importance to long-term access to Iraqi production and secure supply routes towards Asian markets. Russian companies like Lukoil and Rosneft have historically pursued substantial upstream interests in Iraq but face a more constrained operating environment because of imposed sanctions on Russia and geopolitical uncertainty.

As the regional and commercial actors seek viable corridors, Türkiye's principal advantage is that its Ceyhan port is already an operating energy terminal connected to established infrastructure for Iraqi, Azerbaijani and Kazakh oil. Moreover, Türkiye provides a secure passageway through its territory. Its disadvantage is the history of interruptions, arbitration disputes, and political uncertainty surrounding Iraqi exports.

In the past, disputes over Kurdish oil exports through Ceyhan produced international arbitration, competing financial claims, and disagreements over the respective authority of Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara.[16] As infrastructure can create interdependence without producing trust, any attempt to integrate Kirkuk, the KRG, federal export institutions and southern production into a coherent northbound system will therefore depend on political coordination inside Iraq.

In this process, the position of third parties will also be significant. The U.S. is interested in shaping this broader political economy-security nexus, as reflected in Thomas Barrack's expanded regional role following developments in Syria and his appointment as President Donald Trump's special envoy to Iraq. Furthermore, Türkiye's

16. U. Shukri, "What Does Iraq's $1.47 Billion Arbitration Victory over Türkiye Mean for the Future?", Middle East Forum, July 23, 2026, available at: www.meforum.org.

efforts to promote a secure and stable region through multilateral diplomatic initiatives in the security sphere, such as the Mecca Pact, as well as its involvement in transitional processes in Syria and Iraq, can be understood from this perspective. Iran adds another layer of complexity to this picture. Tehran has strong incentives to preserve its influence over Iraq and may view north–south corridors that link Iraq more closely with Türkiye and Europe as a strategic loss.

If Ankara and Baghdad can stabilize their relations, Türkiye–Iraq energy cooperation could move from simple transit towards deeper interdependence across production, refining, electricity, logistics and trade. Extending infrastructure from southern Iraq to Türkiye would also redefine the role of Türkiye's Ceyhan district, turning it from an outlet for northern Iraqi oil into a potential gateway between the Gulf and the Eastern Med. Ankara could also play a constructive role along the Syria route, given its growing influence in Damascus.

Türkiye as a genuine connectivity hub?

The distinction between an energy transit state and an energy hub is central to evaluating Türkiye's ambitions. A transit state provides territory and infrastructure through which energy moves between producer and consumer; a hub performs a more sophisticated function, combining multiple sources, storage, trading, pricing and onward connections in ways that allow flows to be commercially redirected.

Türkiye already has the infrastructure to support a wider hub role. TANAP and TAP connect Caspian gas to Europe through Türkiye, while TurkStream links Russian gas to the Balkans. Turning into a genuine hub requires transparent and predictable capacity allocation, non-discriminatory third-party access, sufficient storage, liquid wholesale trading, reliable pricing mechanisms, and confidence among producers and traders that energy can be redirected without discretionary political intervention. Türkiye has made progress in developing some of these institutional and physical components, but its market remains heavily shaped by the dominant role of state actors, particularly BOTAŞ. The question is therefore not simply whether Türkiye can transport larger volumes, but whether it can provide the regulatory and commercial environment in which multiple producers can compete, trade, store and redirect hydrocarbons efficiently and reliably.

For Europe, the appeal of additional Gulf-Türkiye connections would add another layer to its diversification strategy. Incorporating additional Iraqi or Gulf supply into the wider Turkish network could expand this optionality, especially for south-eastern Europe.

The emerging picture is therefore one of multiple exits rather than a single replacement for Hormuz. For Türkiye, alongside Jordan and Syria, this creates a potential role as a bridge linking Gulf producers with the Eastern Med and European markets.

Dr. Hasan Selim Özertem *is the Director of Research at Ussal Consultancy. His research interests are security, political economy, energy, elite politics, Eurasia, Russia, and Türkiye.*

Prof. Ahmet Erdi Öztürk *is a scholar in Politics and International Relations at London Metropolitan University. He is Co-Series Editor of Edinburgh Studies on Modern Türkiye and Co-Editor-in-Chief of Turkish Studies. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at ELIAMEP. His research interests are comparative politics, foreign policy analysis, and Middle Eastern politics and Türkiye.*

How to quote this publication:


Hasan Selim Özertem and Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, "Strategic Redundancy beyond Hormuz: Alternative Oil and Gas Corridors and Türkiye's Emerging Role", *Ifri Memos*, Ifri, November 16, 2026.

ISBN: 979-10-373-1304-1

The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone.

© All rights reserved, Ifri, 2026

Cover: © Rokas Tenys/Shutterstock.com



27 rue de la Procession
75740 Paris cedex 15 – France

Ifri.org