
Ampo at 50 The Faltering U.S.-Japan Relationship

Gavan McCormack

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Executive Summary

For the last 50 years the governance of the US-Japan alliance has often been characterized by secret diplomacy and discretionary choices. In the post-war period Japan's strategic choices have given overall priority to sustaining a strong security alliance with the United States. The preservation of the alliance has often been set above the supreme law of the land – Japan's constitution – and above the sovereignty of the Japanese people. These practices, essentially allowing the Japanese government to evade its responsibility, have facilitated the adoption of ambivalent and contradictory policies on crucial matters of national security.

The small archipelago of Okinawa, which is supporting the bulk of the US military bases in Japan, has particularly suffered from this twisted governance. Okinawa experienced discriminatory treatment under the US military jurisdiction until 1952 and, thereafter, under the authority of Tokyo. Concerns for the safety of the Okinawa people and the citizens' repeated demands to be rid of the military bases have been disregarded. The difficult transfer of the dangerous Futenma air base in Okinawa, negotiated since 1996, has become the symbol of the complex issues surrounding the US military presence in Japan.

In September 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan took office with the intention of revising the alliance in order to build "a more equal relationship with Washington". However, the US government reacted with condescension and ire. The DPJ's promise to relocate the Futenma base outside Okinawa resulted in the unification and strengthening of the antibase movement in the prefecture. But Tokyo's tergiversations and the failure of Prime Minister Hatoyama to make a viable proposal to Washington turned the Japanese people against its government. As a result, the Prime Minister stepped down in early June.

For the alliance to continue and strengthen through the next fifty years, both sides will have to face up to the past and reflect on the relevance of the security treaty and the governance of their relationship.

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Introduction: Ampo 50 – Ambiguous Celebration

On 19 January 2010, the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the US and Japan, in a statement to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the treaty on mutual cooperation and security, jointly declared that

“the U.S.-Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as regional peace and stability. The Alliance is rooted in our shared values, democratic ideals, respect for human rights, rule of law and common interests. The Alliance has served as the foundation of our security and prosperity for the past half century and the Ministers are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the 21st century.”¹

The year of the “Golden Jubilee” anniversary of the US-Japan alliance should be an opportune time to reflect on it. Should the treaty continue unchanged, be straightened out and revised if necessary, or even ended or replaced with something else? Instead, however, such reflection is blocked by a combination of shocking revelations about the past and intense political hype and rhetoric.

The 1960 “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security”² (commonly known, from the Japanese abbreviation for *anzen hoshō joyaku*, as Ampo) was adopted in 1960, replacing the 1951 San Francisco “Treaty of Peace with Japan,” which was the post-war

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¹ “Joint Statement of The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,” January 19, 2010, by Minister for Foreign Affairs Okada, Minister of Defense Kitazawa, Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/joint1001.html>.

² The 1960 treaty of security is a very narrow agreement for the defense of Japan (in the “Far East” according to Article 6), and has never been revised. The actual term *Nichibei domei* (Japan-US Alliance) was only used in an official document for the first time in 1995. Maeda Tetsuo, “Juzoku” kara “jiritsu” e – *Nichibei ampo o kaeru*, Kobunken, 2009, p. 32.

settlement imposed by conqueror upon its defeated enemy in the wake of cataclysmic war and a six year occupation. Then “independence” had been restored only on condition of division of the country into “war state” (American-controlled Okinawa³ until 1972) and “peace state” (demilitarized and constitutionally pacifist mainland Japan), both under US military rule. The 1960 treaty upheld that division, confirming the US occupation of Okinawa and its use of bases elsewhere in the country.

The 1960 adoption of Ampo was tumultuous. The government at the time was that of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had been set up in part with CIA funds five years earlier and in character and inclination owed much to American patronage. Kishi Nobusuke, the US’s preferred agent, had been installed as Prime Minister in 1957. Kishi rammed the bill through Japan’s House of Representatives in the predawn hours on 20 May, in the absence of the opposition, as protesters milled about in the streets outside. After passage of the bill, President Eisenhower had to cancel his planned visit for fear of a hostile reception, and Kishi was forced to resign. The then-US ambassador, Douglas MacArthur 2nd, reported to Washington that Japan was a country whose “latent neutralism is fed on antimilitarist sentiments, pacifism, fuzzy-mindedness, nuclear neuroses and Marxist bent of intellectuals and educators.”⁴ The memory of that 1960 crisis has deterred both governments from submitting the relationship to parliamentary or public review ever since. This resulted in an alliance management characterized by secret diplomacy and undemocratic practices.

From 2008, as the mandate of the LDP order shrank rapidly and the support for the then-opposition Democratic Party grew until in due course it formed a government the following year, details of the interventions and secret deals surrounding the alliance began to surface. But the humiliating circumstances and near catastrophe of the “alliance’s” origin, the web of lies, deception and surrendered sovereignty that grew around and became inseparable from it, and the deliberate deception of the Japanese people was passed over by anodyne and celebratory statements issued by official and semi-official sources on the occasion of the 50th anniversary. Instead, they celebrated the “alliance” as an unqualified good, to be deepened and strengthened.

³ Okinawa is an archipelago located at the extreme south of Japanese islands. The capital, Naha, is 1500 kilometers south of Tokyo.

⁴ Ambassador MacArthur to Department of State, Cable No 4393, 24 June 1960, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-60, vol. 18, pp. 377-384, p. 380.

Secret Diplomacy and the Undemocratic Management of the Alliance

Prior to the renewal of the security treaty in 1960, during Kishi's term in office, several agreements were struck that determined key aspects of the subsequent relationship.

Discretionary Power: An Alliance Set “Above the Supreme Law”

First, in 1959, the US government intervened to neutralize a Tokyo District Court judgement (the “Sunagawa Incident” case) in which Tokyo District Court Justice Date Akio held US forces in Japan to be “war potential” and therefore forbidden under the constitution’s Article 9 (the peace commitment clause). Had the Date judgement been allowed to stand, the history of the Cold War in East Asia would have had to take a different course. At 8 A.M. the following morning, however, and just one hour before the Cabinet was to meet, US ambassador Douglas MacArthur 2nd held an urgent meeting with Foreign Minister Fujiyama.⁵ He is known to have spoken about the possible disturbance of public sentiment that the judgment might cause and the complications that might ensue. Following that meeting, the appeal process was cut short by having the matter referred directly to the Supreme Court, and MacArthur then met with the Chief Justice to ensure that he too understood what was at issue. In due course, in December 1959 the Supreme Court reversed the Tokyo Court judgement, ruling that the judiciary should not pass judgement on matters pertaining to the security treaty with the US because such matters were “highly political” and concerned Japan’s very existence.

Following the Supreme Court ruling, the not-guilty verdicts in the initial hearings for a group of Sunagawa farmers who were convicted of trespassing in the course of their protest against the compulsory acquisition of their land for the enlargement of a US air

⁵ Odanaka Toshiki, “Shihoken dokuritsu e no oson kodo,” *Sekai*, August 2008, pp. 113-121. See also “Judicial independence infringed,” *Japan Times*, 3 May 2008.

base were reversed. The US intervention in this case only became known more than 50 years later, from materials discovered in the US archives in April 2008. It was April 2010 before the Japanese Foreign Ministry released 34 pages of material to the surviving defendants of the 1959 action.⁶

The Supreme Court ruling in effect elevated the Security Treaty above the constitution and immunized it from any challenge at law. It entrenched the US base presence and opened the path to the revision of the Security Treaty (and the accompanying secret understandings) a month later. The ruling also helped remove wind from the sails of the then-burgeoning anti-US Treaty movement. Denied recourse to the judiciary, the antiwar and antibase struggle was forced into the streets.

Revelations and Disclosing of the Bilateral Secret Agreements

Second were the series of agreements, later known in Japan as the “Secret Agreements” (*Mitsuyaku*), under which Japan (especially in 1958-1960, but also in 1969 and later) agreed to support US war preparations and nuclear strategy.

With the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still fresh in people's minds, and that of the *Daigo Fukuryu-maru* (or Lucky Dragon # 5) in 1954 – when Japanese tuna fishermen fell victim to radioactive ash from a US hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll -- even fresher, no Japanese government could have survived if citizens had known how ready they were to embrace nuclear weapons.

From time to time, however, there were revelations about these agreements. Documentary proof was even found in the US archives, but governments persisted in denying them. In 2008-9, however, four former Foreign Ministry vice-ministers gave evidence of the existence of the agreements and the deception surrounding them, so that it was impossible for the new Government to turn a blind eye to them any longer. Foreign Minister Okada ordered a search of the archives for relevant materials on the *mitsuyaku* and his committee published its findings in March 2010.⁷

They confirmed three main understandings: first was what they called a “tacit agreement” of the Government of Japan (January 1960) to turn a blind eye to US nuclear weapons, agreeing that “no prior consultation is required for US military vessels carrying nuclear

⁶ “Sunagawa jiken no ‘Bei kosaku’ o itten kaiji, chunichi taishi to gaisho kaidanroku,” *Tokyo shimbun*, 3 April 2010.

⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Iwayuru ‘mitsuyaku’ mondai ni kansuru chosa kekka,” 9 March 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/kekka.html>.

weapons to enter Japanese ports or sail in Japanese territorial waters;”⁸ second was a “narrowly defined secret pact” to allow US forces in Japan a free use of the bases in the event of a “contingency” (i.e. war) on the Korean peninsula; and third was a “broadly defined secret pact” for Japan to shoulder costs for restoring some Okinawan base lands for return to their owners.⁹

These findings were notable for what they excluded as well as for what they revealed. The 1960 nuclear agreement was first made public by US Admiral Gene Larocque in 1974 and confirmed by former Ambassador Reischauer in 1981, with the relevant documents found in the US archives in 1987.¹⁰

Another instance involved a 21 November 1969 minute describing an accord between Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and US President Richard Nixon to allow nuclear weapons into Okinawa in times of “great emergency.” Although the Okada Committee recognized the accord as “genuine”, it was not accepted by the committee as a “secret agreement” for the reason that it did not have binding power beyond the term of the Sato administration. This document too had been long known from US sources and a copy even turned up in 2009 in the home of former Prime Minister Sato’s son.¹¹

In a sense these agreements were therefore not intrinsically “secret” so much as *kept* secret, with the Government of Japan continuing up until 2009 to deny that they existed, presumably driven by fear of exposing to the Japanese people its complicity in nuclear war preparations that directly violated its proclaimed Three Non-Nuclear Principles (i.e. the political principles of Non-Possession, Non-Production, Non-Introduction of nuclear weapons introduced by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967).

The Committee chose to exclude from its “secret agreements” category other important agreements whose existence was known from US archival sources: notably the 1958 Japanese agreement to

⁸ “Record of discussion, 6 January 1960,” US National Archives, quoted in *Akahata* editorial, “Lay bare all secrets related to Japan-US Security Treaty,” *Japan Press Weekly*, 5 July 2009.

⁹ Togo Kazuhiko and Sato Masaru, “Gaimu kanryo ni damasareru Okada gaisho,” *Shukan kinyobi*, 26 March 2010, pp. 14-17.

¹⁰ Richard Halloran, “Sign of Secret U.S.-Japan Pact Found, *New York Times*, 7 April 1987; and on the 2008-9 confirmation from four former administrative vice foreign ministers, see national media for summer of 2009, especially *Akahata*, 22 June and 7 July 2009 (where some of the documents are reproduced), http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik09/2009-06-22/2009062201_03_1.html and http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik09/2009-07-07/2009070703_01_0.html. Also Honda Masaru, “Kensho: Kore ga mitsuyaku da,” *Sekai*, November 2009, pp. 164-175.

¹¹ “Top Secret. Agreed Minute to Joint Communiqué of United States President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato issued on November 21, 1969,” as discovered in 2009 by Sato’s son in his father’s papers, reproduced in Shunichi Kawabata and Nanae Kurashige, “Secret Japan-U.S. nuke deal uncovered,” *Asahi shimbun*, 24 December 2009 (<http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200912240069.html>).

surrender jurisdiction over US servicemen accused of crimes in Japan,¹² and (with one partial and limited exception) the 1969 secret agreements concerning the Okinawan “reversion” (discussed below).¹³

The Ambivalent Japanese Posture toward Nuclear Weapons

It is no mere matter of historical concern that the Government of Japan was secretly complicit in US nuclear war strategy by its consent to the US introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, negating one of the country’s famous “Three Principles”, and that the country’s nuclear policy has therefore long been based on deliberate deception at the highest level of government.

In 2009, when President Obama made his Prague speech on the US’s “moral responsibility” to act to bring about a nuclear-free world, Japan responded by public support, and joined with Australia to sponsor a new global nuclear disarmament initiative, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). However, Japan’s national defense policy remained firmly nuclear, i.e., based on the “umbrella” of “extended nuclear deterrence” provided by the United States, and, behind the scenes, it pressed Washington to maintain it. One well-informed nuclear specialist refers to a “nuclear desiderata” document in which the Government of Japan (presumably in the late Aso government period) urged Washington to maintain its nuclear arsenal, insisting that it be reliable (modernized), flexible (able to target multiple targets), responsive (able to respond speedily to emergencies), stealthy (including strategic and attack submarines), visible (with nuclear capable B-2s or B-52s kept at Guam), and adequate (brought to the attention of potential adversaries).¹⁴ The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (headed by William Perry and James Schlesinger), adopted very similar wording in advising Congress in May 2009 that “the United States requires a stockpile of nuclear weapons that are safe, secure, and reliable, and... credible.”¹⁵ One sentence in the report (p. 21) read, “One

¹² Kishi-MacArthur Agreement of 4 October 1958. (“Japan ‘ceded right to try US forces’ – secret accord ‘covers off-duty offenses’,” *Yomiuri shimbun*, 10 April 2010). The Okada Commission did not disclose this document, but it “surfaced” and was disclosed several weeks later. Professor Sakamoto Kazuya of Osaka University is here cited as authority for the view that, fifty years on, this agreement still holds force.

¹³ Niihara Shoji, “Ampo joyaku ka no ‘mitsuyaku’,” *Shukan kinyobi*, 19 June 2009, pp. 20-21

¹⁴ Hans M. Kristensen, “Nihon no kaku no himitsu,” *Sekai*, December 2009, pp. 177-183, at p. 180.

¹⁵ US Institute of Peace, “Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States Issues Final report,” May 2009, pp. XV11-XV111,

particularly important ally has argued to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand” (emphasis added). That “particularly important ally” is generally understood to refer to Japan.¹⁶ Schlesinger also told the *Wall Street Journal* that US nuclear weapons are needed “to provide reassurance to our allies, both in Asia and in Europe.”¹⁷

Although the term “umbrella” is innocuous, even comforting, it means that nuclear victim Japan is also nuclear dependent Japan, resting its defense on nuclear weapon capable B-2 and B-52 bombers stationed at Guam and on Cruise missile-carrying submarines, both ready to inflict nuclear devastation on an enemy just as the US did to it 65 years ago. And unless US nuclear submarines somehow are scrupulous in unloading their missiles before heading for Japanese ports, the likelihood is that the governments of the two countries continue today to connive, as through the past 50 years, to flout the “Three Non-nuclear Principles,” while holding the Japanese people in contempt for their incorrigible “nuclear neuroses.”

More Transparency Needed against Efforts to Conceal the Truth

The Diet Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2010 heard evidence from Togo Kazuhiko, a former Foreign Ministry official, to the effect that during his term as head of the Treaties Bureau in 1998-9 he had drawn up and handed to senior Ministry officials a set of 58 documents (16 of them of high level significance) on “secret agreements” in five red file boxes. Foreign Minister Okada’s Commission had discovered evidence relating to only eight (of which it confirmed only three). Togo told the Diet that he “had heard” of a process of deliberate destruction that preceded the introduction of Freedom of Information legislation in 2001.¹⁸

In April 2010, Tokyo District Court ordered the Foreign Ministry to locate and disclose documents concerning Okinawan “secret agreements,” even though the Ministry denied that it possessed any such documents. It explicitly criticized the Ministry’s

<http://www.usip.org/print/newsroom/news/congressional-commission-the-strategic-posture-the-united-states-issues-final-report>.

¹⁶ A Kyodo report dated 30 July explicitly referred to Japanese pressure. See Narusawa Muneo, “Beigun no kaku haibi to Nihon,” *Shukan kinyobi*, 26 March 2010, pp. 18-19.

¹⁷ Melanie Kirkpatrick, “Why we don’t want a nuclear-free world,” *Wall Street Journal*, 13 July 2009.

¹⁸ “Mitsuyaku bunsho, doko e kieta,” *Asahi shimbun*, 20 March 2010.

“insincerity” in “neglecting the public’s right to know,” and noted its suspicion that the Ministry might have deliberately destroyed sensitive documents in order to cover up the record.¹⁹ From this it was clear that there was much still to be done, both to clarify responsibility for Japan’s half century of lying to its people and to achieve credibility and consistency in its contemporary nuclear disarmament policies.²⁰

Half a century after Judge Date’s ruling on the unconstitutionality of US bases in Japan, Judge Sugihara Norihiko had taken a courageous stand in the same spirit. The Government decided almost immediately to appeal, but this time it took 10 days as opposed to one night. It meant that public attention would continue through ongoing court proceedings to focus on the question of Foreign Ministry responsibility for the disappearance, if not the destruction, of official records of top-level negotiations.

These practices are very telling about the very particular relationship of Japan and the US. I have referred elsewhere to the peculiar Japanese psychology of “Client state”-ism.²¹ In that state of chosen dependence the “client” embraces occupation, and is determined at all costs to avoid offence to the occupiers and ready to pay a huge price to be sure that they remain. It is a stratagem deeply entrenched in the Japanese state, followed by government after government and by national and opinion leaders. It is not a phenomenon unique to Japan, nor is it necessarily irrational. To gain and keep the favour of the powerful can often seem to offer the best assurance of security for the less powerful. Dependence and subordination during the Cold War brought considerable benefits, especially economic, and (with the important exception of Okinawa) the relationship was at that time subject to certain limits, mainly stemming from the peculiarities of the American-imposed constitution (notably the Article 9 expression of commitment to state pacifism).

¹⁹ “State told to come clean on Okinawa,” *Asahi shimbun*, 10 April 2010; Masami Ito, “Court: Disclose Okinawa papers,” *Japan Times*, 10 April 2010.

²⁰ Togo Kazuhiko, testifying to the Diet Committee in 2010 on his role as head of the Treaty Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998-99, “Mitsuyaku bunsho haki – kokumin to rekishi e no hainin da,” *Tokyo shimbun*, 20 March 2010. See also Togo’s discussion with Sato Masaru in “Gaimu kanryo ni damasareru Okada gaisyo,” *op. cit.*

²¹ In the revised Japanese, Korean and Chinese editions of my 2007 book, *Client State: Japan in the American Embrace* (For the American edition: London/New York, Verso, 2007), I offer the following definition: “a state that enjoys the formal trappings of Westphalian sovereignty and independence, and is therefore neither a colony nor a puppet state, but which has internalised the requirement to give preference to ‘other’ interests over its own.”

Ampo and Okinawa

The 50th anniversary celebrations of the US-Japan “alliance” have a peculiar poignancy for Okinawa. Fifty years ago the Ampo treaty settlement simply confirmed its exclusion from Japan’s sovereign territory, its status under direct US military rule remaining unchanged until 1972. With “Mainland Japan” a constitutional “peace state,” Okinawa served as the indispensable base for the prosecution of war in Korea, Vietnam (from the early 1960s), and in preparation for world war. The problem of how to reconcile the contradictory roles of mainland Japan and Okinawa confounds both governments to this day.

The Controversies Surrounding the Retrocession of Okinawa

Under direct US military jurisdiction until 1972, Okinawa’s *raison d'être*, for both Washington and Tokyo, was as a centre for the cultivation of “war potential” and for preparation for the “threat or use of force” – both forbidden under Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. When it was eventually “returned” to Japan, the process of “return” (*henkan*, or giving back) was one of a triple negation. Firstly, instead of a “giving back,” it was actually a “purchase.” Japan bought the islands from the US for a huge sum (most likely around \$685 million),²² while allowing the US to retain virtually all its military assets and paying large ongoing fees since then to ensure that they not think of leaving. The payments included the sum of \$70 million supposedly to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa, but the chief negotiator on the Japanese side revealed nearly 40 years later that it was a groundless figure. “We decided on the cost to be able to say, ‘Since Japan paid so much, the nuclear weapons were removed.’ We did it to cope with opposition parties in the Diet.”²³ A detailed accounting of the entire sum involved remains to be done.

Secondly, the real terms of the “return” (not just the fact of the payments) were carefully concealed. Though celebrated at the time as a diplomatic triumph for Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in securing return on terms of “*kaku-nuki hondo-nami*” (no nuclear weapons,

²² Client State, op. cit., p. 158.

²³ “Ex-negotiator: Cost to remove U.S. nukes from Okinawa exaggerated to dupe public,” *Asahi shimbun*, 13 November 2009.

exactly as mainland Japan), in reality it was neither. Not only were the bases left intact but just two years after announcing the “Three Non-Nuclear Policies,” Sato assured the US that it could continue introducing nuclear weapons into Okinawa, confiding to US ambassador Alexis Johnson that he thought the policy was “nonsense.”²⁴ Five years later, he accepted the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of his government for having declared those very principles, having covertly agreed to vitiate one of them (non-introduction). All Japanese governments from that time to 2009 persisted in lying to parliament and the people by denying the existence of such an agreement.

Thirdly, despite the nominal inclusion of Okinawa from 1972 under the Constitution of Japan, with its guarantees of peace, democracy, and human rights, bitter experience has taught the Okinawans that in practice the principles of the Security Treaty (including its secret elements) have always outweighed the constitution. The constitution in Okinawa from 1972 has been subject to the overriding principle of priority to the military. Peace and war merged in the Japanese state and LDP governments and foreign affairs and defense bureaucracies cultivated the belief that submission to the US (rather than the nominally supreme charter of the Constitution) was, and had to be, the first principle of the Japanese polity. Not surprisingly, Japanese government celebrations of the 50th anniversary tend to avoid discussion of Okinawa.

The Nye Doctrine: No Peace Dividends for Okinawa

For Okinawa, reluctant host to major US Marine and Air Force facilities with one-fifth of the land surface of its main island still occupied by US forces nearly four decades after its “return” (or five decades since adoption of the Ampo treaty), the return of LDP governments in 1995 (after a brief interregnum), and the adoption of the Nye post-Cold War formula from the same year was especially fateful. But where political and intellectual resistance to the Nye agenda crumbled nationally, popular resistance welled in Okinawa, following in particular the shocking rape attack on a 12-year-old girl by a three GIs in 1995.

As the Cold War era ended, instead of gradually reducing its military footprint in Japan and Okinawa as the “enemy” vanished, the US ramped it up, demanding a greater “defense” contribution from Japan and pressing for its Self Defense Forces to cease being “boy scouts” (as Donald Rumsfeld once contemptuously called them) and to become a “normal” army, able to fight alongside, and if necessary

²⁴ “Peace Prize winner Sato called nonnuclear policy ‘nonsense’,” *Japan Times*, 11 June 2000.

instead of, US forces and at US direction, in the “war on terror.” It wanted Japanese forces to be integrated under US command, and it wanted greater access to Japan’s capital, markets and technology. While “Client State” status (as discussed earlier) came to require heavier burdens and much increased costs in contrast to those borne during the Cold War, the benefits were much less.

In 1995, the US government commission headed by Joseph Nye (then Assistant Defense Secretary for International Security Affairs) advised President Clinton on the desirable shape of post-Cold war US presence in Asia. Since the peace and security of East Asia was in large part due to the “oxygen” of security provided by US forces based in the region, he urged that the existing defense and security arrangements should be maintained, the US military presence in East Asia (Japan and Korea) held at the level of 100,000 troops rather than wound down, and allies pressed to contribute more to maintaining them.²⁵

The frame of thinking was predicated on US military occupation continuing and based on distrust of Japan. Ota Masahide, who as Governor of Okinawa between 1990 and 1998 had occasion to deal with Nye from time to time, notes that Nye spoke of Okinawa as “like American territory” and he (Ota) felt “inclined to ask him was it not part of the sovereign country, Japan.”²⁶ Despite their overweening assumption of the prerogative of dictating to Japan, Nye and other “handlers” of the relationship were respected, even revered, as “pro-Japanese.” One well-placed Japanese observer recently wrote of the “foul odor” he felt in the air around Washington and Tokyo given off by the activities of the “Japan-expert” and the “pro-Japan” Americans on one side and “slavish” “US-expert” and “pro-American” Japanese on the other, both “living off” the unequal relationship which they had helped construct and support.²⁷

Like arrows one after the other from the Nye quiver came the legal and institutional reforms adopted to transform the “Alliance” in the desired direction: the Hashimoto-Clinton “Joint Security Declaration” on the “Alliance for the 21st Century” (1996), the “New Defense Guidelines” (1997), the “Vicinity Contingency Law” (*Shuhen jitaiho*,

²⁵ United States, Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, “United States Security Strategy in the East Asia-Pacific Region” (commonly: “The Nye Report”), 27 February 1995.

²⁶ Ota Masahide, interview, Videonews, 11 March 2010. Transcript at “Peace Philosophy,” 12 April 2010, <http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/>

²⁷ Terashima Jitsuro, “Zuno no ressun, Tokubetsu hen, (94), Joshi ni kaeru ishi to koso – Nichibei domei no saikochiku ni mukete,” *Sekai*, February 2010, 118-125. Terashima refers to Japanese intellectuals by the term, “do-gan” (literally “slave face”, a term he invents based on his reading of a savagely satirical early 20th century Chinese story by Lu Hsun). For English translation of this Terashima text, see “The Will and Imagination to Return to Common Sense: Toward a Restructuring of the US-Japan Alliance,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus*, 15 March 2010, <http://japanfocus.org/-Terashima-Jitsuro/3321>.

1999), the “Law for the Protection of Japanese” (*Kokumin hogoho*, 2004), the Law on Response to an Armed Attack” (*Buryoku kogeki jitaiho*, 2003) the “Law to Facilitate Support to US Forces” (*Beigun shien enkatsuka ho*, 2004), the Agreement on the Alliance’s “Transformation and Realignment for the Future” (2005) and “Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (2006), the Law to Advance Reorganization of US Bases (*Beigun kichi saihen sokushinho*, 2007); and the “Special Measures” laws (*Tokusoho*) for the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean (2001), Iraq (2003) and Somalia (2009).²⁸

Late 20th century Japanese governments continually adjusted the treaty by expanding its scope in practice, and early 21st century governments went further, setting aside legal and constitutional inhibitions and struggling to meet American prescriptions for making it “mature”, which meant extending it into a global agreement for the combat against terror.²⁹ Not until 2009 was there any serious questioning of the formula in Tokyo.

However, a serious crisis burst out in Okinawa after the rape of a young Japanese girl by several US soldiers. The people in Okinawa demonstrated to demand the departure of the US forces stationed on the island. It was the Okinawan periphery that set the agenda for the national debate on the country’s and the region’s future.

The 1995 Crisis and the Futenma Saga

The Clinton-Hashimoto Agreement of 1996 began the present phase of the “Okinawa problem” and the long and continuing agony of Nago City. Under pressure of the Okinawan mass mobilization of outrage in the aftermath of the 1995 child rape incident, the “return” of Futenma Marine Air station, which sits incongruously and dangerously amid the bustling city of Ginowan, was promised. The gold of the promised “return,” however, quickly turned to dross as, instead of closing and returning, Futenma was targeted for “replacement” i.e. a new base for the old.

Initially, this Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) was to be a modest heliport (45 metres in length according to the first designs)³⁰ to be located somewhere “off the east coast of Okinawa.” That soon turned out to mean offshore from the fishing port of Henoko, a site that had first featured in a 1966 US Navy “Masterplan,” at the height of the Vietnam War, for a large-scale naval and marine facility.

²⁸ See Maeda Tetsuo, ‘Juzoku’ kara ‘Jiritsu’ e – *Nichibei ampo o kaeru*, Kobunken, 2009, pp. 90-92.

²⁹ Client State, op.cit.

³⁰ Shimokobe Jun, then Vice-Minister at the National Lands Agency, quoted in Sato Manabu, “Obama seiken no Amerika,” *op.cit*, p. 90

Between 1996 and 2010, the government of Japan produced one plan after another centering on Cape Henoko and the Marine base of Camp Schwab already located there. The people of Nago were only once offered a choice on whether or not to accept a new base (albeit in the form of the then small, offshore structure). In a 1997 plebiscite, despite massive central government intervention designed to sway them in favour, a clear majority said "No," but in a bizarre outcome the city mayor flew to Tokyo to announce the outcome, rejected it on behalf of the City (i.e. agreed to the base construction), and announced his resignation. Thereafter, grassroots resentment and hostility to the various Henoko plans emanating from Tokyo persisted. Nago City and Okinawan prefectural authorities in 1999 indicated they would be prepared to accept the project, but only under strict conditions - for dual (military-civilian) use, 15 year limited term and assurance of no environmental damage - as to be tantamount to continuing rejection. The national government, however, interpreted that position as one of unconditional consent. Through the following decade Tokyo studiously ignored the views of Nago citizens, save for pouring money into "development" projects designed to subvert or neutralize their continuing opposition to the base project.

At no point did the Japanese government ever propose that the Futenma Base simply be closed *tout court*. To the US it insisted that relocation elsewhere in Japan was out of the question. It had to be in Okinawa, and in Okinawa it had to be in Henoko.³¹ In July 2002, a revised plan was adopted involving a doubling of the area and a decision to reclaim the coral reef (rather than float on pontoons above it). The more the project was rejected or subjected to impossible conditions, the more it returned, larger and freer of conditions. As survey works began, skirmishes between the government-employed surveyors and the peace and environment coalition opposition, at sea or on the ocean floor, became a regular occurrence.

The 2006 Roadmap on US Forces Realignment

The following year, 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi conceded the strength of the opposition by cancelling the Henoko plan. Again, however, no sooner did he do so than a new, grander design replaced it. First, it took the form of an "L" shaped 1,600 metre structure one kilometre offshore from Henoko but then, under the "*Beigun saihen*" ("Realignment of US Forces in Japan") agreement, in

³¹ Kurt Campbell, then representing the Department of Defense, dismissed the Japanese claim that it would not be possible on military grounds to replace Futenma anywhere but in Okinawa, saying that the Japanese grounds for saying so were only political, and that the US side was open to suggestions for alternative sites in Kyushū or Shikoku. (Minute of Unofficial Discussion Meeting, 13 March 1998, "Futenma isetsu hikoshiki kyogi, 98 nen 3 gatsu toji, Bei 'kengai kano' o dentatsu," *Ryukyu shimpō*, 15 November 2009.)

2006 it became a land-based structure, with dual, “V”-shaped, 1,800 meter runways stretching out from the existing US base, Camp Schwab, into Oura Bay, and including a deep sea naval port and a chain of helipads scattered through the forest. Japan promised it would complete and hand over this complex to the Marine Corps by 2014.

The 2006 revision (itself to be revised later, on which see below) amounted to a comprehensive, hi-tech, air, land and sea base - far larger and more multifunctional than the obsolescent, inconvenient, and dangerous Futenma. Former Governor (and pre-eminent Okinawan historian) Ota Masahide quotes Japanese SDF sources referring to the projected Henoko base as akin in scale to Kansai International Airport in Osaka Bay, as well as Marine Corps descriptions of it as a base that would become second only to Hawaii in the world, at a likely cost of between one and one and a half trillion yen, noting too that it would require \$200 million per year in maintenance.³²

While the Agreement passed in mainland Japan with minimal debate or comment, in Okinawa the resistance grew, defying all efforts by the LDP government to persuade, intimidate, divide, or buy it off. The conservative Governor, thought to be closely allied to the LDP national government, described the plan as “totally unacceptable” and said that “everyone in the prefecture and Nago City opposes it.”³³ Earlier, he had referred to the mood of the islands as being like magma on the brink of eruption.

Despite the cooperative demeanor of the Koizumi and subsequent LDP governments, and Armitage’s satisfaction with it,³⁴ progress on the agreed agenda was slow, especially on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) issue. By 2008, the Survey process still incomplete, the opposition unmoved and, even more important, the LDP’s warrant rapidly running out, Richard Lawless, who as Deputy Defense Secretary had headed the negotiations that culminated in the Roadmap, told the *Asahi Shinbun* in May that the alliance was drifting.

“What we really need is a top-down leadership that says, ‘Let’s rededicate ourselves to completing all of these agreements on time; let’s make sure that the budgeting of

³² Ota Masahide, “Futenma mondai no botan no kakechigai wa koko kara hajimatta,” *Videonews*, 11 March 2010.

<http://www.videonews.com/on-demand/461470/001385.php>.

³³ *Client State*, op. cit., p. 167.

³⁴ Richard Armitage, a regular visitor to Tokyo during these crucial years, often bringing instructions to Koizumi and later governments, by 2006 expressed himself satisfied that Japan was not “sitting in the stands any more,” but had put Japanese “boots on the ground” in Iraq, come out as “a player on the playing field,” down to the “baseball diamond,” and, by agreeing to the Pentagon’s military reorganization plans, elevated the relationship onto a par with the American-British alliance. He gave it high points for its efforts to please. *Client State*, op. cit., Chapter 4. *Passim*.

*the money is a national priority'... Japan has to find a way to change its own tempo of decision-making, deployment, integration and operationalizing [sic] this alliance.*³⁵

The Guam treaty was the embodiment of such a “top-down” prescription.

The 2009 Guam Treaty

The “Guam International Agreement,” signed by Secretary Hillary Clinton and Japanese Foreign Minister Nakasone Hirofumi in February 2009 and then adopted as a treaty (by the Japan side only) under special legislation in May 2009,³⁶ was the devise adopted by the incoming Obama administration to extract formal consent from the rapidly declining Aso government (while it still enjoyed the two-thirds Lower House majority delivered by Koizumi’s “postal privatization” triumph of 2005). This was done in such a way as to bind the prospective DPJ government then waiting in the wings, knowing full well the opposition DPJ’s stance – that no new base should be built within Okinawa and Futenma should be returned *tout court*.³⁷ What distinguished the Guam Agreement was not its content – for almost all had been agreed in 2005-2006, but its form, a *treaty*. And because it was binding on one side only (the government of Japan), it was an “unequal treaty.” To successfully block the Japanese democratic will in this way was the perverse early accomplishment for the Obama administration.

The Treaty was the culmination of a fifteen year process of reorganization in accord with the Nye framework. Though widely reported as a US “withdrawal” designed to reduce the burden of post-World War II American military presence in Okinawa (it included a pledge that 8,000 Marines and 9,000 family members would relocate from Okinawa to Guam), it was actually a design to *increase* the Japanese contribution to the alliance, committing it to the construction of two major US military facilities, extracting large sums in military subsidies in the process.

The Guam treaty is likely to be studied by future generations as something crystallizing the defining moment of a relationship,

³⁵ Yoichi Kato, “Interview/ Richard Lawless: Japan-U.S. alliance faces ‘priority gap’,” *Asahi shimbun*, 2 May 2008.

³⁶ “Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of 111 Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam,” Tokyo, 17 February 2009.

³⁷ “Futenma wa kengai isetsu” (Futenma to be moved outside of Okinawa). See the Democratic Party’s “Okinawa Vision 2008.” However, in the 2009, pre-election version, the pledge was qualified to “move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan.”

when both parties went *too far*, the US in demanding (hastily, well aware that time was running out to cut a deal with the LDP) and Japan in submitting to something not only unequal but also unconstitutional, colonial, and deceitful. Excess on both sides was likely to generate resentment and in the long run to make the relationship more difficult to sustain.³⁸

³⁸ "The Battle of Okinawa 2009: Obama vs Hatoyama," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 16 November 2009, <http://japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3250>.

Allies Adrift – The Impossible Rebalancing of the Alliance

The Democratic Party's 2005 Manifesto declared a commitment to: "...do away with the dependent relationship in which Japan ultimately has no alternative but to act in accordance with US wishes, replacing it with a mature alliance based on independence and equality." That commitment was somewhat watered down as the party came closer to office, but since Hatoyama and his team still talked of "equality" and of renegotiating the relationship, Washington was concerned, and subjected them to a ceaseless flow of advice, demand and intimidation, pressing them to revert to subservience.

US Resistance to the DPJ Project to Build an “Equal Relationship”

Concern over the policy of the DPJ was strong long before it took office. When party leader Ozawa began to adumbrate a shift in Japanese foreign and defense policy from a Washington-centre to a UN-centre, ending deployment of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean in service to the US-led war effort in Iraq, prominent US scholar bureaucrats joined in issuing thinly veiled threats about the "damage" that Ozawa was causing to the alliance.³⁹ The anxiety rose as Ozawa made clear his dissent from the new American president's resolve to expand and intensify the Afghanistan War, and raised the possibility of reducing the US presence in Japan to the (Yokosuka-based) US 7th fleet, implying that the bases – all thirteen of them with their 47,000 officers and military personnel – were unnecessary. Immediately after stating these controversial views, Ozawa was caught up in a corruption scandal involving staff misuse of funds, until he resigned as party chief in late May 2008 and was replaced by Hatoyama Yukio.

It was Joseph Nye who, as the credibility of the LDP faded and the star of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan rose in 2008-9, emerged again at the heart of the Washington mobilization of pressure to neutralize the opposition before it took power and then

³⁹ Kurt Campbell and Michael Green, "Ozawa's bravado may damage Japan for years," *Asahi shimbun*, 29 August 2007.

after it did so. Nye issued two unmistakable warnings. In a Tokyo conference in December 2008, he spelled out the three acts that Congress would be inclined to see as “anti-American”: cancellation of the Maritime Self-Defense Agency’s Indian Ocean mission, and any attempt to revise the Status of Forces Agreement or the agreements on relocating US Forces in Japan [i.e. including the Futenma transfer].⁴⁰ He repeated the same basic message when the Democratic Party’s Maehara Seiji visited Washington in the early days of the Obama administration to convey his party’s wishes to renegotiate these agreements, again warning that to do so would be seen as “anti-American.”⁴¹

Although the United States experienced “regime change” from Bush to Obama nine months earlier than did Japan from Aso to Hatoyama, there was minimal change to its Japan policy, or to the team responsible for it. In Japan, by contrast, the September 2009 change of government was hailed as the most momentous in the country’s post-1945 history. Weeks before his election to power, Hatoyama published an essay outlining his political thinking, explicitly critical of US “market fundamentalism” in which people tended to be treated “not as an end but as a means,” remarking on global trends “away from a unipolar world led by the United States towards an era of multipolarity” of which an East Asian community would be one sign, and defined his political philosophy as “Yuai,” literally “Fraternité,” a notion that he described as something that was “not tender but rather... a strong, combative concept that is a banner of revolution.”⁴² For a Japanese Prime Minister to use the word “revolution” in such a positive way was unprecedented.

In January 2010, Hatoyama chose the occasion of his speech opening the Diet to deliver another elaboration of his core thinking, this time presenting the idea of “protecting life” as his basic philosophical and political principle.⁴³ He began with the words:

I want to protect people’s lives.

That is my wish: to protect people’s lives

*I want to protect the lives of those who are born; of those
who grow up and mature...*

No Prime Minister had ever used this policy speech occasion to utter quite such high-minded, philosophical-religious sentiments

⁴⁰ Quoted in Narusawa Muneo, “Shin seiken no gaiko seisaku ga towareru Okinawa kichi mondat,” *Shukan Kinyobi*, 25 September 2009, pp. 13-15.

⁴¹ *Asahi shimbun*, 25 February 2009. See also Maeda Tetsuo, “Juzoku” kara “jiritsu” e – *Nichibei Ampo o kaeru*, Kobunken, 2009, pp. 17, 25.

⁴² Hatoyama Yukio, “My political philosophy,” *Voice*, September 2009 (13 August 2009), <http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/masscomm/090810.html> and in English in *Financial Times* at <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/99704548-8800-11de-82e4-00144feabdc0.html>.

⁴³ “Policy speech by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama at the 174th Session of the Diet,” 29 January 2010, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hatoyama/statement/201001/29siseihousin_e.html.

before (including 24 references to “life”). Hatoyama must have known his words would have special resonance in Okinawa, either because of the “Association for the Protection of Life” that has long played a central role in the movement for the protection of Henoko from base development, or for the words attributed to the 17th century Okinawan King, “*Nuchi du takara*” (life is precious) that are understood to encapsulate essential Okinawan values.

DPJ to Revise the Guam Treaty, Provoking US Fury

Hatoyama’s decision to reconsider the Guam Agreement was therefore taken as a serious threat. The view at the State Department was reported to be that “The hardest thing right now is not China. It’s Japan.”⁴⁴ The Departments of State and Defense made clear that they would not reopen negotiations and that it would be a “blow to trust” between the two countries if the Guam Agreement plans could not be implemented.⁴⁵ The Obama administration appeared to fear that Hatoyama’s picking at this last, crucial knot in the elaborate package of the unequal relationship threatened to expose the inequity and the iniquity of all that had gone before it, including the deceptions and lies that had become intrinsic to the alliance, and that such exposure might threaten its moral and political credibility.

Visiting Tokyo in October 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates minced no words:

“The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa.”⁴⁶

He is also reported to have insulted his Japanese hosts, refusing to attend a welcoming ceremony at the Defense Ministry or to dine with senior Japanese Defense officials.⁴⁷

The Washington chorus rose to a crescendo in late 2009. Michael Green, architect of Japan policy under George W. Bush, remarked that Hatoyama and his government would not be able to “continue slapping around the United States” or to “play with

⁴⁴ John Pomfret and Blaine Harden, “US pressures Japan on military package,” *Washington Post*, 22 October 2009.

⁴⁵ “Futenma isetsu dekineba Nichibei kankei ni dageki, Bei kokan ga keikoku,” *Asahi shimbun*, 18 October 2009.

⁴⁶ “Joint Press Conference with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,” Tokyo, 21 October 2009, Department of Defense, News Transcript.

⁴⁷ John Pomfret and Blaine Harden, “U.S. pressures Japan on military package,” *Washington Post*, 22 October 2009.

firecrackers,”⁴⁸ and that the DPJ would “regret” it if it changed established policy and withdrew Japan’s naval forces from the Indian Ocean.⁴⁹ Richard Armitage observed scathingly that the Democratic Party was “speaking a different language” and that he and his colleagues were “shocked by its platform.” He reserved especial venom for Democratic Party Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro, who, after not visiting Washington for ten years, had taken five plane loads of political and business leaders to China, an event Armitage described as “the Japanese People’s Liberation Army descending on Beijing.”⁵⁰

In December 2009, when Hatoyama announced that he would postpone the crucial decision until May 2010, officials in Washington were quoted as saying of Hatoyama “We don’t trust him.”⁵¹ Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morell declared that the US “did not accept” the Japanese decision;⁵² Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, said the Japanese public would have to understand the need to keep US forces in Okinawa,⁵³ and Joseph Nye referred to the DPJ as “inexperienced, divided and still in the thrall of campaign promises,” by which he plainly meant that attempts to renegotiate the Guam Agreement would not be tolerated.⁵⁴

Early in 2010, Richard Lawless, former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs under George W. Bush (2002-2007), in an interview with a Japanese newspaper referred to the Japanese government as “mindless,” “irrational,” “half-baked,” “boys and girls playing with... matches,” who have “dug themselves into a great big hole,” and caused “self marginalization.”⁵⁵ It was perhaps the single most overbearing and abusive outburst in the history of the relationship, displaying a level of contempt and condescension inconceivable in US relations with any other country, friend or foe. The spirit of General Douglas MacArthur, 60 years ago referring to Japanese people as “twelve year-olds,” lived

⁴⁸ Michael Green, “Tokyo smackdown,” *The New Foreign Policy.com*, 23 October 2009

⁴⁹ *Asahi shimbun*, 28 August 2009 (quoted in Miyazato Seigen, “Okinawa kenmin no ishi wa meikaku de aru,” *Sekai*, 1/2009: 157-163).

⁵⁰ Richard Armitage, “Armitage on Henoko-Futenma – America needs a Plan B,” *CSIS Pac Forum*, Washington, 15 January 2010, Youtube, <<http://www.youtube.com/2010okinawa>>

⁵¹ Yoichi Kato, “Hatoyama must have strategic talks with U.S.,” *Asahi shimbun*, 29 December 2009.

⁵² “Pentagon prods Japan on Futenma deadline,” *Japan Times*, 8 January 2010.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr, “An Alliance larger than One Issue,” *New York Times*, 6 January 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/opinion/07nye.html> “After Nye’s issue of a public call for US restraint, cautioning of the consequences of a “pyrrhic victory” over Henoko, overt intimidation diminished, but the underlying message was unchanged: Henoko the “best solution.” (“Futenma isetsu Bei seifu no shisei imashime Nai shi ga Bei shi kiko,” *Ryukyu shinpo*, 9 January 2009.)

⁵⁵ Yoichi Kato, “U.S. official: Japan could lose entire Marine presence if Henoko plan scrapped,” *Asahi shimbun*, 4 March 2010.

<http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201003040361.html>.

on in Washington. Weeks later, Lawless referred to Japan's investigation into the "secret agreements" ordered by Foreign Minister Okada as "a preoccupation with the past... a fool's journey."⁵⁶

In short, what the US government had to say to the Japanese government as the 50th anniversary celebrations got under way was to order it, over and over again, to fulfill a highly controversial pledge signed and railroaded through the Diet by its predecessor in a way reminiscent of Kishi in 1960.

Revisiting Ampo: Reassessing the Role of US Forces in Okinawa

The shared refrain on both sides of the Pacific is that the Ampo base system is the indispensable source of "oxygen," as Joseph Nye put it in 1995, for East Asian, especially Japanese, security and prosperity, and that Okinawa will continue to be the irreplaceable source of that oxygen. The (mainland) Japanese media took up the theme in generally acclaiming the alliance's accomplishments and agreeing it must be expanded and deepened.

Yet the view of many military analysts is that the Security Treaty has little to do with the defense of Japan, and that the Marines in particular are in Japan because the Government of Japan provides the bases and pays such generous subsidies for them. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the putative "enemy," the bases have become oriented to global rather than to Japanese or "Far Eastern" considerations. Flying from their Okinawan bases to fight in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq Wars, the Marines are essentially an expeditionary land combat "attack" force, held in readiness to be launched as a ground force into enemy territory, or for the defense of US carriers and ships, not for the defense of Okinawa or Japan.⁵⁷ Though the Japanese government referred to an 18,000-strong marine presence in Okinawa, of whom 8,000 were to be transferred to Guam under the 2006 "Roadmap," leaving a 10,000-strong component to transfer to the Futenma Replacement facility when it was ready, in fact there were only 12,400 marines as of September 2008, and perhaps as few as 4,000 to 5,000 (according to Defense Minister Kitazawa) in February 2010. That meant that both the supposed 8,000 to be transferred to Guam and the 10,000 to move to Henoko were phantom, groundless figures.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ "Updating the US-Japan Alliance," 2 April 2010.
<http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=77>

⁵⁷ Taoka Shunji, quoted in Taketomi Kaoru, "Amerika ga keikai suru Ozawa dokutorin 'honto no nerai,'" *Sapio*, 9 September 2009, pp. 11-14.

⁵⁸ "Tenkanki no ampo 2010: choju naki Futenma, shusho 'fukuan no mikata hyojo,'" *Mainichi shimbun*, 8 April 2010 English translation in Satoko Norimatsu, "The myth of

As Okinawa International University's Sato Manabu put it (of the Henoko project), "This is not a replacement of Futenma... This is a new, different, upgraded facility that U.S. Marines will receive for free and will use as a forward base capable of attacking foreign territories, not just for training."⁵⁹ At senior levels of the Japanese defense bureaucracy a similar view is expressed. The 3rd Marine Division is a "force for deployment at any time to particular regions beyond Japan... By their nature, they are not for the defense of particular regions."⁶⁰

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it becomes increasingly likely that the US has, for its own strategic purposes, decided to transfer core units of the Futenma Marines (not just their command) to Guam,⁶¹ which was identified in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010 as a "hub for security activities in the region."⁶² This point has been most forcefully made by the mayor of Ginowan City, Iha Yoichi, based on analysis of existing and publicly available US military documents. If he is right, the Henoko project itself, and the hullabaloo in Japan surrounding it, rested on a serious misunderstanding. With Guam's military infrastructure upgraded – Anderson Air Base is four times larger than Kadena, the largest US Air Force base in Asia (or 13 times larger than Futenma) – and with three nuclear submarines, it is to become a military fortress and strategic staging post covering the whole of East Asia and the Western Pacific. The Henoko project therefore loses its strategic purpose.⁶³

Even if that is so, however, and the Pentagon has indeed decided to convert Guam into the core military fortress for the region, that is not to say that it would be likely to let Japan off its promise to build and furbish an *additional* base, particularly a multiservice capability with a deep-sea port, such as attached to the Oura Bay design at Henoko.

18,000 Marines in Okinawa admitted by USMC," *Peace Philosophy*, 11 April 2010. <http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/>

⁵⁹ Sato Manabu, "Forced to 'Choose' its Own Subjugation: Okinawa's Place in U.S. Global Military Realignment," *Japan Focus*, 2 August 2006, <http://japanfocus.org/-Sato-Manabu/2202>

⁶⁰ Yanagisawa Kyoji (special researcher and former Director of National Institute for Defense Studies), "Futenma no kakushin –kaiheitai no yokushiryoku o kensho seyo," *Asahi shimbun*, 28 January 2010.

⁶¹ See also Satoshi Ogawa, "Key marine forces to leave Okinawa prefecture," *Yomiuri shimbun*, 22 November 2009.

⁶² Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, February 2010, p. 89.

⁶³ Iha Yoichi, "Why build a base on Okinawa when the marines are relocating to Guam? Okinawan mayor challenges Japan and the US," *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 18 January 2009. http://japanfocus.org/print_article/3287. See also Dario Agnote, "Makeover to turn Guam into US fortress," *Japan Times*, 12 January 2010.

The DPJ's New Stance Fuels the Anti-Base Movement in Okinawa

Under the “LDP Okinawa system,” governments in Tokyo served the US, paid it large subsidies and gave priority in Okinawa policy in particular to US strategy and planning. Meanwhile they exacted compliance from local government authorities in Okinawa by supporting “development” projects and encouraging local governments to avoid discussion of the base issue at elections. Monies under a “Northern Districts Development” formula (tied to submission to the base project) had been poured into Nago City and surrounding districts (80 billion yen in 2000 to 2009), filling the coffers of construction and public works-related groups and easing the fiscal crisis of local governments. Through these 13 years, “conservative” (pro-base) groups insisted that they could be relied on to handle economic problems better and to produce better outcomes in terms of jobs and services than antibase forces because they enjoyed better “pipelines” of connection to the national government and to national business. Over time, the system of subsidy-induced regional compliance in base sitting cultivated cynicism and corruption, and blocked development rooted in local needs.

By 2009, the system no longer worked. The political credibility of the Liberal-Democratic Party-based system that ran national, prefectural and city governments had been fatally weakened in the minds of Okinawan electors: it had simply failed to deliver. Over the years from 2000 to 2009 dependence deepened, unemployment in Nago City rose to 12.5 percent, well above the prefectural average and more than double the national average, jobs and incomes shrank, shops and business closed,⁶⁴ and virtually all local governments sank into chronic fiscal crisis. Far from there being a “benefit” attached to base-related income, towns and villages without bases (and therefore not “enjoying” special subsidies) in general fared much better than those with them, and those that had managed to recover parcels of base land found that productivity and income tended to shoot up, by as much as twenty, thirty, or even forty times, after reversion from military to civilian use.⁶⁵ *Ryukyu shimpō*'s deputy chief editor refers to the bases as “a parasite sucking out Okinawa's vitality” and rotting its economy.⁶⁶

Following the Hatoyama victory in the national elections of August 2009, the opposition to the base project gathered strength.

⁶⁴ 19.5 percent of businesses in Nago were reported closed (shuttered) as of 2008. (Chinen Kiyoharu, “Nago shicho sen hitotsu ni natta min-i,” *Sekai*, March 2010, pp. 20-24, at p. 22.)

⁶⁵ Figures from a study conducted by the prefecture quoted in Maedomari Hiromori, “Kichi izon keizai’ to iu shinwa,” *Sekai*, February 2010, pp. 203-209, especially p. 207.

⁶⁶ Maedomari, *ibid.*, p. 203.

Okinawan DPJ (and associated opposition party) candidates who explicitly opposed any Futenma replacement project swept the polls, recording a higher vote than ever before in the proportional section. The signals of anger and discontent rose to their peak with the outcome of the Nago City mayoral election in January 2010. Nago not only chose a new mayor who promised a break with the corrupt and dependent politics of past decades, but one who also declared that his city would not allow the construction of any new bases. That dramatic act essentially put a full-stop to the plans for the militarization of Oura Bay – a Pentagon dream since 1966 and a favoured Japanese bureaucratic project since the late 1990s, that had come close to realization under bilateral agreements in 1996, 2006, and 2009.

It meant that, while Tokyo struggled desperately to find a way to implement the Guam Agreement, Okinawa unanimously rejected it. On base matters, there was no longer a “progressive-conservative” divide in Okinawan politics. The Mayor of Okinawa’s capital, Naha, who in the past served as President of the Liberal Democratic Party of Okinawa, even made clear that, as a prominent Okinawan conservative, he was disappointed by the Hatoyama government’s reluctance to redeem its electoral pledge on Futenma and hoped the Okinawan people would remain united “like a rugby scrum” to accomplish its closure and return (i.e., not replacement).⁶⁷

Kengai Kokugai (*Outside Okinawa, Outside Japan*)? DPJ’s Tergiversations on Futenma

From December 2009, numerous sites were considered: Kadena (merging some Marine functions from Futenma with those of the USAF base there), other Okinawan islands such as Shimoji (where there was a civil airport with a 3,000 meter runway currently used for pilot training) or Ie, (a smaller airfield used by Marines), or islands relatively near but outside Okinawan prefectural boundaries such as Tokunoshima (with a little used 2,000 metre runway airport) or Mageshima, in Kagoshima prefecture.⁶⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell protested, not unreasonably, that “Almost every day someone comes up with a statement or a proposal.”⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Onaga Takeshi, “Okinawa wa ‘yuai’ no soto na no ka,” *Sekai*, February 2010, pp. 149-154.

⁶⁸ “Kagoshima Mage-to ga hyojo,” *Ryukyu shimpō*, 5 December 2009 (with photograph).

⁶⁹ “US in the dark on final Futenma decision,” *Asahi shimbun*, 5 February 2010.

By March 2010, the Hatoyama government narrowed the selection process to several main options:⁷⁰

- (a) "Schwab": building either a 500-meter-square helipad at U.S. Marine Corps Camp Schwab (at Henoko), or a 1,500 meters runway also within the Camp but further inland, needing more time, and involving more substantial earthworks.
- (b) "White Beach": building a 1,800 metre runway in a 200 hectare reclaimed area off-shore from a US Navy facility at White Beach, in the shallow seas off the coast of Katsuren Peninsula, in the vicinity of Tsuken Island or, in a longer term variant, reclaiming a larger (1,021 hectares) ocean area between Ukibaru and Miyagi Islands and building an artificial island that would be shared by US Marine Corps, US military port facility (relocating from Naha Port) and Japan's Air Self Defense Forces (relocating from Naha Airport).

Either of these options would be accompanied by relocation of some of the training drills currently conducted at Futenma to Tokuno (or Mage) Island, both technically in Kagoshima Prefecture though historically part of the premodern Ryukyu kingdom and culture zone. Hatoyama at this point had accepted the Pentagon logic that the Marines were a necessary deterrent force and it would be inappropriate to relocate them far from Okinawa.⁷¹ His bottom line seemed to be that the US demands would be met, preferably by a formula that would allow transfer of some Marine functions to points just beyond the Okinawan prefectural boundaries, but, if not, and if it meant alienating Okinawans, they would be offered "compensation".⁷²

In broad outline, both the Schwab and White Beach ideas had been considered and ruled out in the negotiations leading to the realignment agreement of 2006. Both were based on a "within Okinawa" design that was rejected by all sides in the prefecture, and to adopt either would require a fresh Environmental Impact study – a process which normally requires several years and, if done properly, would be open to a possible negative outcome or, in the event of a positive outcome, would be followed by up to 10 years for construction. The scale of the White Beach reclamation project was staggering: with three runways (2 of 3,600 and one of 3,000 metres) it would exceed by six times the Henoko "V" option. The Governor declared it

⁷⁰ Media reports, especially "Govt to offer 2 Futenma alternatives," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 March 2010, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20100318TDY01305.htm>, and "Futenma hikojo isetsu mondai – 1010 hekutaru jinkojima o teian," *Ryukyu shimpō*, 16 March 2010.

⁷¹ "Hatoyama shusho, "Okinawa kinrin o mosaku, seiji sekinin ni hatsu genkyu," *Ryukyu shimpō*, 22 April 2010.

⁷² Defense Vice-Minister Nagishima Akihisa, quoted in John Brinsley and Sachiko Sakamaki, "US base to stay on Okinawa, Japanese official says," *Bloomberg*, 2 March 2010.

would take “20 years” to build,⁷³ and both it and the Schwab plan would be “extremely difficult” (read: impossible).⁷⁴ The *Ryukyu shimpō* said that it “would be hard to imagine anything worse” than this plan, with its combination of two “worst” choices.⁷⁵ Uruma City and the Kagoshima prefecture towns and villages that had been mentioned all insisted they would not tolerate any such project and, in a bizarre final revelation, although Hatoyama’s government suggested the White Beach site would be more environmentally acceptable than Henoko because its coral was ‘mostly dead’, when divers from the two Okinawan newspapers investigated the site, they found thriving colonies of coral, a veritable “sea of fertility” as the *Ryukyu shimpō* put it.⁷⁶

Neither the Schwab nor the White Beach designs satisfied Washington. It continued to press Tokyo to maintain (“honour”) the Guam accord.⁷⁷ Furthermore, in a surprising demonstration of sensitivity, the Pentagon let it be known that there was nothing to negotiate with Japan unless and until its Government could show it had secured the consent of residents in the newly chosen sites.⁷⁸ By this, the Pentagon was surely asking the impossible of Tokyo.

As Hatoyama’s government struggled to find a formula acceptable to both Washington and Okinawa, the Okinawan people united to oppose any formula involving base construction in the prefecture. In February, the Okinawan parliament (the Prefectural Assembly), adopted an extraordinary resolution unanimously demanding that Futenma be closed (moved “overseas or elsewhere in Japan”).⁷⁹ In March, all of Okinawa’s 41 local town mayors declared themselves of the same view, and in April the Association of City Mayors, made up of the mayors of the 11 Okinawan cities, unanimously adopted a similar resolution.⁸⁰ Also in April, Tokunoshima was the scene of the largest gathering of people in its history, with three in five of the island’s inhabitants joining in sending Tokyo a message of defiance and resistance to any plan for the building of a base on that

⁷³ “Kern-nai 2 an wa ‘mattaku dame’,” *Asahi shimbun*, 1 April 2010.

⁷⁴ “Chiji, seifu 2 an o konnan shi, Futenma isetsu,” *Okinawa Times*, 3 April 2010.

⁷⁵ “Futenma seifu an –min-i azamuku no an da,” editorial, *Ryukyu shimpō*, 27 March 2010.

⁷⁶ “Hojo no umi sango kagayaku – Futenma isetsu kohochi,” *Ryukyu shimpō*, 3 April 2010.

⁷⁷ “US likely to nix Futenma alternatives,” *Yomiuri shimbun*, 26 March 2010.

⁷⁸ “Hatoyama’s latest Futenma tack: move choppers to Tokunoshima,” *Japan Times*, 10 April 2010.

⁷⁹ “Kengikai, Futenma ‘kokugai kengai isetsu motomeru’ ikensho kaketsu,” *Okinawa Times*, 24 February 2010. A resolution to the same effect had been passed by a majority in July 2008.

⁸⁰ “Zen shuchō kennai kyōhi, Futenma kengai tekkyō no shiodoki,” editorial, *Ryukyu shimpō*, 1 March 2010; “Ken shicho kaigi kennai hantai ketsugi zenkai itchi kuni no chokusetsu yosei,” *Okinawa Times*, 6 April 2010.

island.⁸¹ Weeks later, 90,000 Okinawans gathered at Yomitan Village on the main Okinawa island to demonstrate mass support for the position already established through all their formal institutions of local government. Everybody from the Governor down, and representatives of all political parties from Communist to Liberal-Democratic participated, presenting a united front of opposition to any new base construction and demanding the unconditional closure and return of Futenma.

Two days before the Okinawa mass meeting, Hatoyama in Washington tried to seize the opportunity of being seated near President Obama at dinner during the nuclear summit to tell the President that the May deadline would be met. He was, according to many reports, rebuffed with the sceptical response: "Can you follow through?"⁸² The *Washington Post* described Hatoyama as "the biggest loser [among world leaders]..., hapless..., increasingly loopy,"⁸³ and reported that Japan was so "taken aback by the toughness of Obama's tone that they did not draw up a written record of the words exchanged."⁸⁴

In April, under immense and continuing pressure, Tokyo raised the white flag, indicating it was prepared to 'broadly accept' the 2006 and 2009 agreements for Futenma to be replaced offshore from Henoko. First, however, Hatoyama proposed an offshore, pier-like structure that would rest on thousands of piles (4,000 by some accounts) driven into the sea bed instead of actual reclamation, adding a secondary plan for some helicopter training units, with about 1,000 marines, to be transferred to Tokunoshima. He evidently wanted to avoid at all costs reclamation, saying, 'When I stood by the waters of Henoko, I felt very strongly that creating a landfill over those waters would defile nature. The current agreement should not be accepted'.⁸⁵ As April stretched into May, however, and as Washington remained adamant, he surrendered his last shred of resistance, abandoned the pile-resting scenario and accepted the 2006 Henoko (Oura Bay) landfill design.⁸⁶ Nature would have to be defiled.⁸⁷

⁸¹ "Tokunoshima's Record-Breaking Addition to Ryukuans' Democratic Voices," 18 April 2010. <http://peacephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/04/tokunoshimas-record-breaking-addition.html>.

⁸² Satoshi Ogawa, "US distrust of Japan sharply accelerating," *Yomiuri shimbun*, 19 April 2010.

⁸³ Al Kamen, "Among leaders at summit, Hu's first," *Washington Post*, 14 April 2010.

⁸⁴ John Pomfret, 'Japan moves to settle dispute with US over base relocation,' *Washington Post*, 23 April 2010.

⁸⁵ "Few Futenma choices left for Hatoyama," *Asahi shimbun*, 26 April 2010.

⁸⁶ "Futenma isetsu'seifu-an 28 nichi happyo de chosei, Henoko umitate mo," *Mainichi shimbun*, 19 May 2010

⁸⁷ On ecological grounds alone the idea that a huge new military installation should be constructed at Nago, in a setting whose coral and marine resources are of global as well as regional and national significance, is implausible. In these waters, the internationally protected dugong graze on sea grasses, turtles come to rest and lay their eggs, and multiple rare birds, insects, and animals thrive. A colony of blue coral

After nine inglorious months, the Hatoyama rebellion was over. After fifty years of the Ampo alliance, the truth was that no Japanese government could survive the loss of Washington's confidence. On 28 May, the agreement was formally incorporated in a 'Joint Statement' by the US and Japanese governments.⁸⁸ Days later (2 June) Hatoyama announced his resignation. Kan Naoto, who quickly succeeded him as Prime Minister, immediately called President Obama to assure him that he would honour the 28 May deal.

In 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi gave up the attempt to survey and construct a base on the coral of Oura Bay because of "a lot of opposition." That "lot of opposition," fierce, non-violent and popularly supported, had blocked all government efforts to foist a base on Henoko between 1996 and 2005. The LDP certainly contemplated using force, and (after reworking the Henoko plan) in 2007 sent the Maritime Self-Defense Forces frigate, *Bungo*, to intimidate the sea-floor civic defenders of the sea and its creatures, but held back, presumably in fear of the political consequences of mass arrests. Kan – the first Japanese Prime Minister to have risen from within Japanese civil society – will surely find that opposition now is far greater and he can only proceed if he and his government are ready to adopt the kind of coercive measures at which Koizumi balked. To fulfil his pledge to Obama will require of Kan that he cut himself loose from the social forces that produced him and crush one of the most remarkable non-violent political movements in modern Japanese (or world) history, one that had successfully blocked all base construction designs through the terms of 9 Prime Ministers and 17 Defense Ministers. Hatoyama has surely passed Kan a bitter cup.

was discovered only in 2007 (and in 2008 placed on the IUCN's "Red," or critically endangered list, joining the dugong). A 2009 World Wildlife Fund study found an astonishing 36 new species of crabs and shrimps in Oura Bay. "Oura-wan ni 36 shinshu, ebi kani-rui, ken ni hozon hatarakikake e," *Ryukyu shimpō*, 25 November 2009 (photo at <http://ryukyushimpo.jp/news/storyid-153304-storytopic-98.html>)

⁸⁸ 'Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, May 28, 2010', Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 May 2010. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint1005.html>.

Conclusion

If Okinawa were in the old Soviet Union, or in any country not allied to the West, its antibase movement would be acclaimed as a heroic model of struggle for democratic principle; but not in Japan. The phenomenon of foreign military bases being hosted for any period of time in the territory of a sovereign state is extremely unusual and the likelihood of them being closed following a change of government is high since they are, as Kent Calder puts it, “castles built on sand.”⁸⁹ That Okinawan sand is now crumbling.

It is a paradox for Japan, whose constitution outlaws “the threat or use of force in international affairs” to be allied to the one country above all others for whom war and the threat of war are key instruments of policy, supporting its wars in every possible way short of actually sending troops, offering it more extensive military facilities on more generous terms than any other country, and paying far greater subsidies than any country in the world to support the US armed forces.

Official 50th anniversary commemorations celebrating the US military as the source of the “oxygen” that guaranteed peace and security to Japan and East Asia are not inclined to pay attention to the fact that the same oxygen is elsewhere a poison, visiting catastrophe on country after country, notably Korea (1950s and since), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Vietnam (1960s to 70s), Chile (1973), the Persian Gulf (1991), Afghanistan (2001-), and Iraq (2003-?), and that now threatens Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and (again) Iran.

There is no precedent in modern Japanese history for an entire prefecture to unite, as does Okinawa today, in saying “No” to the central state authorities, just as there is no precedent throughout the post-1945 decades for the confrontation that occurred in 2009-2010 between the US and Japan or for the tone of condescension, intimidation, and occasionally contempt for Japan that characterized the Bush and Obama administrations.

Transcending conventional political divisions, the polls say the Okinawan struggle is now supported by 90 percent of its people. The Okinawan daily, *Okinawa Times*, expressed the hope that the 50th anniversary might offer a “chance to reconsider the Japan-US

⁸⁹ Kent E. Calder, *Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism*, Princeton University Press, 2008.

Security treaty that from Okinawa can only be seen as a relationship of dependence.”⁹⁰ Ginowan mayor Iha was in 2010 preparing to launch a lawsuit against the national government for neglect of its duty to protect the constitutional rights of Okinawan citizens to livelihood and safety.⁹¹

Okinawan sentiments are especially aroused as the contest over the base issue coincided with revelations of the deception practised by LDP governments over the past half-century, and with exposure of the readiness of successive Japanese (LDP) governments to pay almost any price to retain the US forces in Okinawa. Disappointment with Hatoyama was so much the greater because the hopes of change raised by the DPJ before it took office had been slowly let down since then.

The alliance in its first fifty years is now seen to have been characterized by subterfuge and by the persistent abuse of Okinawa, and the anniversary has been marked by US diplomatic triumph and Japanese humiliation. For the alliance to continue and strengthen through the next fifty years, both sides will have to face up to the secret diplomacy, lies, deception and manipulation of the last fifty. In their own rights, the US has to fundamentally rethink the relationship, and Japan must reflect upon, apologize, and offer redress for the wrongs that have for so long been visited upon the people of Okinawa and extend to them, however belatedly, the constitutional guarantees of pacifism, human rights, and local autonomy. Instead, however, early signs are that Prime Minister Kan intends to follow the Hatoyama path, deepening clientilism and rebuffing Okinawa. But, since he cannot emulate the Soviet Red Army in Budapest or the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Lhasa by rolling tanks in to crush local opposition and seal off the Henoko construction site, it is hard to see how he can avoid the fate of his predecessor or how the alliance in its second half-century can avoid sinking deeper into crisis.

⁹⁰ “Nichibei ampo kaitei 50 nen Okinawa no futan keigen honki de,” *Okinawa Times*, 19 January 2009.

⁹¹ “Futenma mondai kuni teiso e chosahi keijo, gikai ni yoan teian,” *Okinawa Times*, 27 February 2010.

Annexes

The US-Japan alliance and the Japanese defense budget

Japan from 1978 began to pay regular sums of subsidy to the Pentagon, a peculiar form of “reverse rental” (by landlord to tenant) that came to be known as “*omoiyari*” (sympathy) payment in Japanese and “Host Nation Support” in English. The annual sum grew steadily, from 6 billion yen in 1978 to around 200 billion yen (more than \$2 billion) today or, with “indirect” items included, an annual total of \$4.4 billion.⁹² Over slightly longer than three decades, it amounts to approximately three trillion yen, roughly \$35 billion. It is about three times as much as NATO and about one half of the entire world’s subsidies to maintain the US military presence. Where other countries tend to “permit” US bases, often extracting substantial sums for so doing, Japan pays handsomely to persuade the US to continue, and not to reduce, its occupation. There is no word for such “reverse mercenary” state behaviour.

There were many other heads under which Japan offered (and offers) financial backing for the US in its global military activities: from the \$13 billion subsidy towards the costs of the Gulf War, through subventions for subsequent wars down, to the most recent Hatoyama pledge of 500 billion yen (ca \$5.5 billion) over 5 years for civilian reconstruction works in Afghanistan. The Guam Treaty of February 2009 committed Japan to pay \$6 billion “relocation costs” for housing, leisure and other facilities for the Marines on Guam, while the Henoko base construction, if it went ahead, would cost officially some 300 billion yen (\$3.5 billion), and in unofficial but credible estimates more like one trillion yen (\$11 billion). With Japan’s public debt (180 percent in 2010) highest in the OECD, it is uncertain how much longer these sums can be shielded from budget cuts.

⁹² Department of Defense, “US Stationed Military Personnel and Bilateral Cost Sharing 2001 Dollars in Millions – 2001 Exchange Rates,” <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/alliedcontrib2003/chart11-4.html>; Yoshida Kensei, “Ampo kichi no shima, Okinawa,” *Oruta (Meru magajin)*, No 72, 20 December 2009, p. 10.

Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), 1996-2010

1996-98	"Heliport," initially 45 metres, offshore, Northern Okinawa; Rejected by Nago City Plebiscite 1997 (then endorsed by mayor but rejected by Governor).
1999-2001	Henoko offshore, removable, floating pontoon, 1,500 metres runway, 75-90 hectares in area, conditional (joint civil-military, 15 year limited, etc.) accepted by city and prefecture; cabinet go-ahead December '99. US were open to relocation elsewhere in Japan, but government of Japan insisted it had to be Henoko.
2002	Henoko offshore construction Plan settled, reef reclamation, ca 184 hectares, 1,500 metres runway, civil-military, pontoon-based.
2004	Environmental survey and protest sit-in commence.
2005	Koizumi cancels the Henoko plan because of 'a lot of opposition', soon substituting for it a shore-based, 'L'-shaped, 1,600 metres, single runway, 1 km offshore, which soon morphs into:
2006	Cape Henoko, shore-based, dual 'V'-shaped, 1800 metre runways, stretching into Oura Bay from Camp Schwab, plus naval port, plus Yambaru forest helipads. Projected completion date: 2014. Endorsed by both governments in ' <i>Beigun saihen</i> ' 2006 and adopted in binding form by Japan in Guam Treaty, 2009.
2010	Hatoyama proposes, <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. in March a three-part composite plan: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a land-based Cape Henoko helicopter runway, either 500 metres or 1600 metres, within Camp Schwab, or - a 1,020 hectare artificial island with 10,200 metres of runway (2 runways of 3,600 metres and 1 of 3,000 metres) offshore from Katsuren Peninsula, in Uruma City (central Okinawa, near existing US White Beach Base), or - construction of new facilities on Tokuno Island, in Kagoshima Prefecture, 200 kilometres north of Okinawa main island and just outside Okinawan prefectoral boundary, or - some combination, or perhaps all of these. 2. in April: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a "final proposal" to the US government, in the form of "broad acceptance" of the Guam treaty terms but significantly

	<p>modifying them to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- For the Futenma replacement Facility at Henoko, substituting a sea-based, single runway of 1,800 meters resting on pillars (perhaps 4,000 of them) driven into the sea-bed for the land-based, refill design, and- Transfer of some helicopter training units from Futenma to Tokunoshima. <p>3. in May:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Abandonment of the pile-resting idea and resumption of the Henoko (Oura Bay reclamation) site.- US government welcomes decision and on 28 May, “2+2” foreign and defense heads of US and Japan formally endorse it.- Hatoyama resigns (2 June) and is replaced by Kan, who reassures Obama that he will “honor” the agreement.
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