
**Evolution of the Australia-Japan
Security Partnership
Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance
with the United States?**

Takashi Terada

October 2010



Center for Asian Studies

The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues.

Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization.

As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience.

Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities.

With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate.

*The opinions expressed in this text
are the responsibility of the author alone.*

ISBN: 978-2-86592-778-4
© All rights reserved, Ifri, 2010

IFRI
27, RUE DE LA PROCESSION
75740 PARIS CEDEX 15 – FRANCE
Tel: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00
Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60
Email: ifri@ifri.org

IFRI-BRUXELLES
RUE MARIE-THERESE, 21
1000 – BRUXELLES – BELGIQUE
Tel: +32 (0)2 238 51 10
Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15
Email: info.bruxelles@ifri.org

WEBSITE: ifri.org

Japan Program, Ifri Center for Asian Studies

The Japan Program of the Ifri Center for Asian Studies provides a platform for debate and the exchange of ideas among Japanese and European experts and decision makers. It also aims at strengthening the French expertise and research capability on Japan. The objectives of the Japan Program are to:

- contribute to the **development of greater mutual understanding** while facilitating exchanges and increasing the visibility of Japan and its national interests;
- **understand the dynamic of Japanese power** in the wider frame of Asia's emergence and globalization;
- assist **decision making processes** by providing a **prospective approach** based on future-oriented topics of discussion and groundbreaking analysis.

Asie. Visions

Asie. Visions is an electronic collection dedicated to Asia. With contributions by French and international experts, *Asie. Visions* deals with economic, strategic, and political issues. The collection aims to contribute to the global debate and to a better understanding of the regional issues at stake. *Asie. Visions* is published in French and in English.

Our latest publications

Gavan McCormack, "Ampo at 50. The Faltering US-Japan Relations", *Asie. Visions* 30, June 2010.

Céline Pajon, "Understanding the Issue of U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa", *Asie. Visions* 29, June 2010.

Executive summary

This paper examines how and why the Australia-Japan defense and security partnership has evolved, what policy implications this new partnership has for the U.S.-Japan alliance system, and what constraints the further advancement of trilateral security cooperation faces.

The U.S. strategic position and defense posture has catalyzed the evolution of the Australia – Japan security and defense partnership. This partnership has helped to sustain the U.S.-Japan alliance through, for instance, deepening Japan's involvement in defense and security arenas, as was seen in the protection of JSDFs in Iraq by Australian forces.

Still, the Australia – Japan security and defense partnership, a relatively new element in the bilateral relationship, is not based on an alliance system like Japan and the United States. It is still in a formative stage and thus requires strong shared strategic interests and common regional understandings to develop.

The convergent views and interests, especially over the approach to the rise of China as a military power, are helping the further development of the trilateral cooperation with the United States within a rapidly changing regional environment.

Contents

INTRODUCTION	4
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: GRADUAL ENGAGEMENT	6
HOWARD AND KOIZUMI: CATALYSTS TO THE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP	9
AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN IRAQ	13
TRILATERAL STRATEGIC DIALOGUE (TSD).....	15
QUADRILATERAL APPROACH: SHARED VALUES FOR SEPARATING CHINA.....	18
STRONG SHARED CONCERN: MILITARY RISE OF CHINA	21
CONCLUSION.....	24
BIBLIOGRAPHY	26

Introduction

The second Armitage-Nye report describes the most desirable Asian structure in terms of U.S. interests as follows:

“An open structure in which Japan, India, Australia, Singapore, and others... based on partnerships with the United States and shared democratic values, is the most effective way to realize an agenda for Asia that emphasizes free markets, continued prosperity based on the rule of law, and increasing political freedom... Working within Asia in this manner... will be key to positively influencing the growth and direction of all of Asia, including China, thereby “getting Asia right.”¹

In this context, the recent development of Australia-Japan security and defense partnership was a welcome move to the United States. Both nations have rapidly established regular ministerial and senior official consultations and meetings, developed in a similar way that the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Australia alliances have advanced. 2007 can be seen as the beginning year for both nations' serious commitment to security cooperation; the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) in March, the inaugural Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (2+2 talks) in June, and the Action Plan based on the JDSC in September. As for military exercises, Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDFs) participated for the first time in the U.S.-Australia joint exercise in June as an observer and the first trilateral P-3C exercise was also implemented in October.

The Australia-Japan security and defense ties have evolved as a result of their responses to the demands from the United States which needed to establish the coalition of the willing to keep its commitment to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as other crucial security regional flashpoints such as the Taiwan problem and the nuclear development in North Korea. The strengthened respective bilateral security and defense ties among the United States, Japan and Australia led to the formation of the Security and Defense

Takashi Terada is Professor of International Relations at Organization for Asian Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo. He is a specialist of East Asian regionalism.

A revised version will be published as a chapter in Inoguchi, Takashi, Ikenberry John, G. and Yoichiro Sato (eds.), The US-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

¹ Armitage, Richard and Nye Jr. Joseph S. (2007) *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020*, CSIS Report, February, p.19.

Cooperation Forum by senior officials held in Tokyo, August 2002, which was later elevated to the ministerial level, called the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) by Foreign Ministers and Secretary of State held in Sydney, March 2006. Moreover, the first trilateral summit among Abe, Bush and Howard at the 2007 APEC Sydney meeting was also organized, so the closer Australia-Japan security relationship has contributed to the formation of a more balanced “triangle” involving the United States.

This paper aims to examine how and why the Australia-Japan defense and security partnership has evolved, what policy implications this new partnership has for the U.S.-Japan alliance system, and what constraints the further advancement of trilateral security cooperation faces. The paper argues that U.S. strategic position and defense posture have catalyzed the evolution of the Australia – Japan security and defense partnership which has served to sustain the U.S.-Japan alliance through, for instance, helping Japan’s further involvement in defense and security arenas, as was seen in Australian forces’ protection of JSDFs deployed in Iraq. The paper finally highlights convergent views and interests, especially over the approach to the military rise of China, which appears to help the further development of the trilateral cooperation under a rapidly changing regional environment.

Historical Background: Gradual Engagement

The postwar security order in Asia and the Pacific has been maintained through the U.S.-centered hub-and-spoke alliance system. Sheridan calls it “really a multilateral security system in everything but name.”² Yet, there were few interactions or consultations over the security-defense policy arrangements among spokes themselves, so even if it were a multilateral security system in essence, the structure was highly hierarchical, representing the spokes’ strong reliance on the United States as a crucial source of deterrence. The development of security and defense ties between Australia and Japan as American spokes was a condition for the formation of a multilateral regional security arrangement in the future, but both nations employed a gradual and low-key approach for the partnership.

During the Cold War era, Japan and Australia forged a strong partnership in the field of economic regionalism in Asia and the Pacific, as was seen in their joint initiatives in establishing the Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) conferences and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) in 1968, the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) in 1980, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. Both nations identify the growing web of Asian and Pacific interdependence as a condition that required a different role for Japan in regional affairs, a role that acknowledged the economic and potential political influence of Japan, beyond the bilateral relationship with the United States. This was the focus of policy innovation in regional diplomacy over the two decades or so until APEC was launched in 1989. The intellectual, business, and governmental dialogues around the region over those years eventually delivered a regional inter-governmental arrangement in the form of APEC, an organization that was uniquely designed to suit the particular political and economic circumstance of Asia and the Pacific, critical to Japanese and Australian interests.

Australia and Japan attempted to incorporate a defense element into their bilateral relations through the 1990s. As an initial first step, Australia accepted the first visit of Japan’s Defense Minister, Yozo Ishikawa, in May 1990 which was believed to be

² Sheridan, Greg (2006), *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, p. 202.

“extremely assuring” for Australia that the attempt to initiate strategic dialogue and defense contacts with Japan represented “no obstacle” for both countries, and that it was possible to develop the partnership to encompass political issues beyond the trade agenda.³ At the same time, Prime Minister Hawke officially supported Japan’s bid for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (this was among the earliest expressions of support for Japan) and the participation of JSDF in a United Nations peacekeeping role in the Persian Gulf and Cambodia. These initiatives led to an Australian government review of Japan’s defense policy, commencing in September 1992. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade initiated an inquiry into Japan’s defense policy for Australia “to be better informed regarding recent security developments and implications for Australia, to address questions relating to possible Japanese roles in the Asia Pacific region, and to recommend constructive actions that the Australian Government might undertake.” The report concluded: “through participation in regional networks, Japan can contribute to the solution of regional problems. It is the Committee’s belief that where it can, Australia has a responsibility to facilitate such a regional approach.”⁴ This is a similar rationale to the earliest case that advocated defense cooperation with Japan. The Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia – Japan Relations, submitted to Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, which advised to forge a defense and security dialogue with Japan: “There would be value in gaining better access to the thinking of the Japanese defense community on broader strategic issues and in establishing more regular exchanges of defense intelligence.”⁵ Isolated from major powers, Australia desperately sought information on key regional affairs for its security and Japan was one of the few regional states that it could rely on in this aim.

A driving force behind Australia’s growing interest in Japan’s security role in the region was a change in Australia’s strategic standpoint on the importance of Northeast Asia to its security. Australia came to take the position that “the security of South East Asia cannot be separated from the rest of East Asia” and instability in Northeast Asia had a direct consequence for Australia’s well-being.⁶ Northeast Asia was increasingly recognized as of central economic importance for Australia during the 1990s (the region now receives over 50 per cent of all Australian exports and is home to Australia’s

³ Dalrymple, Rawdon (1996) “Japan and Australia as anchors: Do the chains still bind?” in Peter King and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), *Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region*, Allen & Unwin, p.46.

⁴ Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade (1993) *Japan’s Defense and Security in the 1990s*, Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, p.209.

⁵ Commonwealth of Australia, (1978) *Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia–Japan Relations*, Australian Government Publishing Service, pp.91-2.

⁶ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia (1997) *In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia, pp.1-2.

two most important economic partners, China and Japan), and Australia has had a huge stake in preserving stability and security in Northeast Asia. In this context, Japan's security and defense policy itself has become more significant in Australia's strategic environment and thus strategic planners in Canberra argued that it was useful to establish a direct dialogue with Japan at the policy level. Japan and Australia commenced politico-military and military-military talks in February 1996 with the participation of assistant secretaries and directors-general. Hugh White, then Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense, explained Australia's objective: ". . . to the extent that talking to Japan gives us an opportunity to encourage the Japanese to see strategic issues our way to pursue their strategic interests in a way which is consistent with ours.... we are trying to influence Japan's strategic policy."⁷ In much the same way as they built the framework for regional economic cooperation during the 1970s and the 1980s, these arrangements in Australia-Japan strategic ties developed in the 1990s constituted the spadework for both countries in forming a partnership in regional security. Yet, because of the sensitivity to the activities beyond the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, uncoordinated and dormant bureaucratic system, and a lack of interest in strategic thinking of its friendly nations, Japan was not able to move quickly. Also the U.S. indifference to the possible development of the Australia-Japan security relationship due to its traditional proclivity to see cooperation between the spokes as "harmless but insignificant" hampered the bilateral ties from rapidly growing into a true partnership.⁸

⁷ Australia-Japan Research Centre (1997) "Developments in Australia-Japan Defense Ties," *APEC Economies Program Report*, No. 23, p.13.

⁸ White, Hugh (2007) "Trilateralism and Australia: Australia and the Trilateral Security Dialogue with America and Japan," in William T. Tow et al (eds.) *Asia Pacific Security: U.S., Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle*, Routledge, p.104.

Howard and Koizumi: Catalysts to the Security Partnership

Prime Ministers Howard and Koizumi, both of whom were aware of the shared political fundamentals and commonly forged a strong personal rapport with U.S. President Bush, were pivotal in breaking the political impasse to add the security and defense elements to the Australia-Japan bilateral relationship. One of the initial motives behind the security-defense partnership was associated with China's active regional diplomacy. If China's interest in improving and strengthening its relations with ASEAN and its further commitment to the formation of an East Asian regionalism were a way for China to create its own sphere of influence in East Asia, this would be counterproductive to America's regional interests.⁹ The economic diplomacy that China has been executing to frustrate the containment that a U.S. coalition might form has involved the process of "knitting together the 'spokes' of the U.S.-centered hub-and-spoke security-alliance system, and connecting them more closely with governments less friendly to Washington."¹⁰ So the role of the bilateral partnership between Japan and Australia, as key regional U.S. allies, was expected by the United States to counter the realization of China's ambition to dominate the region. The United States, for instance, hopes that both nations would play a checking role against China.¹¹

Howard had been interested in a trilateral security cooperation approach even before coming to power. As the then Opposition Leader, he already proposed a tripartite defense and security arrangement among the United States, Australia and Japan in March 1988, but out of consideration for possible Southeast Asian and South Pacific sensitivities, the then Defense Minister, Kim Beazley rejected the proposal.¹² During the visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to Australia in May 2002, Howard as Prime Minister again raised a

⁹ Christensen, Thomas (2006) "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No.1, Summer, pp. 81-126.

¹⁰ Frost, Ellen L. (2007) "China's Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat?" in William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (eds.) *China's Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia*, University of Pittsburgh Press, p.98.

¹¹ Terada, Takashi (2005) "The Japan-Australia partnership in the Era of the East Asian Community: Can they advance together?" *Pacific Economic Papers* No. 352.

¹² *The Age*, 26 March 1988.

similar plan of “forging a closer Australia-Japan-U.S. defense triangle,” an idea that was explicitly “designed to deal with future contingencies involving China.”¹³ His interest in the establishment of a security partnership with Japan in a broader trilateral framework was partly sustained by his confidence arising from Australia’s experiences of working with Japan on several political fronts. For instance, Japan’s generous and crucial contribution to help fund the multinational force in East Timor (INTERFET), which was led by Australia was a good case of cooperation between the two nations in political and security areas. Their cooperation in East Timor also saw Australian soldiers and JSDF engineers closely working together on road-building projects. Welcoming Japan’s contribution of those hundreds of engineers in East Timor, as part of peacekeeping efforts, Howard said that “We see that kind of security involvement of Japan in the region in an extremely positive light.”¹⁴ This positive assessment of Japan’s growing regional security role enhanced his overall views on Japan for Australia’s national interest as he frequently stated that “Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan,” which was based on not only Japan’s status as Australia’s largest export market for almost forty years but also “a strategic partner for regional peace and prosperity.”¹⁵ During the Howard era, Australia increased its defense budget by 50 percent which reflected Canberra’s sense of uncertainty in regional security environment, and this uncertainty was also seen as a “driver in Australia’s pursuit of a security agreement with Japan.”¹⁶ His consideration about Japan as the most significant partner in Asia was seen in his visit to Japan as Australian Prime Minister seven times, the record in history, and his unwavering support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat at UN Security Council, although this stance infuriated China.¹⁷ It was also Howard who ensured Australia would build the Australian pavilion at the 2005 Aichi Expo, which cost millions of dollars, by personally intervening and reversing the previous decision made by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade which had initially showed no Australia’s presence at the Expo.¹⁸ The most significant political decision Howard made himself in terms of keeping good relations and forging security partnership with Japan was to increase Australian troops to Iraq to protect JSDFs, as discussed in more details later, since it made a significant contribution to Japan as well as the U.S.-Japan alliance.

¹³ *Straits Times*, 3 May 2002.

¹⁴ Howard, John (2002) “Opening Statement” at the Joint Press Conference, Sydney, 2 May.

¹⁵ Howard, John (2005) “Australia in the World,” speech addressed at Lowy Institute, Sydney, 31 March.

¹⁶ Chanlett-Avery, Emma and Vaughn, Bruce (2008) “Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India,” *CRS Report for Congress*, RL34312, 7 January, p.6.

¹⁷ Sheridan, op.cit., p.199.

¹⁸ *The Bulletin*, 8 March 2005.

During his term in office as Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi – the first Japanese Prime Minister in almost 20 years since Yasuhiro Nakasone, to complete the full term as President for the Liberal Democratic Party – expended his greatest energies on the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance based on his personal rapport with U.S. President Bush. To provide a support for the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, Koizumi managed to widen the operational scope of JSDFs, which was limited by the Constitution Article 9, by enacting special laws to dispatch JSDFs to those areas, an approach that Koizumi found a way of fulfilling an obligation as an U.S. ally in the war against terrorism. As a result, the relations between the two nations during the Koizumi era were seen as having been “best” in the entire postwar period, and his rapport with President Bush was instrumental in securing “unwavering commitment to the alliance” as Vice President Dick Cheney assessed.¹⁹ This can be Koizumi's most significant foreign policy achievement as Prime Minister.

As mentioned earlier, the United States, excluded from a growing East Asian regional institution such as ASEAN+3, judged China's potential ascendancy in East Asia with its political and economic rise as being undesirable for its own interests. The United States thus felt that the inclusion in an East Asian framework of Australia under the Howard government, which, as the Koizumi government did, sought to strengthen its alliance with the United States, and further security cooperation with Japan, would result in the creation of an East Asian framework that would not counter its interests.

With this background, it was Koizumi who envisaged the creation of an East Asian community in a major speech in Singapore in January 2002 in which he urged Australia, as well as New Zealand, to join a regional framework in East Asia as a “core member.”²⁰ This was seen as a surprise because Australia whose relations with ASEAN countries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia, were strained until late 2004 when the leaders of both countries decided to visit Canberra to promote bilateral relations, was not expected by many in the region to be a natural member of the community. In fact, when Koizumi proposed an East Asian community during his trip to Southeast Asia in January 2002, he faced difficulties in convincing ASEAN leaders, especially Mahathir, that Australia should be included in the community.²¹ Reasons behind Japan's interest in incorporating Australia into its proposed East Asian community stemmed from the following three considerations in Japan's foreign policy: there was a tendency in Japan to fear China's possible

¹⁹ *Nikkei Weekly*, 7 February 2007.

²⁰ Koizumi, Junichiro (2002) “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership,” speech delivered in Singapore, 14 January.

²¹ *Australian Financial Review*, 10 January 2002.

predominance within ASEAN+3 and East Asia as a whole; security issues emerged as a more significant policy area in the bilateral relations with the United States, subsequently leading to the establishment of the trilateral defense talks among Japan, the United States, and Australia, thus enhancing Australia's presence in Japan's security policy; and the United States had expressed concerns about the rise of China as detrimental to American interests in East Asia.²² In Tokyo it was perceived that Japan might be isolated within an East Asian framework in which most of the members were developing countries whereas China could be seen as a representative in this group, facing difficulty in injecting considerations that reflected the perspectives of Western or developed countries such as democracy or human right.²³ For these reasons, Australia was expected to join Japan in an attempt to be more committed to creating better relations with Southeast Asia, with which China has also been engaged in making better relations. Hitoshi Tanaka, a Vice-Minister who was one of these senior officials in MOFA and had been responsible for drafting Koizumi's Singapore speech, commented on Japan's need to have Australia participate in East Asian cooperation: "In my heart I truly hope Australia will participate in the East Asia summit. We have worked very hard to make it possible. We are doing this not for Australia's sake, but for Japan's sake. We need you. I have a very strong feeling about our co-operation with Australia and I have been advocating it for a long time."²⁴ In sum, as discussed later, the rise of China was a new factor that was perceived to reconnect Japan and Australia in more strategic and political arenas.

²² Terada, op.cit., p.18.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ *The Australian*, 28 May 2005.

Australia, Japan and the United States in Iraq

One of the decisive events that strategically connected Japan and Australia was Howard's decision to increase its troops to Iraq to protect JSDF in response to requests from Japan, in addition to the United Kingdom and the United States, in February 2005. 450 Australian soldiers were deployed in Samawah, southern part of Iraq, to provide security for the 550 JSDF troops engaged in the Iraq reconstruction work. Japan's participation in Iraq was not so substantial as to impact the military capabilities, but the United States saw it as a "symbolic value of adding a major participant to the 'coalition of the willing,'"²⁵ and Japan's "boots on the ground" was crucial for the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* declared, the United States placed "great value on its unique relationships with the United Kingdom and Australia," since their military forces stood together in "Iraq, Afghanistan and many other operations."²⁶ The special nature of the Australia-U.S. relationship can be also found in the Australia-United States Treaty on Defense Trade Cooperation signed in September 2007, which would allow most defense trade to be carried out without prior government approval, a kind of treaty that the United States had signed with only the United Kingdom previously.²⁷ Thus, the participation of JSDFs in the reconstruction of Iraq, as well as their supply of fuels to the "coalition" member states in the Indian Ocean, can be seen as a step for Japan to join such a network of this "unique relationships" among the American allies.

The 1,300 Dutch troops had been announced to withdraw from Iraq by mid 2005, leaving 400 Australian and 150 British soldiers, and the security of JSDF was expected to be substantially fragile, given the deployment of JSDFs were allowed to operate only in a non-combat area, the involvement was limited in humanitarian and reconstruction activities, and their use of forces was restricted for defensive purposes. Accordingly, Australia's dispatch of further soldiers to Samawah to protect JSDFs contributed to Japan keeping

²⁵ Uriu, Robert (2004) "Japan in 2003: Muddling Ahead," *Asian Survey*, Vol.44, No 1, p.181.

²⁶ Department of Defense (2006) *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February, p.19.

²⁷ Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, op.cit., p.5.

its “boots on the ground,” that soothed some U.S. critics who normally found Japan’s role as a U.S. ally insufficient. The decision also led to strengthen the bilateral partnership through the actual actions, and a spirit of bound came to be deeply shared by Japanese and Australian soldiers. Howard, who had continued to reject several previous requests by the United States and the United Kingdom due to his election promise not to increase Australian commitment to the war in Iraq, found the Japanese element, carried by Koizumi’s direct call which had been encouraged to do so by Bush, crucial in his decision, and states:

This deployment involves working alongside a close regional partner in Japan. Japan’s presence as part of the coalition is very important. It is not only making a big contribution in practical terms, but Japan’s presence is also very important symbolically... Very important indeed.²⁸

Koizumi’s subsequent agreement to set up a feasibility study for a bilateral FTA (a development that sounds perplexing at first glance, as Australia is one of Japan’s largest agricultural exporters) can be seen as reflecting his desire to take Australia’s trade interests more seriously as a sign of Japan’s gratitude for Australia’s deployment of troops to Iraq to protect Japan’s SDF units.²⁹ This also reflected Japan’s intention to strengthen relations with Australia more comprehensively despite the political difficulties the FTA study would cause at home. Accordingly, should the Japan – Australia FTA occur, it might be Japan’s first bilateral FTA that is promoted primarily on the basis of political and strategic considerations rather than economic considerations.

²⁸ Radio Australia, 22 February 2005.

²⁹ *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 26 April 2005.

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD)

According to White, an approach to trilateral cooperation among Australia, Japan and the United States was generated accidentally at the 2001 AUSMIN in Sydney, the first round under the Bush administration. At a press conference, asked about an “Asian NATO” issue in his meeting with Downer, Powell replied by mentioning something related to a forum among U.S. allies in Asia. Downer, who hoped to avoid antagonizing China through such a politically sensitive idea, tried to redirect attention to another idea in which Australia had been previously interested, which was a trilateral dialogue, although he had intended not to say something about it. Thus, “the idea would not have been aired at all had Powell not responded as he did to the question.”³⁰ Yet Downer’s ad-lib catalyzed the process towards the realization, and several meetings at senior officials’ level, involving Richard Armitage, Ashton Calvert and Yukio Takeuchi, were consequently held in 2002-2004.

Early 2005, the elevation of the trilateral senior-officials’ meeting to ministerial level was announced by Condoleezza Rice, the new U.S. Secretary of State. The elevation was mainly attributed to growing concerns on the part of the United State, as well as Japan, about Australia’s divergent interests regarding the rise of China. Australia’s actions in relation to China have not followed Japan’s and U.S. preferred course. White cited three evidences in which the United States found Australia’s distinctive interests in and approaches to China: 1) the equal treatment to Presidents Bush and Hu, who visited Australia on consecutive days in October 2003, 2) Downer’s statement on Australia’s no obligation to support the United States in any conflict against China over Taiwan in August 2004, and 3) Australia’s rejection to join the United States and Japan in pressing the European Union not to eliminate restrictions on arms sales to China in February 2005.³¹ Australia’s softer stance on China was partly arising from Australia’s firm interest in maintaining the strong economic relationship with China, the world’s largest importer of wool and iron ore, and this interest was to become stronger as China overtook Japan as Australia’s largest trading partner in 2007. This encompasses the possibility of concluding an FTA with China, which was seen as an important shift in Australia’s strategic thinking, as has

³⁰ White, *op.cit.*, pp.107-8.

³¹ White, *op.cit.*, p.108.

the Australian media's increasing coverage on China rather than Japan.³² Australian senior diplomat in charge of Northeast Asian affairs acknowledged that Australia's political and security relations with China were partly influenced by "functional distance"; as Australia tends to find the political and security relations with Indonesia very difficult, Japan does so with China, and vice versa, and he did not conceal the influence of China's trade factor on Australia's softer stance: "Australia has found itself in a difficult situation in terms of its commitment to improving China's human rights records or promoting democracy, given China's growing significance in Australia's trade."³³

With these pressing reasons, Rice and Aso came all the way to Sydney in March 2006 to "air their shared concerns about Australia's growing accommodation with China," an issue that was "indeed uppermost in their minds."³⁴ Yet, the joint statement merely mentioned that three foreign ministers "welcomed China's constructive engagement in the region and concurred on the value of enhanced cooperation with other parties such as ASEAN and the Republic of Korea," a stance which well reflected Australia's anxiety that the TSD that "has made Beijing deeply uneasy" would not be seen as any way of containing China.³⁵ So, Australia continued to take a different policy stance on China and developed the relations with China almost autonomously. For instance, in April 2006, while the United States still harbored concerns that uranium exported to China might be turned to military purposes, an agreement was reached between Wen Jiabao and Howard for the export of 20,000 tons of uranium from Australia to China over the next ten years. The announcement of the establishment of an Australia – China strategic dialogue on 6 September 2007 can be seen as a diplomatic balancing act by the Howard government to substantially enhance relations with China while also maintaining close security ties with the United States and Japan.³⁶

Accordingly, Japan's support for Australia's inclusion in the community-building in East Asia which aimed to enhance the role of its partnerships with Australia as its valued partner, with a view to countering China's ambition to dominate the region, might be frustrated. For instance, during the first East Asia Summit held in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, China insisted that the ASEAN+3, rather than the East Asia Summit, should be used as a forum for

³² Walton, David, (2006) "Australia and Japan," in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), *Trading on alliance security: Australia in world affairs, 2001-2005*, Oxford University Press.

³³ Personal interview, Canberra, 2 August 2006.

³⁴ White, op.cit., p.109.

³⁵ Sheridan, op.cit., p. 201.

³⁶ Walton, David (2008) "Australia and Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?" *Japanese Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 81.

discussing community-building in East Asia, with membership of the community limited to ASEAN+3 nations. China's approach contrasted clearly with that of Japan, which advocated a wider membership including three democratic nations such as Australia, India and New Zealand to reduce China's influence. Japanese leaders such as Noboru Hatakeyama, who played a pivotal role in prompting the Japanese FTA policy, however, attribute the difficulty in forming a regional community in East Asia to the fact that some regional countries like China do not share universal values such as freedom, democracy or human rights with Japan.³⁷ Japan's claim on a wider membership prevailed for the inaugural East Asia Summit, partly due to India's strong claim on the use of the East Asia Summit rather than ASEAN+3 as a vehicle for community-building in East Asia. This view was also supported by Indonesia which worried about the negative consequence of the growing regional power of China on ASEAN's influence and favored involving such balancing countries like India and Australia.³⁸ Yet, Australia, in comparison to Indonesia and India, was quoted as not exercising a strong influence on this battle by a senior official of Japan's MOFA,³⁹ although a senior Australian diplomat rebutted it by claiming that Howard who was eventually impressed by EAS's function, could not take a pushing role in, for instance, agenda-setting, as Australia was a newcomer.⁴⁰ In short, the TSD process has not so far fulfilled a function that the United States initially set up since it has failed to press Australia to take a similar policy stance on China.

³⁷ Hatakeyama, Noboru (2005) "East Asian community: Prospects and problems towards a regional FTA," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 25 November.

³⁸ Terada, Takashi (2010) "The Origins of ASEAN+6 and Japan's Initiatives: China's Rise and the Agent-Structure Analysis," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 23 No. 1, p.76.

³⁹ Personal interview, Tokyo, 24 December 2005.

⁴⁰ Personal interview, Canberra, 2 August 2006.

Quadrilateral approach: Shared Values for Separating China

As the second Armitage-Nye report highlights, the most fundamental element that politically connect the United States, Japan and Australia for security cooperation is shared values such as democracy, human rights or religious freedom.⁴¹ The significance of those values was especially stressed by President Bush and Prime Minister Abe, despite both failing to forge a strong personal rapport that had flourished during the Bush-Koizumi era. For instance, in September 2007, Bush proposed the formation of a new Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership to “provide a venue in which free nations will work together to support democratic values, strengthen democratic institutions, and assist those who are working to build and sustain free societies across the Asia Pacific region.”⁴² In his first administrative policy speech at the Diet in January 2007, Prime Minister Abe who hoped to conduct “assertive diplomacy” urged the need of strengthening partnerships with nations which shared those values, and referred to Australia, as well as India, as such nations.⁴³ The value-oriented foreign policy approach promoted by Abe found India as an additional regional power with which three nations would work together to develop a regional mechanism to engage China peacefully, and the same purpose was embedded in the concept of “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity,” promoted by his foreign minister, Taro Aso.

While Abe ceased prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, to which Koizumi had made an annual event and damaged its relations with China and Korea, with a view to repairing those relations with its Northeast Asian neighbors, his highly ideologically-colored foreign policy approach as seen in the promotion of ties with nations that share “common values” with Japan had been already concretely expressed in his own book. Abe insisted on organizing a summit meeting among Japan, Australia, the United States and India, all of which, he believes, share universal values such as democracy and respect for human rights. The purpose behind this assertion was to discuss the ways of making East Asian countries, including China,

⁴¹ Armitage and Nye, *op.cit.*, p.19.

⁴² White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2007) “U.S. Commitment to Strengthen Forces of Freedom, Prosperity in Region,” 7 September.

⁴³ See the Website of the Prime minister cabinet:
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/abespeech/2007/01/26sisei.html>

accept those values.⁴⁴ For instance, in his speech at the Indian Parliament on 22 August 2007, Abe introduced a new regional concept, a “broader Asia” by stating that “the Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A “broader Asia” that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.”⁴⁵ Abe’s message to India was to promote regional cooperation together within this regional framework, further by “incorporating the United States of America and Australia.” A purpose behind the proposal was mentioned later in his speech that “I feel that it is imperative that the democratic nations located at opposite edges of these seas deepen the friendship among their citizens at every possible level.”⁴⁶ A reason Abe needed to introduce the new concept of “broader Asia,” despite that Australia and India became EAS official members and thus were acknowledged as East Asian nations, was the engagement of a nation which the EAS does not include but Abe considered as an essential country in this new regional concept: the United States. In this sense, the Abe government was more explicit in expressing its desire to promote an exclusive group of democratic nations, centering on the United States, than the Koizumi government, and he was seen as “the most vocal supporter” of the quadrilateral forum.⁴⁷ Notably, Abe came to view Australia as a significant strategic partner especially after he saw Australia’s decision to increase its military forces to help Japan’s SDF in Iraq and promoted Japan’s effort to conclude the Australia-Japan FTA feasibility study, as a senior DFAT official declared.⁴⁸ Japan’s ASEAN+6 approaches, embodied as the establishment of EAS in 2005 and the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in 2007 including Australia and India, have been proposed and developed as part of the foreign policy agendas of the Abe governments, and the issue of how to respond to the rise of China was a common significant influence on both political and economic regionalism schemes.

Abe’s support for the quadrilateral approach sustained by his emphasis on values such as democracy and human rights came to be strengthened after he met with the U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney in February 2007. They discussed the idea of India’s possible participation in Japan, Australia and the United States, to form a quadrilateral grouping among like-minded democratic nations.⁴⁹ This

⁴⁴ Abe, Shinzo (2006) *Utukushii kuni-he [Towards a beautiful country]*, Bungei Shunjuusha.

⁴⁵ Abe, Shinzo (2007) “Confluence of the Two Seas,” a speech addressed at the Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, op.cit., p.14.

⁴⁸ Personal interview, Canberra, 2 August 2006.

⁴⁹ See the Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan : <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/vpv0702.html>

proposal led to an experimental attempt to form the grouping through the organization of an informal meeting in May 2007, in which participated representatives from the four nations as a sideline meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). China was wary of such a move and issued “formal diplomatic protests to Australia, Japan, and India out of concern that they were forming a security alliance with the United States against China.”⁵⁰ A rationale behind India’s participation in the framework can be attributed to its complex relations with China as seen in the territorial disputes with China over Kashmir, Sikkim and Anurachal Pradesh which India might have wanted to discuss as a way of putting a pressure on China.

Yet, Australia was not necessarily keen to use shared values as a political tool to form an exclusive framework as it was seen as annoying China. For instance, in their meeting in Washington in July 2005, Howard was reported to have turned down President Bush’s request that the United States and Australia work together to “reinforce the need for China to accept certain values as ‘universal.’” Howard’s approach towards China was “to build on the things that we have in common, and not become obsessed with the things that make us different.”⁵¹

Australia’s reserved stance on China in value politics was to be more shared by Japan after Prime Minister Abe resigned from office in September 2007 and Yasuo Fukuda who placed a greater emphasis on the relations with China in his foreign policy approach replaced him. Fukuda naturally displayed little enthusiasm for continuing with the four-nation strategic dialogue, and Stephen Smith, Australian foreign minister in the Rudd administration also indicated that the dialogue had caused concern to China, and that Australia had no intention of supporting a framework of this type.⁵² A reason behind the Rudd Government’s decision to refuse to allow Australia’s uranium sales to India while supporting the IAEA’s approval of a uranium deal between India and the United States was not to provoke China which tended to worry about the containment movement. The preconditions for the ASEAN+6 framework, born as a measure to counter the perceived negative aspects of China’s growing rise, have transformed with the change of administrations in the region. The political implications of this change, for example the differences in values held by different nations, have eroded the will to promote the quadrilateral framework for a purpose of checking China’s growing regional influence, at the same time that they have eliminated the strategic value from partnerships among Japan, India and Australia.

⁵⁰ Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, op. cit., p.3.

⁵¹ *Straits Times*, 19 August 2005.

⁵² *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 16 February 2008.

Strong Shared Concern: Military Rise of China

U.S. concern over China derives, for instance, from China's military build-up, as emphasized by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who believed that China's improved ballistic missile system would allow Chinese missiles to "reach targets in many areas of the world. . . Since no nation threatens China, one wonders: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?"⁵³ This concern over China's increasing military build-up was well reflected on the QDR which declares China as "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time off set traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies."⁵⁴ Importantly, such a stark view of China's increasing military spending as threatening the delicate security balance in East Asia has gradually percolated through Japan, as insinuated in the last four *Defense White Papers*. In fact, Japan has kept a close eye on Chinese navy vessels especially after Chinese nuclear submarine's intrusion into Japanese waters in November 2004, and has worried about China's natural gas drilling project near an area in which Japan claims its exclusive economic zone. Howard shared this concern over China's growing military spending: "the pace and scope of its military modernization, particularly the development of new and disruptive capabilities such as the anti-satellite missile, could create misunderstandings and instability in the region,"⁵⁵ although Downer continued to be sanguine about China by seeing China's military budget as reasonable and benign.⁵⁶

Military rather than economic rise of China is a shared concern among major states in Asia and the Pacific including Australia. Although trilateral and quadrilateral ministerial processes have faced a setback, to a different degree, defense cooperation including military exercises has been progressing. In June 2007, JSDFs for the

⁵³ *Straits Times*, 5 June 2005.

⁵⁴ United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2006, p.29.

⁵⁵ *Reuters News*, 5 July 2007.

⁵⁶ Thompson, Mark (2007) "The Japan-Australia Strategic Relationship: An Australian Perspective," paper submitted to the 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue, 10-11 December, Canberra, p.31.

first time joined the U.S.-Australia joint military exercise, Talisman Saber, on an observer status. As this is designed to train both military forces to improve their “combat readiness and interoperability,”⁵⁷ JSDF’s participation was expected to potentially help improve Japanese defense and intelligence capabilities within a broader trilateral framework. Equipment compatibility was essential in joint military operation, and Australia’s decision to acquire “three destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system, the same system used by American and Japanese militaries”⁵⁸ was an initial step for its participation in trilateral defense cooperation. In October 2007, navies from the three countries conducted a drill near Kyushu, as the first trilateral P-3C exercise, to stimulate “search and rescue activities as well as an attack on a Japanese escort ship.”⁵⁹ Also, the quadrilateral approach with Singapore joining the other four nations had naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007 with over 20,000 personnel, 28 ships, 150 aircraft, and 3 aircraft carriers.⁶⁰ Bristled at the exercises, China questioned whether this exercise may lead to an “Asian NATO,” despite U.S. insistence on that “the exercises were not directed at any particular country.” Nevertheless, there was a voice in the U.S. Navy that the demonstration “provides a message to other militaries, and our own, that we are capable of operating together and that we work together with our regional partners to ensure stability in the region.”⁶¹

Importantly, the Rudd government has also taken a similar view on the military rise of China, as was articulated in the 2009 Defense White Paper which saw China potentially “the strongest Asian military power” and warned that “the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained.”⁶² The Defense White Book articulated Australia’s hedge against a situation in which a military strong China backed by the rapid economic growth would challenge the U.S. hegemony in its neighboring areas by planning a military build-up over the two decades that Rudd calls “the most powerful, integrated and sophisticated set of military capabilities “Australia has had,”⁶³ including the acquisition of three air warfare destroyers, eight new frigates and 12 new submarines by 2030. Given the statement by Admiral Wu Shengli, the top of China’s navy, in April 2009 that the navy would “move faster in researching and

⁵⁷ See the Website of the Australian Ministry of Defense:
<http://www.defense.gov.au/exercises/ts07/default.htm>

⁵⁸ *Dow Jones International News*, 5 June 2007.

⁵⁹ Chanlett-Avery and Vaughn, *op.cit.*, p.12.

⁶⁰ U.S. Navy (2007) “Kitty Hawk, Allies Complete Malabar Exercise,” *U.S. Navy Press Release*, 10 September.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Department of Defense, Australia (2009) *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, p.34.

⁶³ *The Economist*, 9 May 2009.

building new-generation weapons to boost the ability to fight regional sea wars,”⁶⁴ Australia’s declaration to see China a major threat to its security represents its potential engagement in U.S. battles against China, or, at least, the continued military sophistication. In this case, Japan’s promise to accelerate an array of defense cooperation with Australia, as declared by both defense ministers in December 2008, and Japan’s choice of India as the third nation, after the United States and Australia, that launched a joint security declaration in November 2008 appeared to lay a foundation for the potential U.S. engagement in a more formal multilateral defense and security arrangement, if China’s maritime ambitions continued.

⁶⁴ *The Australian*, 6 May 2009.

Conclusion

The political-security arrangements between the United States and Japan and the United States and Australia, separately, provided an implicit, if not explicit, framework of political confidence within which the Australia-Japan relationship came to grow and flourish, so the alliances with the United States have contributed to Australia and Japan sharing same strategic interests, laying the foundation for the establishment of closer security ties between them. In other words, the U.S. alliance has catalyzed the recent upsurge of mutual interests in the establishment of the Australia-Japan security and defense partnership. The Australia – Japan security and defense partnership, a relatively new element in the bilateral relationship, is not however based on an alliance system like one between Japan and the United States. It is still at a formative stage and thus requires strong shared strategic interests and common regional understandings to develop. Further development cannot be achieved without political leaders' strong commitment to the trilateral cooperation by removing or narrowing the different perceptions over emerging critical security agendas such as the rise of China.

As argued earlier, both nations had a slightly different perception toward the rise of China while strengthening the bilateral security relations, and a dark shadow was once cast over the bilateral partnership, as well as the trilateral and quadrilateral approaches. Thus, “how defense cooperation can be strengthened without alienating China”⁶⁵ was a major task Australia needed to overcome. Accused of being “passing Japan” through the exclusion of it from the list of countries on his first overseas trip in April 2008, Prime Minister Rudd was seen as taking a pro-China stance as he reversed Howard's decision to sell uranium to India and decided not to participate in a quadrilateral framework, both of which, he believes, would annoy China.

Yet, China's double-digit rises in declared defense spending in the last two decades, as well as undeclared spending which is reported to be much higher, is a major concern shared by almost all countries in Asia and the Pacific. If the transparency were not secured, the momentum for trilateral/quadrilateral defense cooperation would be more firmly established. As it is the first case to the

⁶⁵ Dupont, Alan (2004) *Unsheathing the Samurai sword: Japan's changing security policy*, Lowy Institute Paper, No3, p.49.

United States, Japan and Australia that their major trading partner, (foreign creditor to the United States as well), is their major source of threat, frequent consultations through more institutionalized framework among the three nations are needed to identify their common approaches toward engaging China in the regional stability.

Bibliography

Abe, Shinzo (2006) *Utukushii kuni-he* [Towards a beautiful country], Bungei Shunjyusha, Tokyo.

_____ (2007) “Confluence of the Two Seas,” a speech addressed at the Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August.

Armitage, Richard and Nye Jr. Joseph S. (2007) *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020*, CSIS Report, February.

Australia-Japan Research Centre (1997) “Developments in Australia-Japan Defense Ties,” *APEC Economies Program Report*, No. 23, Canberra.

Chanlett-Avery, Emma and Vaughn, Bruce (2008) “Emerging Trends in the Security Architecture in Asia: Bilateral and Multilateral Ties Among the United States, Japan, Australia, and India,” *CRS Report for Congress*, RL34312, 7 January, Washington D.C.

Christensen, Thomas (2006) “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia”, *International Security*, 31 (1), Summer, pp. 81-126.

Commonwealth of Australia, (1978) *Report of the Ad Hoc Working Committee on Australia – Japan Relations*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra.

Dalrymple, Rawdon (1996) “Japan and Australia as anchors: Do the chains still bind?” in Peter King and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), *Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

Department of Defense, Australia (2009) *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

Department of Defense, the United States (2006) *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February, Washington D.C.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia (1997) *In the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper*, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

Dupont, Alan (2004) *Unsheathing the Samurai sword: Japan’s changing security policy*, Lowy Institute Paper, No. 3.

Frost, Ellen L. (2007) “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat?” in William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (eds.) *China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.

Hatakeyama, Noboru (2005) "East Asian community: Prospects and problems towards a regional FTA," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 25 November.

Howard, John (2002) "Opening Statement" at the Joint Press Conference, Sydney, 2 May.

_____ (2005) "Australia in the World," speech addressed at Lowy Institute, Sydney, 31 March.

Koizumi, Junichiro (2002) "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership," speech delivered in Singapore, 14 January.

Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade (1993) *Japan's Defense and Security in the 1990s*, Senate Printing Unit, Parliament House, Canberra.

Sheridan, Greg (2006) *The Partnership: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Australian Alliance under Bush and Howard*, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney.

Terada, Takashi (2005) "The Japan-Australia partnership in the Era of the East Asian Community: Can they advance together?" *Pacific Economic Papers* No. 352, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Canberra.

_____ (2010) "The Origins of ASEAN+6 and Japan's Initiatives: China's Rise and the Agent – Structure Analysis," *The Pacific Review*, 23 (1), pp. 71-92.

Thompson, Mark (2007) "The Japan-Australia Strategic Relationship: An Australian Perspective," paper submitted to the 4th *Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue*, 10-11 December, Canberra.

United States Navy (2007) "Kitty Hawk, Allies Complete Malabar Exercise," *U.S. Navy Press Release*, 10 September.

Uriu, Robert (2004) "Japan in 2003: Muddling Ahead," *Asian Survey*, 44 (1), pp. 168-181.

Walton, David, (2006) "Australia and Japan," in James Cotton and John Ravenhill (eds), *Trading on alliance security: Australia in world affairs, 2001-2005*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

_____ (2008) "Australia and Japan: Towards a New Security Partnership?" *Japanese Studies*, 28 (1), pp. 73-86.

White, Hugh (2007) "Trilateralism and Australia: Australia and the Trilateral Security Dialogue with America and Japan," in William T. Tow *et al* (eds.) *Asia Pacific Security: U.S., Australia and Japan*

White House, Office of the Press Secretary (2007) "U.S. Commitment to Strengthen Forces of Freedom, Prosperity in Region," 7 September, Washington D.C.