Russia’s War in Ukraine
Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

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Cover: A vehicle with the sign “+”, markings often found on Ukrainian army vehicles, seen driving past a destroyed tank with the sign “Z”, markings often found on Russian military vehicles near the border of Kharkiv and Donetsk region, 2022. © Ashley Chan/SOPA Images/Shutterstock.com

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Abstract

The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided.

On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities.

The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
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Introduction

Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine was predicted with remarkable accuracy, but the failure to achieve anything resembling success was not. United States (US) intelligence gathered detailed data on the concentration of Russian forces, and President Joe Biden deserves credit for declassifying this information and impressing upon North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states the conclusion about the inevitability of Russian aggression. It was not possible, however, to foresee the scope of blunders made by Moscow in executing the rather obvious plan of attack. As a result, many elements of the West’s collective response, prepared on the assumption of a swift collapse of the Ukrainian defense of Kyiv, had to undergo a sequence of revisions. Ukraine’s determined resistance of the massive sudden offensive is without doubt the main cause of the setbacks experienced by Russia, but, as the war continues into its seventh month (the moment of writing), the depth of misjudgment underpinning the decision to launch the invasion becomes all the more astounding.

It is common and not altogether wrong to attribute this mistake of judgement to the ambitions and illusions cherished by President Vladimir Putin, who has articulated many profoundly wrong views about Ukraine. However, putting the blame entirely on the shoulders of the Russian president is rather too easy and more than a little misleading. In his mechanism of decision-making, the aides with access to him in his protracted self-isolation and the advisers who now prepare assessments of the course of the war are reluctant to supply information that might provoke displeasure. But the sheer number of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. This analysis aims at examining the fundamental causes of the still-unfolding disaster, in Russian doctrinal propositions, strategic planning and military culture.

Doctrinal Delusions about the Character of Modern Wars

President Putin finds it proper and symbolically important to issue a series of goal-setting documents, elaborating on the basic National Security Strategy. The apparatus of the Security Council was used to keep this collection updated. The Military Doctrine was last revised in late December 2014, when the Debaltsevo battle in the Donbass war zone was raging. These formal guidelines provide only a tangential and deliberately distorted perspective on the views and assessments informing decision-making in the Kremlin, which is covered by a thick blanket of secrecy. These perceptions may be seriously detached from reality, yet it is possible to identify in this eclectic mix a system of propositions on the central role of military power in upholding Russia’s “Great Power” status, and on the use of war as a continuation and ultimate instrument of policy, underpinning the disastrous decision to invade Ukraine.

Hubris of Russia’s “Great Power” Ambition

The desire to assert Russia’s status as a “Great Power” on a par with the US, and—increasingly, albeit ambivalently—China, is one of the main drivers in Putin’s policy-making, typically formulated in terms of the loose concept of a “multi-polar world”, but, in fact, shaping the revisionist aims in the world order perceived as unfair and detrimental to Russia’s interests. This desire is shared by many elite groups and finds broad support in the populace, but military thinking adds some particular features and faults to the status-obsessed policy. The main thesis advanced by this school of thought is that the claim for international recognition of Russia’s “greatness” must be supported by superior military might; the convincing power of this argument gains from the growing suspicions that Russia is lacking many other qualifications for the desired status and is lagging behind in cultivating the most modern elements of state power.

The fundamental flaw in this thesis is the assumption that Russia can build first-class armed forces while having only a third-class economy, which specializes primarily in production and export of hydrocarbons. This irreducible economic tilt toward the main value-producing sector is incompatible with the demand, advanced by the top brass and elaborated in the sequential state armament programs, that Russia produce the whole range of modern weapon systems, as the Soviet military-industrial complex did. Whatever funding is directed toward the implementation of these ambitions, the Russian economy can deliver only so much, while its society also tends to pursue vocations promising richer rewards, ignoring the drums of militarist propaganda. One illustration of this divergence of aspirations is the fact, lamented by some “patriotic” commentators, that the luxury yachts sailed by Putin’s oligarchs greatly exceed in size and tonnage the Admiral Gorshkov class frigates, few in number, constructed for the Russian Navy.

Another, and perhaps more dangerous delusion in the military-security thinking is that the ability to enforce its will on its neighbors constitutes a necessary proof of Russia’s “Great Power” status. The term “sphere of influence” is rarely used in official discourse, but the point made by Zbigniew Brzezinski back in 1997, that “without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire”, has made a deep impression on geopolitically-minded doctrine-developers in Moscow. An extension of this maxim is the imperative to establish effective control over Belarus, which dictated the granting of support to Lukashenko’s regime when it was shaken by mass protests in summer-autumn 2020. Putin exploited this dependency in order to upgrade the military alliance with Belarus (codified in a new joint military doctrine) and use its territory for launching the invasion of Ukraine, which effectively made Belarus an aggressor state. What constituted the basic military-strategic rationale for this invasion was the conviction that Ukraine’s progressive rapprochement with the West compromised and undermined Russia’s global posture. The top brass was materially interested in substantiating the conclusion that only direct application of military force could check that disagreeable process. They also concurred with the assessment favored by the present-day oriented special services that the decisive test would come sooner rather than later.

All the more astounding is the fact that the General Staff got the scale and nature of the predictable war so wrong.

**Conceit of Confrontation with NATO**

The assertion that NATO constitutes the main source of threat to Russia has been steadily growing in the doctrinal documents issued by the Kremlin, giving rise to the conclusion (spelled out by Putin in more recent statements) that the confrontation is certain to escalate to direct conflict. The debate about whether NATO’s expansion was really perceived in Moscow as a security threat has become sterile as neither set of arguments can dissuade the opponent – or indeed influence the rigid positions. No amount of reasoning, it seems, can alleviate Putin’s obsession with hypothetic NATO missiles to be deployed in Ukraine.12 What is important to re-examine is Russia’s rationale for emphasizing and propelling this clearly unequal confrontation. Strategy-designers in Moscow were never in doubt that the total strength of the trans-Atlantic alliance is vastly superior to Russia’s, and Putin on many occasions pledged not to engage in a costly arms race with NATO.13 Why then direct such vast resources into producing presumably superior weapon systems and taking the great risk of challenging this mighty adversary, even if indirectly?

One part of the answer can be found in the supreme confidence in the strength of nuclear deterrence. To reinforce the proactive impact of this posture, Putin placed great emphasis on modernizing strategic nuclear forces and deploying new delivery systems for non-strategic nuclear munitions.14 This effort has yielded mixed results; the US and key NATO member-states have been calibrating their responses to Russia’s aggression very carefully in order to minimize the risk of a nuclear escalation.15 Yet, Western support for Ukraine has steadily increased, and the declared goals of supplying heavy weapons have shifted toward ensuring a convincing victory.16 This prospect of turning the tide of war remains uncertain, but it

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13. Putin has also made many claims about developing weapon systems that had no Western analogues; see, for instance, “Russian Hypersonic Weapons Have No Analogues in the World, Says Putin”, *RIA-Novosti*, June 17, 2022, [https://ria.ru](https://ria.ru). This recurrent point is taken as the punch-line in the recent video-clip by the popular music group Leningrad; see “Clip Analogovnet Gained Nearly a Million Views”, *Gazeta.ru*, July 4, 2022, [www.gazeta.ru](http://www.gazeta.ru).
16. The statement on Ukraine’s victory by US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin initially seemed controversial, but, by the time of the NATO Madrid summit, it was broadly accepted by the allies. See D. Kuleba, “How Ukraine Will Win”, *Foreign Affairs*, June 17, 2022, [www.foreignaffairs.com](http://www.foreignaffairs.com).
is clear that the heavy priority in Russia’s military build-up granted to nuclear projects has left it with fewer battalions than it needs for achieving even a limited victory in the Donbass war zone.

Another and perhaps more important driver of the readiness to confront the superior power is the overestimation of divisions and disagreements in the Western alliance, which has always co-existed in a peculiar blend with the inflated assessments of the NATO threat. Such assessments are useful for pressing demands for more funding, but military experts were also attentive to the data on the inferior capabilities of the German Bundeswehr and other weaknesses in European force structures.¹⁷

The top brass also assumed that confrontation with China would determine a sustained reorientation of US military efforts toward the Asia-Pacific theatre, while Russia could count on the strength of its strategic partnership with the great eastern neighbor and redeploy troops from the eastern military district to the battlefields in Ukraine.¹⁸ The Russian top brass were never much impressed with the scope of NATO’s efforts aimed at strengthening the defensive positions in the three Baltic states, but they definitely did not expect the massive increases in military expenditure and forward deployments that were made even before the adoption of the new Strategic Concept at the Madrid summit in June 2022. Divisions in the West are real, but exaggerated evaluations have left Russia at a deep disadvantage at every interface with the re-energized Alliance. The decision of Finland and Sweden to join NATO also constitutes a major setback for Russian strategy, and Putin—having discovered that threats of severe repercussions were counter-productive—had to consent that Russia had no problem with this enlargement. Ukraine, however, is an entirely different matter.¹⁹

**Confused Conceptualization of “Hybrid Wars”**

Russian doctrinal thinking about the character of modern wars was supposed to be advanced, experience-informed and innovative. Yet, as the war in Ukraine degenerated in the matter of a month into an old-fashioned positional stalemate, the shallowness and profound sophistry of this thinking was convincingly exposed. The Russian high command appears to

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have convinced itself—and Putin—that Russia had achieved an unrivalled capacity for engaging and succeeding in extra-modern warfare. The cost of this misjudgment has yet to be estimated, and paid, but it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that a modest victory around Donbass, which was feasible with a different war plan, has become all but impossible due to the wasted resources in the misdirected initial offensive operations.

What constituted a central tenet in Russia’s conceptualization of forthcoming wars was the thesis that combat operations by conventional forces would be executed only in support of coordinated actions of a non-military kind, from cyber-attacks to economic sanctions, aimed at disorganizing and incapacitating the enemy state. Characteristically, in the reasoning developed by the General Staff, the intention of waging such “hybrid wars” was ascribed to the hostile West, while Western analysts recognized in this (not entirely false) attribution a Russian intent to project power in new, convoluted ways. Russian experiments in applying this complex warfighting method were keenly examined. The idea of combining military instruments with various subversive means, while not quite revolutionary, appeared sound, but the problem was that the Russian top brass had no trust in other power-wielding bureaucracies and no intention to subordinate their war plans to their “hybrid” schemes.

One particularly convoluted twist in this conceptualization was the definition of so-called “color revolutions” as a form of “hybrid warfare”, allegedly waged by the US and its allies against Russian interests in the former Soviet space. Advancing this proposition, General Valery Vasilievich Gerasimov had to make a stretch of strategic imagination, but he primarily followed increased political demand, as the Kremlin became obsessed with exorcising the “specter” of revolutions haunting the post-Soviet space from Kyrgyzstan to Armenia to Belarus. The key battleground where the threat of revolution had to be defeated and extinguished was obviously Ukraine, but the main assumption—and the crucial flaw—in this imaginary contestation was the proposition (strikingly anti-Marxist in nature) that revolutions were not driven primarily by

domestic grievances but induced, manipulated and controlled by external agencies, above all the US. This doctrinal guideline informed the planning of the intervention in Ukraine, in which the correct point of departure—that the US and NATO could be deterred from direct involvement in the hostilities—underpinned the wrong conclusion that the Ukrainian state shaped by the 2014 “Euro-Maidan” revolution would not be able to defend itself and would break down within a week.
Strategic Misperceptions of the Parameters of Combat Operations

The basic doctrinal error regarding the weakness of the Ukrainian state explains some of the blunders in the execution of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, but the conduct of offensive operations has been so demonstratively ineffectual and misdirected that many key guidelines in the military strategy need to be re-evaluated. Russian command has not rigidly followed the “total victory” war plan, but each revision—from the hopeful blitzkrieg to the forceful attacks in several unconnected directions and to the concentration of efforts on the Donbass war zone—has been flawed in a different way. As of the middle of August, the offensive push has degenerated into a stalled positional war of attrition; that hurts Ukraine, but Russia cannot possibly win due to the lack of reserves and depletion of resources. The whole list of misperceptions and miscalculations in Russian military strategy will take time to compile, but a few apparent shortcomings can already be examined.

Exaggerated Role of Air Power and High-Precision Weapons

Soviet strategy-designers were seriously impressed by the devastation of the Iraqi army by the US and allied air campaign in the first Gulf War, but the break-up of the USSR and the experience with managing violent conflicts in the 1990s hampered the incorporation of those assessments into Russian military strategy. It was the war in Kosovo (which happened to be the first armed conflict that the up-and-coming Vladimir Putin observed from a position near the high level of Russian leadership) that reinforced the assessment on the decisive impact of airstrikes and long-range high-precision weapons in modern wars.25 That proposition was not quite applicable in the second Chechen war, followed by the long struggle with violent instability in the North Caucasus; nor was it tested in the week-long Russian-Georgian war in August 2008.26 Nevertheless, the intention to modernize and expand Russia’s capabilities for waging air campaigns gained momentum, and was incorporated already in the 2020 State

Armament Program (SAP), approved in late 2010, as well as into every successive SAP.27

The first real test for the output from these sustained investments came in autumn 2015, when Russia launched a military intervention in Syria; this was different from its various previous power projections not only in geographic distance from home territory, but also in the pivotal role of air power.28 The mixed squadrons deployed at the hastily refurbished Khmeimim airbase did a reasonably good job in bombing various rebel groups, including ISIS, which lacked even elementary air-defense weapons. The course of the protracted civil war changed in favor of the al-Assad regime, culminating in the battle for Aleppo, completed by the end of 2016. The Russian navy supported the air campaign by delivering several strikes with the new Kalibr cruise missile from various platforms in the eastern Mediterranean and Caspian Sea, but the main purpose was to test this new long-range capability.29 Another innovation was the deployment of various air-defense assets aimed at establishing an A2/AD “bubble” over Latakia province and the eastern Mediterranean, but these capabilities were never used for intercepting Israeli air raids or US missile strikes.30 Moscow was keen to set a pattern of “deconflicting” with both the US and Israel, but the military showed uncharacteristic reluctance to put the much-advertised S-400 surface-to-air system to a real test, perhaps fearing fiasco.

This experience informed the Russian plan for executing a sequence of air strikes to ensure the success of the multi-prong land offensive toward Kyiv and Odesa, which has turned out to be seriously flawed.31 Ukrainian air-defense capabilities, even if not integrated into a system, reduced Russia’s ability to dominate airspace, so that most strikes were delivered from high altitude with low precision, while the number of sorties was too low to make a significant impact, and the close air support of the advancing columns was effectively non-existent.32 Russia’s Pantsir-S2 anti-aircraft platforms have proved unable to deal with the Turkey-produced Bayraktar drones used by the Ukrainian army, while the multi-layered defense system did not save the Moskva cruiser from the fatal hit by the Neptune anti-ship

missiles. The strategic idea concerning the central role of airpower in modern wars remains sound, but the Russian high command sought to implement it by acquiring a wide range of poorly compatible weapon systems, while neglecting the technologically demanding task of integrating available capabilities for performing joint missions in a complex combat environment.

**Scrapped Mobilization Infrastructure for Short Wars**

The centrality of the Great Patriotic War in Russian strategic thinking has been reinforced by the heavy emphasis on this historic moment in Putin’s discourse on Russia’s unique global role. All the more astounding is the prevalent strategic assumption of a short duration for modern wars. Examples of protracted wars abound (including the painful experience of the two Chechen wars), but the Russian top brass preferred to look at the swift initial phase of the second Gulf War, and the swift capture of Crimea in 2014 provided the ultimate case. To a substantial degree, this propensity for wishful strategic thinking was driven by necessity: the old Soviet infrastructure for mass mobilization was resolutely dismantled in the course of military reform launched after the August 2008 war with Georgia (also a short and victorious one). Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, the main driver of that radical reform, never pretended to have a strategic vision of modern armed struggle; he merely perceived the hundreds of “cadre” units as a costly redundancy—and moved decisively to disband them.

This break with Soviet tradition was a move too far for many generals; they made the case with Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (appointed to replace disgraced Serdyukov in November 2012), who retracted some of the most objectionable reform steps, but generally prioritized modernization over restoration. Since the onset of conflict with Ukraine in 2014, Putin has held several sessions with the top brass and the bosses of the defense-industrial complex on the agenda of economic mobilization, but his instructions clashed with the reality of budgets channeled into producing “wonder weapons” and a growing appetite for profiteering—and were mostly ignored. Those stocks of Soviet military hardware that were not

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scraped did not age well, but it was beyond the capacity of a reduced and technologically fragmented industrial base to replenish these arsenals.37

In the strategic planning of the attack on Ukraine, these shortcomings were perceived as irrelevant, as the main goal was to achieve a decisive victory in the shortest possible time, and the warnings about fierce resistance were firmly dismissed.38 It was only after the retreat from the outskirts of Kyiv and the failure to gain territory in the offensive push limited to the Donbass region that the need to reinforce exhausted troops with fresh reserves became urgent, generating expectations that Putin would announce partial, if not total, mobilization in the traditional May 9 address to the Red Square parade.39 No departure from the “special operation” discourse happened on that occasion, and Putin remained in denial of the need to up the stakes, ordering instead the recruitment of regional volunteer battalions.40 The full impact of sanctions was probably an unknown for him, but the government, while having good expertise in managing financial flows, had scant ideas about running a wartime economy amidst deepening recession.41 As the prospect of a protracted war became a working proposition, the gap between strategic demands for a sustained and expanded supply of manpower and resources, and the inability of the government and the economy to implement meaningful mobilization has deepened to a chasm.

**Fixation on Battalion Tactical Groups**

The basic organizational structures in Russian ground forces remained habitually solid from the Soviet era to the reforms at the start of the 2010s, when the order to shift from the Division-Regiment-Battalion to the Brigade-Battalion structure was issued and swiftly enforced. The new organization was supposed to be more flexible and modern, even if Serdyukov’s key goal was to reduce the number of senior officer positions. Shoigu reconstituted several divisions, but not regiments, and the main experience-informed innovation was to ensure that each brigade could field one fully manned, combat-ready battalion tactical group (BTG).42 This development was partly driven by necessity, since only experienced semi-professional kontraktniki were included in these units, while the conscripts were assumed to be left at the brigade bases. The BTGs were supposed to be

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highly mobile and capable of operating independently in modern battlefields combining artillery, armor and air-defense capabilities, so that, of the total unit’s strength of about 800, only 200 were infantry soldiers.43

As of mid-2021, as many as 168 BTGs were supposed to be fully ready, according to Shoigu, so that each brigade was ordered to generate two units, while the recruitment of kontraktniki stalled.44 As many as 100 BTGs were concentrated (and accurately identified by US intelligence data) for the attack on Ukraine from the north (Belarus), south (Crimea) and several directions from the east.45 The failure of the initial thrust was determined by many mistakes (including underestimation of the enemy), but it instantly revealed serious flaws in the design of operations centered on the use of BTGs.46 One of the most striking was the absence of the brigade-level chain of command, so that the BTGs gathered together from different brigades (and often from different military districts) engaged in maneuvering and fighting without effective interaction with one another and without proper operational leadership. The impact of this confusion was aggravated by the rigid pattern of following orders, which meant that the commanders of BTGs were not trained in exercising tactical initiative and acting on their own judgement.47 Many generals had to leave the safety of headquarters in the far rear in order to take direct control over the disjointed BTGs, while Putin tried to interfere in tactical decisions from his “bunker”.48

Conceptualizing operations by the BTGs, the General Staff failed to take into proper account—improbable as it may seem—the limitations of Ukraine’s geography, ordering the deployment of these formations in wintertime along the few available roads leading to Kyiv. This politically ordained dismissal of the basic war environment resulted in a logistical mess, made the long-stretched convoys vulnerable to drone and Javelin strikes—and led to heavy casualties.49 In the next stage of hostilities, as the warfare changed into positional battles for entrenched villages and road-crossings, artillery became the main means of gaining ground, but the

BTGs, designed for fluid battlefields defined by superior mobility, turned out to be unsuitable for performing the key tasks. Every attempt to deploy these units for breaking through “softened” enemy positions exposed them to well-directed artillery and drone strikes—and caused more casualties.50 The Ukrainian command has gradually grown confident enough to progress from tactical counter-attacks to larger-scale counter-offensive operations, but Russian strategy has never envisaged the employment of BTGs in defensive battles—and is hardly able to develop such instructions in a hurry.

In the most general terms, it can be argued that, if the Russian doctrinal misperceptions of the character of modern wars originate in misjudgment and under-estimating potential enemies, the strategic blunders regarding the scope and dynamics of combat operations are rooted in an exaggeration of their capabilities, in misunderstanding their usefulness, and in deliberate denial of deficiencies.

Anti-Modern Strategic Culture and Military Modernization

The multiple and diverse setbacks in Russia’s military campaign have illuminated the deep discord between the massive investment in modernizing the armed forces and the profoundly anti-modern strategic culture prevalent in both the mindset of the high command and the professional codes of the officer corps. Single strikes by the newest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles are trumpeted by Russian propaganda even if they have minimal impact, while the mounting evidence of atrocities and rape is dismissed as malicious Western slander. Modernization is typically equated with development and acquisition of high-tech weapon systems, which are supposed to fit with and augment the archaic and brutal methods of executing combat operations. In reality, the Russian armed forces can neither perform complex missions requiring interoperability of superbly trained troops and semi-autonomous platforms, nor deliver victory the old-fashioned way, relying on numerical superiority and disregarding the number of casualties.

Misfit of Bureaucratic and War-Fighting Cultural Traits

Conservative and servile bureaucratic cultural patterns have dominated in the evolving Russian strategic culture not only because of the Soviet heritage, but also due to deep mistrust in the Kremlin of war-seasoned veterans with their professional meritocracy and particular esprit de corps. With the appointment of Sergei Shoigu, a new symbiosis of these two traits was shaped as he promoted many “warriors” and emphasized the imperative to learn from combat experience and to prepare the troops for hard work. Yet, in the matter of a few years, the bureaucratic routines reasserted their strength as Shoigu attended more staged exercises than real training, curtailed critical reporting, and excelled in self-glorifying public relations. His huge construction project for a distinctly pseudo-Christian war-worshiping cathedral exemplified that conversion to monocracy.

The intervention in Syria was supposed to deliver a new boost to the war-fighting cultural trait, as the General Staff took particular care to set a pattern of rotation of mid-rank and senior officers through the command positions in the grouping of forces, numerically small as they were. This effort at seasoning the officer corps and spreading real combat experience produced, however, only limited value, particularly for the ground forces, as the character of operations against the ISIS militia and other rebels was quite particular, and the typical three-month tours of duty became a sort of military tourism rather than leading to practical learning.53 What most generals and colonels learned from that quasi-combat deployment was a complete disregard for collateral damage, and observations about the effectiveness of crude brutality in terrorizing a civilian population into submission. These lessons have been unflinchingly transferred from Syria to Ukraine.54

Fighting generals know that wars never go to plan, but the bureaucrats in uniform were completely unprepared for the chaos of the initial offensive maneuvers and the breakdown in the lines of command and control. Many senior officers saw no other way to restore a modicum of order than to move forward along the long-stretched convoys in order to take personal control over the confused BTGs. This—along with alleged help from US intelligence agencies—resulted in shocking high casualties among them.55 The basic tenet of the bureaucratic culture—to report only good news and to push responsibility down—was undercut by the crude demands to direct real combat operations. It was only by the end of the first month of the disingenuous “special operation” that the top brass managed to explain to the commander-in-chief that Kyiv could not possibly be captured.56 This major setback resulted in an aggravation of tensions between Putin and the military leadership, feeding the constant swirl of rumors about dismissal of Gerasimov and other prominent commanders.57 Irrespective of the scope and timing of purges, it is apparent that the “warriors” have failed in commanding their troops and the bureaucrats in managing the war effort. There are no signs of a harmonious interplay between these cultural traits emerging.
Curtained Draft and Stalled Professionalization

The enormous size of the Soviet armed forces was secured by the well-established conscription system. This was maintained after the fall of the USSR, despite very different demographics and social attitudes in the newly reconstituted Russian state. It was only in the late 2000s that Putin decreed a reduction in the duration of mandatory service from two years to 12 months, assuming that this “new look” of the army would promote its accelerated modernization.58 Correcting the course of reforms in the mid-2010s, Shoigu set ambitious goals for increasing the number of soldiers serving on contract, while maintaining the symbolically important level of total strength at 1,000,000. In reality, the attractiveness of contract service remained dubious, so most of the kontraktniki did only one two-year term, and the annual draft total amounted to between 260,000 and 275,000 conscripts.59

The half-&-half battalions could put on a perfect show at parades and in choreographed exercises, but the hard challenge of real war instantly exposed the deficiencies of the under-reformed system of conscription and recruitment.60 The ambiguous status of “special operation” signifies that legislation prohibiting the deployment of conscripts in combat operations abroad applies, but it turned out to be impossible to bring the BTGs to full strength without young draftees, many of whom inevitably added to the unpublished list of casualties.61 Kontraktniki are by no means bona fide professionals, and, even if their basic training is satisfactory, they typically lack skills for operating technically sophisticated equipment, not to mention processing digital data. Western experts long suspected that the most damaging deficiency in the mixed system of conscription and contract in the Russian army was the inability to build a corps of professional sergeants, but, in the months of failed offensives, disorganized retreats and ugly trench warfare, no solution to this problem has emerged.62 Many units of the Rosgvardiya, the internal security structure created by Putin in 2016, are comprised entirely of professional servicemen, but legislation prohibits their deployment outside the borders of the Russian Federation; several

cases of group refusals to partake in the “special operation” were reported despite strict censorship.63

The tactical ineptness and timidity under fire are just one side of the problem of poor professionalism; another is the propensity to looting and the fast-spreading participation in war crimes.64 The behavior of the Russian army in the occupied Ukrainian territories has turned shockingly similar to the atrocities committed by the Soviet army in 1945, as it advanced into East Prussia and other German lands.65 Inside Russia, any mention of marauding or rape is prosecuted and severely punished as “discreditation” and the spreading of “false news” about the army. The Bucha massacre is denounced as “monstrous forgery”.66 Neither the official cover-up of the crimes nor the glorification of fake valor can, however, discourage draft-dodging, give a boost to the morale of exhausted battalions, or stimulate the signing of new contracts for serving in their ranks.

**Rampant Corruption and Useless Mercenaries**

In the Soviet army, habitual corruption was tolerated much the same way as in other institutions, but it was the deep reduction and redeployment of military structures in the early 1990s that increased thievery and embezzlement by an order of magnitude. Serdyukov’s reforms involved the sell-off of military stock and real estate; this stimulated further growth of the culture of corruption. Shoigu preferred to extinguish the scandal, so the high-profile case against Serdyukov and his cronies was quietly dropped.67 The steep increase in funding for military procurement in the second half of the 2010s led to a new surge in corruption, and the few investigations that were made public testified to a massive scale of fraud in rearmament projects of every kind, from the unlucky aircraft carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* to soldiers’ uniforms.68

The protracted winter camping of Russian troops in the months preceding the invasion of Ukraine exposed them to many corruption-caused hardships, even if most experts were preoccupied with counting the number

of deployed BTGs rather that with their combat readiness. The order to launch the offensive operations took most field commanders, as well as logistical services, by surprise; the problems with supplies instantly took on insurmountable proportions. The case of cheap Chinese tires that caused many supply trucks to get stuck in the mud was picked up by many commentators as illuminating the endemic thievery in the rear echelons of the “Potemkin army”.

As the war turned into a more positional configuration, with pitched battles for road intersections and river crossings, the issue of steady delivery of supplies has become crucial. In the protracted war of attrition, Russia is set to experience fast degeneration of its combat capabilities due to irreducible corruption.

It is not only logistics but also recruitment that is affected by corruption, and the shortage of manpower for rebuilding the damaged battalions drives the Russian command to experiment with non-traditional and inherently corrupt solutions, including forced mobilization in the Donetsk and Luhansk quasi-republics. The notorious “Wagner group” of mercenaries, which originated in the messy fighting in Donbass in 2014 and then was deployed to Syria and Libya, has been brought back, primarily for the task of keeping the occupied territories under control. It has turned out to be difficult to recruit volunteers into various “Wagner”-type bands, even from the prison population, so a suggestion to transport Hezbollah fighters and other militias from Syria appeared feasible to Russian commanders; those of them who had been even briefly exposed to the Syrian war should have known better. Ramzan Kadyrov, the maverick ruler of Chechnya, bragged about the bravery of his battalions, but, in fact, the performance of kadyroustsy was predictably dismal. Mercenaries are no good in trenches; their propensity to rampage undercuts Russian control over the occupied territories, and the army loses what tenuous cohesion it has.

The misjudgments, the setbacks and the looming defeat of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (precariously deadlocked at the moment of writing) are so profound and unexpected that a single explanation—typically centered on Putin’s bad leadership—is unsatisfactory. A critical examination of all parameters of Russia’s presumed superior military might is needed. The doctrinal ambitions, defining an extra-wide spectrum of threats, singling out NATO as the main adversary and asserting Russia’s ability to deter and defeat it by employing the complete set of capabilities, from the nuclear arsenal to “hybrid” means, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining quick victory by establishing air dominance and executing deep offensive maneuvers by armored BTGs led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. A conservative and corrupt strategic culture produced inflexible chains of command, the demoralization of poorly led combat units, and ugly atrocities.

The sum total of these inherent flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of costly and fruitless fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire and seeking to erode with indiscriminate bombing its will to resist. This return to traditional means and methods cannot produce success because it presupposes achieving numerical superiority in all key capabilities, and first of all in manpower. In fact, it is Ukraine that is able to deploy troops in greater numbers and equip them with newly received Western armaments, while the Russian BTGs receive scant reinforcements. The strategy of a protracted war of attrition can only lead to victory if Russia’s economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically challenging, if not impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.

Russia’s defeat in the conventional war with Ukraine (nuclear options inevitably involve the risk of a rapid, catastrophic disaster) might appear less than probable in the current deadlocked situation, but it is in fact pre-determined by the combination of Ukrainian resolve, Western commitment and degradation of Russia’s military might. This outcome will necessitate reforms in every component of the damaged and exhausted Russian military machine, while the effectiveness of such reforms would depend on a readiness to learn lessons, which in turn would depend on the extent of the defeat.
A ceasefire that left most of Donbass under Russian control could be construed as a “victory”, and so is certain to entrench the confrontation, escalate domestic repressions and focus strategic thinking on scoring a more convincing result in the next spasm of hostilities. A settlement that restored the status quo ante might compel a more profound reckoning with strategic reality and lead to the collapse, protracted rather than instant, of Putin’s regime. The successors, initially quite possibly from the power elites, would be eager to pin the whole blame for starting the lost war on the fallen leader and would have to accept further compromises, including a retreat from all eastern Ukraine (while desperately insisting on keeping possession of Crimea). Explaining away the defeat by Putin’s blunders and sabotage by the pro-Western “fifth column” might seem for the caretakers to be the most convenient way to minimize damage and curtail reforms, but this “easy way out” would rapidly run into a dead end, as the economic crisis will keep deepening. Russia cannot avoid the hard work of reconstituting its state identity, one key element of which is its self-defeating strategic culture.
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