|
|
William C. Ramsay introduced the Energy Roundtable by
reminding the general context of the climate negotiations: the negotiations
are now at the halfway point on the Bali Roadmap. Just after the Poznan
Conference, we should now assess its outcome. Moreover, it is time to
discuss the prospects for the Copenhagen Conference in December: will it
produce a final agreement? Poznan took place in a quite unique context in
December 2008, as the EU was pursuing final negotiations on its climate and
energy package in parallel, and the US was unable to take clear positions
due to the presidential transition. Given the last-minute adoption of the
EU climate and energy package, which now contains many compromises and
concessions, one might ask if the package has reinforced or rather weakened
EU leadership on the issue. At the same time, the world is wondering what
one can expect from the Obama administration, in terms of new domestic
legislation and the US position on the international negotiations.
These questions are getting all the more important because the
Copenhagen agenda is very tight: developed countries participating in the
Kyoto Protocol must declare emissions targets by the end of March and the
draft text of a new global agreement must be tabled by June. Due to the
complicated context, it seems preparations are a bit behind schedule. One
can indeed wonder if it is feasible to reach an international agreement by
the end of the year. Therefore, the proposal of pre-agreements between
larger countries is worth considering, as it could allow faster progress.
Moreover, we should consider Ban Ki-moon’s proposal to raise the level of
negotiation, from ministers to heads of state and government. Finally, it
was interesting to see that developing and emerging countries took a more
active role in Poznan than at precedent negotiations. So one may ask if
this will also be true for Copenhagen.
Pernille Nielsen explained that the Danish government
started preparations for the Copenhagen Conference in 2006, when it was
decided that Denmark would host the event. The practical organisation of
the conference will constitute a huge task, as it will be the biggest
international conference ever organised in Denmark, with more than 15,000
people expected to attend. Pernille Nielsen then drew a positive picture of
the Poznan Conference, saying that it allowed to end a year of listening and
to start real negotiations. In the course of the negotiations, the EU will
need to assure leadership, because the world will listen to the EU only if
it speaks with a loud voice, i.e. if Europeans deliver on their promises to
cut emissions. Especially, we are awaiting the EU's position
on finance and technology transfer. In the Danish representative’s
view, the latest signals from the US are very positive and one can now hope
that the US will show real leadership as well. At the same time, we must be
aware that no deal will be possible without China. But latest developments
in China are also rather encouraging, as the Chinese have adopted national
plans to reduce emissions, improve energy efficiency and develop
renewables.
Still, the preparation and organisation of the negotiations will be
a big challenge. We need political involvement in the process throughout
the year. The informal Nairobi ministerial meeting which Denmark has
taken the initiative for, is an example of this. In sum, the preparations
are well on track, especially when we compare the current situation to the
run-up of the Kyoto Conference.
Richard Bradley first underlined that the preparation of
the Copenhagen Conference by the Danish government is of excellent quality.
In his view, the Danes are the most committed organisers of a Climate
Change Conference ever. Moreover, the recent adoption of the EU climate
package gives some hope for the negotiations. But one must wonder now what
the EU can effectively trade and offer at the negotiation table: technology
transfer looks the most likely negotiation item. Mr. Bradley then reminded
the public that climate change needed urgent action, and action that goes
beyond the current proposals. In order to limit global warming, a
significant change of the capital structure must happen, as the world needs
to get to a zero emission economy by the end of the century. The current
scenarios for future energy supply, however, are in strong contradiction to
this objective, as they are based on fossil fuels. So policy-makers must
encourage a change of path by setting the necessary incentives.
In order to achieve this, the climate negotiations must reflect the
new reality, as the (energy) world order has changed: the OECD countries
are not the only important consumers any more, nor the only significant CO2
emitters. As a consequence, the language and procedure of negotiations must
change. This is even more so as future emission increases will mainly come
from non-OECD countries.
The IEA has developed models to achieve the necessary emission
reductions: the “550 Policy Scenario” and the “450 Policy Scenario”, which
are both described in detail in the World Energy Outlook 2008. For both,
energy efficiency improvements will make the most important contribution to
emission cuts. As the necessary political decisions need a certain amount
of time to be implemented, decisive steps must be taken now if one wants to
achieve the proposed goals for 2020. Also for longer time frames, decisions
have to be taken as early as possible, as the effects on the climate will
only be felt many years later.
Given the short amount of time left before the Copenhagen
Conference, Richard Bradley remains sceptical about its outcome. For the
time being, no negotiation text has been tabled and there is no agreement
on any of the major components – in this context, the issue of technology
transfer looks particularly difficult. Moreover, some countries still need
to submit their proposals. The fact that negotiations are conducted on two
floors in parallel and the absence of a strong presidency still complicate
the negotiations. Finally, one should not neglect that some countries, for
instance the OPEC countries, will have a destructive strategy towards any
new regime.
The new US administration has raised some hope for the negotiations,
as the US could now become a dominant player in the negotiations and move
them forward. However, this is not clear yet, as the negotiation team has
still to be designated. Furthermore, climate change and the possible introduction
of a cap and trade system are a “4th level issue” for president Obama, so
he will not pay a political price for the issue. This clearly is a negative
sign for the Copenhagen Conference. In a historical perspective, it would
be surprising to see the US signing an international agreement on an issue
that has not been discussed at the national level before: in the past, the
process always went the other way round. So one may imagine that first a
national US legislation is needed, and only in a second step the US will
sign an international agreement.
In conclusion, the outcome of Copenhagen could be similar to the
outcome of the Kyoto Conference. There will be some targets and a formula
“allowing for” cap and trade, but no binding obligation for a global cap
and trade system. So the outcome might be not enough and not sustainable –
a more progressive approach would be needed. China and India, in
particular, should agree that from 2020 onwards, they will behave like
developed countries.
Pierre Dechamps started by presenting the EU’s political
objective concerning climate change. The EU wants to limit the temperature
rise to 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels – even if already such a
moderate rise of only 2°C will demand huge adaptation efforts. In order to
achieve this, the EU has adopted the energy and climate package, with the
well-known 20-20-20 goals. The CO2 emission reduction would even be
increased to 30% if an international agreement is reached in Copenhagen:
this 10% reduction increase will constitute the main EU offer in the
negotiations. The package adopted in December 2008 is indeed an example for
the whole world, as it commits the EU to emission reductions that are to be
realised under common responsibility: the solidarity mechanism inside the
EU is a model that should be extended to the global level. Equally the EU
cap and trade system (EU ETS) could serve as model for a worldwide emission
trading system.
Besides this, the EU package is an example of legislation for
developed countries. However, it is strong on mitigation, but lacks
adaptation measures and concrete proposals for financing. These issues will
be covered separately. That is why we need different and more
differentiated solutions on the global level and especially for developing
countries, which must also contain strong adaptation measures. It does not
make sense to ask developing countries for absolute emission reductions.
They should agree on a departure from the “business as usual” scenario
instead. Their commitment must be supported by national action plans that
contain clear accounting rules and verification techniques. Finally,
developing countries also must address the issue of deforestation, but they
need efficient solidarity mechanisms for doing so: the transfer of revenues
from emission permits (like those obtained via the EU ETS) could be a good
tool in this context.
Overall, it is clear that no general agreement in Copenhagen is
possible without a financing agreement. So a new model of governance for
financing climate change adaptation and mitigation measures is needed. The
current economic crisis will however complicate this task. Technology and
money transfers will be more difficult to obtain in times of high budget
deficits. But we need to remember that the climate crisis is structural,
whereas the economic crisis is cyclical. That is why the economic crisis
cannot be a pretext for not dealing with climate change.
Moreover, Mr. Dechamps underlined that the “Clean Development
Mechanism” (CDM) is not working in a satisfactory way. He hence proposed to
review this mechanism and make it more efficient or indeed phase it out
progressively and replace it with trading schemes. In his conclusion, Mr.
Dechamps confirmed that it will be a big challenge to achieve a success in
Copenhagen. It will be most important to agree on the “big issues”, as
details could be agreed upon after the conference.
In the following question and answer session, the
discussion touched upon the issue of technology transfer and available
technologies that allow emission reductions. The diffusion of existing
technologies seems most important, but the fact that most technologies are
owned by private companies poses a significant problem. Enhanced
international cooperation in the field of R&D could be a solution to
this problem. Moreover, one should not forget the difficulties policy
makers in developed countries may face when explaining to their
constituencies why they are financing other countries’ growth by technology
transfer, especially in the context of the current economic crisis. Another
point of debate was the possible merger of the two negotiation tracks
inside the UNFCCC: it would be beneficial, but looks difficult to realise.
One participant put into question the overall design of the negotiations
and demanded that the 15 most important CO2 emitters should demonstrate
global leadership and work out an agreement on their own.
Jacques Lesourne then questioned the possibility of the EU to
realise a 30% CO2 emission reduction by 2020 – a goal the EU has promised
to achieve in case of an international agreement. Pierre Dechamps agreed
with this comment, calling the lack of a clear roadmap to achieve the 30%
frustrating. He estimated that this level of reduction could be realised,
if at all, externally, by financing even more projects in third countries,
which provides an additional incentive for success in Copenhagen. It will
participate alongside Member States at the Copenhagen Conference, which
could prove difficult. Avril Doyle, MEP, commented on the perceived lack of
leadership in the negotiations, stating that Europe does not want to take
the lead alone. She then expressed her hope that a strong leadership by
committed and talented chairs could still emerge. Richard Bradley did not
share this hope, as the current negotiations lack good chairmen that could
lead the discussions, as it was the case in the Kyoto negotiations. He
added that first China must be convinced to join, and then India might
join. Russia, however, might be the most difficult country to persuade.
Conference report written by Christian Schülke, Junior Research
Fellow, Ifri Energy
|