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COOPERATING WITH AFRICAN ARMED FORCES

Aline LEBOEUF

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Editorial Board

Abstract

Nowadays, numerous actors are involved in military cooperation programs aiming to strengthen African armed forces and build special partnerships. These programs consist of training and the deployment of military advisors, as well as material and financial support to various sub-Saharan African forces. Military cooperation faces a number of constraints, however, due to the "patchwork" nature of many African armed forces and, in many cases, their lack of professionalization. Although military cooperation may sometimes leave advisors frustrated, its impact in Africa is undeniable and perceptible in the long term, making it a highly important strategic tool. Nevertheless, military cooperation is facing serious challenges, and there is still a long way to go. To that end, cooperation will have to be engendered from the bottom up, with the deployment of advisors at the operational level, as well as from the top down, with the introduction of security sector reforms to facilitate the progressive yet sustained changes that African forces need.

Résumé

De très nombreux acteurs sont aujourd'hui impliqués dans des programmes de coopération militaire visant à renforcer les armées africaines et à nouer des partenariats privilégiés. Ces programmes se traduisent par des actions de formations et le déploiement de conseillers militaires, ainsi que par l'apport d'une aide matérielle et financière aux différentes armées d'Afrique subsaharienne. Cependant, la coopération militaire rencontre un certain nombre d'obstacles dus à la nature même des armées africaines et à leur faible professionnalisation. Malgré le sentiment de frustration qu'elle engendre parfois pour les conseillers, la coopération militaire en Afrique exerce une indéniable influence, bien visible sur le temps long, ce qui en fait un outil stratégique de premier ordre. D'importants défis demeurent toutefois à relever et le chemin est encore long. Pour ce faire, il faudra développer la coopération « par le bas », *via* le déploiement de conseillers au niveau opérationnel, ainsi que « par le haut » en vue d'une réforme du secteur de sécurité qui seule permettra d'apporter aux armées africaines les changements progressifs mais soutenus dont elles ont besoin.

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Introduction

Given the threats now faced by sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from terrorism, through insurgencies and piracy, to organized crime, African armed forces can no longer simply act as instruments of prestige to be used for parades on national holidays or for destabilizing democratically elected governments through coups d'état. They need to be able to fulfill specific missions, and they are called upon to intervene in wars more and more frequently through the hardening of peacekeeping operations, such as in Mali, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Central African Republic (CAR). If these forces are not strengthened, they risk collapse, as in the case of Mali's military in the face of jihadist forces in 2012.[1]

Africa's armed forces do not stand alone, however, in confronting these challenges. They can count on a vast panoply of military cooperation, in multiple forms and provided by a range of organizations, both public and private. The importance and the nature of this aid have varied throughout history.[2] During the Cold War, African armed forces were the object of keen interest by the Great Powers, including France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the countries of the communist bloc, the United States, and China, which have frequently competed in their efforts to equip and arm the African military. This trend was reversed in the 1990s, with a sharp drop in interest in Africa from other continents. Terrorism was accorded a higher level of importance in the 2000s, while a spike in raw material prices engendered considerable growth in the continent as well as an influx of new investment from Asia and the West. These two factors sparked renewed interest in Africa, which was viewed as

1. This paper is the English version of a *Focus Stratégique* initially published in French in October 2017. Facts and figures have not been updated and may have changed since the first edition. The author warmly thanks everyone who assisted her in carrying out this study, either by agreeing to be interviewed, by contributing to the peer review of the study (which involved fifteen or so external reviewers in both Europe and Africa), or by facilitating her research. Some of the research required for this study was carried out as part of the Guerre&Po project, directed by A. Gnanguênon and hosted by the Institut des mondes africains (IMAF) and the School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS). A section of the study was discussed at a seminar at the Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM) in October, 2016, on the theme of "The New Faces of African Armed Forces" and was published in the ainsi-va-le-monde.blogspot.fr and ultimaratio-blog.org blogs under the title "Afrique, 'Nous sommes passés d'une coopération militaire de substitution à une coopération de conseil'" ("Africa—We have progressed from military cooperation through substitution to cooperation through advice".) The author thanks those involved.

2. See, for example, O. Ismail and E. Sköns, "Introduction" in O. Ismail and E. Sköns, *Security Activities of External Actors in Africa* (Sipri), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 2-8.

fresh ground for financial opportunities, and hence gradually rose up through the hierarchy of global priorities. These developments fed through into renewed competition between nations and private actors to "rebuild" and cooperate with Africa's military.

It is this resurgence of military cooperation that provides the focus for this study, which concentrates on cooperation with the armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa and their armies in particular, although certain elements may also concern navies and air forces. At its core, this analysis concerns cooperation, rather than African armed forces as a whole, so certain crucial elements may be emphasized to help explain the bias inherent in certain cases of cooperation, even if this applies only to a minority of African forces. This, indeed, is one of the difficulties inherent in a study such as this: the armed forces of African nations—even if we limit ourselves to sub-Saharan African countries—find themselves in a wide variety of situations, and we must keep this diversity in mind.

It is essential to remember that today's African armed forces have evolved out of history—largely from colonial history, albeit not entirely[3]—and that they were not set up "according to the model of European forces".[4] Mindful of this historical legacy, we have concentrated on the forms that the practice of military cooperation with sub-Saharan African countries has developed over the past ten years.[5]

We have deliberately excluded the intelligence sector from this study, given the lack of sufficient information on this area, even though it represents a significant aspect of cooperation with African forces.[6] Indeed, such difficulties with sources pose a general problem, albeit a less acute one, in the subject as a whole. Few texts have been devoted to the matter, so it is sometimes necessary to cross-reference sparse but heterogeneous sources, which may relate to only one isolated element—typically a monograph on bilateral relations. There are a limited number of works, however, such as *Security Activities of External Actors in Africa* by Olawale Ismail and Elisabeth Sköns, which examine the cooperation of various actors in Africa and draw a comparative analysis.

3. C. Evrard, "Retour sur la construction des relations militaires franco-africaines", *Relations internationales*, No. 165, 2016/1, pp. 23-42.

4. M. Debos and J. Glasman, "Introduction au thème. Politique des corps habillés. État, pouvoir et métiers de l'ordre en Afrique", *Politique africaine*, No. 128, 2012/4, p. 12. Our translation. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of quoted foreign language material in this article are our own.

5. Our analysis shall focus on cooperation with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, rather than addressing regional dimensions.

6. K. P. Donovan and A. K. Martin, "ASR Forum on Surveillance in Africa: Politics, Histories, Techniques, Introduction", *African Studies Review*, Vol. 59, No. 2, September, 2016, pp. 31-37.

We offer a presentation of the different types of military cooperation, whose aims can range from the creation of a military from scratch, such as in Somalia, to simple support for exporting military equipment. It is also necessary to explore the sociology of the actors involved in cooperation: who is it that cooperates with African armed forces, and by what means? We then outline the difficulties facing many armed forces in Africa, and their consequences for those actors involved in reforming them. Thirdly, we seek to assess the consequences of military cooperation policies. Finally, we return to the two elements that are essential to achieve any fundamental reform of African forces, whether by a bottom-up or top-down approach: operational cooperation and security sector reform (SSR).[7]

7. The research presented here shall draw on a 2013 PhD thesis on SSR in Sierra Leone, making use, in particular, of the archives of a British officer who was responsible for logistics in the Sierra Leonean military (procurement and stock management); on a mission carried out in Côte d'Ivoire in April, 2014; and on around thirty interviews conducted in Paris between 2015 and 2017 with participants in French cooperation at different levels (heads of security and defense cooperation, members of defense staff, French Elements in Senegal, French Elements in Gabon, defense attachés, cooperants who had joined defense ministries, African army staff, or schools), with State Department representatives, and with African officers.

The Burgeoning Landscape of Military Cooperation

In any comparison of the various actors in the field of military cooperation in Africa, whether they are Western, Asian or African, six main categories of cooperation emerge:

- bilateral meetings between figures from the realm of defense, with the signature of cooperation agreements;
- structural assistance, both in the beneficiary countries and in those providing cooperation;
- training provided through the detachment of "cooperants", technical advisors, or operational advisors;[8]
- the organization of joint exercises;
- the donation or sale of infrastructure, equipment, or arms;
- financial assistance.

Behind these approximate categorizations, however, there is a high, indeed burgeoning, degree of diversity, not least because the armed forces concerned have such a variety of military cultures. In particular, the various countries do not all favor the same types of cooperation. Nevertheless, the categories listed above allow us to make an effective comparison of different sorts of cooperation and, following a brief presentation, this typology will be used in examining the different actors involved in military cooperation in Africa.

8. This study uses a number of synonyms for "military advisor", each of which carries certain nuances. The term "cooperant" (*coopérant* in French) refers to military personnel on detachment from the French Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate, who serve as advisors with an African military institution and are authorized to wear this institution's uniform. The term "technical advisor" refers to technical trainers deployed for a short period, perhaps to train personnel in the use of a specific type of weapon or military capability (e.g. in tackling improvised explosive devices). The concept of "operational advisor" refers to mentors or troops providing support on detachment with a combat unit or an operational or tactical staff group (e.g. within an operational instruction detachment (DIO)).

Mapping in Military Cooperation in Africa

Several categories of actors are involved in military cooperation in Africa. In many cases, the pattern of cooperation of one country with others is the product of history. France, for example, maintains a special relationship with its former colonies, although it has also come to engage in military cooperation with other countries such as Nigeria and, to a more limited extent, Kenya.[9] Over the course of the past twenty years or so, some forms of military cooperation have likewise been established with states that have not hitherto had such strong links. This has often been done for strategic reasons (whether security-related or economic), such as in the cases of the United States and China.

Rivalries on the international stage have often been acted out in African theaters, with stances being adopted either for or against one party or another, which can sometimes reset a whole chain of partnerships like dominoes.[10] Examples include relations between Israel and the Arab states (with notable tensions between Saudi Arabia and Togo, which had been due to host the Africa-Israel summit in 2017[11]); the China-Taiwan dispute (with Swaziland remaining as Taiwan's sole ally in Africa); the positions of Saudi Arabia and Iran vis-à-vis Sudan;[12] and more recent issues involving Qatar (concerning Sudan, Chad, and Senegal), and the two Koreas.

The United States is the foremost financial player by far in military cooperation with Africa. It operates the most programs, and has the biggest budget, with $2.5 billion set to be allocated for military and police aid in Africa in 2017.[13] This is a lower amount than American security assistance granted to other countries such as Israel ($3.1 billion) and Afghanistan, ($3.67 billion). However, even when the $1.31 billion of aid given to Egypt

9. France deployed an officer at the International Peace Training Center (IPTC) in Kenya. M. Jowell, "The Unintended Consequences of Foreign Military Assistance in Africa: An Analysis of PSO Training Centres, African Government Forces", *Working Paper,* December 1-2, 2014, Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic Africa Institute.

10. For an analysis of the involvement of international actors in Africa in the wider context of cooperation and development aid, see P. Hugon, "Les nouveaux acteurs de la coopération en Afrique", *Revue international de politique de développement*, No. 1, 2010, pp. 99-118.

11. Following a period of cooling relations between certain African states and Israel, given the enhanced solidarity between those countries and Arab states, there has since been a re-engagement by Israel in several African countries over the past few years. H. Butime, "Shift in Israel-Africa Relations", *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 17, No. 3, October 2014, available at www.inss.org.il. According to a French officer (peer review, August 2017), Israel has a niche policy, intelligence, security protection, and drones.

12. M. Duteil, "Géostratégie – Arabie Saoudite-Iran; le duel africain", *Le Point Afrique*, January 26, 2016, available at afrique.lepoint.fr.

13. Available at securityassistance.org, consulted on June 30, 2017.

is taken away from this $2.5 billion, the sums are still significant.[14] By way of comparison, the Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate, the French government department in charge of structural cooperation, had a budget of only €101.6 million in 2017.[15] Given Donald Trump's budgetary decisions, however, American assistance is set to decrease in 2018.[16] The first budget bill for 2018 contains a significant reduction in funding for the State Department, which provides approximately half of America's funding for military assistance, more in loans but less by way of grants, and a centralization of funding for those states assessed as being the most strategic.[17]

American aid is not easy to analyze, given its highly complex funding arrangements, spread among 194 programs and budgetary authorities, which are each granted different amounts.[18] The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is responsible for implementing most of these programs, which rely on either the State Department or the Department of Defense.[19] Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) is the best-known program and one of the longest established, having formerly existed as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), set up in 1996. ACOTA aims to train African armed forces in peacekeeping, using private security companies under contract with the US government.[20] This is by no means the only initiative to benefit African countries, however. Several programs are run in conjunction with defense institution building, seminars organized by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, or various aspects of the International Military Education and Training (IMET)

14. For an analysis of American international military assistance policy, see D. S. Reveron, *Exporting Security, International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the US Military*, 2nd edition, Washington D.C .: Georgetown University Press, 2016.
15. Available at www.senat.fr. The DCSD's budget came to €62.9 million in 2016, representing a drop of 40.8 % over ten years, although it was greatly expanded in 2017. Operational cooperation budgets would need to be added to obtain a comparable total, although these figures are more difficult to obtain, as they correspond to multiple budget lines.
16. For Derek S. Reveron, there is a bipartisan consensus in support of using the armed forces for military assistance. D.S. Reveron, *Exporting Security*, *op. cit.*, p. 11. This at least appears to confirm the analysis of Congress's initial response to President Trump's minimalist cooperation budget. For further information, see J. Lachman, "Congress Protects U.S. Foreign Aid For Now but the Budget Wars Are Just Beginning", May 12, 2017, www.justsecurity.org. Laurent Touchard anticipates a drop in the budget for the Global Peace Operations Initiative, which includes Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, "as it is not directly targeted against the jihadis", in L. Touchard, *Forces armées africaines*, Broché, 2017, p. 188.
17. K. Soffen and D. Lu, "What Trump Cut in His Agency Budgets", *The Washington Post*, May 23, 2017; "The Evolving US Diplomatic and Foreign Aid Budget: What Do these Changes Mean for Africa?" Brookings Institution, June 26, 2017, available at www.brookings.edu.
18. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Building Partner capacity: Inventory of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts*, March 24, 2017, p. 2.
19. E. Sköns, "The United States" in O. Ismail and E. Sköns, *Security Activities of External Actors*, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 and 120-121.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-128.

program, which was set up in 1976, together with regional programs such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), as well as vehicles for sales such as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, or those for donating military equipment, such as the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program.[21]

In spite of its complexity, American military cooperation is among the most transparent, together with French cooperation initiatives: it has high media exposure and has been the subject of various studies over recent years.[22] Although some countries particularly benefit from American assistance, it seems to reach all African countries at least to a marginal extent, in particular through IMET or FMS/FMF.[23] In 2015, for example, the top five beneficiaries by number of trained personnel were Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Niger, and Tanzania, which can be explained by the important role played by these countries in providing peacekeeping contingents ("Blue Helmets"). This ranking changes frequently from one year to the next, however.[24]

On the back of its experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US Army recently announced the creation of six specialist cooperation brigades—the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). As well as providing pools of officers specializing in military assistance, these units aim to free up the other forces involved in these missions, allowing them to focus once more on joint combat. The first of these SFABs, to be formed in 2017-18, will bring together more than 500 military personnel, organized into *kandaks* of twenty-one, comprising twelve advisors and nine soldiers responsible for protecting them.[25] This institutionalization of the advice and assistance mission will eventually have consequences for the way in which the US conducts its cooperation activities in Africa. Not all problems will be solved. The teaching of local languages is supposed to last only two weeks (as is the case with "pedagogy"), and there appears to be nothing in place to improve cultural awareness.

21. Comment by a French researcher specializing in the United States, peer review, August 2017.
22. D. E. Thaler, M. McNerney, B. Grill, J. P. Marquis, and A. Kadlec, *From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2016; K. A. Harkness, "The US Military in Africa. Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for More", *Parameters*, summer 2015; K. Larsdotter, "The US Military in Africa. Security Assistance in Africa: The Case for Less", *Parameters*, summer 2015.
23. M. Kandel, "La stratégie américaine en Afrique", *Études de l'IRSEM*, No. 36, 2014, p. 18.
24. "US foreign Military Training Reached Record Highs in 2015", *Security Assistance Monitor*, May 2017, p. 3.
25. C. Todd Lopez, "Security Force Assistance Brigades to Free Brigade Combat Teams from Advise, Assist Mission", May 18, 2017, available at www.army.mil.

In comparison, Chinese cooperation remains difficult to analyze as a whole, although a country-by-country study reveals an ambitious policy that reaches all the African countries with which Beijing has diplomatic relations, at least to a marginal extent.[26] China's cooperation with some of its historical allies such as Zimbabwe, Angola, Tanzania, Ghana, and Gabon is solid, and its ties appear especially close with Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia.[27] Cooperation has also recently been fostered with new partners such as Djibouti, where China now has a military base.[28] China's financial resources are significant, with high levels of both donations and loans to match the country's African ambitions, although their overall value is difficult to gauge. On the whole, China has positioned itself as an alternative partner, allowing some countries to obtain arms (especially drones) and providing training in cases where Western states have kept their distance or imposed embargos, as has been the case with Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, and, more recently, Burundi.[29]

In comparison with the contributions of China and the United States, the role played by other countries can appear modest, even those with the regional ambitions of France and the UK, although the means deployed still reflect their ambition. The case of France merits particular attention. Despite the country's limited means, the actions it conducts are far from trivial. With its operations Serval, Sangaris, and Barkhane, France has demonstrated its readiness to expose its soldiers to lethal danger to defend the security of its African partners. This has transformed France's relationships with the countries concerned, at least for now. The French military has sought to refresh the forms of cooperation that it has in place, by emphasizing partnership, rather than assistance, and favoring dialogue with Africans in order to develop a common vision, so that it can then adapt its actions—bearing in mind its limited resources—according to a multilateral approach, rather than a bilateral one.

26. D. H. Shinn, "Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World" in R. I. Rotberg (ed.), *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008, pp. 161, 164; C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution to the Modernisation of the African Armies", paper presented at a colloquium entitled "Les nouveaux visages des armées africaines", IRSEM, Paris, October 5 and 6, 2016; D. Cordano, "China's Role in Africa's Conflicts: Military Cooperation, Arms Transfers and Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations", *Consultancy Africa Intelligence*, April 14, 2014.

27. C.-H. Huang and O. Ismail, "China" in O. Ismail and E. Sköns, *Security Activities of External Actors, op. cit.,* p. 24.

28. *Ibid.*

29. C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.,* pp. 21, 24; C. Enuka, "China's Military Presence in Africa: Implications for Africa's Wobbling Peace", *Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, pp. 18-19; D.H. Shinn, "Military and Security Relations: China, Africa, and the Rest of the World" in R.I. Rotberg, *China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence*, *op. cit.,* p. 163.

French cooperation comes in four forms. First of all, there is structural cooperation, which involves in-depth activity by military means. Led by the Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate (DCSD), a division of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this type of cooperation aims in particular to increase the human capital of partner forces and to improve the structure of a country's armed forces, their human resources, their doctrine, or their civil-military relationships. Secondly, the assistance that it provides is more focused on training and bringing a country's forces up to a more or less operational condition. The French *forces de présence*—troops on permanent deployment in Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Djibouti—have a primary role in this daily oversight function. The third and fourth aspects of cooperation consist of accompanying and fighting alongside partner forces in joint operations. There is a certain continuum between these different functions, which further strengthens the coherence of the arrangements. For example, in the space of three months, 75 percent of troops trained by the French Elements in Senegal (EFS) have been deployed in operations.[30]

One example where dialogue and partnership have been promoted through this approach is the establishment of joint operational cooperation plans in West Africa. Cognizant of the common security situation among west African nations, French cooperation efforts, and in particular the EFS, have sought to prevent the crisis in the Sahel from "spilling over" into the coastal countries of west Africa. To achieve this, the three pillar states under the Yaoundé process for fighting crime at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, Senegal, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, have considerably stepped up the regional consultation process in order to identify ways to strengthen their border protection, with the assistance of French cooperation. A network of combat rescue experts has been trained up with assistance from the Val-de-Grâce military hospital in Paris. Training and exercises have been led between the armed forces involved in response to local and regional priorities, using a bottom-up approach.

Other countries are also present and active in Africa, even though their activities are less immediately visible. For example, India was already conducting military cooperation activities with a third of African countries in 2008.[31] Turkey, too, has emerged as a significant player. In addition to its involvement in Namibia, it is now building a base in Mogadishu for

30. Interview with a French general, Paris, October 2017.
31. A. Dutta, "Indo-African Defence Cooperation: Need for Enhanced Thrust", *Journal of Defense Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, winter, 2008, pp. 170-177; M. Kumar, "India and South Africa: Security and Military Cooperation", February 10, 2017, available at papers.ssrn.com; and *ADIT – The Bulletin*, "Defence on the Agenda during Modi's Kenya Visit", *defenceWeb* , July 26, 2016, available at www.defenceweb.co.za.

training several hundred Somalian troops.[32] The United Arab Emirates is conducting a highly active military cooperation policy with Somalia and Eritrea in connection with the war in Yemen, and it is also present in other east African countries.[33] Saudi Arabia is making no secret of its ambitions: having gifted Niger military trucks and equipment in March 2014, Riyadh has been building up its material assistance to Djibouti, where it seeks to establish a base.[34] Since the breakout of war in Yemen, the kingdom has been expanding its partnerships with African countries that are prepared to send men. Hence, an air exercise was held in Sudan, Africa's main contributor, while other countries such as Senegal, Mauritania, and Chad have been courted, although their participation on the ground has not as yet been confirmed.[35]

Israel, Germany, Belgium, Japan, Russia, Indonesia, Brazil, and Canada are all pursuing considerable levels of military cooperation in Africa. These countries' activities tend, however, to be focused in a particular region (the Sahel and Djibouti in the case of Germany, the Portuguese-speaking nations in the case of Brazil, and central Africa for Belgium) or on a certain type of cooperation (arms sales for Russia and peacekeeping, training in engineering, and maritime capability in the case of Japan[36]). Even North Korea has proposed military cooperation to a number of African countries since their independence—including Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, and Burundi. In 2016, however, Uganda, Botswana,

32. L. Touchard, "Namibie" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.,* p. 174; O. Nkala, "Turkey to Open Military Base in Mogadishu", *defenceWeb*, March 24, 2017, available at www.defenceweb.co.za; *Agence d'information d'Afrique Centrale*, "Somalia; la Turquie ouvre sa première base en Afrique", May 7, 2017, available at www.adiac-congo.com.

33. "The Gulf's 'little Sparta'. The Ambitious United Arab Emirates", *The Economist*, April 6, 2017, available at www.economist.com; A. Mello and M. Knights, "West of Suez for the United Arab Emirates", *War On the Rocks*, September 2, 2016, available at warontherocks.com.

34. Z. Moussa, "Coopération militaire Niger/Royaume d'Arabie Saoudite; 38 camions et d'importants matériels militaires au profit des Forces armées nigériennes", *Le Sahel*, available at lesahel.org; Assajog, "L'Arabie Saoudite fait don de 25 véhicules et d'effets militaires aux Gardes-côtes djiboutiens", available at www.assajog.com; M. A. Saleh, "Une base militaire saoudienne à Djibouti", Human Village 26, March, 2016, available at human-village.org.

35. "Sudan and Saudi Arabia Boost Ties with Joint Air Force Drill", *Daily Mail*, April 9, 2017; *RFI*, "Quels sont les pays africains engagés dans le conflit au Yémen ?" March 13, 2016, available at www.rfi.fr.

36. Japan has sent thirty-nine experts to these schools. In particular, it is participating in the UN Project for African Rapid Deployment Engineering Capabilities, which has allowed it to train engineering units in Africa. Furthermore, the Japanese are providing assistance to the Djiboutian coastguard. Source: C. Pajon, "Japan's Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach?" *Asie.Visions*, No. 93, Ifri, May, 2017, p. 24.

and Namibia broke off relations with Pyongyang, following a rapprochement with South Korea.[37]

There are other countries with a more marginal presence. Pakistan is one of the few states (along with Turkey and Russia) to have maintained military cooperation links with the Gambia under Yahya Jammeh.[38] Other examples include Jordan, which organized a counterterrorism exercise with Kenya in 2016,[39] and Ukraine, which provided Chad with a number of aircraft (ten Su-25s and one MiG-29) between 2008 and 2013.[40] Some countries, including those mentioned above, also make use of international organizations such as NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, and the African Union as channels for cooperation with African armed forces, in the knowledge that each of these organizations has its own cooperation strategy.[41]

Lastly, it is important to note the existence of military cooperation between African countries. Morocco and South Africa play a paramount role in this respect. The Meknes Royal Military Academy has been training Senegalese officers since 1969, and several African countries have since been sending personnel there for training, notably Côte d'Ivoire.[42] The Moroccan military is now prioritizing the fight against terrorism, and provided training for 400 Malian soldiers in desert combat tactics in 2014.[43] Other African Union countries have also been working together, in particular by welcoming African student interns into their institutions (see Appendix) and by consulting one another on strategic issues, especially where they are jointly fighting a common enemy, as in the case of the G5 Sahel countries and the Multinational Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram. Rwanda has plans to become a regional leader in officer

37. A. Berger, "Disrupting North Korea's Military Markets", *Survival*, Vol. 58, No. 3, 2016, pp. 101-130; A. Berger, "I. North Korea in the Global Arms Market", *Whitehall Papers*, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2015, pp. 12-151; S. Ramani, "North Korea's African Allies", *The Diplomat*, June 4, 2016, available at thediplomat.com. See also K. Sieff, "North Korea's Surprising, Lucrative Relationship with Africa", *The Washington Post*, July 10, 2017; the report by the panel of experts on violations of the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea, *Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874* (2009) in United Nations Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, April 27, 2017, S/2017/150, available at www.un.org; L. Touchard, "Namibie" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

38. L. Touchard, "Gambie" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

39. Press release by the President of Kenya, "Kenya, Jordan Aim for Stronger Military Ties", *Allafrica*, September 26, 2016, available at allafrica.com.

40. "Chad's Air Force Badly Damaged by Storm", *defenceWeb*, July 4, 2017, available at www.defenceweb.co.za.

41. Interview with a French officer, Paris, November 2015; M. Bromley, "The European Union" in O. Ismail and E. Sköns, *Security Activities of External Actors*, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-150; S. Wiharta, "The United Nations" in *Ibid*, pp. 151-173.

42. Comment by an Ivorian researcher, peer review, August 2017.

43. Y. Abourabi and J. Durand de Sanctis, "L'émergence de puissances africaines de sécurité; étude comparative", *Études de l'IRSEM*, No. 44, 2016, p. 51; Touchard, "Maroc" in *Forces armées africaines*, p. 520.

training.[44] Finally, it is interesting to note that the biggest partner in terms of trained personnel in Mali is Algeria.[45]

This proliferation of actors has resulted in coordination problems between the various stakeholder. There has already been an instance of the same training course being given twice in one month to the same group of African officers.[46] In this case, the apparent competition was unintentional. In other cases, however, there can be something of a competition to influence African armed forces, which may be desirable and useful for the African country concerned. One solution to these coordination problems would be for the beneficiary country to establish a centralized exchange framework so as to promote greater transparency, as Côte d'Ivoire's National Security Council has done. This sort of framework can prove difficult to set up, however, in the face of opposing interests.

The Diplomatic Framework

All cooperation is based on a diplomatic framework, which, in providing a legal basis, is essential to achieving a more successful policy. Sometimes, cooperative relationships may be limited to diplomatic exchanges. Even states that have only a limited level of cooperation with African countries can have diplomatic relations for defense purposes. In other words, they are able to organize meetings between defense ministers or chiefs of staff. This is the case, for example, between Indonesia and Senegal.[47] For some countries, such as China, diplomatic relations involve the presence of a significant number of defense attachés (it has twenty-four in Africa[48]) and the signing of military conventions or agreements, which can form part of a multisectoral "package",[49] such as in the case of South Africa, through a structured partnership based on bi-national defense committees.[50] Indeed, India and South Africa have a military cooperation agreement dating from

44. Comments by a British researcher, peer review, September 2017.
45. Comments by a Malian officer, peer review, August 2017.
46. Interview with a French soldier, September 2017, Paris.
47. "L'Indonésie offre une Coopération de Défense stratégique au Sénégal", *Nouvelles d'Indonésie,* No. 4, September, 2013, available at www.kemlu.go.id.
48. C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.,* p. 3
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 16-17 (agreement with Cape Verde), p. 19 (agreement with Mozambique). For Djibouti, see D. H. Shinn, "The Evolving China-Africa Security Relationship", conference headed "FOCAC: Creating a platform for Africa's sustainable development", Cape Town: Centre for Chinese Studies, Stellenbosch University, p. 7. On Mozambique, see "Mozambique and China Sign Military Cooperation Agreement", *Rádio Moçambique*, December 20, 2016, available at clubofmozambique.com.
50. The only other African country to have such a relationship with China is Egypt. C.H. Huang and O. Ismail, "China", *op. cit.*; D.H. Shinn, "Military and security relations", *op. cit.,* p. 169.

1995, with a joint committee on defense cooperation having been set up in August 1998.[51]

The defense agreements that France signed upon the independence of most of its former colonies are better known. These have generally involved a French guarantee in case of demonstrable external aggression. Technical military assistance and logistical support agreements have also been signed. Indeed, these sorts of agreements are more numerous—with notable examples including those with Chad in 1976[52] and Mali in 2014.[53] Several of these defense agreements have been renegotiated over the years, in particular since 2009.[54] Assistance clauses have been removed, notably in the agreements with Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, the CAR, and the Comoros. The agreement for Djibouti contains a guarantee that "the French Republic commits to contributing to the defense of the Republic of Djibouti's territorial integrity".[55] An agreement was also signed and ratified with Togo, although the text has not been made public.

China and France are not the only countries to sign such agreements. The US has signed agreements with partners ranging from "major non-NATO allies" to those of various statuses, including Djibouti, Uganda, and Rwanda.[56] In a further example, Côte d'Ivoire and Turkey have signed agreements on military cooperation (2015) and defense (2016), as has Niger with Saudi Arabia (2017).[57] For its part, the UK has had a defense cooperation agreement with Kenya since June 1964, as well as substantial cooperation agreements with South Africa.[58]

51. M. Kumar, "India and South Africa", *op. cit.*, pp. 2-3.

52. Decree No. 78-568 of April 21, 1978, on the publication of cooperation agreements between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Chad, signed in N'Djamena on March 6, June 19, and October 6 and 19, 1976, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr.

53. Decree No. 2016-1565 of November 21, 2016, on the publication of the defense cooperation treaty between the French Republic and the Republic of Mali, signed in Bamako on July 16, 2014, available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr.

54. Cameroon (May 21, 2009), Gabon (February 24, 2010), Central African Republic (April 8, 2010), Togo (March 13, 2009), Comoros (September 27, 2010), Djibouti (December 21, 2011), Côte d'Ivoire (January 26, 2012); Senegal (April 18, 2012); Mali (January 26, 2012).

55. Available in French at www.legifrance.gouv.fr. ("la République française s'engage à contribuer à la défense de l'intégrité territoriale de la République de Djibouti".)

56. Comment by a French researcher specializing in the United States, peer review, August 2017.

57. A. Adélé, "L'offensive de la Turquie en Afrique de l'Ouest", *Le Monde*, February 29, 2016; A. Y. Barma, "Niger-Arabie Saoudite; des pétrodollars contre des terres arables ?" January 13, 2017, available at afrique.latribune.fr

58. "UK-Kenya Conduct Joint Military Training", *British High Commission Nairobi*, October 11, 2016, available at www.gov.uk; S. Perlo-Freeman, "The United Kingdom" in O. Ismail and E. Sköns (ed.), *Security Activities of External Actors*, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

Training

The second aspect of military cooperation with African countries concerns training. This approach allows for the transfer of knowledge and advice; it enables two armed forces to come together and become interoperable; and it can influence a military's direction through officer training. All types of training are possible. One well-established and commonly practiced approach involves enrolling officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in education or training establishments, ranging from military schools to war colleges, and sometimes in a higher education institution (equivalent to France's CHEM, or Centre des hautes études militaires) when it comes to training future generals.[59] Some of these are specialist institutions, such as training schools for mine clearing.[60] Shorter operational training courses are also offered, for example on human rights or on improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This training can be given either individually or collectively. The European Union Training Missions or EUTMs in Mali, Somalia, and the CAR provide training in crisis management and recovery for groups set up along the lines of the joint tactical units known in French as GTIAs, or *groupements tactiques interarmes*. In Mali, for example, about seven hundred troops are participating. The Somalian military is being trained by a number of countries, including Turkey and the UAE.

Even those countries with limited involvement in Africa are enrolling students in their schools, including Pakistan, which trained around forty Nigerians in 2016.[61] It is the United States, however, that trains the biggest number of personnel by far, with 40,482 enrolled on its programs in sub-Saharan Africa in 2015.[62] Since it was established, the ACOTA program has

59. In particular those recently set up by a French firm in Côte d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (THEMIIS—The Management Institute for International Security).

60. For example, the Centre de prévention au déminage humanitaire or CPADD (the Center for Humanitarian Demining Training), an ENVR (regionally oriented national school) based at Ouidah in Benin, and the International Mine Action Training Centre, supported by the British Peace Support Team in Eastern Africa, as well as mine-clearing courses and equipment donations by China; Shinn, "Military and Security Relations", p. 178; C.H. Huang and O. Ismail, "China", *op. cit.,* p. 25; C.Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.*, p. 13.

61. "Nigeria Air Force expected deliveries first three JF-17 Thunders in 2016", *Defence Blog,* January 6, 2016, available at defence-blog.com. Nigeria has JF-17s and ten Super Mushshak trainer aircraft, and the Pakistan Armed Forces are helping to train Nigerian pilots. B. Khan, "Nigeria Looks to Pakistan for Training Support", *Quwa*, August 28, 2016, available at quwa.org.

62. "US Foreign Military Training Reached Record Highs in 2015", *Security Assistance Monitor*, May, 2017, p. 3. Several other different figures are available, depending on which programs are included in the calculations, according to a French researcher specializing in the United States, peer review, August 2017. The ACOTA program trained eight Malawian battalions, which equates to almost the entire military. Malawian forces also benefit from Canadian and Egyptian training, as well as the services of British military advisors. Touchard, *Forces armées africaines*, p. 154.

provided training for more than 77,000 African Blue Helmets.[63] The Americans are said to have trained more Burundian troops than the Burundian military itself, as well as half the Ugandan military and more than a third of the Rwandan military.[64]

The former colonial powers clearly play a major role in the provision of training. France trains around 30,000 African troops annually. In 2012, France trained 17,000 personnel through operational cooperation and 14,500 through the DCSD, including in ENVRs (regionally oriented national schools).[65] The UK accepts African officers into its schools, in particular from Kenya, South Africa, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, notably at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, which has had an active program since the 1960s and trained over five thousand Nigerian personnel between April 2015 and August 2016.[66] Since the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) was initially deployed in Ghana in 1976, it has provided a further mechanism for training armed forces in situ in various African countries.[67]

In 2006, it was noted that around 400 personnel were being trained annually at China's PLA National Defense University (NDU), hence, on average, "every African military has at least one colonel or brigadier general" who has been trained at China's NDU.[68] Further training has been carried out either in China or in African countries,[69] with at least thirty Angolans and thirty Nigerians being trained in China every year.[70] China is believed to have more than twenty military colleges and training units engaged in the training of foreign military personnel, the NDU being the most prestigious among them.[71] Furthermore, the number of African personnel enrolled at Russian defense institutions increased fivefold from 2000 to 2009, reaching a total of one thousand trainees.[72]

63. K.A. Harkness, "The US Military in Africa", *op. cit.,* p. 21.
64. K. Larsdotter, "US Military in Africa", *op. cit.,* p. 26.
65. J. Lorgeoux and J.-M. Bockel, "L'Afrique est notre avenir", Information Report No. 104, on behalf of the French Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces Committee, tabled on October 29, 2013, available at www.senat.fr.
66. UK Ministry of Defence and the Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Fallon MP, "UK Armed Forces Deployments Tackle Security Threats in Africa", August 5, 2016. See: www.gov.uk.
67. S. Perlo-Freeman, "The United Kingdom" in Ismail and Sköns, *Security Activities of External Actors*, p. 95.
68. L. Horta, "Defense and Military Education: A Dimension of Chinese Power", *Power and Interest News Report*, September 29, 2006, quoted by L. Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations. Implications for U.S. National Security", RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 56.
69. C.H. Huang and O. Ismail, "China", *op. cit.,* p. 24.
70. D. Shinn, "Military and Security Relations", pp. 165, 168.
71. Z. Shen, "On China's Military Diplomacy in Africa", *Global Review*, undated, available at www.siis.org.cn.
72. P. Holtom, "Russia" in O. Ismail and E. Sköns, *Security Activities of External Actors*, *op. cit.,* p. 75.

This is also where intra-African cooperation is at its most dynamic. We have been able to identify more than eighty African schools that are accepting trainees from other countries (see Appendix). Among these are fourteen ENVRs (regionally oriented national schools), which are a type of joint venture between France and the host country. At least half, and perhaps even three quarters, of promotions are given to those from other African countries. The ENVRs officially train 2,500 trainees every year.[73] China has set up a flight school in partnership with South Africa, the AVIC International Flight Training Academy, which has been training 400 pilots a year.[74] A further interesting example of intra-African cooperation is that of Chute Systems, a South African company founded in 2009 that runs a Namibian special forces and parachute training service.[75] As an illustration of the importance of inter-African training, it may be noted that Rwandan soldiers have been trained not only by the US, the UK, China, India, and Israel, but also by Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, and Botswana.[76]

Peacekeeping schools are proving highly popular among donors. There are twelve or more in sub-Saharan Africa (in Togo, Mali, Ghana, Rwanda, Nigeria, Benin, Tanzania, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and two in Ethiopia),[77] and several states with an involvement in Africa have set them up in their own countries: the United States,[78] China,[79] Russia,[80] Japan, Brazil, and India.[81] A considerable number of Africans come to train at these institutions, albeit this is often for short-term training programs lasting a week to a month, with the course content decided by donors in an ad hoc way, sometimes with mismatches between the course participants and the peacekeeping troops.[82] This copying of practice is frequent in military cooperation in Africa.

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73. P. Trimbach-Rognon, "France's Capacity-Building Activities in Africa and Prospects for Cooperation with Japan", presented at seminar entitled "La coopération franco-japonaise en Afrique; les dimensions économiques et sécuritaires", Ifri, July 10, 2016.
74. C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.,* p. 27.
75. L. Touchard, *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.,* p. 174.
76. M. Jowell, "Unintended Consequences", *op. cit.,* pp. 281-282.
77. We may mention, among other institutions, the Peace Support Training Centre in Ethiopia, the École de maintien de la paix (EMP) in Bamako, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, the Centre d'entraînement aux opérations de maintien de la paix (CEOMP) in Lomé, the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) in Kenya, and the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Zimbabwe. The twelve schools are supported by Japan. C. Pajon, "Japan's Security Policy in Africa", *op. cit.,* p. 24; M. Jowell, "Unintended Consequences", *op. cit.*
78. Peace Operations Training Institute, Williamsburg, available at reffop.francophonie.org.
79. C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.,* p. 5.
80. The Interior Ministry training center for Blue Helmets near Domodedovo. Holtom, "Russia", p. 76.
81. The Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK), set up in 2005. D. Chuter and F. Gaub, with contributions from T. Abdel-Baghy, A. Leboeuf, J. Luengo-Cabrera, and J. Spinoza, "Understanding African Armies", *ISSUE Report*, No. 27, April, 2016, p. 19.
82. M. Jowell, "Unintended Consequences", *op. cit.* The author himself worked at the Kenyan International Peace Support Training Center for several years.

Detachment of Military Advisors

Military cooperation can also be achieved through the detachment of "cooperants", technical advisors, or operational advisors. The differences between these three categories can sometimes be difficult to establish, with the exception of French cooperation. Technical and operational advisors are deployed by the staff of the armed forces, either directly or via the French Forces in Africa (in Gabon, Djibouti, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal) for short training courses on operational techniques in the case of technical advisors, or for operational instruction detachments (*DIO*s in French) alongside the military on the ground in the case of operational advisors. Cooperants, on the other hand, are deployed by the Security and Defense Cooperation Directorate (DCSD), and can serve as advisors to a defense minister, chief of staff, or training school.

It is not easy to calculate the number of military advisors deployed in any given country, as definitions vary. Numbers may be cited, however, for a particular country, for example the United States, which has been known to deploy advisors on an ad hoc basis, especially in support of specific operations. For instance, over three hundred advisors were deployed in combating Boko Haram,[83] and around a hundred in Uganda, the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan against the Lord's Resistance Army.[84] One advisor worked with Côte d'Ivoire's National Security Council in 2014, and another was placed with the Interior Minister, although no advisor was deployed directly within the armed forces.[85]

There were known to be 208 French cooperants in sub-Saharan Africa in 2016—the number having dropped nearly every year since the late 1990s. The numbers of technical and operational cooperants are not so well established, although we know that the French Elements deployed in Senegal primarily for military cooperation numbered 350.[86] The UK regularly deploys its soldiers and advisors, as was the case in the past in Sierra Leone, with the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), which was usually around a hundred strong in the 2000s. More

83. There were fewer than three hundred special forces troops in Cameroon and fewer than twenty in Niger in 2016; there were officially eighty advisors in Chad up until the end of 2014; the US intended to deploy advisors in Nigeria in 2016, but the deployment was not confirmed. R. Chersicla, "Staying Small to Stay Feasible: SOF Support in Countering Boko Haram", *Small Wars Journal*, July 22, 2016; L. Ploch Blanchard, "Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions", *CRS Report*, March 29, 2016, pp. 13-14.
84. A. Arieff, L. Ploch Blanchard, and T. F. Husted, "The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response", *CRS Report*, September 28, 2015, p. 10.
85. Interviews—American advisor, Abidjan, April 2014.
86. Available at www.defense.gouv.fr. French forces in Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire and Djibouti also have technical and operational cooperation as part of their mission.

recently, the UK has also been involved in Somalia[87] and Nigeria. In 2015, it announced the deployment of three hundred troops to Nigeria to train the Nigerian military in its fight against Boko Haram (the number had been 125 prior to then).[88] Indeed, the British military reformed its system of cooperation by establishing dedicated units to provide operational training for friendly and allied states. These battalions, organized according to the same model as the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) deployed by NATO in Afghanistan, essentially comprise officers, and specialize in a particular area.[89]

Number of French Defense and Security Advisors between 2006 and 2017



Source: Notice no. 142 from Christian Cambon and Leila Aïchi on behalf of the French Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces Committee, November 24, 2016.

It has been confirmed by a number of sources that China, too, deploys advisors,[90] although this practice is often connected either with detachments at African training schools or with training in the use and

87. It was planned for seventy British troops to provide long-term reinforcement for the UN support mission for AMISOM. British Ministry of Defence, "UK Armed Forces Deployments Tackle Security Threats in Africa", August 5, 2016, available at www.gov.uk.

88. E. McAskill, "UK to send more armed forces to Nigeria to advise on Boko Haram", *The Guardian*, December 21, 2015, available at www.theguardian.com.

89. According to a French officer taking part in a peer review.

90. According to C.-H. Huang and O. Ismail, detachments of Chinese instructors attended military staff colleges in Zimbabwe and Guinea. Huang and Ismail, "China"; furthermore, the Chinese army was reported to have an unspecified number of military personnel among the Tanzanian military, which would have made the detachment of a defense attaché unnecessary—in C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.,* p. 4. According to D. H. Shinn, twenty-one Chinese experts were deployed in Nigeria to train the Nigerian armed forces in the use of military hardware donated by China; Zambia regularly takes on Chinese military doctors. D.H. Shinn, "Military and Security Relations", *op. cit.,* pp. 168, 173, 175.

maintenance of the equipment that the Chinese have provided.[91] Other countries also send advisors and trainers to sub-Saharan Africa. India has sent twenty-five instructors to Lesotho, for example.[92] Furthermore, following the example of Zimbabwe, which sent military instructors to Guinea-Bissau to provide logistics training, various trainers have been sent between African countries.[93] A further major tool of cooperation, in addition to these deployments of instructors and advisors, involves the organization of joint exercises.

Joint Exercises

The carrying out of exercises represents an essential tool of military cooperation, as it fosters the habit of joint working on the ground and, in some cases, facilitates "real size training" among the units concerned. Any training that aims to make a long-lasting impact on personnel contains an element of exercises. This was the case, for instance, with training provided by EUTM (European Union Training Mission) Mali, at least in the earlier phases of its mission, which involved troops undertaking exercises to test the knowledge they had acquired. The human rights aspect was put to the test in role-play exercises involving the capture of prisoners, to see whether the Malian soldiers respected the theory-based instruction they had received on the correct behavior to adopt with prisoners.[94]

In addition to these one-off exercises, which may be used to complete a specific training program, there are also multinational exercises, or "major maneuvers", bringing together units from several armed forces with a view to improving their interoperability. Whereas France's Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity program (known as RECAMP in French) has included such exercises (including those organized by Euro-RECAMP in 2010 under the AMANI Africa training cycle), it is the United States that is proving to be most adept at the systematic organization of these exercises, which are held in Africa regularly. In 2017, the Flintlock exercise engaged around two thousand personnel from twenty countries over a three-week period.[95] The UK, too,

91. This is reported, at least, by Zanardi regarding the deployment of teams of between three and ten Chinese military instructors in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Gabon. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", pp. 14, 20, 23; C. Enuka, "China's military presence in Africa", *op. cit.,* p. 25.
92. India is hosting thirty-five troops from the Lesotho Defense Force at its training schools. The force also receives training from South Africa and Botswana. L. Touchard, "Lesotho" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.,* p. 144.
93. L. Touchard, "Zimbabwe" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.,* p. 195.
94. Interview with former EUTM Mali human rights advisor, Paris, 2016.
95. AFRICOM is understood to have organized ten exercises in Africa in 2013. Larsdotter, "US Military in Africa", p. 26; Major A. Hammari, "International Cooperation at U.S. Command", June 15, 2015, available at www.offiziere.ch.

organizes ad hoc exercises in Sierra Leone and Kenya, which are also used for training British troops.[96] The exercises organized by France are less ambitious in scope, but they are more horizontal and flexible in nature, particularly in the case of those undertaken with Djibouti, which also involve US personnel if desired.[97] The Chinese appear to have mainly used this approach in the case of maritime exercises (albeit not exclusively), through which they provide training for navies that have benefited from Chinese donations or sales of ships, thus incentivizing them to make further purchases of vessels.[98] Seven of the nine major multinational exercises that were held in sub-Saharan Africa in 2016 (including three naval exercises) were organized by the United States, with one by France, and one by the East African Community.[99]

Material Support

It may at first seem ridiculous to provide military training without weapons, yet this is what the European Union and some individual European countries did with limited budgets or if legal restrictions prevented them from selling or providing weapons to African armed forces. For instance, when the UK intervened in Sierra Leone and provided its military with training, it was able to supply troops with socks and uniforms, but not weapons. China therefore ended up providing small arms to the Sierra Leonean army.[100] The same issue arises in the case of EUTM Mali. The countries participating in the EU's Mali mission have each been providing their own equipment, but without ensuring their mutual compatibility, which has given rise to serious interoperability problems, especially in the crucial area of communications.[101] The same goes for EUTM CAR, which has been training the future battalions of the Central African Republic's armed forces but without being able to provide them with equipment. France, too, has been experiencing difficulties in providing equipment and weapons, even when supplying used equipment, as its stocks are now considerably depleted compared with when the

96. A joint exercise involving Kenyan and British troops was organized for the first time for five years in Kenya in 2016. British High Commission Nairobi, "UK-Kenya Conduct Joint Military Training", October 11, 2016, available at www.gov.uk.
97. Comment by a French officer participating in the peer review, August 2017.
98. The Chinese have at the very least organized exercises with four countries, naval exercises with South Africa in 2008, with Nigeria in 2012 and/or 2014, and with Tanzania (the Beyond 2014 exercises), as well as a humanitarian exercise, Operation Peace Angel, with Gabon in 2009. Huang and Ismail, "China", p. 24; C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.*, p. 14; L. Thrall, *China's Expanding African Relations, Implications for U.S. National Security*, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2015, p. 56.
99. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2017*, London: Routledge, p. 552.
100. Interview with British general, London, 2004.
101. Interview with French officer, Eurosatory, June 2016.

RECAMP program was set up in 1997, at a time when France was able to pass on large quantities of equipment surplus resulting from its military reform at the time – the end of conscription resulting in large surplus.

In this context, it is China that has frequently supplied and equipped African armed forces, including that of Sierra Leone, not just with weapons and other equipment, but also with infrastructure (including barracks) via grants or loans.[102] China has even offered to help some states to develop their defense industries, concentrating on small arms, but also through larger projects, as has been the case with Sudan, Uganda, Madagascar, and Nigeria.[103]

Grants and sales of vehicles, planes, drones, and ships are made by a wider range of actors, among them Europeans, especially for dual-use equipment.[104] Figures for arms sales to Africa, including those verified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), show that, between 2011 and 2015, the top exporting country was Russia (34 percent), followed by China (13 percent), France (13 percent), and the United States (11 percent).[105] Between 2012 and 2016, the top three arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa were Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia.[106]

Financial Assistance

States providing military cooperation to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa can also do so through the provision of budgetary assistance or loans, which allows salaries to be paid, infrastructure to be funded and, in some cases, armored vehicles, ships, drones, and planes to be purchased. Morocco apparently offered financial assistance to Côte d'Ivoire to help it pay the bonuses that were promised in the wake of mutinies that took place in January, February, and May 2017.[107] Following its intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000, Britain provided the country with budgetary assistance to allow it to pay the wages of its security sector personnel, and even organized "payment parades" so it could deliver soldiers their pay by

102. D.H. Shinn, "Military and Security Relations", *op. cit.,* p. 170.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 171; C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.,* pp. 11-13.
104. See, for example, the article "Senegal has Received New Armoured Vehicles from China", *defenceWeb*, April 8, 2016, available at www.defenceweb.co.za. As well as Chinese vehicles, the article also mentions vehicles from France, Israel, and Brazil. The maintenance challenges posed by this multiplicity of platforms are easy to imagine.
105. These figures do not take small arms into account. Source: SIPRI, 2016, cited by C. Rainfroy, "Marché de l'armement en Afrique; qui achète quoi et à qui ?" *Jeune Afrique*, February 26, 2016, available at www.jeuneafrique.com.
106. "Increase in Arms Transfers Driven by Demand in the Middle East and Asia, says SIPRI", available at www.sipri.org.
107. Interview with a French officer, Paris, June 2017.

hand, while performing a roll call.[108] Under François Bozizé, the Central African Republic was largely dependent on external assistance to pay its civil servants, and received a grant from the EU to fund retiring soldiers and police officers.[109] Such types of funding are widely used and considerable in scale, certainly for Africa's most fragile armed forces, as history has shown that a military left unpaid always ends up turning on the population for compensation.

China has made loans to African countries on several occasions so that they could purchase equipment or build up their military infrastructure. Sometimes, these loans have funded operations through regional initiatives such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). For example, in 2010, Beijing granted Mauritania $1.5 million to re-equip engineering units. It also loaned $30 million to Ghana for setting up a communications system for its security forces.[110] In accordance with one particular practice that has been adopted by certain Western companies in training an African contingent for peacekeeping duties, the contingent's equipment purchases, which are required in order for it to obtain UN verification, are made in advance by the company or companies, which reimburse themselves—at least in theory—as soon as the UN allowances for funding the contingents are paid out.[111] It should be emphasized that the financial assistance provided by the United States and China in particular is often tied: in other words, it is intended to benefit the companies from the country providing it. Hardly ever, therefore, is assistance provided selflessly.

This overview of the practices and the stakeholders involved in military cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa has revealed both the proliferation of initiatives and the important role of cooperation between the different entities operating in sub-Saharan Africa.[112] However, this does not in itself allow us to evaluate the effects and impacts of these practices on Africa's armed forces. Furthermore, there is a marked gap between the multiplicity of means deployed and the state of most African forces, which are still beset by a series of problems.

108. A. Leboeuf, *La réforme du secteur de sécurité en Sierra Leone*, PhD in political science, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, January 2013, p. 336.
109. F. Koursany, "Centrafrique; un directeur de publication en prison", *Journal de Bangui*, May 30, 2011, available at www.journaldebangui.com.
110. C.H. Huang and O. Ismail, "China", *op. cit.,* p. 25. For further examples of such funding, see *Ibid.*, p. 25. The authors point out that it is Chinese companies that have benefited from these contracts.
111. Interview with company representatives, Shield Africa, Abidjan, February 2017.
112. M. Duchâtel, R. Gowan, and M. Lafont-Rapnouil, "Into Africa: China's Global Security", *European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief*, June 2016, p. 11.

African Armed Forces and Military Cooperation

Like the nations where they are based, African armed forces are highly diverse.[113] Although their manpower and budgets are extremely limited compared with armed forces in the rest of the world, some forces, such as those of Ghana[114] and Senegal, are renowned for their efficiency and effectiveness. In general, African forces are better able to participate in peace operations and are more suited to rapid deployment than was the case fifteen years ago, when conditions were considerably more difficult. Nevertheless, most of them are still "patchwork" armed forces, often sorely lacking in professionalism. International military cooperation initiatives can certainly contribute toward improving them, but they will always come up against the reality on the ground, which considerably limits their scope for maneuver and their results.

"Patchwork" Militaries

"Patchwork" is a description often given to African forces, because of the successive layers they have to build up as the result of mutinies, disarmament processes, demobilizations, rehabilitations, and political decisions to add new military divisions or favor certain existing ones in order to improve control over the armed forces as a whole. Military cooperation bears its own share of the responsibility for creating this heterogeneity through exposing what is a single institution to several different military cultures and approaches to training, with a military's officers having received their training from multiple countries. This can exacerbate tensions within a military by favoring one component part over another. This cultural patchwork is exacerbated further by a disparity in equipment, with incompatible communication systems and higher maintenance costs due to the coexistence of multiple and varied weapons systems, for instance.

The Ivorian military is certainly among Africa's most composite in nature. Since the 1990 mutiny, which integrated personnel from various

113. D. Chuter and F. Gaub, with contributions from Abdel-Baghy et al., "Understanding African Armies", pp. 14-15.
114. L. Touchard, "Ghana" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233.

different categories of military service into the armed force, a number of waves of new recruits, who have been favorable to one president or another, have joined Côte d'Ivoire's military. Instead of holding four or five-year contracts, which would let the military refresh its personnel, these recruits were offered retirement at fifty-five, which made a nonsense of the military's age structure.[115] One of the most recent new intakes comprised the 8,400 former members of the Forces Nouvelles, which held the north of Côte d'Ivoire until 2011. As well as this, there are tensions in the country that are common among African armed forces, between the better trained and equipped elite corps and the main body of soldiers, who are substantially less well provided for.[116]

Mali's military contains similar divisions, in particular between its "red berets" and "green berets", which clashed in 2012, this being a major factor in the military's rout at the hands of Tuareg and jihadist rebels.[117] Furthermore, given the historical background of the Malian military, which was long under Soviet influence, officers have traditionally been over-represented, whereas there is an insufficient number of NCOs.[118] The Congolese (DRC) military also contains highly diverse elements, with an elite corps, a number of units led by poorly trained generals, and its highly unequal mixture of troops following the reintegration of various groups of fighters back into the military.[119] The military of Burkina Faso was split into two after the fall of President Blaise Compaoré, with those still faithful to the former president (the Regiment of Presidential Security) on the one hand, and supporters of the transition on the other.[120]

Such divisions may be found in several of the armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa. Even when African forces take more control of their human resources, they still have to address acute inequalities between the elite forces and the rest. The Cameroonian military is characterized by differing competences between the Brigade d'intervention rapide (BIR) and the less well-trained units. Similarly, in Chad, there are flagrant inequalities between the country's state security service directorate (DGSSIE), being

115. M. Fofana, "Informalité et hybridité au sein des forces de défense et de sécurité de Côte d'Ivoire", manuscript provided to the author, March 2017.
116. A. Leboeuf, "La réforme du secteur de sécurité à l'ivoirienne", *Étude de l'Ifri*, March 2016; A. Leboeuf, "Les mutineries de janvier 2017 en Côte d'Ivoire: scénarios & options", *Ultima Ratio* blog, February 8, 2017, available at ultimaratio-blog.org.
117. B. Ahmed, "Mali: les dessous d'un contre-coup d'État manqué", *Jeune Afrique*, May 7, 2012; M.-A. Boisvert, "2012: l'étrange défaite de l'armée malienne", *Ultima Ratio* blog, January 18, 2017, available at ultimaratio-blog.org.
118. Contribution by a researcher as part of the peer review process, July 2017.
119. G. Berghezan, "Armed Forces of the DRC: institutionalized chaos?" *GRIP Analysis Note* (Group for Research and Information on Peace and security), January 9, 2014.
120. L. Touchard, "Burkina Faso" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 208.

the clan-based unit that acts as a spearhead for the rule of Idriss Déby, and the rest of the Chadian National Armed Forces. By favoring elite units, military assistance can end up exacerbating divisions between different units, often with the blessing of the rulers, who value the creation or formation of a praetorian-type unit.

A further problem that almost all armed forces face is the emergence of a strong dependence on the various sorts of military cooperation that they are offered. A small military such as that of Benin does not find it easy to turn down the few places offered to it in French, American, or Chinese institutions, even if these offers do not correspond with its requirements. Moreover, when the officers return, they have to readapt to their home military quickly. If they fail to do so, they can experience difficulty reintegrating, as those personnel who return from abroad are sometimes unfavorably regarded by those in the same organization.[121]

The return to one's home country can sometimes entail a culture shock between irreconcilably different military cultures, as may be the case, for instance, between NATO and Chinese planning cultures, which are not readily compatible.[122] Benin seems to be the sole country to have put in place a system allowing young officers to readjust upon their return from foreign institutions. They are then "retrained" for a year, alongside their colleagues who had received their training in Benin in the traditional manner.[123] The Somalian military has had to face this problem on a bigger scale, as its troops have received training from AMISOM, the EU, the US, the UK, the UAE, and Turkey. In the summer of 2017, it announced the implementation of an integration program, to be conducted by a specially established National Integration Commission.[124] Despite the degree of similarity and the extent of copying between different countries' cultures of war, which gives rise to something of a shared international "military field", some features remain distinct, even between the West and Asia. These differences need to be addressed by the smaller African countries in

121. An African officer who had been trained at France's École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr explained that he was reprimanded upon returning to his home country on the basis that he was not able to salute correctly—as he now saluted in the French style, rather than in that of his own country's military. This may appear a mere anecdotal example, but numerous African officers have spoken of the problems they have encountered in trying to readapt, with their colleagues who have remained in the home country not always appreciating the contributions of those who have been away and who now seek to improve their home military's ways of doing things, as they have supposedly forgotten how their country works. Interviews with several African officers, Paris, 2015-2017.

122. Interview with an African officer, FICA, Paris, June 2017.

123. Interviews with several African officers, Paris, 2015-2017.

124. "State Forces to be Integrated into National Army and Police in 3 Months", *Goobjoog News*, April 20, 2017, available at goobjoog.com.

particular if they seek to gain the maximum benefit from military cooperation.

We should note, moreover, the marked hierarchies that divide officers in the same country if they have been trained at different establishments. Those among Benin's top-ranking officers with a Soviet military culture (who were trained in the USSR) have now been replaced by officers with a French military culture.[125] In the past, these hierarchies were unfavorable for China, which did not receive the best officers. Nevertheless, some indicators suggest that Chinese training, delivered for many years using poor French translations of the original instructions in Mandarin, have now improved in quality.[126] Those Chinese officers who have learned French apparently attend the same courses and are thus able to socialize more widely with their African partners.[127] If this development is confirmed, it is likely that future training courses in China will attract more African officers, including the best performing, which will have a concrete effect on the leadership of African armed forces in the years to come.[128]

A Matter of Professionalization

Since the publication of Samuel Huntington's work on civil-military relations, it has become customary to consider professionalization as a normal feature of any military that is controlled in an "objective" manner through politics.[129] Professional armed forces are rare in sub-Saharan Africa, however. Indeed, they are often governed in a way that is far removed from normal Western criteria, and are often marked by patrimonialism, corruption,[130] and practices stemming from witchcraft.

125. Interview with an African officer, Paris, 2016.
126. For a critique of the training of African officers in China, see C. Zanardi, "Assessing the Chinese Contribution", *op. cit.*, p. 12.
127. Interview with a French officer, Paris, 2016. This rumor was confirmed by two officers participating in the peer review, summer, 2017.
128. It is interesting that this rumor is not causing concern in either Paris or London, where interviewees expressed a certain degree of satisfaction with the idea that China was making a significant contribution to the training of senior African officers. Interviews, Paris and London, summer 2016. Note that, at the start of the 2000s, following the UK's intervention, those officers who were causing the British problems were simply sent to China for training to get them out of the way for a while. Interview with a British officer, London, 2003.
129. S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957.
130. For examples of such practices, especially those linked to arms sales, see L. Touchard, *Forces armées africaines*: "Malawi", pp. 155-156, "Mozambique", pp. 164-165, and "Guinée-Conakry", *op. cit.*, p. 241. Laurent Touchard highlights in particular the negative consequences of this corruption, which reduces the available resources for equipping armed forces and limits operational capacity, although he also considers that practices of patronage can have a positive effect by making a highly bureaucratic and centralized decision-making process more "fluid".

Here, we understand "professionalization" as a set of civil-military relationships whereby the military apparatus enjoys autonomy from the state's political structures, while at the same time being under their control. The military respects the political authority, because it is effective and independent, is cognizant of its missions, and has the means at its disposal to carry them out. Furthermore, control at the political level does not interfere with the armed forces' meritocratic system, for instance by favoring the recruitment of certain preferred personnel. This is understood as *objective* control of the military, as opposed to the *subjective* control of the military to which politicians tend to resort in instances where the armed forces do not have a professional status.

The less professional armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa recruit according to ethnic or clan-based criteria, which results in stalled careers, and hence frustration, for those who do not belong to the favored social group.[131] Posts can be sold to the highest bidder or allocated to those with the best connections. There are no arrangements for retirement as such, and there is no control over the hierarchy of ranks.[132] The payments owed are not made regularly. In this context, populations are subject to plunder and racketeering at the hands of the military, mutinies are a frequent occurrence, and there can sometimes be coups d'état.[133] This was the situation with the military in Sierra Leone prior to the security sector reform instigated by the British in May 2000. Up until then, the country's troops had been known as *sobels*: soldiers by day, rebels by night. Most significantly, the functioning chains of command (where they do operate) are not the official chains of command. This was true of the Malian armed forces in 2012, and is still largely the case in the Congolese (DRC) military, as well as being a feature of a section of the Ivorian military.

Several of these elements will even apply to the best-trained armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa, although they will also have features that make them more professional—or at least appear so. The Nigerian military, for example, is often held up as being one of the best in Africa, given its large size and its modern equipment. In April 2014, however, when the Chibok schoolgirls were kidnapped by Boko Haram, Nigeria's military still had problems of outstanding payments, pitifully poor rations and "Spartan

131. M. Fontrier, "Des armées africaines; comment et pour quoi faire ?" *Outre-Terre*, No. 11, 2005/2, p. 353. This was the case in the Gambian military under Yahya Jammeh, for example, especially in the national guard. See Touchard, "Gambie" in *Forces armées africaines*, p. 227.

132. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, one fifth of personnel are officers. L. Touchard, "Malawi" in *Forces armées africaines*, *op. cit.,* p. 154. In Guinea, half of the armed forces consists of officers. Touchard, "Guinée-Conakry" *in Forces armées africaines*, p. 241.

133. C. Thiriot, "La place des militaires dans les régimes post-transition d'Afrique subsaharienne; la difficile re-sectorisation", *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, Vol. 15, 2008/1, pp. 15-34.

living conditions", leading the soldiers from one barracks in Maiduguri to mutiny twice, with shots being fired at a general's car.[134] Deploying ill-equipped, poorly trained, unpaid regional forces who resort to plundering the local population in order to feed themselves is rarely an effective conflict solution, as evidenced by Nigerian, Congolese, and then Pan-African interventions in Chad (involving Senegalese, Zairian, and Nigerian troops) between 1979 and 1982, which in any case failed to prevent Hissène Habré from taking power.[135]

Ostensibly, this lack of professionalism justifies the use of military cooperation to engender it. However, mere awareness of a military's ethnic or clan-based characteristics is not necessarily sufficient to find solutions to rebalance the situation. In the example of EUTM Somalia, the mission trained officers according to a non-clan-based system so as to avoid any discrimination. This process gave rise to severe problems, however, because the officers and troops from a clan judged as having superior status refused to obey their superior officers drawn from clans viewed as inferior. Eventually, the EUTM had to review clan representation among the officer corps in order for them to be obeyed.[136] The efforts undertaken in Rwanda to promote a Hutufication of the military—except for senior officers[137]—demonstrate how firm political will can result in an ethnic or clan-based rebalancing within a military. This should properly be regarded as a political procedure, however, not a mere technical operation in HR.

Technical cooperation can contribute a great deal to professionalization, whether through managing the competitive process for promotion to officer posts, through supporting a meritocracy in recruitment, or through the use of bank accounts for wages (which may not prevent corruption, but it at least reduces the scope for delays in payment). However, even in Botswana, whose military is known for its professionalism, patronage can still be found in the allocation of training places abroad. In Zimbabwe, Congolese mining concessions have been allocated to the most dedicated officers. Ethnic favoritism and co-option are practiced in Kenya, and tensions between the different forces are maintained. Indeed, these three phenomena offer ways for the civil

134. M. Wrong, "Why Are Africa's Militaries So Disappointingly Bad?" *Foreign Policy*, June 6, 2014. For an in-depth analysis of the state of the Nigerian military, see International Crisis Group, "Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform", *Africa Report*, No. 237, June 6, 2016.

135. Fontrier, "Des armées africaines", p. 367.

136. Interview with a European soldier who had participated in EUTM Somalia. See also C. Robinson, "The Somali National Army", *Brief for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group,* United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, January 31, 2015, pp. 6-7.

137. M. Jowell, "Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)", *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2014, pp. 279-280.

authorities to maintain control of the military.[138] In curbing such practices, military cooperation should help the political authorities to develop new approaches to secure their control over the military.

One final issue needs to be addressed, as it tends to raise a significant level of criticism in the West: namely, the question of respect for human rights. Training programs led by Western countries and organizations often comprise an element relating to human rights, and even *gender* in the case of the UN. However, practice on the ground often demonstrates the limited utility of these structures, even where they do exist. Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, attracted criticism from human rights organizations for their approach to fighting Boko Haram.[139] Nevertheless, in some countries, such efforts to raise human rights awareness among African armed forces are bearing fruit, demonstrating that such initiatives can work. In Sierra Leone, a conversation on human rights has been instigated, notably with the imposition of effective sanctions against those in the security forces who fail to respect them.

Behaviors have evolved accordingly, and the incidence of abuse has decreased. In the DRC, the conviction of eight Congolese soldiers for acts of violence against civilians in Kasai province sends a positive signal for the country.[140] As was the case with EUTM Mali, if specific exercises are put in place that allow the rules that have been learned in courses to be implemented operationally, this can help cut the incidence of violence against civilians and breaches of the law of armed conflict. Courses must be complemented by an awareness of the reality on the ground, particularly in relation to gender in those countries where family customs have remained highly conservative, such as Chad, Mali, and Niger, where it is problematic to ask the military to adopt what would amount to a revolutionary attitude regarding the position of women.[141]

As a result of the Leahy Law, the United States is prohibited from providing military assistance to countries that fail to respect human rights, although the application of the law is anything but systematic, as it does not prevent the US from providing such assistance to 120 countries in the

138. M. Jowell, "Cohesion through Socialization", *op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.
139. "Nigeria: New President Should Address Abuses—Act Boldly on Violence, Corruption, and Lack of Accountability", *Human Rights Watch*, May 26, 2015; "Right Cause, Wrong Means: Human Rights Violated and Justice Denied in Cameroon's Fight Against Boko Haram", *Amnesty International*, 2016.
140. "Militaires condamnés pour un massacre au Kasaï", *Tribune de Genève,* July 6, 2017, available at www.tdg.ch.
141. Attempts to modify family laws in these three countries triggered such a response that the projects concerned were abandoned by the authorities. For a critique of the role of human rights training in military cooperation, see D. Chuter, "African Solutions to Western Problems: Western-Sponsored Training Programmes for African Militaries – Impact on Peace and Democratic Consolidation" in D. J. Francis (ed.), *African Peace Militaries: War, Peace and Democratic Governance*, London: Routledge, 2017.

world.[142] Some battalions that were trained by the United States were later found guilty of committing violence against civilians. For example, the DRC's 391st Commando Battalion was implicated in the rape of 130 women and minors in the course of operations against the March 23 Movement (M23) in 2012,[143] and Cameroon's Brigade d'intervention rapide was accused by Amnesty International of human rights violations.[144] A university study carried out by Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley showed that, of the successful coups d'état that took place between 1970 and 2009, two thirds were led by troops who had been trained under the American IMET program—which raises questions about the type of training they received.[145] It is reasonable to assume that similar significant problems affect other countries providing military cooperation to sub-Saharan African nations, even if they are less well documented.

142. R. Kleinfeld, "Rethinking US Security Assistance beyond the Leahy Law", *Just Security*, June 28, 2017, www.justsecurity.org; D. Gillison, N. Turse, and M. Syed, "The Network: Leaked Data Reveals how the U.S. Trains Vast Numbers of Foreign Soldiers and Police with Little Oversight", *The Intercept*, July 13, 2016, available at theintercept.com. According to this article, it is technically impossible to abide by the law, given the paucity of resources set aside for the number of cases to be processed annually (there being 191,899 cases in 2015).

143. K. Larsdotter, "US Military in Africa", *op. cit.*, p. 29.

144. J. Thompson, "U.S. Supported Cameroonian Military Unit Accused of Abuse", *Security Assistance Monitor*, January 8, 2016, available at www.securityassistance.org.

145. J. Dillon Savage and J. D. Caverley, "When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups", *Journal of Peace Research*, 2017, quoted in D. Trilling, "U.S.-Trained Militaries More Likely to Overthrow their Governments", *Journalist's Resource*, August 30, 2017, available at journalistsresource.org.

How to Assess Cooperation?

The qualities of individual advisors can be key to determining the effectiveness of training and, to an extent, the reforms that are implemented by African armed forces. Some advisors will have a keen understanding of the armed forces they are working with—but others do not. There are many who cite the frustrating, difficult nature of their work, and the lack of a sense of achievement.[146] Such frustrations are not new. They were prevalent as far back as the 1960s, for example when the Cubans tried to train Simba rebels in what was then Congo-Léopoldville. Che Guevara noted that the "traits" of the Simbas' military culture made "the soldier of the Congolese revolution the poorest example of a fighter that [he had] ever come across".[147] At the same time, Edward Rose, Britain's ambassador in Léopoldville, commented that "the rebels seem to be inspired more by primitive African superstition than by Comrade Mao's experiences and directives"[148] and that "128 men can't change the characteristics of an African country like the Congo. Che did everything he could".[149]

Substitutes or Advisors?

One explanation of these frustrations may lie in the shift from cooperation through substitution, where a foreign officer will replace an African officer, to a form of cooperation based on advice or appropriation, where the foreign officers do not take decisions but limit themselves to an advisory role. In the case of France, this transition dates from the 1990s. One cooperant makes the following assessment:

> It's hard when you're not doing a substitution. You suggest something, but things get snarled up. They take it on either

146. This section draws in particular on our presentation at a colloquium entitled "Les nouveaux visages des armées africaines" / "The Changing Character of Africa's Armed Forces", at the Institut de recherche stratégique de l'École militaire (IRSEM), October 5 and 6, 2016, and also on an interview granted to H. Weill: "Afrique; Nous sommes passés d'une coopération militaire de substitution à une coopération de conseil", Thursday, October 6, 2016, available at http://ainsi-va-lemonde.

147. E. "Che" Guevara, *The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo*, New York: Grove Press, 1999, p. 227, quoted in S. Fitzsimmons, *Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 51.

148. Quoted in P. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria*, Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 2002, p. 64, quoted in Fitzsimmons, *Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts*, p. 50-51.

149. V. Dreke, *From the Escambray to the Congo: In the Whirlwind of the Cuban Revolution*, New York: Pathfinder Press, 2000, quoted in Fitzsimmons, *Mercenaries in Asymmetric Conflicts*, *op. cit.*, pp. 136, 51.

> partly (by anything between 5 and 90 percent) or not at all. There's no way to apply any pressure. [As] cooperation isn't about substitution any more, that means there are no more levers. There are underground forces we don't get, like family, ethnicity, kinship, and so on. You might have the perfect technical solution, but [that's not enough].

Yet if this is the issue, how can we explain the frustration of British officers in Sierra Leone in the early 2000s, who all had a substitution role at the start of the reforms? The difficulties that some cooperants have encountered in trying to "influence" their African partners cannot simply be explained by their position as advisors, despite what may often be said on the matter.

A Reduction in Headcount

One important and complementary factor in the case of France is the reduced number of personnel. Whereas, some years ago, three hundred military cooperants worked in Côte d'Ivoire, all with substitution roles, there are now only around a dozen advisors—although this is still a significant figure given the low overall number of personnel involved in French military cooperation. Headcount is not a factor in explaining the frustrations of British troops in Sierra Leone, however, as there was a relatively high number of military cooperants there (a hundred by the end of the war), and they had strong executive authority during the early years. The British forces explained that their influence was still limited, however, and that they were unable to implement all the reforms that they judged essential, particularly in procurement, in spite of their significant—albeit temporary—control over Sierra Leonean military structures. Despite the practice of substitution and despite the numbers, the Sierra Leoneans would still find means to maintain control, especially by using organizational structures to keep "their" men involved in the decision-making chain. British cooperants may well have officially been taking the decisions, but all they could do was try and influence systems whose customs, practices, and ties worked against hierarchical control.[150]

Clear Results—But Not as Expected

A further set of explanations for the frustrations that were experienced points to the mismatch between the stated ambitions of military cooperation and the structural difficulties linked to the reality of the armed forces concerned and their patchwork, non-professional nature. Let us

150. A. Leboeuf, *La réforme du secteur de sécurité en Sierra Leone, op. cit.*

consider, for instance, a cooperant faced with the following dilemma. The general he is advising sets him a mission. He sets about carrying it out, but realizes that the general's staff has rejected the plan, due to an ineffective chain of command. What should he do? If he ignores the problem and simply obeys the general, his mission will fail. How can he try and convince the staff, who should in theory obey the general and follow his plan without contesting it?

Given the independence and power of the African organizations concerned, which can either take on or decline foreign support, the influence of cooperants may often be clear, yet it is sometimes unexpected or paradoxical. Let us first of all recall some successes of cooperation, which can occasionally be surprising in the context of strong resistance on the part of the organization being reformed. Appropriation and change often go through complex routes. In the words of the Sierra Leonean diviners studied by Rosalind Shaw, "it's ours because we borrowed it".[151] It seems that military cooperation had a positive impact on the response of the Forces républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) in Grand-Bassam, in bolstering the preparations of special forces for heading off a potential terrorist attack.

African officers who have been consulted on the matter have emphasized the usefulness of foreign advisors in providing a parallel network, linking up those structures that operate in a silo and do not communicate with one another. The role of French cooperation in this regard has been welcomed among the G5-Sahel countries and in the context of the multinational efforts against Boko Haram. The French play an essentially neutral interface role between armed forces that do not regularly work together or even communicate with one another. One particular way of providing influence is through advisors and cooperants providing assistance in the drawing up of written material. One cooperant commented:

> You would sometimes get the impression they weren't listening to you, but then nine months later you read what you'd said in their papers.

There have been many instances, in Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali, of material largely written by French or British officers being approved and passed off as having been produced by the local military—who have been most proud to have formulated these texts. Other material produced by foreign advisors, on the other hand, might be dismissed or

151. R. Shaw, *Memories of the Slave Trade, Ritual and the Historical Imagination in Sierra Leone*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 70.

simply forgotten about. The initial French draft white paper for Côte d'Ivoire was never completed. The trend of appropriation goes far beyond a copy-and-paste approach, with the advice offered being tailored to the realities on the ground by the local forces so as to change it and make it their own.

Better Preparation for Military Advisors

In performing a sort of triage of the external advice offered, the phenomenon of local appropriation partly explains how some advice is taken into account, while other counsel is quickly forgotten. A further factor that can help explain these differences lies in the quality of the advice provided. To be an advisor is one thing; to wield influence is quite another. Each cooperant has their own individual attributes, which need to be developed and consolidated through a better selection procedure and more rigorous preparation of the military advisors who are deployed:

> [As an advisor] you need six months to immerse yourself, to make yourself useful and indispensable, to become part of the furniture. If they come to see you and ask for your help, you're on the right track. You shouldn't be too ambitious, you need to adapt, and say things in a figurative way. Not just say everything's okay—you need to be able to talk about what's not going right.

Another French advisor uses decisions that have already been taken to get his African partners to follow the plans they had agreed to:

> I remind them these things are written down. Every day I do all I can to remind them that's the deal—nothing else. I get there eventually, but it's not easy. It's all a question of culture. We need those papers, whereas they would happily do without them.

As far as the foreigners are concerned, the main difficulty lies in understanding how the security sector or military they are tasked with reforming operates. The job of cooperant is not something that can be improvised, and not all officers are equally well suited to the task.[152] High-quality recruitment and training are essential. Lessons can be learned in this regard from the efforts made by the Agence française de développement (AFD) to review the role of technical assistants and their

152. This point was emphasized by a Tunisian officer, who described contrasting situations in which French cooperants either did not have adequate training or were perfectly suited to their mission. Comments by a Tunisian officer, peer review, July 2017.

contribution to capacity building.[153] Emma Skeppström authored a useful text dedicated to the "profession" of security sector reform advisor.[154] A further piece by an Australian former cooperant on what is required in order to be an advisor is clearly and effectively written, and is also worthy of note.[155]

Even in cases where military advisors might believe their mission to have failed, their influence will be real, if variable. The substitution approach is not necessarily more effective than the advisory approach. In fact, it is the rigor of the selection and preparation of military cooperants that appears to make the difference, rather than the numbers or the choice of approach. This essential mission to strengthen Africa's armed forces needs to be consolidated, so that they can play a leading role in stabilizing the continent and fighting terrorism. The practices that have been adopted can be conceptualized and studied among other feedback with the aim of delivering new tools to cooperants so that they can enhance their influence. For now, however, such a process is not yet sufficiently embedded or mature, even in the United States, where specialist military cooperation units have been trained.[156] In France, cooperants often come with a languages and international relations background, which may further institutionalize the preparation and training of advisors.[157]

Appropriation and Political Will: Two Key Factors for Success

It is best to avoid assessing the effectiveness of military cooperation on the basis of the successful outcomes or failures of a military that has benefited from this cooperation (e.g. Nigeria and Niger in combating Boko Haram and the Malian military in facing armed terrorist groups). As Professor Derek Reveron has said, "We need to embrace the idea that our partners' failure is not our failure".[158] He reinforces this idea by citing the former US Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, who said:

153. "Comment renforcer les capacités à travers l'accompagnement technique", *Les essentiels du renforcement des capacités*, No. 1, Agence française de développement, January 2016. This text is the product of a study conducted by J. Evin, D. Lecallo, and C. Koseph-Julien: "Accompagnement technique et renforcement des capacités; leçons de l'expérience", *Notes techniques*, No. 5, October 2015.
154. E. Skeppström and F. Gabrielsson Kjäll, *The SSR Adviser's Handbook*, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Swedish Agency for Peace, Security and Development, 2016.
155. N. Wilson, "Aide Memoire – Advising and Mentoring Foreign Militaries", *Grounded Curiosity* blog, August 10, 2017, available at groundedcuriosity.com.
156. AFRICOM contains a "regionally aligned force", which has been specially trained for providing military assistance. GAO, "Regionally Aligned Forces: DOD Could Enhance Army Brigades' Efforts in Africa by Improving Activity Coordination and Mission-Specific Preparation", GAO-15-568, August 2015.
157. Comment by French officer, peer review, July 2017.
158. Reveron, *Exporting Security*.

> We can give them training, we can give them equipment, but we obviously can't give then the will to fight. But if we give them training, we give them equipment, give them support, and give them time, I hope they will have the will to fight.[159]

Some armed forces have benefited from military cooperation, whereas others have taken little from it, in particular because a great deal depends on the nature of the country's political leadership and their willingness—or otherwise—to use external assistance not as a source of *subjective expatriate control*, but as a source of *objective expatriate control*, which facilitates professionalization and boosts effectiveness while strengthening their political control.[160] Although the form of military cooperation and the type of military being reformed are important, these factors are not enough on their own to explain the level of success of cooperation efforts. One clear illustration of the political capacity to make good use of external military assistance is that of Senegal, where there have been no attempted coups—and the respect for the democratic system on the part of the Senegalese armed forces is impressive.

Each country effectively reinvents civil-military relationships in its own way, drawing inspiration from what its neighbors are doing and adapting its techniques to the perceived threats.[161] Rwanda has been following a different path to professionalization using common socialization experiences of training, military operations, and peacekeeping, which offer alternative means for the civil authorities to keep control of the armed forces. This has complemented the professionalization process and a meritocracy whereby military personnel benefit from socioeconomic guarantees, such as banked wages, medical insurance, and rations, along with favored access to bank loans or opportunities for commercial activity.[162] The Rwandans are not especially influenced by foreign advisors, and keep very close control over their military, even though this involves clear expectations in terms of effectiveness—unlike with other armed forces, such as that of Côte d'Ivoire,

159. M. Merighi, "Sea Control 137 – Security Cooperation with Derek Reveron", June 14, 2017, available at cimsec.org.

160. A situation in which subjective or objective control is provided by recourse to foreign or *expatriate* actors. We explain this difference drawing from the well-known distinction between subjective and objective control made by S. Huntington; A. Leboeuf, "D'une armée prédatrice à une force au service de l'ONU; l'exemple de la Sierra Leone" in A. Augé and A. Gnanguênon (eds.), *Les Champs de Mars*, No. 28, October 2015, pp. 50-56.

161. Indications are that those armed forces that have won a war are both more efficient (at least in the years following their victory) and more independent with regard to military assistance (examples include Angola, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Chad). They will not hesitate in playing one donor against another and will not allow them to influence their civil-military relationships.

162. M. Jowell, "Cohesion through Socialization", *op. cit.*, pp. 281-282.

which have allowed themselves to become weakened by their governments in order for control to be maintained.[163]

In conditions such as these (with Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Chad all providing examples), many countries bank on peacekeeping operations as a tool for strengthening or controlling their armed forces. Peacekeeping operations can facilitate access to various training programs at very low cost. They provide an opportunity to reward certain officers or soldiers with a form of bonus, while in the same time keeping them away from their home country. Above all, they give armed forces a mission to pursue in the absence of any international threat—which is the case for most African states. Although careful attention needs to be paid to units returning to their home countries following peacekeeping operations, whose troops present a heightened risk of mutiny, most typically over the issue of bonuses,[164] such drawbacks appear to be secondary. However, there is no guarantee that the training provided to troops for their deployment on such peace missions will result in an improved quality of soldier—and this is despite UN audits, as they only assess the equipment of the units involved.

It is important, above all, to bear in mind that nearly all the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have very low defense budgets. Even in those rare cases where they exceed 3 percent of GDP, they represent a "financial drain"[165] for states whose GDP is low in any case. States are hence forced into delicate trade-offs between security funding and investing in development, sometimes without being able to secure either.

Given this disconnect between the capacity of African armed forces and the expectations of international stakeholders, military cooperation is becoming an increasingly difficult and delicate commitment, hampered by significant resistance and barriers to entry, especially when politicians oppose military reform. That is not to say that it is a fruitless effort, however—sometimes it does bring about results, making a contribution to incremental changes that can lead to significant outcomes. If we are to proceed further in an attempt to utilize these scale effects more systematically, it would be useful to investigate two practices that have not been covered in the earlier section, but which have proved to be the most fruitful approaches over the twenty-five years since the end of the Cold

163. For an analysis of the control exerted over the military in Uganda, which raises the particular question of the renewal of control with generational change within the army, see:
J.-J. Patry, "Les armées ougandaises; un instrument de contrôle intérieur et de positionnement régional", Observatoire des Grands Lacs en Afrique, note No. 9, November, 2014.
164. M. Dwyer, "Peacekeeping Abroad, Trouble Making at Home: Mutinies in West Africa", *African Affairs*, London, 2015, Vol. 114, Issue 455, pp. 206-225; "La grogne des Casques bleus camerounais de retour de RCA", *RFI*, September 9, 2015.
165. T. Schenne, "Europa Soll Helfen", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 18, 2015.

War: a bottom-up approach involving cooperation between brothers in arms on the front, in particular through operational instruction detachments (DIOs), and a form of top-down cooperation involving reforms to the security sector and its associated governance.

Bottom Up and Top Down: Operational Cooperation and Security Sector Reforms

There are a number of options for using military cooperation to strengthen African forces "as they are, not as they ought to be". In order to be effective, however, these initiatives should carry no illusions about the armed forces being cooperated with. This requires personnel being embedded with or closely accompanying the forces being reformed, including on the ground and at the front line, whether as part of UN or African peace operations, or missions for the G5-Sahel or the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. This is the mission, in particular, of the operational instruction detachments (DIOs)—so-called *mentors* who were previously seconded to the Afghan military and who sometimes appear in certain African conflicts. To understand African armed forces requires a top-down approach to addressing their issues of governance by means of security sector reform. If these two vectors of bottom up and top down are combined more effectively, they could herald robust change within African armed forces.

Cooperation at the Front: Brotherhood in Arms

Working together, either in preparation for or during combat, offers the best way of building familiarity and learning between brothers in arms. The joint learning process can sometimes be extremely challenging, given how different the culture and practice of war can be. For instance, an officer placed with the UN staff at Kidal complained about the significant gaps in level between the Europeans and the Africans.[166] For one thing, the means of communication were different. When he reached out to Chadian forces in Tessalit following an attack, it proved impossible to get through to them or to obtain any report by email, as the officer in situ had never checked his inbox. Indeed, attacks are handled differently. When an attack was launched against the base at Kidal, some of the African soldiers started firing in all directions, creating considerable confusion

166. Interview with an officer who had been posted in Kidal with MINUSMA, July 2016.

and making it impossible to ascertain the enemy's position. Furthermore, the African troops the officer was working with were sorely lacking in any culture of intelligence gathering, especially in basic human intelligence during patrols. When a contingent left the base on patrol with orders to gather intelligence, the unit leader came back with empty hands, declaring that he had only seen "a pair of sneakers", with no further details and without any analysis of this information—the relevance of which was not obvious to the French forces.

While this particular officer was struggling to adapt to the differences between European and African soldiery, another recounted the difficulties encountered when undertaking a convoy between Kidal and Tessalit.[167] The convoy took fourteen days to make the journey, as the lack of rigor on the part of certain elements, as well as breakdowns, resulted in several pauses being required to reassemble the convoy and proceed. On several occasions the officer found himself having to negotiate, rather than giving orders. He judged these problems to be not so much cultural as to do with people—whoever they may be. As he later reflected:

> The [MINUSMA] contingents never cease to surprise us, and there is no limit to it. In this, the parallel with regimental life is pretty obvious [because every weekend the "guys" cause fresh problems that have to be resolved]. But like the mountains, the desert takes no prisoners, and in that sort of environment, nothing can be left to chance.[168]

It is his role, therefore, to leave nothing to chance, and to anticipate the problems that may arise, using his knowledge of the terrain and of the men. This sort of work can also be done by operational instruction detachments or mentors. In Mali, the AFISMA/MINUSMA forces were initially accompanied by French liaison and support detachments (DLAOs in French), while operational assistance detachments (DAOs) accompanied the Malian forces. All formations became known as DLAOs as from February 1, 2014, but the concept has stayed the same. Whereas the Afghan OMLTs (operational mentor and liaison teams) comprised groups of six, the Malian DLAOs were thirty-two strong, illustrating how the composition of these detachments can change depending on location and time.[169]

167. R. Bernard, *De sueur et de sable, 14 jours pour rouvrir l'axe Nord Mali*, December 2014, Paris: Le Polémarque, 2016.
168. *Ibid*., p. 202.
169. L. Beaujouan, *Théorisation de l'usage des conseillers militaires en opération,* dissertation for political science masters (*master 2 de Science politique*), Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, p. 54.

Given their knowledge of the troops they accompany, such detachments can advise and direct them, they can anticipate their gaps in knowledge, and they have both the ear of the officers and the confidence of the troops, because they are fighting at their side. They can play a liaison role between the men they are advising and accompanying to the front and the other actors on the ground, including UN officials (to ensure timely deliveries of food and equipment) and Western elements. This was the case under Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, for example, which brought fire support, drones, planes, helicopters, health evacuations, and intelligence capability.

Support can be given at the staff level to boost strength and provide a liaison function with other Western stakeholders or even between different African actors. In this context, the staff of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) fighting Boko Haram provides a particular example. The Western advisors have the skill mentioned above, in that they know how to make links between African actors who are not good at communicating horizontally (without consulting national capitals), until such point as this transversal approach has become sufficiently bedded in that they are able to leave. This does not mean taking command of the African forces deployed; it involves advising and supporting them, especially as some armed forces—that of Senegal in particular—might reject an approach that calls into question their ability to operate on their own. Rather than being a new phenomenon, this approach dates at least as far back as the independence era, and is worth re-examining.

Security Sector Reform: Modernizing African Military Governance

While it is possible to support those African forces that are deployed in peacekeeping operations using a bottom-up approach, a different path should also continue to be explored: namely, that of improving African armed forces from the top down via security sector reform (SSR). Security sector reforms began in the late 1990s, although implementation is a delicate matter, as such reforms can be all-encompassing in nature. Indeed, as well as concerning the armed forces, they also involve the police and gendarmerie, the judiciary, customs, and other agencies. These reforms therefore require effective coordination between all those actors involved in cooperation. Moreover, they aim not only to boost effectiveness but to improve the governance of the security sector, and so they cannot be undertaken unless they are widely supported by the authorities of the country concerned. The reforms are indispensable, however, if African armed forces are to be transformed and

professionalized in the longer term. It is a matter of striking a new balance that avoids coups d'état or the privatization of armed forces for the benefit of the ruling elite (i.e. a subjective control of the military), while securing a law-based state, where any armed personnel who do not abide by the law are held to account and punished.[170]

How can such reforms be led? First of all, it is crucial to have a high degree of familiarity with how the security sector operates so as to anticipate the effects, direct and indirect, that the proposed reforms will have. This requires funding for action research on the country concerned (for operational purposes), as well as more fundamental work in social sciences such as anthropology, sociology, history, and politics. It is important to be attentive to a diverse range of local actors, and to use the analysis undertaken to draw up a strategy for action (in the context of national or regional policy) and train up SSR advisors so that they can utilize the research that has been carried out and implement the strategy.

It is essential from the outset to set an ambitious objective in agreement with the rulers concerned, which means that they, too, must have an interest in achieving it. This may mean bringing a military that had traditionally held a rebel stance under the control of the government, for instance, or improving the country's security and thereby garnering support from the population. This can sometimes mean implementing an objective, *expatriate*, form of control—i.e. using foreign military advisors to control the military. For such reforms to work, the judicial system must be robust enough to allow military personnel, gendarmes or police officers who have committed abuses to be charged.

It is sometimes necessary to protect the security sector by ensuring that it remains absolutely rigorous in the face of illicit or corrupt practices, so that soldiers and other security sector personnel are paid on time and capacity is safeguarded. If this approach is followed, a nation's security sector will not merely operate in the same way as the rest of its country's institutions; it can become a model sector, leading the way forward for other sectors of the state and the country's population in a virtuous circle.

Such changes may at first seem out of reach. Yet all it takes, sometimes, is for certain practices to start getting considered as illegal or illegitimate, and their incidence can diminish. Then, the fact that the practice has become less common leaves more room for legitimate and legal reforms and practices, as was the case in Sierra Leone in the 2000s.

170. A. Leboeuf, "La réforme du secteur de sécurité, entre bureaucraties et stratégie", *Focus stratégique*, No. 51, Ifri, April 2014, available at www.ifri.org.

This does not necessarily require some utopian, revolutionary change, but rather some well-implemented progression in the right direction. It is important, though, to maintain the momentum of any such reforms for their entire duration so that they may be maintained and to avoid any regression to old practices. Technical advisors need to be in place for the long term if they are to carry out preventive work, rather than just being there to fulfill urgent tasks.

Conclusions

Cooperation with African armed forces requires knowledge and understanding, as well as the ability to effect change. Many countries and organizations, including in the private sector, are now involved in this process in a competitive, rather than cooperative, spirit. Not all the actors involved have the means to fundamentally reform what are often heterogeneous and non-professional armed forces. And those international or state partners that do have the means to put the required reforms in place, whether through operational cooperation or security sector reforms, will come up against major challenges, even if they believe they have come to know the African armed forces concerned. As David Chuter has written:

> [T]rying to effect change at a considerable distance, with overwhelming power but limited local resources, in the face of language and cultural barriers, and with a constant turnover of staff with strong normative views but little practical experience [is] if not unvarying, at least the kind of problems that change only very slowly.[171]

Indeed, no change is possible without strong political will on the part of African rulers, together with solid determination from their military chiefs.[172] If such willingness is lacking, it can appear preferable to avoid becoming involved—to "know when to leave".[173] The alternative involves winning their confidence and support for the reforms to be carried out. This means convincing them that their foreign partners are themselves making substantial and sustainable efforts to guarantee the effectiveness of their contributions to reforming the armed forces of countries south of the Sahara.

One particular problem needs to be addressed if solutions are to be adopted that boost the effectiveness of cooperation. Most of the existing cooperation policies seek to enhance compatibility between the armed forces of the sub-Saharan countries and Western forces. In doing this, such policies create dependences, especially when it comes to certain sophisticated capabilities that the African armed forces concerned were not generally used to operating with, such as drones, electronic intelligence,

171. D. Chuter, "African Solutions to Western Problems", *op. cit.*.
172. This point has been acknowledged and emphasized by a Tunisian officer. Comments by a Tunisian officer, peer review, July 2017.
173. Comment by a French general, peer review, July 2017.

and air-to-ground fire support, which themselves generate fresh requirements. This can impose a model of development on African armed forces that does not necessarily correspond to their needs or resources. With this in mind, is it really necessary to keep exporting "our" models? Alternatively, should we be further developing those endogenous models that are more suited to the needs and resources of African armed forces, but without necessarily imposing limits or constraints that might not apply to their situations? As a French general said, "It's up to the Africans to find a successful route using their own models for how their countries and their societies work".[174]

This does not make it any less important to improve the effectiveness of military cooperation. To achieve this, it is crucial to adopt those cooperation policies or SSR strategies that encompass a strategic vision and an overhaul of practices when necessary, rather than pursuing a tacit, ad hoc reproduction of existing approaches.[175] Ideally, the cooperation policy should form part of wider national or regional policy, thus facilitating a holistic approach, and this requires a deeper knowledge of African armed forces and the political, social, anthropological, and sociological contexts in which they exist. This can be achieved by funding fundamental research in social sciences and action research, and also by maintaining a listening approach with the range of local actors.

Furthermore, these various cooperation policies should seek to improve the coordination of actions by different parties. SSR approaches, particularly in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, have been taken alongside the creation of national security councils, led by the country's respective presidents, which are coordinating donor action and facilitating information exchange on the responsibilities that each of them has—and they are doing so in complete transparency. Such structures can usefully be established to provide a framework for exchange, even if their initiatives encounter resistance on the part of those who have no interest in communicating their actions. Although it may not be possible to eliminate all sources of tension, solutions do exist to ease the friction caused by a lack of communication. For example, there could be regular exchanges of personnel, or monthly meetings could be held between the various actors involved in military cooperation or SSR.

It is also necessary to make a systematic assessment of each advisor's past successes and failures, both as an individual and for their mission. Systematic lessons learned can help evaluate the solutions that the advisor implemented

174. Comments by a French general, peer review, July 2017.
175. T. Shepherd, "Strategic Ends, not Tactical Means: Better Ways to Build Partner Capacity", US Army War College War Room, available at warroom.armywarcollege.edu.

when faced with typical problems. In France, the special headquarters for overseas missions (État-major spécialisé pour l'outre-mer et l'étranger, or EMSOME) and the newly-created special land forces center for operational military partnerships (centre de partenariat militaire opérationnel, or CPMO) could act as key drivers in this regard and could contribute to improve the training of future advisors.

Finally, it is essential to improve the selection procedure for the personnel accompanying African armed forces on the ground. The suitability of the advisors deployed in relation to mission expectations remains a crucial factor of success.[176] They should be selected on the basis of their qualities, in particular their ability to adapt, their flexibility, their patience, and their ability to provide advice and suggestions but without directing decisions. Once selected, cooperants need to be specifically trained for their forthcoming mission. They need to know about the military in which they are being deployed, and also about the country and the culture that shape that military's identity and practices. The training of OMLTs prior to their deployment lasts several months and provides a model for DIO advisors and cooperants that is difficult to replicate today, at least in France, because of issues with resources and priorities.[177] Moreover, it is still unlikely that technical advisors could make ad hoc preparations prior to a specific posting.

Those involved in military cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa require greater resources at their disposal if they are to play a decisive role in transforming and professionalizing African armed forces. The various programs of military cooperation should not be blamed for the failures or faults of those African armed forces that they have so far not managed to fundamentally improve. There are not many cases where cooperant countries have provided all the necessary means to succeed: an adequate budget, a selection procedure, training, an adequate number of advisors deployed, or firm knowledge of the African armed forces concerned. These attributes are increasingly essential, however, if the mission of military cooperation is to succeed. This now require a systematic approach from all armed forces that seek to bring about a transformation of their African partners in helping them to protect their civilian population.

176. The mission of councillor "is not a mission like any other (. . .) [It] has the essential criterion of success—the bond of confidence between advisors and their counterparts. This bond has to be nurtured through the competence of the mentors, as well as by mutual closeness and understanding". Beaujouan, *Théorisation de l'usage des conseillers militaires en opération*, p. 80.

177. With six months of preparation prior to a posting, in-depth training on first aid, guidance, dealing with IEDs, and combat shooting; realistic exercises at the operational adaptation detachment at Canjuers in Provence, and NATO pre-deployment certification. L. Beaujouan, *Théorisation de l'usage des conseillers militaires en opération*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

Appendix

List of African Institutions Hosting Interns from Other African Countries[178]

Host Institution	Country	City	Partner Countries	Cooperation Framework	Number of Positions
École supérieure de la Gendarmerie nationale des Issers	Algeria	Boumerdès	Mauritania, Western Sahara, Mali, Tunisia		
École de commandement et d'État-major	Algeria	Tamentfoust	Mali		
Académie militaire interarmes	Algeria	Cherchell	various African countries		
École nationale des Officiers (ENO)	Benin	Toffo	Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Senegal, Togo,	Regional partnership—west and central Africa	
Center for Humanitarian Demining Training (CPADD)	Benin	Ouidah	around 28 different countries	ENVR	Around sixty places per year, one fifth of which are for Benin
Bembéréké Military Academy	Benin	Bembéréké	Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Central African Republic	Military academies/ colleges/ schools	
Académie militaire Georges Namoano (AMGN)	Burkina Faso	Pô	Mali, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Benin, Gabon, Togo, Guinea, Djibouti		
Kadiogo Military Academy (PMK)	Burkina Faso	Kadiogo	Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo	Military academies/ colleges/ schools	
Higher Institute of Studies for Civil Protection (ISEPC)	Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	ECCAS; Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon	ENVR	

178. Table drawn up by L. Mingasson (2016) and C. Essola-Moabo (2017) during their internship at Ifri's Security Studies Center. This table is far from exhaustive, but it illustrates the wealth of intra-African exchanges involving the eighty institutions identified.

École militaire technique de Ouagadougou (EMTO)	Burkina Faso	Ouagadougou	Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo	ENVR	Over 150 places per year, of which a quarter are for Burkina Faso
Higher International School of War (ESIG)	Cameroon	Yaoundé	Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, Togo	ENVR	
Combined Services Military Academy (EMIA)	Cameroon	Yaoundé	Gabon, Mali, Central African Republic, Senegal		
Pôle Aéronautique National à Vocation Régionale (PANVR)	Cameroon	Garoua	Francophone Africa; Cameroon, Mali, Niger, Madagascar, etc.	ENVR	Around forty places per year, of which a third are for Cameroon
Centre de Perfectionnement aux techniques de Maintien de l'Ordre (CPTMO)	Cameroon	Awaé	Francophone Africa	ENVR	Around a hundred places per year, of which a third are for Cameroon
Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Défense (CSID)	Cameroon	Yaoundé	Francophone Africa	ENVR	Around forty places per year, of which a fifth are for Cameroon
École internationale des forces de sécurité (EIForces)	Cameroon	Awaé	ECCAS; Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon	ENVR	
École de Génie-Travaux (EGT)	Congo-Brazzaville	Brazzaville	ECCAS; Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea	ENVR	Around a hundred places per year, of which a third are for Congo-Brazzaville
École Militaire Préparatoire Technique (EMPT)	Côte d'Ivoire	Bingerville	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Gabon, Guinea, Niger, Mali, CAR, DR Congo, Senegal, Chad, Togo	Military academies/ colleges/ schools	
École des Forces armées (EFA)	Côte d'Ivoire	Yamoussoukro		Partnership of countries in the sub-region	

École de Gendarmerie d'Abidjan (EGA)	Côte d'Ivoire	Cocody, Abidjan	Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger	Partnership of countries in the sub-region	
Egyptian Military Academy	Egypt	Cairo	Sudan, Somalia		
Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College (EDCSC)	Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	Neighboring countries	Supported by AFRICOM	
Defence Engineering College	Ethiopia	Bishoftu	Somalia and others		
École nationale de gendarmerie d'Owendo	Gabon	Owendo	Benin	Bilateral partnership	
École d'Application du Service de Santé Militaire (EAS)	Gabon	Melen		ENVR	Around twenty places per year, of which a quarter are for Gabon
Prytanée militaire de Libreville	Gabon	Libreville	Benin, Guinea, Mali, CAR, Senegal	Military academies/ colleges/ schools	
École d'Etat Major de Libreville (EEML)	Gabon	Libreville	ECCAS; Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon	ENVR	Around sixty places per year, of which an eighth are for Gabon
Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College	Ghana	Accra			
Tica Naval School (marine training center)	Equatorial Guinea	Tica	Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal	ENVR	Around fifty places per year, of which a third are for Equatorial Guinea
National Defence College	Kenya	Karen, Nairobi	Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Botswana, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Burundi, Namibia, Sudan, South Sudan		
École Militaire Inter-Armes (EMIA)	Mali	Koulikoro	Benin, CAR, Togo, Senegal		
École militaire d'administration (EMA)	Mali	Koulikoro		ENVR	Around a hundred places per year, of which a quarter are for Mali

Prytanée militaire de Kati (PMK)	Mali	Kati	Chad, Niger, Benin, Senegal	Military academies/ colleges/ schools	
École d'état-major nationale de Koulikoro (EEM)	Mali	Koulikoro	Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Togo		
École de Maintien de la Paix (EMP)	Mali	Bamako	ECOWAS members of the African Standby Force	ENVR	Over a thousand places per year, of which a quarter are for Mali
École d'application des officiers de Kati	Mali	Kati	CAR		
École de la gendarmerie	Mali	Faladié	Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Togo		
Collège Royal de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur (CREMS)	Morocco	Kénitra	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Congo, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Comoros		
Cours supérieur interarmées de l'intendance (CSII)	Morocco	Marrakesh	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Central African Republic, Senegal, Togo		
École royale d'infanterie (ERI)	Morocco	Ben Guerir			
École Royale des Officiers de Gendarmerie (EROG)	Morocco	Casablanca	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Comoros, Senegal		
École royale navale de Casablanca (ERN)	Morocco	Casablanca	Gabon		
Royal Military Academy (ARM)	Morocco	Meknes	Mali, Gabon		
Centre d'Instruction de la Marine Royale (CIMR)	Morocco	Casablanca	Côte d'Ivoire		
Centre d'instruction service social des FAR (CISSFAR)	Morocco	Rabat			
École Royale du Service de Santé Militaire (ERSSM)	Morocco	Rabat	Gabon		
École des personnels paramédicaux des Armées de Niamey (EPPAN)	Niger	Niamey		ENVR	Around sixty trainee places each year, of which half

					are for Niger
École de formation des officiers des forces armées nigériennes (EFOFAN)	Niger	Niamey	Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Central African Republic, Togo, Chad, Senegal		
École nationale des sous-officiers d'active (Ensoa)	Niger	Kaolack	Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, Togo		
Prytanée Militaire de Niamey (PMN)	Niger	Niamey	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, Senegal, Chad, Togo	Military academies/ colleges/ schools	
École d'Administration Militaire et Technique (EAMT)	Niger	Niamey	Benin, Chad		
Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC)	Nigeria	Jaji	Ghana, Mali		
National Defence College	Nigeria	Abuja	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Togo		
Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA)	Nigeria	Kaduna			
Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA)	Rwanda	Nyakinama	Comoros, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan		
Rwanda Defence Force Command and Staff College (RDFCSC)	Rwanda	Kigali	Zambia		
École d'application de l'infanterie (EAI)	Senegal	Thiès	Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Uganda, Central African Republic, DR Congo, Rwanda, Chad, Togo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal	ENVR	Around sixty places per year, of which a third are for Senegal
École nationale des officiers d'active (ENOA)	Senegal	Thiès	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar,		

			Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, Chad, Togo		
École des Officiers de la Gendarmerie Nationale/Cours d'Application des Officiers de Gendarmerie (EOGN / CAOG)	Senegal	Ouakam	Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad	ENVR	Around a hundred places per year, of which a third are for Senegal
École nationale des sous-officiers d'active (ENSOA)	Senegal	Kaolack	Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Togo		
École militaire de santé (EMS)	Senegal	Dakar	Benin, Burkina, Côte d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Togo		
Prytanée militaire Charles N'Tchoréré de Saint-Louis (PMS)	Senegal	Saint-Louis	Benin, Central African Republic, Guinea, Mali, Niger		
Tanzania Military Academy (TMA)	Tanzania	Monduli	Burundi, Kenya, DR Congo, Uganda		
Groupement des écoles militaires et interarmées (GEMIA)	Chad	N'Djamena	Niger, Central African Republic		
Centre d'entraînement aux opérations de maintien de la paix (CEOMP)	Togo	Lomé	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo	United States Institute of Peace (USIP)	
École de Formation des officiers des Forces Armées Togolaises (EFOFAT)	Togo	Kara	Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Central African Republic, Chad		
École du service de santé des armées de Lomé (ESSAL)	Togo	Lomé	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, DR Congo, Chad, Togo	ENVR	Over 100 interns trained each year; a quarter of the places are for Togo
École d'État-major (EEM)	Tunisia	Le Bardo, near Tunis			
École supérieure de guerre	Tunisia	Le Bardo, near Tunis	Mali, Senegal, Mauritania		
Zambian Defence Services Command and Staff College	Zambia	Lusaka	South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia, Zimbabwe		

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