

# EUROPEAN TASK FORCE ON IRREGULAR MIGRATIONS

## Country Report: France

Center for Migrations and Citizenship



The Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization.

As an independent think tank, IFRI sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, IFRI brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities.

With offices in Paris and Brussels, IFRI stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate.

*This project was carried out by Ifri with the support of the Barrow Cadbury Trust and the Conseil régional d'Île-de-France.*

*We are much indebted to all our contributors for their willingness to discuss their ideas throughout the four seminars we organized at Ifri on November 2009, the 17th; on April 2010, the 23rd; on November 2010, the 26th and on June 2011, the 15th.*



© All rights reserved, Ifri, 2011

ISBN: 978-2-86592-940-5

**Ifri**

27 rue de la Procession  
75740 Paris Cedex 15 – France  
Phone: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00  
Email: [ifri@ifri.org](mailto:ifri@ifri.org)

**Ifri-Bruxelles**

Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21  
1000 Bruxelles – Belgium  
Phone : +32 (0)2 238 51 10  
Email: [info.bruxelles@ifri.org](mailto:info.bruxelles@ifri.org)

Website: [Ifri.org](http://Ifri.org)

## Authors

---

This text was written by **Emma Broughton**, based on a participation to the ETFIM project and primary research effectuated by **Sarah Toucas**.

**Emma Broughton** is a Research Fellow in the Center for Migrations and Citizenship of the Ifri. In this position, she coordinated the 'Migrations and entrepreneurs' programme with Dorothee Prud'homme, and participates in the London section of the SUCCESS programme, on social identities in European neighbourhoods. Her research interests lie in migration politics, with a special interest in private sector actors and their role in the elaboration of policies, and most of her research is structured by a comparative interest (UK, United States, Canada). Emma Broughton holds the Master of Science in International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science (2007).

**Sarah Toucas** is a PhD student in International Relations at the Institute of Political Studies of Paris and collaborator with the Center of Studies and International Research (CERI). Her thesis concerns the integration process in a divided society (Divided Past, Shared Future? International Migrations and the Process of Identification in Northern Ireland). She interned and later became a research fellow at the Institute for Conflict Research of Belfast in Northern Ireland (2007-2008) and the Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute (HRSJ) at the London Metropolitan University (2006). She was a scholarship fellow of the UN Institut for Education and Research in Northern Ireland and in Southern India. Her publications notably include : Segregated Lives : Social Division, Sectarianism and Everyday Life in Northern England, Belfast, Institute for Conflict Research, 2008; Push and pull factors towards and against a common European migration policy: France, Britain, and their approaches to irregular migration, Paris, Ifri/Barrow Cadbury Trust, 2008; Investigation into the role of Employment Agencies and Employment businesses in the Recruitment and Employment of Migrant Workers in Northern Ireland, A Literature Review, Belfast, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2008.

# Contents

---

<b>AUTHORS .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>THE POLITICS AND POLICIES OF UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS IN FRANCE: ON THE ROAD TO IRREGULARITY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
Registration and a posteriori individual regularisation .....	5
The politicisation of migration and non-regularisation policies.....	7
The criminalisation of irregularity.....	9
Undocumented migrants in France today – a perspective on migration policy.....	13
<b>POLICY SCALES IN FRANCE: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN LOCAL, NATIONAL AND EU LEVELS.....</b>	<b>17</b>
Europe/France – a race to the bottom? .....	17
National level/local level .....	20
<b>LOCAL CASE STUDY: PARIS.....</b>	<b>23</b>
The state of undocumented migrants in Paris .....	23
Paris vs. the national migration policy?.....	25
Mass mobilisation: a regularisation strategy at the local level? .....	27
<b>CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>32</b>

# Introduction

---

Looking back since the end of the 1970's, French immigration policy has been characterised by an increased toughening, both on the outside, through greater border control and an increasingly strict asylum policy, and on the inside, with a progressive criminalisation of irregularity. Interestingly, and as shown through this compilation of articles, this trend has been followed relatively consistently throughout the European Union space, even in a country outside of the Schengen agreements as the UK. Migration policy has become one of the most politicised topics within the European Union, to the effect that most politicians seek to 'make their mark' on the issue. Another common thread in the case studies presented here is the constructed dimension of an irregular administrative status. In France, as in other European countries, migrants have navigated in and out of an irregularity on the basis of new laws and circulars.

Regularisation policies in France have never been used as a legitimate tool, but rather as a pressure valve to dampen the inadequacies of the migration policies – stricter border controls and regularisation processes vs. labour needs of the economic sector; drastic decrease of number of asylum status granted vs. human rights commitments, etc. The regularisation process itself becomes, over the years and arm-in-arm with a tougher migration policy, increasingly arduous to complete and opaque, resting more and more on the discretionary power of civil servants. Although one cannot speak of an actual paradigm change in the regularisation policy, the criteria for regularisation transitions from being family-based to being employment-based, and from there to being employment-based within the new '*immigration choisie*' principle – immigrants coming to France to work should fill specific and targeted positions for which labour shortages have been observed.

A tougher migration policy and increasingly restrictive regularisation policy dovetailed the evolution taking place at the European level, but it seems to have a transformative impact at the local level. Two processes seem to be at play: the responsabilisation of actors at the local level who become *de facto* immigration officers – civil servants at the prefectures but also CEOs – or, contrarily, who voice the contestation against national migration policies, and, in parallel, the 'cannibalisation' of the not-for-profit sector, which becomes increasingly concerned with migration policies and regularisation issues. NGOs and trade unions at the local level, with the support of certain political actors, are the ones bringing irregular migrants together –

following their own criteria: foreign workers; parents of children attending French schools; young undocumented migrants, etc. – and by this means giving them agency as a group.

# The Politics and Policies of Undocumented Migrants in France: On the Road to Irregularity<sup>1</sup>

---

## *Registration and a posteriori individual regularisation*

France is an old immigration country, in which the story of defining and controlling foreign populations goes as far back as the Enlightenment period and the subsequent nation-state building process. The distinction between regular and irregular migration is accepted as a fact today, but it is the result of a lengthy process to which both public and private actors, at various state, regional and local levels, took part. For the French historian Gérard Noiriel, the shift from early 19<sup>th</sup> century *laissez-faire* liberalism to late 19<sup>th</sup> century welfare state interventionism in the economic and social spheres was a key turning point in the history of asylum. Indeed, asylum used to be granted on private and local charity grounds, but with the rise of modern nationalism, national identification became the chosen means to select those who belonged to the French society and therefore could gain a right to protection, and those who did not. Furthermore, as 'paper identities' became increasingly significant, administrative power itself expanded (Noiriel, 1991: 90, 157).

The deportation of unwanted foreigners remained unregulated until the adoption of the law of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of December 1849. After years of both political and work-related migration, the population of foreigners living in France reached one million (3% of the total population) in 1881. In 1888, for the first time, foreigners living in France were required to register with the town council<sup>2</sup>. Registration practices made use of the new anthropometric identification methods developed originally for criminals, and in use since the creation of the first 'criminal identity service' (*Service de l'identité judiciaire*) in 1882 – current policies that tend to criminalise irregular migration in France and in Europe seem, in this perspective, rooted in the past... France also

---

<sup>1</sup> The first part of this report has been written based on research provided by Sarah Toucas.

<sup>2</sup> Decree of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October 1888.

inherited a well-organised surveillance system from this period, which involved strongly centralised police and administration services<sup>3</sup>.

During the First World War, measures to control foreigners shifted progressively from *a posteriori* to *a priori* authorisation, through the progressive establishment of categories granting differential access to French territory. From 1912 onwards, 'nomadic' and 'homeless' individuals –and therefore, foreigners – could be refused entry on the French territory<sup>4</sup>. The first foreigner identity card was introduced in 1916-1917, under the impulse of the ministry of Home Affairs and against the will of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that point, the state *controlled* rather than actually *regulated* migration flows. The French economy relied heavily on foreign workers, and the identity card system, which was first a means to control residency, quickly became a means to control employment<sup>5</sup>. By 1931, France had become one of the world's main immigration countries<sup>6</sup>. Workers were recruited, transported and employed by the consortium 'Société générale d'immigration', and were regularised by the state once in France, and granted access to equal pay and social protection.

Immigration was not managed through law until quite recently. The Ordinance<sup>7</sup> of the 19<sup>th</sup> of October 1945 introduced the French nationality regulations, and the Ordinance of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November 1945 regulated the entry and stay of foreigners in France. Since then, each new law on immigration has referred to the 'amended' 1945 Ordinance. At the time however, the Ordinance did not introduce any ground-breaking rules, but was rather very much based on the government Decree of 1938 that had significantly expanded surveillance mechanisms targeted at foreigners. The Ordinance granted the State a monopoly to recruit migrant workers through the newly instated National Immigration Office (*Office national d'immigration* - ONI) although in practice, the need for foreign workforce in the

---

<sup>3</sup> In 1893, registration requirements were extended to new migrants who wanted to work in France, a person housing a foreigner had to inform the town council within 24 hours, and mayors were required to transfer to prefects all the information they had on the activities of foreigners in their area. Prefects then sent all information to the ministry of Justice (enthusiastically, as Noiriél explains).

<sup>4</sup> Law of 16<sup>th</sup> of July 1912 (See: Noiriél, 1991, p.176).

<sup>5</sup> See: Decree of 21<sup>st</sup> of April 1917. During the First World War, about 400,000 foreigners (mainly Belgians) were granted a work permit to work alongside French women to keep the economy activity in order. in order to keep the country going ('Histoire de l'Immigration en France', Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration, available from: <http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/histoire-de-l-immigration/le-film>).

<sup>6</sup> During the inter-war period, immigration agreements were concluded with overpopulated countries (Poland, Italy and Tchechoslovakia) and in 1927, the Parliament facilitated access to French nationality in order to face the demographic crisis. As a result, the number of foreigners living in France doubled over ten years, from 1 532,000 in 1921, to 2 409,000 in 1926 (7% of the total population) and 2 715,000 in 1931 (See: 'Histoire de l'Immigration en France', Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration, available from: <http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/histoire-de-l-immigration/le-film>).

<sup>7</sup> In France, a law passed by the government is called 'ordinance'.



housing, agricultural and industrial sectors exceeded governmental capacities and bypassed its control. In 1968, ONI controlled only 18% of entries, whilst employers recruited the vast majority of foreign workers (82% of total numbers), as was already the case before the war. This was made possible by the fact that prefectures were given significant leeway to interpret the law, resulting in an administrative regulation of immigration, through individual decision-making (Spire, 2005). At the time, 'clandestine migration' was considered, on par with regular migration, as a means to reduce labour shortage. Rodier (1998) notes that in 1966, it was considered acceptable for the Minister of Employment to declare: 'Clandestine immigration is not unhelpful. The sole application of international regulations and agreements would probably lead to scarce workforce' (*Les Échos*, 29 March 1966, as quoted in Rodier, 1998).

No law on immigration would be passed between the Ordinance of 1945 and the 1980 'Bonnet' Law – circulars, however, would still be implemented.

### ***The politicisation of migration and non-regularisation policies***

If migration policy-making was dormant during the 'Trente Glorieuses', the three decades of economic prosperity that followed the end of the Second World War in France, the 1980's witnessed a legislative proliferation, with more than 20 laws passed to this day.

In the beginning of the 1970s, immigration became a 'politicised topic'. That is, as Lagroye put it, 'a topic that political agents and institutions would address' (Lagroye, 2003: 367, as quoted in Spire, 2004: 12). As we have seen, *a posteriori* regularisation was until then the customary route to be granted the right to stay in France. In 1972, the 'Marcellin-Fontanet'<sup>8</sup> circulars established that only foreigners with a work contract and access to housing would be granted a resident card, and forbade automatic regularisation of clandestine workers. Foreign workers who had suddenly turned into 'illegal workers' with the passing of these circular led a massive protest movement, supported by left-wing organisations<sup>9</sup>, intellectuals (Foucault and Sartre notably) and the CFDT trade union (*Confédération française démocratique du travail* – French democratic labour

---

<sup>8</sup> Raymond Marcellin and Joseph Fontanet were respectively Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Employment at the time.

<sup>9</sup> Two of the main French left-wing migrants organisations were created around that time: FASTI (Fédération des Associations de Solidarité avec les Travailleurs Etrangers – Solidarity with foreign workers' federation) in 1967 and GISTI (Groupe d'information et de soutien des immigrés – Immigrants' information and support group) in 1972.

confederation)<sup>10</sup>. Although individual regularisation had just been banned officially, the government introduced the first 'exceptional regularisation' measure of its history: the circular of 13 June 1973 'normalised' the situation of about 40,000 '*sans papiers*'<sup>11</sup> (undocumented migrants) who had worked in France for at least a year or who were able to present a work-contract established at least six months earlier. In 1979 similarly, the government regularised 3,000 Turkish workers employed in the clandestine textile industry of the Paris 'Sentier' area (Rodier, 1998).

However, restrictive migration policies followed through, and border control progressively acquired a central place in migration policy, partly due to the pressure of extreme rightist parties and the dominance of the public opinion<sup>12</sup>. France officially halted long-term work-related in-migration flows in 1974 – which was quite late into the oil crisis and economic downturn of 1973-1974 when compared to other European countries. Whilst other major immigration countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand introduced selective migration policies based on economic needs, France shifted the criteria for selecting migrants for entry from employment-based to family-based: incoming migrants with family ties in France would be favoured.

This hardening of migration policies was paralleled by a steep change in asylum policy. The French office for refugees and stateless people (*Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides* - OFPRA<sup>13</sup>), the institution in charge of asylum applications, began rejecting an increasing number of asylum applications, when its action had been characterised until then by the acceptance of most demands: in 1973, the vast majority (85%) of all asylum seekers were granted refugee status, but in 1990, OFPRA rejected most applications (85%) (Legoux, 1995: 138, as quoted in Valluy, 2008: 81). Over the years, constant rejection of asylum seekers led to what Valluy calls a 'reversal' of the politics of asylum, from 'refugee protection' to 'discrediting and repressing refugees' (Valluy, 2008: 85), and made asylum policy one of the first 'producers' of undocumented migrants in France.

In France, jurists and political scientists have analysed the restrictive turn taken by French immigration policy in the 1970's as a

---

<sup>10</sup> A 'general strike of Arabic workers' was also organised independently. See: Saïd Bouziri, 'De la clandestinité à la reconnaissance', *Plein Droit* n°11, July 1990, available from: <http://www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/11/clandestinite.html>.

<sup>11</sup> The term '*sans-papiers*' was coined by left-wing organisations in the 1970s in reaction to the term '*clandestine*' used by the government. It literally means 'undocumented'.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 15 September 2011.

<sup>13</sup> The OFPRA was created in 1952 in the context of post-World War II international diplomacy. It was rooted in the principles adopted in the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugee and Asylum, according to which States have the power to select refugees and therefore to limit the free movement of people (see: Noiriel, 1991). In France, the Decree of 30 November 1926 still regulates the asylum procedure.

side effect of a) the economic downturn, b) the rise of xenophobia within European populations and c) the massive increase in asylum applications (See, notably: Weil, 1988; Schor, 1996; and Lochak, 1997). For historical sociologists, who tend to look for longer-term explanations of policy change, the politicisation of migration rather preceded restrictive migration policies<sup>14</sup>. Breaking away from what he calls 'mainstream' migration policy analysis, Valluy (2008) argues that restrictive migration policies and the above-mentioned 'reversal' of asylum policy originated in norms and practices of the French colonial administration, that were re-enacted in the post-colonial administration. As a result of administrative overhauls, civil servants were put in charge of policing immigration, as well as of managing social policies targeting 'decolonized immigrants'. Valluy (2008) concludes that the social construction of the 'foreigner' as a public matter had a technocratic rather than a popular origin, and that the idea of 'working-class xenophobia', stirred up by political and intellectual elites in the 1970s when the French Extreme Right party '*Front national*' had no political weight (See: Collovald, 2004; Laurens, 2006), was rather the expression of a 'government xenophobia' (See also: Fassin et al., 1997; Lochak, 1997).

### ***The criminalisation of irregularity***

The growing politicisation of migration policy went hand-in-hand with a growing criminalisation of irregularity, a policy turn which has been confirmed and re-affirmed to this day.

### **Foreigners: a threat to the national economy, to national security and to national identity**

In 1976, the Secretary of State for Immigration Paul Dijoud introduced a 'new immigration policy' that aimed at a) stopping work-related migration and b) integrating regular migrants who had settled in France. In order to legitimise the very selection of migrants that would be eligible to integration, the ruling class (left-wing and right-wing governments alike) established a distinction between regular and irregular migration - and migrants<sup>15</sup>. The meaning entailed by 'irregularity' did however change over time.

In order to justify immigration control and enforcement, 'illegal immigration' became increasingly and openly linked to security, or

---

<sup>14</sup> As Valluy explains, this results in reversing Theodore Lowi's finding that 'policies determine politics' (2008, p.96).

<sup>15</sup> See, under a left-wing government, François Mitterand's Declaration to the Council of Ministers, 31 August 1983; and under a right-wing government, the Minister for Home Affairs Charles Pasqua's 1986 discourse according to which, 'we need to fight clandestine immigration and imported delinquency (...) this new law will help separate the wheat from the chaff'.

rather insecurity. Police forces were given vamped up means to implement the two main dispositions of the 'Bonnet' law of January 10<sup>th</sup> 1980: forced return and detention of 'illegal' migrants destined to be deported. The 'Bonnet' law instated forced return in the case of irregular entry and irregular stay, a procedure that was modelled on forced return for threat to public order. Furthermore, the law allowed for individuals to be detained prior to being returned<sup>16</sup>. If detention constitutes an integral part of immigration policies today, and is accepted as such, lawyers and legal practitioners at the time were staunchly opposed to the detention of individuals on the basis of an administrative irregularity. Indeed, the discovery in 1975 of a clandestine detention centre in Arenc, near Marseilles, led to strong protests.

François Mitterrand, a member of the Socialist Party, confirmed the practise of detention in the first months of his being elected, in 1981, and opened 12 new detention centres and several police custody suites – these developments were counterbalanced by the granting of more rights to foreign workers, thereby establishing a policy of overture and integration for certain categories of migrants, and a tough security policy for migrants coined as 'irregular'. A circular was passed to subordinate the decision to deport an 'illegal' migrant to the judgement of an administrative court of justice, rather than to an administrative decision only, thereby preventing unilateral decision making and administrative abuse<sup>17</sup>, and a 'consolidated' right to stay was also granted to certain categories of migrants. The freedom of association act, which had been banned since 1936, was re-established and extended to non-nationals, and in September 1982, the massive regularisation of 140,000 migrants (on a total of 150,000 applications) was carried out.

In the run-up to the legislative elections, in 1986, a new step was taken in the criminalisation of undocumented migrants, portraying illegal migration as a threat to the French national identity – an evolution that has strengthened to this day. The victory of the right-wing party in the elections marked the establishment of the first 'cohabitation' government in France. Shortly after, the Pasqua law was passed, restricting the categories of foreigners who could be granted automatic residency status, as well as those who could not be deported. As a result, a higher number of migrants living in France fell into illegality.

---

<sup>16</sup> Dans l'ordonnance qui régit le séjour des étrangers en France depuis 1945, rien n'autorise la détention administrative d'un étranger pour défaut de papier. La dernière loi qui le permettait date de 1938, et c'est la loi qui a instauré l'enfermement des étrangers sans-papiers dans des camps d'internement, loi qui s'est ensuite étendue, pendant la guerre, à la détention administrative de tous les autres indésirables français et étrangers avec papiers, notamment en vue de leur déportation en Allemagne.

<sup>17</sup> Law of 17 October 1981 on the entrance and stay of migrants, modifying the ordinance of 1945.

In 1997, the Jospin government, a left-wing government under the right-wing presidency of Jacques Chirac, proceeded to the regularisation of about 90,000 undocumented migrants out of 150,000 applications, on family-based criteria. The dissolution of the French Assembly in 1995, which had given way to the left-right 'cohabitation' between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin's government, had been preceded by strong debates on the migration policy of the Chirac government. The Socialist Party denounced the Pasqua-Debré laws, which they perceived as producing undocumented migrant workers, and made their abrogation one of their electoral promises. Eventually, such laws were only modified, rather than abrogated.

### **The 2000's: securing the criminalisation turn and implementing 'immigration choisie'**

The legislative proliferation that characterised the 1980's and the 1990's has not abated to this day, and neither has the trend towards the criminalisation of the populations considered as 'illegal' migrants. The so-called 'Sarkozy law' was passed in 2003, hardening the detention conditions of undocumented migrants. The detention period was lengthened to 32 days (rather than 12), and re-entry into the French territory for deported migrants was forbidden for two years following deportation. Since then, the law has been modified four times, each time towards an increased vulnerabilisation of undocumented populations – the conditions for family reunification have been hardened, the rights of foreign spouses of documented migrants or French nationals have been weakened, and several pathways for 'automatic' regularisation (*'régularisation de plein droit'*) have been withdrawn. The number of residency permits for family considerations decreased of 14% between 2004 and 2008, and the residency permits for humanitarian considerations of 21%.

In 2005, detention centres in France could 'accommodate' 1,500 persons. In line with the Plan adopted in 2005 by the French government, which aimed to strengthen actions against 'clandestine' immigration (*Plan de renforcement de la lutte contre l'immigration clandestine*), the Interministerial Committee for immigration control (CICI-*Comité interministériel de contrôle de l'immigration*) decided to increase the capacity of detention centres to 2,700 in June 2008. Since 2003, children have been detained, with their families, in detention centres.

The criminalisation of undocumented migrants even extends today to external actors, such as CEOs employing undocumented migrants, or members of NGOs assisting undocumented migrants in various ways – housing, administrative procedures, personal tutoring – a new development that associations called the 'solidarity offence'.

In parallel to this increased criminalisation of 'illegal' migrants, the toughening of the asylum policy continued, contributing to the production of more undocumented migrants. In 2003, the de Villepin law outlined a list of countries from which it would become impossible to

request asylum. At the European level, the Dublin agreements of 1990 (Dublin I) and 2003 (Dublin II) introduced increased restrictions, and specifically the 'one stop one shop' rule forcing asylum seekers to make their application in the first EU country they entered.

The end of the 2000's are also the decade of a new orientation in the French migration policy, outlined in 2006: that of '*immigration choisie*' (or chosen immigration) as opposed to an immigration that would not be chosen but would be an exogenous imposition (*'immigration subie'*). The entry of migrants onto the French territory becomes conditioned to the participation to specific sectors of the economy, deemed to be in need of extra labour, while migrants that do not correspond to these economic needs suffer from increasingly tough measures. As part of this new policy, massive legislative procedures directed towards undocumented migrants, such as massive regularisation operations, are banned.

At the time of writing, people are fleeing Libya and the link between irregular migration and (in)security is constantly being reinstated by governments and the media in the West. In France, Claude Guéant, who was nominated to replace Brice Hortefeux as Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration as part of a hasty reshuffling of the cabinet in February 2011<sup>18</sup>, declared: 'It falls upon us, men and women of the Ministry of the Interior and of Immigration (...) to strengthen security and to fight against irregular immigration which, this is a fact (...) worries (French people)<sup>19</sup>. Claude Guéant's statement echoed French President Nicolas Sarkozy's view, expressed the previous day on television, that, 'we are very much aware that ongoing tragedies could lead to uncontrollable migration flows and increased terrorism'<sup>20</sup>.

---

<sup>18</sup> On 27<sup>th</sup> of February 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy announced that Claude Guéant would replace Brice Hortefeux as Interior and Immigration Minister, and that Alain Juppé would replace Michèle Alliot Marie as Foreign Affairs Minister. This is the 10<sup>th</sup> reshuffle since Nicolas Sarkozy's election in 2007, and it takes place right after Michèle Alliot Marie's contested holidays in Tunisia, just before local 'cantonales' elections, and a year before the 2012 presidential elections. Some have emphasised that as a result, Brice Hortefeux, who is well known for his anti-immigration views, would be able to campaign publicly.

<sup>19</sup> 'Il nous revient à nous, les femmes et les hommes du ministère de l'Intérieur et de l'Immigration (...) d'améliorer la sécurité et de lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière qui, c'est un fait, (...) inquiète (les Français).' (author's translation). See for example: Reuters France, 'Claude Guéant promet de lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière', 28 February 2011. Available from:

<http://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRPAE71R0N620110228>

<sup>20</sup> 'Nous savons ce que pourraient être les conséquences de telles tragédies sur des flux migratoires devenus incontrôlables et sur le terrorisme.' (author's translation). See for example: Reuters France, "Claude Guéant promet de lutter contre l'immigration irrégulière", 28 February 2011. Available from:

<http://fr.reuters.com/article/topNews/idFRPAE71R0N620110228>

## Regularisations?

Despite the governmental ban, some general regularisations occurred in this decade, even though they were always used, as was the case before, as a pressure valve for increasingly inadequate migration policies. In 2007, just before the presidential elections, a group of undocumented migrants that had occupied a university building in Cachan was regularised, on employment-based criteria.

The work of the CGT trade union was instrumental in achieving this regularisation. Indeed, by the mid-2000's, trade-unions began to endorse an increasingly important role in supporting foreign workers in their regularisation procedures, effectively taking over from other more traditional NGOs in this endeavour. This new type of mobilisation by a traditional social partner could have had an effect in the decision of the government to shift the criteria for regularisation back to being employment-based (*'immigration choisie'*). Another widespread mobilisation of foreign workers took place in 2009, amongst the workers of the catering business. Restaurants and offices were occupied, again, and the CGT also played a central role in structuring this movement. In June 2010, an agreement was even concluded between the Ministry of Immigration and the CGT, to soften the rules set as part of the 2009 circular on work-related regularisation, and allow undocumented workers to apply for regularisation under specific conditions and during a limited period of time (from 1 July 2010 to 31 March 2011). However, as soon as it was agreed upon, the programme was emptied of much of its substance through 'technical adjustments'<sup>21</sup>.

## ***Undocumented migrants in France today – a perspective on migration policy***

Undocumented migrants in France today can have a number of different profiles and stories. They can have entered the French territory irregularly (irregular entry), or have entered the territory regularly but lost their 'documented' status because their papers have expired (mostly asylum seekers whose application has been turned down, but also students who have tried to enter the workforce despite their student visa). Undocumented migrants can also have a residence permit but no work permit, and hence work illegally. This can be the case of students, asylum seekers or refugees, which are not allowed to work. Finally, undocumented migrants can belong to the 'neither-nor' category (the *'ni-ni'*), that of migrants who cannot be given permits, but cannot be returned to their country of origin because of political turmoil, strong familial ties or because their

---

<sup>21</sup> See, for example: rfi, 19/06/2010 'Salariés sans-papiers: le gouvernement lâche du lest'. Available from: <http://www.rfi.fr/france/20100619-salaries-papiers-le-gouvernement-lache-lest>

supposed country of origin does not recognise them – this can happen when migrants, voluntarily or not, are not in possession of their passports. China, for example, is known for refusing the return of a number of supposedly Chinese nationals.

Such undocumented migrants are present in all the sectors of the French economy in which the flexibility of the labour market is high: construction, agriculture, cleaning services, professions of care to children and elderly people, textile, private security services, catering services and the tourism industry. Most of these jobs carry ‘3D’ profiles: they are dirty, difficult and dangerous<sup>22</sup>.

The number of undocumented migrants in France today is hotly debated. The most current number is that of 300,000 undocumented migrants, but there are no reliable figures on which to base this estimation. What’s more, estimates can vary greatly depending on authors and methodology. Kovacheva and Vogel (2009) estimated that in 2008, a minimum of 1,949,000 and a maximum of 3,811,000 ‘irregular foreigners’ were living in the EU27 (See: HWWI, 2008). In France, constant changes in the national legislation affect the very definition of irregularity: different categories of people can be considered regular at one point and irregular the following year. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates showed that in 1992, around 350,000 illegal migrants were residing in the country, compared to 200,000 in Germany and 600,000 in Italy. At that time, Barreau (1992) estimated that each year, around 30,000 individuals entered the country illegally. Three years later, in 1995, the then director of Public Liberties and Legal Affairs of the Interior Ministry Jean-Paul Faugère told the National Assembly that a minimum of 200,000 irregular migrants were living in France. He based his estimate on the number of return decisions taken each year over the course of 4 to 5 years (50,000 return decisions per year), as well as on the number of decisions actually implemented each year over the same 4 to 5 years (10,000 measures per year) (See: Sénat, 2008). Based on this set of estimates, a National Assembly report stated that in 1996, between 350,000 and 400,000 foreigners were living in France in an irregular situation (Assemblée Nationale, 1996). The National Assembly produced figures in 1996 that were subsequently used by the Senate in 1998 and in 2006. More recently, Gourévitch (2010) estimated that over the past two years (2008-2010) a minimum of 350,000 and a maximum of 750,000 people were living in mainland France in an irregular situation. The author, who works for the French NGO ‘Contribuables Associés’ (‘associated taxpayers’) based these figures on his own (unquoted) ‘previous studies’ (Gourévitch, 2010: 15). During the recent strikes led by undocumented workers in Paris, representatives of the French trade union CGT estimated that up to 400,000 ‘*sans-papiers*’ were working in France, most of them under a work-contract and paying taxes (See for example, *Le Figaro*, 25/11/2009).

---

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 15 September 2011.



## Quantified targets

If the actual number of irregular migrants living and/or working in France remains unknown, the number of individuals who have been returned to their country of origin in the past years is one that is highly mediatised, as are quotas-based policies. In 2006, when Nicolas Sarkozy presented his circular on immigration and integration to the National Assembly, he argued: 'The fight against clandestine immigration is determined. Lengthened detention times and fixed annual targets for the number of individuals to be returned have resulted in a two-fold increase in the number of return measures effectively implemented: from 10,000 in 2002; to 12,000 in 2003; to 15,000 in 2004; to 20,000 in 2005. The Minister of Home Affairs has targeted 25,000 returns in 2006. To meet this target, we have increased the capacity of detention centres (from less than 1,000 places in 2002, to 2,500 places in 2007)<sup>23</sup>. In 2007 a total of 23,000 foreigners in an irregular situation were returned to their country of origin. The figures went up in 2008, when 29,799 people were deported<sup>24</sup>. Overall, the number of effective return measures tripled over six years. In 2009, the Minister of Immigration Eric Besson announced on the French radio station 'Europe 1' that 29,000 foreigners in an irregular situation had been returned to their country of origin<sup>25</sup>. If the figures went down in 2009, the number of effective return measures still exceeded the quotas imposed for the year.

It is worth noting that the cost of such a policy might be more than the cost of integrating foreign migrants. Blic (2007) is one of the few researchers who attempted to give an estimation of the cost of the fight against irregular migration. According to him, the amount spent has tripled between 2004 and 2005, and has continued rising since, to culminate at 687 million Euros in 2007. Most of this money goes to paying the salaries of civil servants in the air and border police, as well as to the maintenance of retention centres<sup>26</sup>. According to estimates, each deportation of a foreign migrant costs around 20 000 Euros<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>23</sup> 'La lutte contre l'immigration clandestine est déterminée. L'allongement de la durée de la rétention administrative et la fixation aux préfets d'objectifs annuels de reconduites à la frontière ont permis de doubler, en trois ans, le nombre de mesures d'éloignements exécutées: 10 000 en 2002, 12 000 en 2003, 15 000 en 2004 et 20 000 en 2005. L'objectif de 25 000 reconduites en 2006 a été fixé par le ministre d'État, ministre de l'intérieur et de l'aménagement du territoire. À cette fin, la capacité de rétention administrative est développée (moins de 1 000 places en 2002, 2 500 places en 2007).'

<sup>24</sup> See, for example: [http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/01/12/29-799-etrangers-reconduits-a-la-frontiere-en-2008\\_1141042\\_3224.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2009/01/12/29-799-etrangers-reconduits-a-la-frontiere-en-2008_1141042_3224.html)

<sup>25</sup> Le Monde quotes a National Assembly report stating that 4,346 of the 14,844 individuals effectively returned during the first semester of 2009 were Romanian, 1,552 were Algerian, and 1550 originally came from Morocco. See: [http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/01/07/29-000-sans-papiers-expulses-en-2009-par-la-france\\_1288854\\_3224.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2010/01/07/29-000-sans-papiers-expulses-en-2009-par-la-france_1288854_3224.html)

<sup>26</sup> Guiraudon, 2008, pp173-194 footnote 5, p.179

<sup>27</sup> Interview with Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 15 September 2011.

France's regularisation policy has therefore toughened over the years, on par with other dimensions of the migration policy – border control, asylum policy, etc. The succession of restrictive policies and massive regularisation programmes suggests that the latter act as a pressure valve to relieve the unavoidable contradictions that structure French (and European) migration politics – how can the economy pace up without an input of foreign labour in certain sectors? How can migration policies be reconciled with commitments in terms of human rights and children's rights? How can social life function at the local level if residents cannot be effectively integrated? It is now well known that entering the EU/a country clandestinely is just one possible route to irregularity, and that in fact most migrants in an irregular situation initially enter the EU/French territories legally. Furthermore, the frontier between legality and illegality is much more subtle than is made out in public and political debates. As Samers (2003) puts it: 'undocumented immigration as an analytical category is somewhat odd because it is in many respects an epiphenomenon of migration and citizenship policy'. Or, as many observers argue, undocumented immigration is produced. There can be no undocumented immigration without immigration policy, and thus those who are deemed to be 'illegal', 'irregular', '*sans-papiers*' or indeed 'undocumented' shift with the nature of immigration policy.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, undocumented immigration has two characteristics: it is intimately connected with the political economy of migration and citizenship more generally, but, precisely because of its epiphenomenal character, it also becomes an explicitly juridical and police matter.

---

<sup>28</sup> See: Black, 2003; and Cohen, 2003.

# Policy Scales in France: The Interplay between Local, National and EU Levels

---

## *Europe/France – a race to the bottom?*

‘Between 1996 and 2008, around 4.7 million persons applied for regularisation through 43 regularisation programmes (including de facto regularisation programmes) across 17 EU member states. During that period, the legal status of at least 3.2 million persons was recognised. (Carrera and Merlino, 2010: 16). The EU-funded REGINE project, which aimed to map regularisation practices across the EU-27 member states<sup>29</sup> shows therefore that ‘although some EU member states considered regularisation to be an exceptional policy’, they have frequently been used by European States. Furthermore, ‘the outcomes of regularisations and their impact have remained positive overall’<sup>30</sup>. However, EU Member States are still reluctant to accept any guideline from the EU in that field<sup>31</sup>, and European countries have different visions of regularisations: Spain and Italy have proceeded in large waves, whereas France, for instance, is much more cautious of using this tool.

Since the Schengen Agreements, the communautarisation of the immigration and asylum policies in Europe has moved forward, particularly concerning border control and the fight against irregular migration. Indeed, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) has moved immigration and asylum policies from the third to the first ‘community’

---

<sup>29</sup> THE REGINE project was funded by the DG JFS, and it was managed by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, from December 2007 to July 2008 (see the project website, <http://research.icmpd.org/1184.html>).

<sup>30</sup> In 2007, a report by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of the Council of Europe concluded that Spain’s 2005 regularisation programme was ‘a success’. Through this programme, a total of 570,000 persons were regularised in Spain in 2005.

<sup>31</sup> The 2007 report by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of the Council of Europe recommended that common guidelines on the use of such programmes be adopted by member states. In 2009, the Commission’s Communication COM(2009) 262 also recommended the use of common guidelines. For Carrera and Merlino (2010), ‘the fact that the latest draft of the Stockholm Programme does not make any reference to “guidelines” shows (once again) that member states are reluctant to accept any EU influence on this issue’ (2010, p.16).

pillar, thus granting the Commission and the Parliament more decision-making power on the issue, and paving the way for a more European immigration policy. The greater role granted to the Parliament has also had the effect of toughening the EU's policy on these issues.

As we mentioned earlier, the Dublin agreements of 1990 and 2003 toughened the asylum policy at the European level, notably with the establishment of the 'one stop one shop' rule obliging asylum seekers to make their application in their first country of entry.

In 2009, the European Council adopted the Stockholm programme, setting the EU's agenda on, *inter alia*, asylum, immigration and visa policy, until 2014. This coincided with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which established the qualified majority voting rule for illegal immigration. This programme enshrined the two structuring principles on which the current paradigm on migration policy is based: the fight against irregular migration (stricter border controls, suppression of massive regularisations, stricter return policies) and the objective of attracting highly qualified migrants on the EU territory (the European Union 'blue card', modelled on the American green card, the 'skills and talent' (*competences et talents*) permit in France, the immigration point system in the United Kingdom...).

The European immigration policy today has therefore distanced itself from the 'zero immigration' objective that dominated in the 90's, adopting a new philosophy by which migration flows are perceived as a valuable resource that can help palliate the demographic crisis, maintain the welfare state and fill in labour shortages in specific sectors of the economy. The objective then becomes one of attracting specific and particularly beneficial profiles, according to categories based on the administrative status of migrants (legal vs. illegal), the channels used to enter EU territory (employment-based immigration vs. family-based immigration, asylum seekers), and the skills that migrants possess (high skilled vs. low-skilled labour).

France played a role in the upload of this new policy paradigm at the European level. Indeed, it was Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of Home Affairs, which first introduced a distinction between 'immigration choisie' and 'immigration subie', in 2003. In 2006, during a hearing before the National Assembly, Mr. Sarkozy explained that his plan was to re-open French borders to employment-based immigration, whilst simultaneously fighting more openly irregular migration: 'In their country of origin, candidates to immigration need to be made well aware of the new policy. They need to know that from now on entering France in a clandestine manner or using a tourist visa and queuing at a prefecture counter will not lead to being granted long-term residency anymore'<sup>32</sup>. After years of hampering the distribution of employment-based permits, family-based visas are now the ones being threatened.

---

<sup>32</sup> 'La nouvelle politique doit être bien comprise par les candidats à l'immigration, dans les pays d'origine. Ils doivent savoir que, désormais, on ne pourra plus entrer

French decision-makers took advantage of their endorsing the rolling presidency of the Council of the European Union, from the 1<sup>st</sup> of July to the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 2008, to upload this new policy at the European level and adopt a set of legally binding instruments. Amongst these are the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum<sup>33</sup>, the 'Return Directive'<sup>34</sup>, the 'Employers' Sanction Directive'<sup>35</sup> and common border control instruments. These directives in turn enabled France to strengthen the securitary dimension of its migration policy by allowing the extension of the maximum detention time in European administrative retention centres to 18 months (France extended its maximum retention time from 32 to 45 days).

Despite this toughening of European immigration policy, French policy seems to be moving a step ahead from its European counterparts. On a number of occasions, different representatives of the European Union's authority have had to curb the virulence of French immigration policy. The scathing criticisms addressed by Viviane Reding, Justice Commissioner, to the French government with regards to its treatment of Roma people, in September 2010, are still vividly remembered. On the 28<sup>th</sup> of April 2011<sup>36</sup>, and in response to a case raised by an undocumented migrant in Italy, the European Court of Justice stated that member states could not detain undocumented migrants on the sole basis that they had not obeyed an order to leave the territory. This decision applies to France, and restrains the growing criminalisation of irregular stay.

And indeed, it seems that the European immigration policy sometimes appears too lax for the actual French government. On the 26<sup>th</sup> of April 2011, in the midst of the 'Arab revolutions', Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that the application of the Schengen treaty needed to be suspended, after Italy granted about 20,000 short-term (3 months) 'Schengen visas'. The fear of an unmanageable migration influx was raised again, even though it was never backed by any data,

---

en France clandestinement ou grâce à un visa de tourisme, et espérer obtenir, contre toute logique, en faisant la queue à un guichet de préfecture, un titre de séjour permettant de s'installer durablement.' Audition de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, ministre d'État, ministre de l'Intérieur et de l'aménagement du territoire sur le projet de loi relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration, Commission des Lois Constitutionnelles, de la Législation et de l'Administration Générale de la République, Compte Rendu N° 36, 29<sup>th</sup> of March 2006. Available from: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/cr-cloi/05-06/c0506036.asp>

<sup>33</sup> Available from: <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/eu-european-pact-on-immigration-verll.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (Official Journal of the EU, 24/12/2008).

<sup>35</sup> Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for minimum standards on sanctions against employers of third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory.

<sup>36</sup> CJUE, Première Chambre, 28 April 2011, Hassen El Dridi alias Soufi Karim

and the influx of migrants from countries undergoing a revolution was eventually low (less than 30,000 Tunisians, and ever fewer Libyans)<sup>37</sup>.

There is therefore no real common immigration strategy at the European level, even though some progress was made and actors recognise it would be a positive step. Some analysts believe that the 2008 Pact could provide the basis for an improved common policy. Despite this lack of momentum at the European level, there is a certain degree of interplay between the European and national levels, and France seems to be one of the actors pushing the European Union towards a tougher and more differentiated immigration policy (the '*immigration choisie*' concept). In this regard, both France and the European Union are faced with an implementation challenge, residing in the need to open up frontiers to a foreign workforce called for by firms all over Europe, whilst legitimising such a policy to European citizens, predominantly supportive of a tougher immigration policy (Duez, 2008; Bertossi, 2009).

## **National level/local level**

The interplay between the national and the local level in France is characterised by a tension between distributed authorities (those authorities representing the state at the local level, such as prefects) and decentralised authorities (regional authorities, town halls). Indeed, in the implementation of migration policies, the discretionary power of distributed authorities is very strong, and has become increasingly structured by the state. The result is an application of migration policies that is often in tension with local situations and needs in terms of integration and the creation of a 'successful' society at the local level.

### **The power of distributed authorities**

The granting of residence permits in France depends disproportionately on the prefecture (departmental authority) of the department in which the migrant gives his application, and on the civil servants at the prefecture counters. Spire shows that central decisions in the regularisation process are now devolved to such civil servants (Spire, 2008), such as the appreciation of a satisfactory level of integration on part of the migrant applying for a ten-year residency. Students applying for student visas now have to undergo an interview with civil servants from the *Centre pour les Etudes en France* (CEF – Centres for studies in France), in which their academic project or potential interest for the French economy is assessed. Similarly, employment-based applications are evaluated by employees of the *Direction regionale des entreprises, de la concurrence, de la consommation, du travail et de l'emploi*, a regional administrative structure, who

---

<sup>37</sup> Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Interview with the author, 15 September 2011.

assess the economic need for the profile of the applying migrant, and can decide on the nature of the work contract to be given. The focus on irregular immigration that has developed in recent years has even led to the recruitment of new civil servants in charge of the implementation of the migration policy amongst social workers, work inspectors, or members of the national employment agency.

This move towards a greater power of local level state representatives was complemented by an adjusted evaluation process: if local distributed authorities are in charge of the implementation of the national migration policy, the results of such a policy should be measured at the local level also. Prefects are therefore given additional means and powers to carry out their mandate, but are also sanctioned if nationally-set targets are not met<sup>38</sup>. The French newspaper *Le Parisien* revealed in June 2010 that, since 2009, prefects had been given financial incentives in the form of bonuses to respect the quotas set by the Ministry of Home Affairs in terms of deportation of irregular migrants. This evolution was felt at the local level through an increased repressive activity from police forces (577,816 people were put in custody in 2008, which represents a 55% increase over 8 years).

The increase in the power of local state representatives can have the result of blurring application procedures, to the point that it has become impossible for applicants or NGOs supporting migrants to know whether the latter's applications will be accepted. Procedures can vary greatly from one case to the next, based on the civil servant processing the application. Moreover, the growing power of local state representatives has the effect of separating regularisation procedures from more general policies designed to ensure the development or maintenance of a 'successful' society at the local level: policies relating to integration, housing, education, access to healthcare, etc.

### **Tension with local decentralised authorities and the development of new forms of action**

On a very basic level, the increased opacity of application procedures in prefectures creates a deleterious atmosphere, in which all applicants fear deportation, and NGO volunteers a criminalisation of their support to applicants.

---

<sup>38</sup> About the nomination and revocation of prefects by the President Nicolas Sarkozy, see:

[http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/22/la-valse-des-prefets-s-accelere-depuis-2007\\_1391194\\_823448.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/22/la-valse-des-prefets-s-accelere-depuis-2007_1391194_823448.html);

[http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/23/un-prefet-n-est-pas-la-que-pour-diriger-la-police\\_1391425\\_823448.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/23/un-prefet-n-est-pas-la-que-pour-diriger-la-police_1391425_823448.html);

[http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/27/quand-sarkozy-rudoie-les-prefets-rassemble-a-l-elysee-avec-leurs-epouses\\_1392503\\_823448.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/27/quand-sarkozy-rudoie-les-prefets-rassemble-a-l-elysee-avec-leurs-epouses_1392503_823448.html).

On the links between prefectural and police institutions, see:

[http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/23/un-prefet-n-est-pas-la-que-pour-diriger-la-police\\_1391425\\_823448.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2010/07/23/un-prefet-n-est-pas-la-que-pour-diriger-la-police_1391425_823448.html)

More generally, ‘cities and municipalities often have to pay the price for failed integration processes – although they are not in control of immigration flows and depend on national and federal legislation in all immigration related issues.’ (Borkert et al., 2007: v). Local decentralised authorities therefore often have to deal with vulnerable populations, generally in poor health and in need of social assistance in terms of housing, access to education, etc. Administrative courts in suburbs bordering Paris are overwhelmed by cases of undocumented migrants, and see their activity cannibalised by deportation procedures. Migrants in an irregular situation can wait for months before having their case settled, thus remaining in a precarious, undocumented, situation, which prevents them from becoming fully ‘productive’ members of their locality. In Paris, a small public garden in the northeast of the city, the ‘*square Villemain*’, was occupied for months by a group of Afghan ‘neither-nors’ who would not be regularised but who could not be sent back to their country of origin either, for humanitarian reasons. Families, children and youth camped in the open with no access to common amenities, education or legal employment opportunities, and some social unrest derived from it. Recently, the president of the General Council of Seine-Saint-Denis, a department with a large number of undocumented migrants, announced that his department would no longer accept undocumented migrant youths because of the overload of dedicated infrastructures and the lack of financial resources to manage the influx. A member of the Socialist Party, the President, Claude Bartolone, stated that he would change his position only if the national government allocated extra resources to decentralised authorities, to manage an issue that was largely created by the government’s strict migration policies<sup>39</sup>.

The social fabric at the local level is further weakened by the turn towards employment-based regularisations in France’s migration policy. Indeed, and as we have already seen before, new mobilisations strategies emerged among the undocumented migrant workers populations, modelled on the traditional strategies of workers: strikes, and the occupation of strategic economic structures. Such mobilisations, however, are not always supported by traditional charitable NGOs (Portier, 1995). Claims to solidarity shift from being based on social, family or housing rights, to being based on employment rights – from social justice to economic justice. In that sense, even if such mobilisations do highlight the exclusion suffered by immigrant populations, they focus on economic exclusion, hiding by the same token the social causes of exclusion, and separating their action from local policies (relating to housing, education, etc.) (Lévy and Fijalkow, 2010: 122-123).

---

<sup>39</sup> See the article by L. Thouny in the newspaper *Libération* : <http://www.liberation.fr/societe/01012358897-que-deviennent-les-mineurs-etrange-isoles-de-seine-saint-denis>



## Local Case Study: Paris

---

The well-known centralisation of France's political, administrative and economic structures logically applies for mobilisation on migration issues. The French capital has been the figurehead of most of the political battles carried out on the issue of 'illegal' immigration, and the mobilisations that have taken place there have often emulated other localities.

Although the number of irregular migrants living and/or working in Paris remains unknown, some have argued that the city is marked by a high rate of illegal migration, which would be even higher than in other European cities (see: Borkert et al., 2007: 51). Several factors contribute to explaining these migration and settlement patterns. In general, irregular migrants live in large cities and capitals. Whilst rural regions like north-east Italy, Catalonia, Andalusia, or the French wine-growing regions 'may have large concentrations of undeclared workers, sometimes intermittently, at harvest time or for other labour-intensive agricultural work, capitals are the headquarters of public services, international organisations and NGOs responsible for managing specific populations (asylum seekers, statutory refugees, administrative legalisation), as well as of the main employers, and provide an anonymous environment more favourable to many informal or illegal activities' (Tapia, 2002: 36). Established ethnic networks and communities also contribute to explain the Paris settlement, both factors working together.

### *The state of undocumented migrants in Paris*

In Paris, one resident out of 6 is an 'immigrant'. The largest immigrant community in France is Portuguese, followed by Algerian immigrants, first, second or third generation. Other former colonies provide the rest of the bulk of immigrants, while Paris also boasts a long-standing tradition of Chinese immigrants, which came into the country in subsequent waves and settled in different areas of Paris as they arrived (the traditional 'Chinatown' in the 13<sup>th</sup> arrondissement was complemented later on by a settlement in the 'Belleville' area, in the North of Paris). Paris has also experienced 'new immigration', with populations from countries such as Afghanistan, Irak, Iran... The closing down of the Sangatte settlement in December 2002, as well as that of the so-called 'jungle' in and around Calais, strengthened these immigration movements from countries in a political turmoil.

Another ‘new’ immigration pattern affecting Paris is one composed of Roma people, originating in their majority from Romania and Bulgaria. These migrants have a paradoxical status because they are citizens of the EU, and therefore allowed to travel within the bounds of the Schengen Agreement, but are considered by authorities to be within the bounds of “illegality”.

The comprehensive social security programme that is available to French citizens also extends, to some extent, to undocumented migrants. It provides the latter populations with minimal access to healthcare in Paris, although it must be said that the protection given by the AME (*Aide Médicale d’Etat*), accessible to the most vulnerable populations, is getting increasingly thin. Children of undocumented families can also attend French schools and, in a lot of cases, can benefit from free meals at the canteen, just as other children from families with limited revenues.

The widespread mobilisation around the issue of undocumented migrants in Paris encouraged a greater participation of undocumented migrants to political activities. The feeling of being a ‘second-class’ citizen and the fear of social exposure, which are current amongst undocumented migrants, can be softened by the participation in affirmative and dedicated political or social mobilisations, and have a socialising effect on the undocumented migrants themselves. This has been the case in the ‘Belleville’ neighbourhood, where a large Chinese community lives. The action of the RESF NGO (*Réseau Education Sans Frontières*, an NGO concerned with children in undocumented families) in helping Chinese families with their regularisation procedures and assisting them in the case of an arrest or a transfer in a detention centre created strong links across communities at the local level, and encouraged political participation in demonstrations and other types of mobilisations.

Despite those positive indicators, the general situation of undocumented migrants tends to be very precarious. The lack of residency or working permits greatly hampers migrants’ chances of finding a stable employment, and thus being able to support themselves and/or their families sustainably. Moreover, public structures dedicated to caring for the most vulnerable members of the French society, such as the *Samu Social*, are themselves suffering from budgetary cuts which are hampering their capacity to assist vulnerable populations, amongst which figure prominently undocumented migrants. Work on the ground shows that it is becoming increasingly difficult for homeless undocumented migrants, families or individuals, to secure a stable place to sleep. A number of undocumented migrants also do not speak French, or not well enough to ‘function’ properly at the local level, at least at first. Finally, a number of undocumented migrants can be in a poor state of mental health upon arrival, or after having experienced their undocumented status for a few months. A number of migrants in this situation feel that they cannot start their ‘real’ life without papers: a residency or a work permit would give them the right and the chance to find an

employment, but it would also legitimise their stay in France, and enable them to participate fully in the life of the locality they are in, without fearing police controls and deportation. The undocumented status has a strong psychological impact on migrants, who often develop more or less serious depressive or anxiety disorders, which become an additional hurdle on their path to citizenship. Even more worrying in a long-term perspective are the disorders developed by children in undocumented families, who very often serve as interpreters for their parents in their dealings with the French administration, and therefore have to shoulder a large part of their parents' stress, fears and anxieties at a young age.

## ***Paris vs. the national migration policy?***

The term '*sans-papiers*', was popularised in 1996 in Paris, during one of the most emblematic mobilisations for the regularisation of undocumented migrants: the occupation of the St Bernard church in the 18<sup>th</sup> '*arrondissement*' (neighbourhoods) of Paris. And in fact, most of the symbolic battles that happened on this issue took place in Paris.

There are a number of reasons for this. As we mentioned earlier, Paris is the capital of a very centralised country, and hence the great majority of civil society organisations, administrative structures, job offers, established migrant communities... are located in Paris. More specifically, the French capital has, for the past decade, been governed by a left-wing cabinet staunchly opposed, *inter alia*, to the government's right-wing policies on immigration issues. Moreover, the local town halls of Paris' '*arrondissements*' in which the largest migrant populations have settled tend to be governed by left-wing teams as well.

The massive mobilisation around the issue of undocumented migrants in Paris began in the 90's, as a protest against the passing of the aforementioned Pasqua-Debré laws. Large numbers of undocumented migrants, supported by NGOs and church representatives, took to the streets and started off hunger strikes and the occupation of churches. The two main events of this mobilisation were the consecutive occupations of the St Ambroise church, in the East of the city, and of the St Bernard church, where about 300 undocumented migrants settled, and were evacuated by the police after 40 days of occupation. This movement marked the beginning of the interest of the media for the issue of undocumented migrants, spurred by the mass involvement of citizens and the participation of sponsors from the political or artistic sectors, which would remain constant over the years.

These events marked the beginning of the mobilisation of NGOs and citizens in Paris around the issue of undocumented migrants. The Paris Diocese and the Protestant federation of Paris became strongly involved, as did NGOs such as Ras l'front, le Mrap,

la Cimade, Médecins du Monde, GISTI, who were instrumental in establishing links between the movement and the political realm. Intellectual and artists also put forward the concept of 'civil disobedience' to justify supporting undocumented migrants by providing them with assistance and accommodation against the law.

The position of the French Mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, on this issue has overall been one of a moral and political support for the fight of undocumented migrants, and a criticism of the migration policy carried out by the national government, but with little specific actions on the ground apart from the general protection granted to vulnerable populations in Paris. A public declaration of support can, however, have some tangible effects on the grounds, as it sheds the public light on the mobilisation at hand, thus preventing massive police controls and pressurising the national government to take action. Bertrand Delanoë for example publicly voiced his concern that only a third of the families that had given in their application as part of the 2006 circular on the regularisation of undocumented parents of children attending French schools would be successful. During the months-long strike of foreign migrants led by the CGT, in 2009-2010, Bertrand Delanoë questioned the government's migration policies, emphasising the very difficult living conditions of such populations, and the negative impact of tough policies on the economy and solidarity at the local level. In the spring of 2010, he asked that all undocumented migrants be treated in a 'humane way', and that they be received by the Minister of Employment, Eric Woerth, and given clear and consistent regularisation criteria. Very recently, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of April 2011, the Mayor of Paris declared being shocked at the arrest of Tunisian immigrants waiting to be given food in Paris. He also expressed his support to Tunisian migrants fleeing the revolution, and promised to grant them housing opportunities. One of the specific actions that the Paris town hall did engage in is the '*parrainage républicain*', or 'republican godfather/mothering' of children in undocumented families, of which we will talk more about later. The Mayor of Paris received a delegation of sponsored families in the town hall, and 'godfathered' a family of undocumented migrants in 2009.

But the only parties supporting the regularisation of undocumented migrants today are the Green Party and the Communist Party (PC), and local town halls of the city remain more active on the ground than the general Paris town hall. Since the 1997 massive regularisation carried out by the Jospin government, no massive operation of its kind has been carried out. But grassroots movements have continued to develop strongly, around two main poles: a family-based mobilisation around children in schools and their families, a strand of activities mostly organised around the work of RESF, and an employment-based mobilisation around foreign workers whose action is mostly structured by the CGT trade union.

## ***Mass mobilisation: a regularisation strategy at the local level?***

Faced with the toughening of migration policy and the growing arbitrary of decisions in prefectures, a number of NGOs seem to have opted for a strategy of mass mobilisation, as a way of regaining some leverage on the executive. Two examples are interesting in this respect.

The first one relates to the actions deployed by trade unions, and mostly the CGT, to obtain the regularisations of foreign workers. We have seen that such mobilisations have grown in frequency and scope, to the point that they have now become a 'traditional' tool in foreign workers' regularisation strategies. These mass mobilisations often take the form of occupations and/or strikes. In April 2008 for example, more than 500 undocumented migrants of the catering sector went on strike, structured by the CGT. And in 2009-2010, as we have seen, 6,000 migrants went on strike for 9 months, occupying various places, to negotiate clearer regularisation criteria – which they obtained, following a negotiation with the then minister of Immigration Eric Besson (even though the agreement was later weakened). Mobilisations around employment-based regularisation also increasingly involve CEOs, whose firm's activities are hampered by the occupation of premises or the strike of a part of the workforce.

A second example is the strategy developed by RESF, a decentralised network of support for undocumented families, structured around the schools that the children of undocumented families attend. The founding principle of this original and innovative organisation is that undocumented migrants need to be protected through social integration, and the construction of a social fabric of friends or colleagues that will testify of their good integration to the French administration and will be quickly and powerfully mobilised in case of a problem (custody, detention, etc.). Faced with the growing difficulties in obtaining permits, which have been noted on the ground, RESF has spontaneously opted for a strategy of mass mobilisation in 'crisis' situations. In the event that an undocumented migrant is arrested, a process is set into motion in which a strong and relentless pressure is put on the administrative authorities concerned. Emails are sent on a common mailing list giving all the necessary information to activists to prepare and send faxes to the attention of the police office/the prefecture and flood the latter with phone calls. This strategy has a surprising ratio of success, and can often ensure that the arrested undocumented migrant come out of the police office rather rapidly. In the case that he is sent to a retention centre, the same strategy is put into place, and can be accompanied by small demonstrations at the airport if a deportation procedure is implemented. Interestingly, such demonstrations have raised awareness on the issue amongst cabin crew and employees working in airports, and in some cases, the undocumented migrant was brought off the plane

following the refusal of the pilot or some of the passengers to fly the plane with a cuffed person at the back. In less dramatic situations, it is also common that groups of friends or colleagues accompany an undocumented migrant to the prefecture for the presentation of his permit application, as a way of showing the civil servant at the counter – who has an important discretionary power in deciding on the fate of the application – that the application he or she is reviewing is that of an integrated foreigner, whose life is now firmly established in Paris.

Another strategy that is developing at the local level around RESF, though on a smaller scale, is that of developing local citizenship criteria through a process known as '*parrainage républicain*', or 'republican godfather/mothering'. This sponsorship is based on a 'godfather/mothering' ceremony that takes place in local Paris town halls, churches, schools, cinemas, and even at the French Senate, in which two 'documented' French citizens – often a member of RESF or of a school and a political representative – agree to 'godfather/mother' a family of undocumented migrants. This process has a dual objective of establishing a referent for a specific family, who will be in charge of coordinating actions of support – from support in the creation of a regularisation application to the coordination of a rescue strategy in case of an arrest – and of establishing a proof of the family's social integration, to the attention of civil servants at the prefecture counter. Godfathers/mothers also offer a moral support that is essential to the good health of undocumented migrants.

## Afterword

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of September 2011, a building to be demolished in the city of Pantin, on the outskirts of Paris, took fire. Of the 30 squatters that occupied it at the time; mostly migrants recently arrived from Egypt and Tunisia, four were burned to death and two died from smoke inhalation.

If France has demonstrated its political support for the Arab revolutions since their inception, on a domestic level the fears of an invasion of migrants and an increase in crime levels have been consistently ramped up by members of the government. In April 2011, Italy and France evoked the possibility of re-establishing border control within the Schengen space, as a temporary measure to manage migration flows from Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – migration flows which have remained very low: less than 30,000 Tunisians, and even fewer Libyans<sup>40</sup>. France also sent back to Italy a number of migrants whose financial resources were judged insufficient, and as we have seen, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was emulated

---

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 15 September 2011.

by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, warned against the possible dangers generated by migration from the Arab spring countries, and reiterated his desire to be firm in managing it.

At the local level, assistance to migrants fleeing the revolutions, amongst which the provision of shelter, was suspended on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September – the Paris town hall had voted an emergency support plan that lasted from April to August. As a result, a number of migrants found themselves without a shelter, occupying a number of different locations (gymnasiums, town hall buildings, squats), from which they were regularly expelled by local authorities. It is probable that the migrants who inhabited the squat in Pantin had themselves transited through a number of these temporary shelters.

This event illustrates both the discrepancy between official discourses on migration and reality on the ground – political support to the Arab spring; low levels of immigration from Arab spring countries; legal entry of the majority of recent immigrants who benefitted from a six months residence permit from the Italian government, allowing them to travel freely within the Schengen area – and between national and local policies: actors in both levels evade their responsibilities in this event, blaming smugglers and the policies of the government, respectively. Beyond the tragedy of such an event, such discrepancies generate a heavily inefficient outcome by weighing disproportionately on the most vulnerable actors.

## Conclusion

---

In April 2011, Claude Guéant, minister of Home Affairs, declared wanting to diminish the permits for employment-based immigration, even after the adoption of the '*immigration choisie*' principle. Private sector representatives were quick to voice their concerns about such a policy, considering the labour shortages faced by certain sectors of the French economy. This short example exemplifies both the inadequacy of French migration policy, tightly linked to trends in the public opinion, and its negative interplay with non-state actors at the local level – here private sector actors.

The toughening of migration policies and regularisation procedures in France has, somehow involuntarily, empowered actors at the local level (politics, NGOs, trade unions) to constitute themselves into an opposition force. But if the position of the government on the regularisation process is very clear – no massive regularisations and stricter criteria for individual procedures – the position of local non-state actors on regularisation is not homogeneous. Trade unions and foreign worker movements advocate for sectorialised regularisations, local NGOs fight for case-by-case regularisations and political parties tend not to support massive regularisation procedures, with a few exceptions.

Progress towards an effective and legitimate migration policy seems increasingly to stumble on the regularisation proposition. One possible way out could be the establishment of a true migration and integration framework at the EU level. According to Tapinos (1994) and Venturini (2004), national regularisation policies are 'costly in terms of the budget, equipment and human resources marshalled in the 'militarization of borders', police investigations and deportations; and they are ineffective as they have shown scarce results in view of the exponential efforts expended towards prevention or repression (or both)', and costly in terms of their human rights implications (Carrera and Formisano, 2005: 9). The authors conclude that: 'A common and comprehensive approach on regular migration (i.e. a regulated labour market in the EU) would ... partly contribute to the prevention of irregular migration. The establishment of an institutional and organisational framework for the admission and access to a 'secure status' by irregular workers who are bound by clandestine and exploitative circumstances might be a key element for providing an optimal solution.' (Carrera and Formisano, 2005: 9).

Another path that could potentially position itself as an alternative to the fight for regularisation, is the basing of political



membership, or the 'right to the city' on presence rather than nationality – as illustrated by the 'republican godfather/mothering' example: 'inhabitation replaces national citizenship as the basis for membership, which unhinges the right to the city from the national scale, from the sovereignty of the nation-state, and from the nation as the primary political community.' (Purcell, 203: 578).

## Bibliography

---

Barron, P., Bory, A., Chauvin, S., Jounin, N., Tourette, L., 2011. *On bosse ici, on reste ici. La grève des sans-papiers, une aventure inédite*. Paris: La découverte.

Bertossi, C. (ed.), 2009. 'How can Europeans agree on a Common Migration Policy?', *Report of the Ifri/Barrow Cadbury Trust 'Anglo-French Policy Dialogue on Regularisation and Co-Development'*. Paris: Notes de l'Ifri.

Big Browser, "Il faut nous signaler toute personne d'apparence pays de l'Est", 9 février 2011. Available from: <http://bigbrowser.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/02/09/facies-il-faut-nous-signaler-toute-personne-dapparence-pays-de-lest-dna/>

Black, R., 2003. 'Breaking the convention: researching the "illegal" migration of refugees to Europe', *Antipode* 35(1), 34–54.

Blic de, D., 2007, 'Sans-papiers: l'autre "chiffre" de la politique d'expulsion', *Mouvements*, March 2007. Available from: <http://www.mouvements.info/Sans-papiers-l-autre-chiffre-de-la.html>

Borraz, O., Guiraudon, V., 2008 (eds.). *Politiques publiques 1, La France dans la gouvernance européenne*. Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.

Cohen, S., 2003. *No-one Is Illegal: Essays on Asylum and Immigration Control*. Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham.

Collovald A., 2004. *Le 'Populisme du FN', un dangereux contresens*, Paris: Editions du Croquant.

Colyer, M., 2001. 'Is there any difference between documented and undocumented migration? An analysis of the EU's "comprehensive migration policy" with reference to Algerian migrants in the UK and France'. Paper prepared for the 7<sup>th</sup> IRAP Conference, Johannesburg, January 2001.

Duez, D., 2008. *L'Union européenne et l'immigration clandestine: de la sécurité intérieure à la construction de la communauté politique*. Bruxelles : Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

Fassin D., Morice A., Quiminal C. (eds.), 1997. *Les Lois de l'inhospitalité : les politiques de l'immigration à l'épreuve des sans-papiers*. Paris: La Découverte.

Future Group, 2008, 'Freedom, Security, Privacy – European Home Affairs in an Open World', Report of the Informal High Level

Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy, Brussels, June 2008.

Gillet, C., 2007, 'Chinese Immigration in Paris: Realities of an Underworld', *The Wall Street Journal*, 13 August 2007. Available from: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118680079015394988.html>

Guiraudon, V., 2008, 'Les politiques de gestion des frontières et de l'immigration', *In* : Olivier Borraz and Virginie Guiraudon (eds.), *Politiques publiques, 1 La France dans la gouvernance européenne*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, 173-194.

Lagroye, J., 2003, 'Les processus de politisation', *In* : J. Lagroye (ed.), *La politisation*, Paris, Belin, 2003.

Laurens S., 2006, 'Le racisme, attribut du populaire ?', *Plein Droit*, n°69.

Laurens, S., 2009. *Une politisation feutrée. Les hauts fonctionnaires et l'immigration en France (1962-1981)*. Paris: Belin.

Legoux, L., 1995. *La Crise de l'asile politique en France*. Paris, Centre Population et Développement (CEPED).

LeMonde.fr, "La Mairie de Paris demande aux migrants tunisiens de quitter un gymnase", 19th May 2011. Available from: [http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/05/19/la-mairie-de-paris-demande-aux-migrants-tunisiens-de-quitter-un-gymnase\\_1524709\\_3224.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/05/19/la-mairie-de-paris-demande-aux-migrants-tunisiens-de-quitter-un-gymnase_1524709_3224.html)

Lochak D., 1997. 'Les politiques de l'immigration au prisme de la législation sur les étrangers', *in*

Fassin D., Morice A., Quiminal C. (dirs.), *Les Lois de l'inhospitalité : les politiques de l'immigration à l'épreuve des sans-papiers*, Paris, La Découverte, 1997.

Lochak, D., 1998. 'L'immigration, une question trop sensible', Paris: PUF. Available from: <http://www.gisti.org/doc/presse/1998/lochak/question.htm1>

Lochak, D., 2006. 'Le tri des étrangers : un discours récurrent', *Plein Droit* n° 69, July 2006. Available from: <http://www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/69/tri.html>

Marie, C.V., 1983, 'L'Immigration Clandestine en France et le Travail Clandestin des Etrangers en France à travers la Régularisation des "sans-papiers" de 1981-1982', Report for Mr Pierre Beregovoy, Minister of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, September 1983.

Marie, C.V., 1983, 'L'Immigration clandestine en France', *Travail et Emploi* n°17, July 1983. Available from : [http://www.travail-emploi-sante.gouv.fr/publications/Revue\\_Travail-et-Emploi/pdf/17\\_2215.pdf](http://www.travail-emploi-sante.gouv.fr/publications/Revue_Travail-et-Emploi/pdf/17_2215.pdf)

Marie, C.V., 1984, 'De la clandestinité à l'insertion professionnelle régulière. Le devenir des travailleurs étrangers régularisés', *Travail et Emploi* n°22, December 1984.

[http://www.travail-emploi-sante.gouv.fr/publications/Revue\\_Travail-et-Emploi/pdf/22\\_2252.pdf](http://www.travail-emploi-sante.gouv.fr/publications/Revue_Travail-et-Emploi/pdf/22_2252.pdf)

Masson, P., Balarello, J., 1998. Commission d'enquête sur les régularisations d'étrangers en situation irrégulière, Rapport 470 (97-98), Tome I, Available from: [http://www.senat.fr/rap/197-4701/197-4701\\_mono.html](http://www.senat.fr/rap/197-4701/197-4701_mono.html)

Maillard de, Jacques, 2010, "Les Politiques de Sécurité", In : Olivier Borraz and Virginie Guiraudon (eds.), *Politiques Publiques 2, Changer la société*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2010, 57-77.

Midi Libre, 25 April 2011, 'Nîmes Le parcours des Tunisiens du centre de rétention renvoyés en Italie', available from: <http://www.midilibre.fr/2011/04/25/nice-nimes-le-parcours-des-tunisiens-renvoyes-en-italie,309171.php>

Noiriel, G., 1995. Des étrangers bien encombrants, *Plein Droit* n°29-30.

Rodier, C., 1998. 'Les délices du droit régalien. 1947–1997 : 50 ans de régularisations', *Plein Droit* n° 38, avril 1998. Available from: <http://www.gisti.org/doc/plein-droit/38/delices.html>

Samers, M., 2003, "Invisible Capitalism: political economy and the regulation of undocumented immigration in France." *Economy and Society*, Vol.32 (4), 555-583.

Schor, R., 1985. *L'opinion française et les étrangers, 1919-1939*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.

Schor R., 1996. 'L'extrême droite française et les immigrés en temps de crise. Années trente - années quatre vingts', *Revue européenne de migrations internationales*, Vol.12 (2) 1996.

Secrétariat general du comité interministériel du contrôle de l'immigration, Rapport au Parlement, Les orientations de la politique de l'immigration et de l'intégration, Septième Rapport établi en application de l'article I. 111-10 du code de l'entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d'asile, Available from: <http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/RapportCIC17eme.pdf>

Spires, A., 2005. 'L'application du droit des étrangers en préfecture', *Politix*, n°69, 11-37.

Spire, A., 2008. *Accueillir ou reconduire. Enquête sur les guichets de l'immigration*. Paris: Raisons d'agir.

Valluy, J., 2008. 'Du retournement de l'asile (1948-2008) à la xénophobie de gouvernement: construction d'un objet d'étude', *Cultures & Conflits* n°69, 81-111. Available from: <http://conflits.revues.org/index10752.html?file=1>

OECD, Sopemi France 2010: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/45627895.pdf>