

les notes de l'ifri

n° 6 bis

série transatlantique

**Where Does the Atlantic Alliance Stand?
The Improbable Partnership**

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Translated by David Lyman Neal

1999

Institut français des relations internationales

The Transatlantic programme is organised
with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States

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First published in French:
Où en est l'Alliance atlantique ? L'improbable partenariat
(© Ifri, November 1998)

© All rights reserved, Ifri, Paris, 1999
ISBN 2-86592-069-0
ISSN 1272-9914

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Introduction

In April 1999, the Atlantic Alliance will have been in existence for half a century. The Heads of State and Government of the 16 current Member States and of 3 new Member States will meet in Washington to celebrate the event. This fiftieth anniversary would in itself justify giving thought to the state of the Alliance, be it only to endeavour to go beyond the clichés generally voiced in such circumstances. Of course – and we will inevitably be reminded of this on such an occasion –, the longevity of the institution is in itself the proof of its “success”: how many alliances, throughout history, can pride themselves on such a long life and above all on having overcome the threat which initially justified their creation?

If now is an opportune moment to analyse the current state of Transatlantic relations, it is first of all because a phase in NATO history has no doubt come to an end. Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO’s future gave rise to three major questions: what should its “*raison d’être*” be now that bipolar confrontation had ended? Its geographical contours? Its internal balances? In less than a decade, substantive answers have been supplied to these questions: by defining new NATO missions, by inviting three CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries) to join, and by fixing the modalities for its internal adaptation, the Madrid summit in July 1997 brought to a close a cycle opened in 1989-1990.

What are the chronological sequences of what is generally called a “transition phase”? What were the strategic issues at stake? Above all,

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how was the Madrid result reached, and at what price? The first part of this paper aims to map out an interpretative outline of this turbulent and sometimes critical period immediately following the Cold War.

This look at the decade which is drawing to a close is an indispensable precondition for any serious reflection on the present state of Transatlantic relations. The climate of Atlanticist optimism or even euphoria following the Madrid summit appeared to announce a cloudless future. With hindsight, however, matters appear in a different light. Not only did the Madrid “happy ending” fail to erase the serious crises which the Alliance had already weathered, but when one gives the matter real thought, the answers that the Allies provided to questions raised in the immediate post-Cold War period all represent new challenges: just how far can the Atlantic Alliance be extended? How far can its missions evolve? To what extent can its internal structure be adapted? These are all uncertainties which, in the years to come, could bring the United States into conflict with its allies or even lead to new crises: they constitute the focus of the second part.

Can such crises be avoided? Can one imagine a “new partnership” between the United States and Europe which would make it possible to remedy the persistent asymmetries in the Transatlantic relationship and allow the Alliance to face these future challenges collectively? Behind this set of questions is the entire question of Euro-American balances. It is not new: the reader will recall the proposals by Kennedy in 1962 and those by Kissinger in 1973, but it could come back onto the agenda of NATO debate, as some US experts are proposing. Is such a new “grand debate” conceivable and what result can one expect from such a debate in present circumstances? At least from the politico-strategic point of view, can the solution to this structural problem of Euro-US relations be found within the framework of the Alliance as it has existed for the past half-

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century? The third part of this essay attempts to provide a partial response to these questions.

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For some, the end of bloc confrontation posed the question of the very existence of an institution which lost its “*raison d’être*” as soon as the disappearance of the threat which had given rise to its creation had disappeared. For others, on the contrary, the very success of the Alliance justified its preservation. In no time at all, the second school of thought prevailed: there has been virtually no debate on NATO’s existence after the end of the Cold War. The dismantling of the bloc system did however raise at least three questions which, if not existential, were at least fundamental: that of the geographic contours of the Alliance; that of its functions; and lastly, that of its internal balances. These three sets of problems, closely linked from a historical and strategic point of view, have constituted the backdrop for the Transatlantic debate during the past decade and supply a perspective for interpreting the development of the Atlantic Alliance since 1989. Three successive periods may be clearly differentiated in this chronology: the one immediately following the Cold War and characterised by a return to the “troubled partnership” (1989-1992); the one that led from these misunderstandings to the very serious Atlantic crisis in the middle of the decade (1992-1995); lastly, the one which led to the resolution of the crisis at the Madrid summit and its consequences (1995-1997/1998).

■ The Troubled Partnership – Again

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- The question of NATO's contours was the first which arose soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the time, it came down to the problem of NATO membership for a united Germany. Admittedly, the aim in 1989-1990 was to "flank" Germany rather than to "enlarge" NATO: if the Germans and their allies, led by the Americans, demanded that united Germany be allowed to participate in NATO and if the Soviets finally accepted this arrangement in the summer of 1990 in return for adjustments concerning the territory of the ex-GDR, it is first and foremost because everyone, including the latter, viewed the arrangement as the most reassuring option for the future¹.

The fact remains that the inclusion of the territory of the former GDR constitutes *ipso facto* the first enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance after the Cold War. The Americans' determination to consolidate the Alliance, the Germans' concern to push the dividing line between the two Europes towards the East, the French's scepticism as to the appropriateness of expanding the NATO system, the Russians' refusal then acceptance in exchange for substantial concessions: in retrospect, the debate on the conditions for the participation of a united Germany in NATO appears as the foreshadowing of the debates on opening the Alliance up to the Central and Eastern European countries from 1993-1994 onwards.

To be sure, the delicate management on a "2+4" basis of the German question made it impossible at the time to evoke any notion of precedent. Can the Russians today take advantage of guarantees given at the time by the Westerners as to the future non-enlargement of the Alliance? In 1990, reassuring the Soviet Union, at least psychologically and politically, was in any event the order of the day: the end of the Cold

¹. For US policy in the immediate post-Cold War era, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995.

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War did not signify the revenge of one bloc over another but rather co-operation between East and West to manage security in Europe.

It was therefore impossible at that time for the West to openly envisage the admission of new members to the Alliance: moreover, although it had lost the former GDR, the Warsaw Treaty was then still in place.

Be that as it may, the fall of the Berlin Wall posed *ipso facto* the problem of the geographical limits of an institution founded on the rejection of spheres of influence and geared to transcending the division of Europe. Historians will say to what extent the future enlargement of NATO already represented a realistic medium-term hypothesis in Washington. Retrospectively, in any case, the decisions taken from the London summit in July 1990 to the Rome Summit in November 1991 (establishment of diplomatic relations between NATO and the Eastern European countries, creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council – NACC), appear ambivalent: although they proceeded from a certain bloc conservatism, they also fitted into a dynamic of enlarging the sphere of NATO influence pushed by the United States against the backdrop of the disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty and the implosion of the USSR. Even though it was not officially on the agenda, the question of opening up to the East was implicitly posed.

- The question of NATO's functions was posed more clearly and subsequently gave rise, from 1989 to 1992, to a more explicit debate between the Allies. Here as well, the German question served as a starting point: did not making the Alliance the foremost international framework of German reunification *ipso facto* underscore NATO's fundamental role with regard to security in the broad sense of the term? By integrating and flanking united Germany, NATO was in fact reverting to its initial function of peacemaker – if not pacifier – and not merely defender of Europe. Yet beyond Germany, the question of

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NATO's role in the European system as a whole was clearly posed. Even before the fall of the Berlin Wall, President Bush indeed made overcoming the division of Europe NATO's "*new mission*"². Against the backdrop of the return of Germany and the Old Continent to unity, US policy, totally in keeping with the Harmel Report of 1967, consisted of emphasising the "new tasks" of the Alliance, those which come under security and not defence in the strict sense of the term. In Washington, this was indeed perceived as the condition for preserving the legitimacy of NATO and US leadership after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. The "politicisation" of NATO (an euphemism which at the time referred to its potential role above and beyond Article 5) was well and truly the cornerstone of the "*New Atlanticism*" announced by James Baker soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall³.

The US desire to politicise the Alliance, to underscore the security role *lato sensu* clearly did not enjoy unanimous support. Those who wished to promote in this same role the European Union in gestation sought to oppose it, starting with France, which rejected any enlargement of NATO's competences above and beyond its defence functions *stricto sensu*. At the time, François Mitterrand denounced NATO's continuous moralising and the fact that it had been turned into a "*Holy Alliance*"⁴. The debate between Americans and the French remained muffled, but both were fully aware of the stakes: the former thought that the latter were seeking to marginalise NATO, whereas the latter saw NATO's politicisation as a danger that the former might gain a lasting hold over European security despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Admittedly, by 1992 the quarrel appeared to have died down: NACC set

². Cf. his speech in Mainz on 31 May 1989.

³. Cf. his speech in Berlin on 12 December 1989; see also Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *op. cit.*

⁴. For French policy during this period, see Frédéric Bozo, "France", in Michael Brenner (ed.), *NATO and Collective Security After the Cold War*, London, Macmillan, 1998.

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NATO up in this political role which Washington had advocated since 1989. Above all, the Allies, including the French, accepted – first in Oslo then in Brussels – the possibility of NATO asserting itself on the Old Continent as the military tool of the OSCE or the UN. But this was an agreement of principle: the debate would surely be revived when the time comes to put it into practice. Against the backdrop of the worsening of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, NATO's role – virtual for the time being – in the post-Cold War crises remained problematic.

Yet it was the question of NATO's internal structures which was posed the most openly soon after the end of the Cold War. From 1989 to 1992, the problem of the Euro-American readjustment within NATO gave rise to a debate which, due to its intensity, echoed the Transatlantic misunderstandings at the time of the "troubled partnership" in the 60s or 70s. The erosion of bloc logic could only breathe new life into a set of problems long conjured away by the bipolar context and once again bring the US and France into conflict. On the US side, the tone was set back at the end of 1989: indeed, James Baker, in Berlin, did not fail to reaffirm Washington's support for European economic and political construction, but in the US order of priorities, this obviously came after NATO. Through a rhetoric which recalled that of President Kennedy in his Philadelphia speech in July 1962, US diplomacy clearly showed its desire to situate future Community developments within an Atlantic framework. Clearly, the "*new Atlanticism*" would leave but little room for the affirmation of a European strategic identity.

Yet this identity was henceforth France's top priority goal. In the name of Europe, the French were taking up again with an objective which they finally viewed as attainable now that the disappearance of the Soviet threat no longer justified NATO's objections which had acted as a drag on it for so long and now that the Community had rediscovered an

economic and political dynamic likely to lead to a strategic Europe. They conceived of this strategic Europe by definition as autonomous in relation to the United States, at least in an initial phase, for everything which did not come under defence as such, as the latter could remain primarily under NATO. Mindful of the limits of what their partners could accept, the French were well and truly calling for a collective security role for the European Union in gestation.

This explains the rivalry between two processes: the reform of the Atlantic Alliance, initiated soon after the London summit, and the intergovernmental conference on political union, launched in December 1990⁵. This rivalry more or less reproduced the behaviours of the main actors during previous confrontations (the United States and Great Britain on one side, France on the other, and Germany in between), illustrated in particular by the divergences as to the role of the Western European Union (WEU) – NATO’s European pillar for some and the EU’s armed wing for others. Admittedly, in early 1992, soon after the Rome NATO summit and the Maastricht European summit, a compromise appeared to be in hand: on the one side, the Alliance recognised the European dimension for the first time; on the other, the Union adopted a political and – over the longer term – a military blueprint which spared both European ambitions and Atlantic realities. In practice, however, the diplomats’ efforts only managed to mask the incompatibilities between the two conceptions which soon emerged when put to the test of reality.

■ Towards an Atlantic Crisis

⁵. With regard to this set of problems, see Nicole Gnesetto, *La Puissance et l'Europe*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, collection “La Bibliothèque du citoyen”, 1998.

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The test of reality turned out to be, from 1992 to 1995, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

The return of war in Europe has in effect been a decisive test for NATO and, first and foremost, for its “*raison d’être*”. Although the Allies have agreed in principle since 1992 on NATO’s necessary role with regard to collective security, the Yugoslav crisis has highlighted the difficulties of such a role, from both the operational and the political point of view. Because the US had pushed for Allied recognition of NATO’s “new missions”, the time had come for it to make an effective demonstration thereof. However, although the US wanted to involve NATO in the crisis management process, there could be no question for the Americans of envisaging direct US involvement on the ground. Conversely, the European powers primarily concerned were involved within the UN framework and intended to confine NATO to an auxiliary role. At the same time, however, the Europeans – including the French – measured the effective dependency of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces in the former Yugoslavia) in relation to NATO. Although the latter played a growing military role in the crisis from 1992 to 1995 – at least on sea and in the air – its action was checked by a dual paradox: the US wanted NATO involvement without US intervention, while Europe needed America but wished to limit NATO’s role.

Over and above NATO’s operational role, the Allies were more fundamentally divided as to the way to end the crisis separating them: a policy of “lift and strike” for the Americans as against a policy of neutrality and interposition for the Europeans. The former wanted to impose their strategy without committing themselves on the ground, but how was it possible to both preserve Atlantic solidarity while secretly conducting a policy which fundamentally challenged it? The Europeans, on the other hand, would have liked to have involved the US in their crisis management without however changing their own strategy, yet

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how could they hope for the support of the leader of the Alliance without taking the latter's approach to the crisis into consideration?

As the situation deteriorated in Bosnia, owing to these contradictions, in late 1994 and early 1995 NATO came within a hair's breadth of a crisis without precedent since the Suez affair. As in 1956, the Europeans perceived US policy as capable of endangering their essential interests (the safety of their Blue Helmets) and doubted America's solidarity in such a situation (the evacuation of UNPROFOR), while the Americans denounced the Europeans' powerlessness in Bosnia and their incapacity to assume their responsibilities. The Alliance was seriously shaken, its future uncertain: although the essential, namely, Article 5, was probably not called into question, doubts were allowed as to its capacity to cope, in the future, with situations not falling within its purview: how could NATO be relied on as a military instrument in future crises if US participation remained haphazard? And above all, how could one be assured of the allies' political cohesiveness in the face of such crises?

- From 1993-1994 onwards, Euro-American misunderstandings over the former Yugoslavia and the Alliance's role outside of Article 5 combined with growing controversy over NATO's geographic enlargement. To be sure, everything started with the aspiration of the Central and Eastern European countries to rejoin Western institutions once the page of the Cold War had been turned. The Germans played a non-negligible role in the launching of the debate in 1993: the integration of the CEECs in NATO was in response to the sincere desire and well-understood interest of a united Germany to shift towards the East the dividing line which had long split it. Yet it was the US which, starting in late 1993, imparted the movement⁶.

⁶. For US policy with regard to NATO enlargement, see James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision", *The Washington Quarterly*, 21/1, winter 1998, pp. 85-102.

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Was this the first act of a grand enlargement strategy designed to replace the containment strategy of the Cold War? Or was it the preoccupation of a president short of diplomatic successes in a difficult election year? The motives for the US decision to open up NATO were complex: domestic policy vied with international vision. Nevertheless, NATO enlargement became a real priority for the US. The Partnership for Peace (PPP), the principle of which was endorsed at the Brussels summit in January 1994, marked a decisive step: while making it possible to control the movement and differentiate between the situations of the countries concerned, it clearly opened up the prospect of an enlargement in due form. This was confirmed shortly thereafter by Bill Clinton, when he stated that the question was not “*if*” but rather “*when*” and “*how*”. At that point, the dynamic was launched, but with one uncertainty: how could the question of enlargement be taken up against the backdrop of the major crisis involving the former Yugoslavia?

The fact that Washington accelerated the enlargement process could only give rise to concern on the other side of the Atlantic. First of all, it raised a series of intrinsic questions: how could Russia be induced to accept the process? Would the US Senate go along? How would the lucky few be selected? What should be done about those left behind? Last but not least, would this not weaken NATO’s cohesiveness? But the Europeans were also justified in wondering about its motives: was this not above all an attempt to confer a new legitimacy on NATO and US leadership in the middle of the Bosnian paralysis? In fact, enlargement could be interpreted as a decoy. How and why should new security guarantees be extended in Eastern and Central Europe – a region which did not face any real threat – if it had not proven possible to impose peace in the Balkans? In short, what could be done for Bratislava if nothing could be done for Sarajevo? Not only did both processes of enlargement – the functional and the geographic – each give rise to

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serious differences of opinion between the Allies, but there was a very clear danger from 1994 onwards that the two would combine, thus causing the Transatlantic crisis to worsen.

- All this could only pose once again the question of NATO's structure and its internal balances. Admittedly, in 1992-1993, the trend seemed to be moving towards a lessening of the misunderstandings of previous years. First, the new US Administration displayed greater openness in this field than the previous one: sincerely more prepared to encourage the building of Europe but above all less concerned by international affairs than domestic policy, the Clinton team did not seem hostile to the ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity). Second, the most ardent defenders of European autonomy now acknowledged its limits; the European crisis after Maastricht, combined with the Europeans' powerlessness in the former Yugoslavia, could only lead them to revise downwards their ambition to see the Union in a role of a fully fledged strategic actor. This was indeed the compromise reached at the Brussels summit: the Americans recognised the legitimacy of the ESDI, while the Europeans, starting with the French, agreed to assert their strategic identity, as the case might be, within the framework of NATO. This in turn led to the idea of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), a formula designed to enable the Europeans to develop within the Alliance military capabilities which could be "*separable*" but "*not separate*" from NATO in the event of operations carried out under their responsibility.

Yet the aggravation of the situation on the ground and the deterioration of Euro-US relations in 1994-1995 threw the terms of this compromise entirely back into question. Indeed, the political and military mechanism in Bosnia acted as a test for ESDI's viability: although UNPROFOR was by and large dominated by the Europeans, the latter, as we have noted, relied on NATO, in particular for monitoring the embargo in the Adriatic as well as the no-fly zone over Bosnia but also in the key field of C3 (Command, Control, Communications). Yet this mechanism could

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not function in the absence of a minimal agreement between the Allies; the dissensions between Americans and Europeans indeed highlighted a reality all too quickly forgotten: NATO has only limited “collective means” and relies by and large on US means. This was reflected in the autumn of 1994 by America’s unilateral decision to suspend its participation in the monitoring of the embargo in the Adriatic. Although it had no serious operational consequences, the affair could only underscore the risks of the Europeans relying too much on the Americans in a crisis managed by the former without the active participation of the latter: these risks were perhaps acceptable in a crisis where limited interests were at stake, but they would be intolerable in the case of a grave threat to essential European interests. Thus, it is the very idea of the ESDI and the “*separable*” but “*not separate*” European capabilities in NATO that was called into question against the backdrop of growing Euro-American differences of opinion as to the management of the crisis.

■ From Dayton to Madrid

In the spring of 1995, there was a danger that the situation in the Balkans would go completely out of control; the feeling that a Serb victory was inevitable, the fear of an imminent breakdown of the UN operation, the risk of a major crisis in Transatlantic relations – the spiral seemed to lead straight to a disaster for Bosnia, a rout for the international community and the break-up of NATO. Yet the events which occurred during the summer suddenly reversed the process: the hostage crisis led to the strengthening of the UN military posture in Bosnia as a result of the deployment of the Franco-British rapid reaction force, while the Croatian offensive in Krajina and the Croatian-Muslim offensive in Bosnia reversed the balance of power on the ground to the detriment of the Serbs, thus paving the way for massive engagement by NATO, hence the US.

Discussions will go on for a long time as to the role of the different actors in this crisis, in particular the American and European ones, as well as the factors which made possible the resolution of the crisis in autumn 1995. In any event, one thing is certain: the cessation of hostilities, the Dayton agreements and the deployment of IFOR (Implementation Force) constituted a fundamental turning-point for the Atlantic Alliance. With its resolution, an entire interpretation of the Bosnian crisis imposed itself: if it ended, it was because NATO committed itself completely and the US exercised its leadership fully. This interpretation is somewhat questionable historically speaking but imposes itself politically speaking: it is the one which, on a lasting basis, would guide the course of events within the Alliance and thus provide the answers to the three major questions which remained open since 1989.

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- First of all, the questions relating to NATO's functions. In autumn 1995, NATO's new role was validated. The upheavals of 1992-1995 were forgotten: with the Dayton agreements and their implementation, NATO now acted as a guarantor for security in Europe. If the Westerners were able to cope with the Bosnian crisis, was it not because NATO was more effective than the other institutions? Naturally, the resolution which came in the autumn of 1995 served as a precedent: by obtaining this result in the most serious European crisis since 1989, NATO established itself as the pivot of security in Europe in the post-Cold War era. This provided proof that, once the page of the Cold War had been turned, NATO was capable of playing a major role above and beyond its traditional defence function: if there were any doubts left as to its "*raison d'être*" once the Soviet threat had disappeared, the Dayton agreements dispelled them once and for all.

This is especially true since NATO's new role was confirmed from an operational point of view. The deployment of IFOR illustrated, in practice, the capacity of NATO's military machinery to carry out intervention and peacemaking operations such as Joint Endeavour: was it not the old integrated NATO which, despite a few adjustments, was hiding behind IFOR? Consequently, it would be able in the future to serve effectively in large-scale operations not covered by Article 5: the mechanism introduced in Bosnia in December 1995 also acted as a precedent. Moreover, did the contrast between IFOR's success and UNPROFOR's failure leave the slightest doubt? Only NATO, as a result of its integrated military apparatus, was capable, in Europe, of carrying out a type of operation which the UN had proved unable of conducting. In short, far from being doomed to obsolescence after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, NATO's military dimension clearly regained its usefulness with IFOR.

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- Dayton and IFOR established NATO's new role while simultaneously removing the main obstacle which, in autumn 1995, still stood in the way of NATO enlargement. Without the Dayton agreements and an end to the fighting in Bosnia, the process launched in 1994 could not have succeeded⁷. As long as NATO showed itself incapable of coping with a crisis which threatened its cohesiveness and its credibility, its opening-up to new members indeed remained compromised. The resolution which came in 1995 could only, *a contrario*, relaunch the dynamic: the candidates for accession naturally saw this as confirmation of NATO's major role and America's commitment to European security, thus further strengthening their determination to belong to the Alliance; the US was determined to successfully conclude a process of enlargement which, soon after Dayton, could only establish NATO's post-Cold War legitimacy and its own leadership; finally, the European capitals could only follow Washington once the Bosnian obstacle had been removed.

In fact, in autumn 1995, the process accelerated; enlargement became the main priority, not only for the US but also for the Alliance as a whole. Notwithstanding, its modalities were defined by the US acting as sole project manager: initially limited to the three most advanced Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic), enlargement would have to be successfully concluded for the 50th anniversary of the Alliance in 1999. To be sure, the Russian obstacle still had to be removed: this was done on 27 May 1997, with the signing in Paris of the NATO-Russia Founding Act which *de facto* granted Moscow major compensations. The Europeans also had to ratify the choice of the Americans; this was done at the Madrid summit on 8 July, which officially closed the "guest list" despite the fact that France and Italy were lobbying hard for Romania and Slovenia.

⁷. *Ibid.*

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Because the US had made enlargement the test of its leadership and of NATO's legitimacy in the post-Cold War era, the Madrid result constituted *ipso facto* a success for the former and a decisive moment for the latter. After the consecration of NATO's pivotal role in European security with the Dayton agreements and the IFOR deployment, the geographical enlargement of the Alliance – which had not appeared certain at all some eighteen months previously – strengthened the demonstration of its “*raison d'être*” after the Cold War and confirmed the primacy of the US. At the same time, the choice of the countries concerned – limited to the three most “Western” candidates from among the numerous candidates for accession – did not appear likely to dilute NATO or challenge US pre-eminence in this respect. The US, which both initiated and arbitrated the enlargement process, ended up by imposing its vision on the Europeans who were more determined than truly convinced of its opportuneness.

- The above explains by and large the evolution, from 1995 to 1997, of the third major issue of Transatlantic relations: the structures of the Alliance and in particular of European identity. The resolution of the Bosnian and Atlantic crisis made it possible to pick up the debate on European identity where the Allies had left it after Brussels. In autumn 1995, once the grave Euro-American uncertainties of the past eighteen months had been dispelled, the situation finally appeared favourable to the constitution of an ESDI which was both visible and effective within the Alliance. This explains the decisive choice made at the time by France, which stated that it was available to participate fully and entirely in a NATO reformed along the lines of Europeanisation and adaptation to the new collective security functions. After having attempted fruitlessly to build a European defence pillar outside NATO, France felt that it could manage to do so within the Organisation itself⁸. For the

⁸. Cf. in this respect Gilles Andréani, “La France et l’OTAN après la guerre froide”, *Politique étrangère*, N° 1, spring 1998, pp. 77-92; and Frédéric Bozo, “France”, article mentioned.

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first time in thirty years, an overall readjustment of Euro-Atlantic relations seemed to be within reach: the simultaneity of NATO reform and of the European intergovernmental conference could provide an opportunity in this connection. The outcome of the Berlin ministerial meeting in June 1996 seemed to confirm this: on the one hand, the uniqueness of NATO's military structure was recognised; on the other, confirmation was provided as to the possibility that the Europeans might carry out military operations within the framework of the WEU while relying as the case might be on NATO's means.

Yet Berlin marked the high point in the process of internal adaptation. In the months which followed, the Allies struggled to put into practice the compromises which the Europeans had wrested from the Americans. Admittedly, progress was made with regard to the CJTFs or WEU-NATO linkage, but from the summer of 1996 onwards, the negotiations were stymied by the restructuring of the integrated commands. France's urging that a European officer be appointed commander-in-chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) and America's refusal compromised France's return to the military organisation, even though the gain of France-NATO rapprochement which had been under way for several years was not called into question. At the same time, the "integrated" Allies moved towards a limited adaptation of the structure of NATO commands. Consequently, the Madrid summit could only confirm the failure, at least in relative terms, of NATO's Europeanisation. Even though it was a priority goal for the French and the partisans of a strategic Europe, internal adaptation yielded to the two enlargements as far as US priorities were concerned. Moreover, in Washington's view, adapting NATO primarily meant rendering it compatible with its new functions and with the upcoming participation of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe. The first demand was tied to a reform of NATO taking IFOR as a model and not a hypothetical European pillar, whereas the second implied satisfying the

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CEECs asking for a US guarantee, not a European identity. In short, neither militated in favour of a genuine readjustment of Euro-US relations within NATO. Although substantial progress had been made over a two-year stretch, after Madrid, the cursor of internal NATO adaptation was staying much closer to the US position than to an European position which moreover remains problematic.

What conclusions can be drawn from this brief overview of the decade which has just gone by? Admittedly, the “new Alliance” – the incantatory formula of NATO press releases – has become a reality; assumption of new security functions, opening-up to new members, (partial) adaptation of structures; for NATO, the 1989-1997 period can be likened to a second “creation”. Yet the delivery was not painless; this result was only achieved at the price of serious Transatlantic misunderstandings, followed by an Euro-American crisis of exceptional gravity, and finally, the spectacular re-establishment of US leadership. As a result, European interests have hardly been taken into account in the new Transatlantic situation: far from being absorbed, the Euro-American imbalance has been reaffirmed.

The Alliance Pacified? Future Challenges

“The Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions”. This sentence taken from the Harmel report of 1967 is more topical than ever before. The past decade has provided ample proof that the Alliance is capable of adaptation. Nevertheless, it would be illusory to think that this adaptation is in some way final. When they closed the post-Cold War chapter, the Allies opened another: when they resolved certain problems, they created new ones, all of which are closely inter-related. Owing to the very nature of the replies which have been provided in recent years to the three major questions facing the Alliance in 1989, geographical enlargement, the evolution of missions and internal adaptation have all become future challenges in Euro-US relations, whether it be on the short, medium or long term.

■ What Are the Limits to Enlargement After Madrid?

From 1994 to 1995, NATO's opening-up to the East gave rise to a sometimes difficult debate. The Madrid summit, by fixing the modalities for the first enlargement of the post-Cold War era, seemed to have put an end to this debate. But was this really the case? One year after Madrid, there are real grounds for doubt; in reality, the debate is far from over

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and NATO enlargement remains, both today and in the future, a major issue as far as Transatlantic relations are concerned.

- Admittedly, in the short term, the uncertainties are limited. The entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic no longer poses a problem. The accession of the three countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which the Washington summit should provide an opportunity to celebrate in April 1999, is taken for granted, with however two subtle restrictions which could hang over Euro-American relations in the future. The first has to do with the costs of the operation: who is supposed to pay? The US views NATO enlargement as an extension of the US guarantee in Europe. Consequently, there can be no question of adding an additional financial cost to this additional strategic engagement. It is up to the Europeans to shoulder the cost. Yet for the latter, with the French in the lead, the reverse reasoning prevails: insofar as enlargement is *first and foremost* an American affair, there can be no question for the Europeans of assuming the financial burden on their own, especially if their influence in NATO is not enhanced in the process. Thus, the debate on the cost of enlargement ties back into the fundamental debate on the sharing of the burden and responsibilities within NATO. Even though it subsided immediately following the Madrid summit – the scene of a heated Franco-American exchange in this respect –, the effective integration of the CEECs in NATO – which will in one way or another have economic and financial consequences – could relaunch it in the months and years to come⁹.

The second nuance concerns the conditions for ratifying the accession of the CEECs. Indeed, the disaster foretold by the opponents of

⁹. At the Madrid Summit, President Chirac stated that France did not intend to increase its financial participation in NATO owing to the accession of the CEECs. Subsequently, the quarrel died down by a sort of mutual consent on a minimalistic evaluation of the cost of the operation. Yet there will indeed be costs (e.g. for improving infrastructures) and benefits (in particular the securing of arms markets) to be shared between Allies...

enlargement in the US – non-ratification or ratification coupled with a restrictive reinterpretation of the Washington treaty – did not come to pass. Despite the fact that the Republican majority carried over votes for reasons of domestic policy, the US Senate had no real difficulty endorsing NATO admission for the three new members in April 1998. Nevertheless, the largely mediocre debate to which the event gave rise on Capitol Hill failed to provide the opportunity sought by the Clinton Administration for a tangible manifestation of America's commitment towards Europe. Is this proof that NATO enlargement is a foregone conclusion for the American political class? Hardly. Is this pure and simple lack of interest of public opinion and Congress for what was supposed to be the reconsecration of the Alliance after the Cold War? Perhaps. Be that as it may, this “stealthy” ratification is no doubt an omen of a change in US priorities with regard to this field.

- This in turn explains the questions over the medium term. They concern the “second wave” of enlargement which could give rise, between now and the Washington summit, to a debate between the two shores of the Atlantic with the parties on opposite sides in relation to the 1994-1995 debate. Admittedly, it is too early to gain a clear idea of what the US attitude could be in this respect, and a clarification seems unlikely before the summit. Nevertheless, a new enlargement is doubtless not a US priority in the short or medium term despite the officially unchanged policy – or rhetoric – of the “open door”. The Administration may have doubts as to its capacity to secure congressional approval of the idea in the coming months or years; above all, the “first wave” has reinforced NATO's legitimacy and America's leadership on a lasting basis. When viewed from this angle, the first enlargement is sufficient unto itself.

If confirmed, a restrictive or delaying US attitude would probably create Transatlantic difficulties, reversed in relation to the previous period:

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although the Europeans came round – sometimes reluctantly – to enlargement in 1995-1997, today most of them can only reject an approach which they deem exclusive since it would come down to tracing a new East-West division. Everything appears to indicate that some of them would be keen to obtain at the Washington summit what they were unable to obtain at the Madrid summit owing to America's decision to limit the number of "invitations" to three, against the will of a majority of the allies; the French and the Italians, in particular, could request invitations for Romania and Slovenia¹⁰.

Between America's understandable desire to pause momentarily and Europe's legitimate concern for a continuous process, the problem of enlargement could, in coming months and years, continue to be a focal point for tensions within NATO. Furthermore, the Transatlantic debate could go beyond the problem of NATO enlargement *stricto sensu* and also extend to the opening-up of the EU and the WEU, respectively. While postponing *sine die* a new enlargement of NATO, might not the US be tempted, in the future, to bring pressure to bear for a rapid enlargement of the European Union? This would provide a means of making the Europeans bear the burden of stabilising the periphery of Europe, without risking a dilution of NATO or extending formal new security guarantees – in short, imposing a new burden-sharing arrangement. Certain US stands in favour of admitting not only Turkey but also the Baltic States to the Union run along the lines of such a scenario, which is difficult for the Europeans to accept unless they call the EU's gains into question and confirm on a lasting basis NATO's domination of European security. Conversely, a lasting pause in NATO enlargement might lead the most ambitious Europeans to stress their

¹⁰. As far as the candidate countries are concerned, the "Madrid Declaration" specifically mentions Slovenia and Romania (and, to a lesser extent, the Baltic countries). The scope of these "signals" is not however interpreted in the same way in Washington or in Paris and could give rise to a difficult debate between now and the Washington summit.

own strategic responsibilities in relation to the countries concerned, for example by opening the WEU up to the new EU members, even the non-NATO ones. Yet such an initiative could only make the US dig in its heels, anxious as it is to avoid any implicit security guarantee, together with the EU members most hostile to a genuine European defence pillar, starting with Great Britain.

- A new NATO enlargement appears relatively unlikely in coming months and years – the “pause” advocated by the US will no doubt be a lasting one. Yet everything seems to indicate – starting with the experience of the first enlargement – that the question will come up again, in the more or less long term regardless of what happens. Admittedly, it is difficult today to anticipate a change in the international context which would be likely to relaunch this question (the worsening of the internal situation in Russia could have this kind of impact). Nevertheless, the precedent of the CEECs shows that strategic considerations are not the most decisive factors: as in 1994-1995, it is factors internal to the US which could, over time, reopen the prospect of enlargement. If the US, as it did in 1994, saw an opportunity to reaffirm its Atlantic leadership or relegitimise the Alliance, a new opening-up to the East would be a tempting option for it.

Yet it is by no means certain that a subsequent enlargement would enjoy the same success as the first one. As has been said, the choice made in Madrid featured the advantage of reconciling the new legitimacy of an enlarged NATO with a preserved Atlantic identity and cohesiveness. Such an equilibrium will without any doubt be more difficult to achieve in the future. The further one moves away from the groups of the most “Western” country candidates, a category which covers the three new members, the greater the danger that NATO enlargement will in particular cause the Transatlantic link to be diluted and NATO to be turned into a more or less loose collective security organisation; the

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further away one moves from the CEECs, the more difficult it becomes to arbitrate between increasingly contradictory priorities (Balkan, Baltic, etc.). In both cases, there is a real danger that US and European conceptions might diverge.

Finally, the further NATO extends to the East, the more the issue of relations with Russia will interfere with the enlargement issue. The NATO-Russia Founding Act will have been the price to pay to obtain Moscow's *nihil obstat* to the "first wave"; it is not at all clear how it could give up the idea of turning it into a lever giving it power over any future enlargement. Such an arrangement could give it considerable clout, insofar as it establishes Russia *de facto* as a fully fledged partner of NATO – at least for any matters which do not come under Article 5 *stricto sensu*. Would a new enlargement justify new concessions to Moscow likely to transform the very nature of NATO even further? This question could divide the Allies on the occasion of one or, *a fortiori*, several new "waves" of accession.

Above and beyond all this, the question of membership for Russia itself could be posed¹¹. The Founding Act was conceded by the Allies in exchange for an enlargement which in the final analysis is limited: will they be able to extend NATO further to the East without going past this point, i.e. without agreeing to include it purely and simply? Such a prospect would represent a real upheaval. If the question of Russia's inclusion is not a hotly debated issue today, it is because it remains all the more speculative given that its internal development hardly lends itself to this scenario. If this stops being the case, it is hard to see how it could fail to become a major issue or even a subject of conflict within

¹¹. Cf. in this respect David S. Yost, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, Vol. 40, N° 2, summer 1998, pp. 135-160.

NATO and, in particular, in relations between Europeans and Americans¹².

The first enlargement and the entry of the CEECs was the easiest part: this first, limited opening-up of NATO did not threaten to either upset balances or transform NATO's identity – a sort of “convenient” enlargement, as it were. Supposing that the process is continued, things would no doubt be different: enlargement to the East and its corollary, relations with Russia, could once again over time become a major issue in Transatlantic relations. Not only would the continuation of the process inevitably pose once again the problem of internal NATO balances, but whereas the first enlargement was, at least in part, initiated in 1994-1995 to avoid tackling directly the question of NATO's “*raison d'être*”, the continuation of the process could once again make this question a very topical one.

■ The New Missions: Towards the “Globalisation” of the Alliance?

This explains the issues regarding the other enlargement of NATO: that of its missions. Up until the autumn of 1995, as has been noted, NATO's new missions, endorsed on paper by the Allies from 1992 onwards, remained blocked by the Bosnian situation. Dayton and IFOR removed the obstacle: NATO's role as a pivot of security in Europe has been established by the resolution of the crisis. Yet does this mean that the question of “functional” NATO enlargement has been settled once and for all? Nothing is less certain: the situation in the Balkans

¹². The problem of China could also be evoked here; a NATO-Russian *rapprochement*, or even Russia's inclusion in the Alliance, could hardly be perceived as anything else but part of a strategy to contain China – which once more brings us back to the question of NATO's “*raison d'être*”. Yet could the Europeans accept this – assuming that this was the Americans' intention ?

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continues to raise questions and could once again put NATO to the test. Furthermore, above and beyond the Balkans, one issue could divide the Allies in the future: just how far can these missions be extended?

- Admittedly, nearly three years after Dayton, NATO appears to have won its wager. IFOR, which was deployed in December 1995 for one year (60,000 men including 20,000 Americans), has carried out its mission of ensuring the military implementation of the peace agreements. This success has made it possible to maintain, after December 1996, a stabilisation force, SFOR (30,000 men), for 18 months. By deciding recently to prolong this arrangement until autumn 1998 then to maintain indefinitely a SFOR reduced to some 20,000 men, the Allies are displaying NATO's determination to continue to guarantee peace by dissuading the opposing parties from reopening hostilities. Yet this result – which was by no means a sure thing – must be qualified: on two occasions, the danger of a US withdrawal was reportedly substantial, and its materialisation would inevitably have had very grave consequences on both the situation in Bosnia and Transatlantic relations¹³.

Yet these difficulties remain present just beneath the surface and could, over time, obstruct NATO's stabilising role in Bosnia. This role is inevitably designed to be a long-term one: although the military implementation of the Dayton agreement can be deemed a success, the results are much more mediocre from a political point of view¹⁴. Is it a

¹³. Either the Europeans, applying to the letter the principle "in together, out together", opted to withdraw, which meant that the door was open for the return of war in Bosnia but also for the discredit of the Alliance and for a new Transatlantic crisis, or they resigned themselves to trying to maintain a force in Bosnia with US military support but no American troops on the ground, in which case, the danger was that of lapsing into the powerlessness of UNPROFOR again and reverting to the Euro-American quarrels of 1992-1995.

¹⁴. Cf. in this respect Ivo H. Daalder, "Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement", *Survival*, Vol. 39, winter 1997-1998, pp. 5-18.

foregone conclusion that NATO will maintain a military presence until a lasting peace has been established in Bosnia? This is not certain. Since the deployment of IFOR, the Americans have sought both to limit their engagement and retain control on the ground, whereas the Europeans intend to assume their responsibilities but do not feel that they can do so without the Americans. Up until now, these contradictions have been transcended at the price of a series of downwards adjustments of the NATO mechanism proportionate to the US and European contributions. Yet this logic of *diminutio capitis* will necessarily come up against its limits and could force the Allies to make the choice which they have put off until now: for the Europeans, conducting an operation without US involvement; for the Americans, supporting an operation conducted by the Europeans. Will both sides be ready for this? Pending a hypothetical final settlement, the evolution of the Bosnian problem could in any event once again act as a drag on Transatlantic relations.

The same can only apply to Kosovo. Indeed, the Allies have from the start, in the spring of 1998, tackled this new crisis with one major concern: avoiding repeating the mistakes they made in Bosnia. This explains their desire to display NATO's military determination and to show, within NATO, a maximum of political cohesiveness. It remains to be seen whether both sides will stand up to a possible deterioration of the situation on the ground; are the Allies, with the Americans in the lead, prepared to commit themselves if need be in a theatre of operations every bit as explosive as Bosnia was, and will they agree on the modalities for the use of force (in particular, could NATO intervene, as the Americans are suggesting, without an explicit mandate from the United Nations)? Would they share on a lasting basis the same approach to the crisis and would they agree on the conditions for its resolution (including, as the case may be, independence for Kosovo)? Although a return to the grave Euro-American misunderstandings of 1992-1995 seems unlikely today, the problem of NATO's *effective* role with regard to collective security

and crisis management in Europe cannot be considered as settled once and for all.

- The problem of NATO missions could even, in coming years, take on a still broader scope through a sweeping debate on the “globalisation” of the Atlantic Alliance. To date, NATO’s functional enlargement has remained limited to Europe: although NATO has effectively gone beyond its Article 5, it remains today within the limits of its Article 6¹⁵. This delimitation could in turn be called into question through the impetus given by the US. Naturally, the stability of Europe continues to represent an important issue for America, which in this sense remains a “European power”¹⁶. But what will the *relative* importance of the Old Continent be over the long run in its strategic concerns? Will these concerns not be increasingly dominated by problems such as those linked to weapons of mass destruction or access to energy resources, hence centred round extra-European zones such as the Middle East or Asia-Pacific? Such a redefinition of the order of US priorities could not in any event fail to affect US policy with regard to the Alliance. Over time, this policy could shift towards a new extension of NATO’s missions. To put it bluntly, the aim would be for the US to give NATO a role in the management of future world crises, while maintaining its stabilising function in Europe.

Admittedly, nothing indicates that this new enlargement – both functional and geographical in nature – is already on the agenda of US policy. Yet, just like its opening-up to the East a short while ago, NATO’s globalisation could well appear in the future as a response to the Alliance’s growing need for legitimation in US public opinion and political circles. This theme is already very present in the debate in the

¹⁵. Article 6 of the Atlantic Treaty specifies the zone of application of Article 5 of the Treaty, *grosso modo* the Euro-Atlantic zone.

¹⁶. Cf. Richard Holbrooke, “America, a European Power”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, N° 2, March-April 1995, pp. 38-51.

US and fits into an increasingly pregnant approach chosen by decision-makers¹⁷. The ratification of the accession of the CEECs in the spring of 1998 provides an example of this: whereas – as we have said – geographical enlargement aroused little interest in itself in Congress, it provided an opportunity for a debate on NATO missions. This *per se* is not surprising: the ratification of enlargement could not take place without the question of NATO's role arising. Yet above and beyond this, is not the enlargement of its missions taking pre-eminence over geographical enlargement as far as US priorities are concerned?

The US/Iraq crisis in February 1998 can serve as an indicator in this respect. Admittedly, the US did not seek to involve NATO *directly*, no more than it did during the Gulf crisis then war of 1990-1991, when it remained behind the scenes. Nevertheless, from one crisis to another, Washington's impatience at the Allies' perceived insufficient solidarity in the Gulf has been becoming more and more marked, especially in Congress¹⁸. In the past, the Americans have often deplored the fact that the Europeans did not show solidarity "out of area" which in their eyes should have been a fair trade for their commitment in Europe. Yet owing precisely to the vital nature of the European stakes, in the final analysis Transatlantic relations did not suffer greatly during the Cold War. This no longer holds true today: the more Europe's relative importance diminishes in US strategic concerns, the more problems outside Europe will impact on NATO.

Although it is not formally a topical issue today, the globalisation of NATO could quickly become such an issue under pressure from the

¹⁷. Cf. Stephen Larrabee and David Gompert, *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Cf. also, hereinafter, "Towards a Transatlantic Partnership ?", pp. 39-53.

¹⁸. Cf. Joseph Fitchett, "Three Nations Follow Kohl's Lead in Backing the US in Stand off With Iraq", *International Herald Tribune*, 9 February 1998.

Americans¹⁹. Yet such a demand could only lead to a new and difficult Transatlantic debate. Apart from Great Britain, nothing indicates that the Europeans are favourably inclined in this respect; for those which, like France, aspire to a global strategic role, such an extension of NATO's prerogatives would be difficult to accept; for those which have no such ambition or lack the necessary means, it is not appropriate. In any event, it would pose the major problem of the relations and division of labour between the UN and NATO and, in particular, that of the necessity or lack thereof for a UN mandate for possible NATO operations "out of area". Above all – supposing that it materialised notwithstanding –, the globalisation of the Alliance would in all likelihood increase the risk of new Atlantic crises, whether it be from a political point of view (as potential disagreements between Allies are no doubt more serious "out of area" than in Europe) or from a military point of view (the imbalances between Europeans and Americans are even more striking in this field).

The problem of NATO's functions is therefore far from being settled: it could, to an ever greater extent, combine with that of its geographical contours. With the dual enlargement, it is well and truly the fundamental question of NATO's limits which remains more topical than ever today: limits between Europe and the rest of the world; limits between collective defence and collective security.

■ Internal Adaptation: Can NATO be Reformed?

There remains one last question, directly determined by the previous ones: that of internal NATO adaptation. It is true that the reform of the

¹⁹. The conversations within the Alliance on the new strategic concept could provide an opportunity for this.

Organisation's structures, which was forgotten at the Madrid summit, does not appear as a priority today. Admittedly, the working programme drawn up in Berlin in June 1996 is moving discreetly forward: deepening of NATO-WEU co-operation, introduction of the CJTFs, restructuring of commands. Nevertheless, the process, after having peaked two years ago, has lost its momentum. At the same time, the France-NATO *rapprochement*, begun in 1992-1993 and stepped up in 1995, has been put on the back burner. For the time being, matters will probably remain there. For some, with the US in the lead, internal adaptation is continuing regardless of what the French think; for the latter, the reform can only be a truncated one. Yet both sides agree for the time being to avoid new confrontations in this respect; hence the desire to minimise, in Washington as in Paris, the importance of this issue. As has already been noted, the Madrid decision further highlighted enlargement to the detriment of internal readjustment. The effective entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can only confirm, in an initial phase, this order of priorities and reinforce the *status quo* within NATO. Now that it has been relegated to the background of Atlantic priorities, this question should not, at least in the short term, give rise to significant tensions within the Alliance.

Yet there is no gainsaying that NATO is structurally ill-suited to the two main challenges which the future holds in store for it. Whereas a substantial transformation of its missions is under way and the process of its geographical enlargement has been launched, the Alliance's politico-military organisation remains excessively marked by the Cold War period and its legacy. As a result, the continuation of internal adaptation and, in particular, of the Europeanisation of NATO could, over the medium and long run, once again become a major issue in the Transatlantic debate and a catalyst for future misunderstandings.

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- This is due first of all to NATO's new missions. The facts speak for themselves: the deployment of IFOR followed by that of SFOR under US command relied on the old NATO structure. Conversely, the modest "Operation Alba", carried out by the Europeans on their own, did not enjoy the support of NATO or, for that matter, that of the WEU. In short, NATO today seems to be a prisoner of an all-or-nothing attitude when it comes to intervention. Even though this situation has fundamentally political causes – US uncertainties and European inadequacies –, it also reflects the structural rigidities of a NATO whose configuration has hardly evolved since the Cold War. Just as it was obliged to move from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" in the era of the balance of terror, NATO will have to adapt to intermediate situations, to the grey zone of interventions in the post-Cold War era. Yet flexibility and Europeanisation are two sides of the same coin: insofar as America appears relatively incapable of accurately adjusting its response in European crises, only an enhanced role for the Europeans could enable NATO to escape the dilemma of over-engagement or non-engagement. As has already been said, the question could arise in Bosnia or on the occasion of any other European crisis which the Allies find themselves facing in the future. If this were to happen, it would relaunch the debate on NATO reform and generate new tensions inside NATO between two contradictory demands: continued US control versus genuine internal adaptation.

The same would apply to a possible globalisation of NATO missions. On the one hand, the hypotheses of intervention outside Europe can only reinforce the operational pre-eminence of the US – the only country capable of conducting such operations – and perpetuate "hard" military integration suited to this type of mission modelled after Operation Desert Storm. On the other hand, however, these same hypotheses would only be politically acceptable for Washington's allies if they did not take the form of a purely and simply American operation, hence the need to give

the Europeans additional responsibilities. This comes down to saying that the more NATO's potential field of intervention is extended, the greater will be the contradiction between the lasting reality of US primacy and the prospect of a more Europeanised NATO²⁰.

- Yet this debate could also be relaunched in coming years as a result of the enlargement process. Although it would seem in the short run that this process will inevitably confirm the established order within NATO, the situation appears less rigid in the longer term. Once the CEECs have been integrated into the Alliance, Europe's relative clout within the Atlantic body – barring an unlikely increase in US resources – will be enhanced: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will increase it mechanically. Above all politically, these three countries, which at present attach little importance to the problem of the European defence and security identity, could become more favourable in this respect as the time draws near for their accession to the EU. In these conditions, the theme of NATO Europeanisation could generate a certain dynamic and lead to calls for a new sharing of responsibilities between Allies. This would apply *a fortiori* in the event that the process is pursued beyond the “first wave”.

At the same time, enlargement could lead to the downscaling of integration and to cutbacks in NATO's politico-military structures: if spending remains constant – the optimistic assumption –, territorial dilatation and maintenance of the military apparatus in its present state appear irreconcilable indeed. Barring an unlikely return to an outside threat which would justify the maintenance of the old integrated structures, NATO enlargement, combined with the affirmation of its collective security role rather than its mutual defence role, could thus

²⁰. To which should be added the problem, already mentioned, of the UN mandate: to what extent would the Europeans agree to participate in such operations without a green light from the Security Council ?

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lead over time, just as mechanically, to enhanced flexibility of integration or even a certain “disintegration”. Here as well, flexibility and Europeanisation go hand in hand: the likely reduction in the relative size of US means within the NATO apparatus in Europe should lead to a military organisation which is both looser and more Europeanised.

It remains to be seen how the US will react to these broad tendencies. Historically, the US – since the 60s at least – has constantly sought to offset the downsizing of its military commitment in Europe by increased control over NATO structures, as a result in particular of its technological superiority and its mastery of the vital functions of command, control, communication, etc. It is thus likely that it will continue to seek to trade the maintenance of its military commitment to Europe in an enlarged Alliance – hence one which is more likely from the US point of view to involve America in a crisis or conflict on the Old Continent – in exchange for uncontested mastery of the NATO apparatus. Is this not the logic at work behind the so-called “revolution in military affairs”? In these conditions, pursuing the process of enlargement, just as extending missions, could only fuel the debate or even create new tensions with regard to internal NATO adaptation.

The answers which the Allies have provided since 1989 to the questions raised by the end of the Cold War have led today to just as many questions for the future. As is often the case, the solutions themselves bear the seeds of new problems: the geographical limits of NATO, the evolution of its missions, the problem of its internal adaptation are all interdependent challenges which the Allies will have to overcome in future years – and are all possible causes for Transatlantic misunderstandings. Each of these issues involves US interests and European interests. Can they be reconciled? Today, NATO remains fundamentally imbalanced between America and Europe; can this imbalance be righted?

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This twofold question remains at the heart of any reflection on the future of the Atlantic Alliance.

Towards a Transatlantic Partnership?

One year after the Madrid summit, the state of the Atlantic Alliance can give rise to two contrasting or even contradictory interpretations. From a certain point of view, ten years after the end of the Cold War, NATO appears more robust than ever since its founding. Far from having lost a role after the disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty and the USSR, NATO now serves as the cornerstone of European and Western security. Far from having lost its vitality, the Alliance has confirmed its power of attraction with the upcoming accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Far from having relinquished leadership or its commitment in Europe, America remains the most influential power within NATO.

Yet from another point of view, many questions remain. Despite the staged unanimity of the press releases and official celebrations, NATO's future is far from secure: now that the page of the Cold War has been turned once and for all, its role to come remains undetermined; its definitive geographical limits are still imprecise; last but not least, the Euro-American relationship is still fundamentally imbalanced. These subjects will not fail to give rise to new debates, and the Washington summit could provide the first illustration of this.

■ A New “Bargain”

It is this realisation that led certain US observers, and in particular RAND analysts²¹, to propose a new Euro-American “partnership”, a theme which could guide the Transatlantic debate in coming months and years. The authors – some of whom occupy key posts in the Clinton Administration – feel that the security relationship between Europe and the United States remains structurally fragile today despite the appearances of Atlanticist consensus. Admittedly, the entry of the CEECs demonstrates the vigour of the Euro-American link and confirms NATO’s post-Cold War success. Admittedly, the transformation of NATO’s missions have made it the lynchpin of European security. Yet the geographical and functional enlargement of NATO (of which the RAND analysts were among the most active advocates) must not, in their view, “*disguise the nagging doubts that persist about the long-term viability*” of the Transatlantic relationship²². Indeed, whereas Europe no longer represents the priority in US strategic concerns, the Europeans continue to view NATO as essentially the guarantee of US involvement in Europe. NATO’s renewal since the end of the Cold War is therefore based on a fundamental misunderstanding: “*while Europeans have focused [during the period which has just gone by] on how to keep the United States engaged in Europe, Americans have focused on challenges beyond Europe*”²³. This explains the “structural flaw” of the present Transatlantic partnership: “*its scope is too narrow, confined mainly to Europe itself, and its responsibilities are unequally shared*”²⁴. The authors therefore conclude that “*keeping the United States engaged in Europe may lie in a broader, and more equitable partnership that*

²¹. Cf. David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era*, *op. cit.*

²². *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²³. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

²⁴. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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addresses the full spectrum of shared US and European interests – those in Europe and those beyond Europe’s borders”²⁵.

This analysis has led the RAND researchers to formulate what could be called a new Transatlantic “bargain” and to propose the terms of a new partnership. First of all, a broader partnership: the Europeans must recognise, as the Americans would like, the global character of Western security interests and contribute actively to the defence of these interests, alongside the US and within the framework of NATO. Next, a more balanced partnership: in return, the US must be prepared to encourage the affirmation of European identity and to establish with the Europeans a genuine sharing of responsibilities. American pre-eminence and European solidarity at the global level, European responsibility and American support on the Old Continent: these could well be the terms for a new “Transatlantic bargain”, the condition for the survival of a renewed Atlantic Alliance.

- In fact, a NATO rethought in this way would no doubt be better able to take up the challenges to come, starting with those of its new missions.

First of all, in Europe: by finally assuming a coherent, autonomous strategic role on the Old Continent and by agreeing to play a world strategic role alongside the Americans, the Europeans would show that they are ready for genuine “burden-sharing” which would, in exchange, help to consolidate US commitment within NATO. By doing so, they would put themselves in a position to secure US recognition of their responsibilities in maintaining security on the periphery of the Union and to enlist US support for this type of action.

²⁵. *Ibid*, p. 40.

Next, outside Europe: by recognising the appropriateness of a genuine European pillar within NATO and by supporting, as the case might be, European operations on the Old Continent, the Americans could more easily convince the Europeans to intervene overseas and to support the US politically or even militarily in interventions formerly deemed “out of area”. This twofold tradeoff (globalisation in return for Europeanisation, US world leadership in return for European pre-eminence in Europe) would thus be the key to a new sharing of roles between Allies within the framework of a NATO increasingly geared to its “new missions”.

- In addition, this kind of readjustment of the Transatlantic relationship would make it possible to tackle future challenges linked to NATO’s geographical enlargement more calmly. Given that this approach would enhance the Europeans’ strategic clout and lessen unilateral US temptations, it would facilitate a more balanced management of the enlargement process and would no doubt make it possible to defuse possible Euro-American conflicts of interest. The Americans would have to get along with the Europeans, who would be in a stronger position to influence decisions concerning NATO enlargement, whereas the Europeans could more easily accept the prospect of future enlargements at America’s urging without fearing a correlative dilution of the US guarantee. Conversely, a genuine European pillar within the Alliance would enable the Europeans (as a result of an enlargement of strictly European institutions, whether it be the EU or the WEU) to compensate for possible US reluctance to welcome a given country into the Alliance as such; the Americans would be less concerned by the risk of granting the backdoor security guarantees they fear through this channel. In other words, a more balanced Euro-American partnership could lead to a genuine joint management of enlargement and offer more diversified and more flexible solutions than the present all-or-nothing situation, while at the same

time making it possible to reduce the risk of future misunderstandings or crises.

- Lastly, such a partnership would no doubt facilitate the search for a solution to the pressing issue of adapting NATO's military structures to both its new missions and the new Euro-American balances, the two aspects being moreover indissociable²⁶. The distribution of tasks and responsibilities between Americans and Europeans would only reflect the terms of the new Transatlantic "bargain". Consequently, the principles of NATO restructuring would be both simple and uncontested: for the Americans, global strategic responsibilities, hence the role of leader of possible large-scale military interventions ranging from peacemaking to collective defence, as the case might be with European participation; for the Europeans, responsibilities in the European theatre and the leading role in actions covering the fields of humanitarian activities up to the maintenance of peace in Europe, as the case might be with US support. The old integrated defence structure left over from the Cold War, which is both rigid and dominated by the US and is organised on the basis of compartmentalised operating theatres and only developed on the fringes for new missions through the CJTFs, would be replaced by a single modular military structure, organised according to the nature of potential missions, from low-intensity intervention up to the use of force, whether it be in Europe or elsewhere, thus making possible on a case-by-case basis operations led by the Americans or the Europeans.

■ For a Grand Transatlantic Debate

The RAND authors deserve our congratulations; their attempt to rethink globally the Euro-American strategic relationship has the merit of launching a necessary debate and of going beyond the illusory consensus

²⁶. Cf. in this respect James A. Thomson, "A New Partnership, New NATO Military Structures", in David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, *op. cit.*

characterising Transatlantic relations today²⁷. Viewed in abstract terms, the diagnosis formulated and the proposals put forward in *America and Europe* do not lack relevance and lend themselves to debate. In concrete terms, however, the feasibility of a “new partnership” appears uncertain to say the least – as the authors of the book moreover recognise. Such a refounding of the Transatlantic relationship is in fact subject to two essential conditions: first of all, “Europe” must be prepared to play a specific strategic role at the global level; next, America must be prepared to make Europe a true “partner”. Neither of these conditions is fulfilled today.

- First of all, Europe: today, it is far from being able to claim the status of a global strategic actor. From the Maastricht conference in 1991 to that of Amsterdam in 1997, the illusory character of such a status has only been confirmed. Granted, the European strategic blueprint suffers from cyclical obstacles: the construction of Europe has not yet emerged from the political and economic crisis it entered in the early 90s. But it is above all handicapped by structural factors on which it is pointless to elaborate²⁸: the weakness of military and institutional means; the ambiguity of its goals (“Europe as a power” – *Europe-puissance* – or “Europe as an area” – *Europe-espace*²⁹?); finally, the lack of a common vision of the kind of role that Europe could play on the international scene. These factors are hardly likely to evolve significantly in the foreseeable future. In the short or medium run, enlargement should

²⁷. Cf. in this respect the comments of Jean-Marie Guéhenno, “Getting the Transatlantic Partnership Right”, *Survival*, Vol. 39, N°2, summer 1997, pp. 147-151.

²⁸. Cf. the uncompromising analyses by Philip Gordon, “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy”, *International Security*, Vol. 22, N° 3, winter 1997-1998, pp. 74-100, and *The US and ESDI in the New NATO*, collection “Les notes de l’ifri”, Transatlantic Series, N° 4, 1998; and those of Nicole Gnesotto, *La Puissance et l’Europe*, *op. cit.*, and “Défense européenne et partenariat atlantique” in Françoise de La Serre and Christian Lequesne (ed.), *Quelle Union pour quelle Europe ? L’après-traité d’Amsterdam*, Brussels, Complexe, 1998.

²⁹. Cf. in this respect Philippe Moreau Defarges, *L’Union européenne : la fédération nébuleuse*, collection “Les notes de l’ifri”, N° 3, 1997.

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remain the EU's main priority; assuming that it is accompanied – as more and more Member States are advocating – by a real deepening effort, it appears relatively unlikely that the CFSP/CDP would be the priority issue.

Over the longer term, could the euro have a strategic impact and generate a spillover effect in the political and defence fields? The idea is in fashion, particularly in France. Yet nothing is less obvious: independently of the intrinsic obstacles to the European strategic blueprint, the plan for a single currency has to date been relatively harmful for the strategic dimension, whether due to convergence criteria which have often cut into military spending or, more generally, to the absolute priority which the Fifteen have given it in recent years – which explains to a large extent Amsterdam's mediocre results. Yet neither these criteria (as required by the stability pact) nor this priority (the success of the euro will imply lasting economic and fiscal harmonisation efforts between the Member States) are likely to be called into question in the foreseeable future. Even with the euro, there is little likelihood that the Union will soon become a strategic player in the true sense of the term. Accordingly, far from appearing in the eyes of the Americans as a more credible international partner than before, Europe's marginalisation, or even its strategic introversion, in short, its "isolationism", could even be accentuated from the Americans' point of view.

- This brings us to the second problem: the Americans' relative unreceptiveness. Is the US ready for such a partnership? This is definitely open to doubt. First of all, for economic reasons. Today, America views itself as a power without any rivals, a "hyperpower", to use the expression coined by Hubert Védrine. Admittedly – as the US is finding in the Middle East –, America's power is not without limits; it cannot impose its will on the rest of the world. Nevertheless, owing to

the disappearance of the former Soviet counterbalance but also the politico-strategic atrophy of the European Union, the US has experienced, since the end of the Cold War, a *relative* supremacy without precedent in the post-World War II period: whether it be in Europe itself or, *a fortiori*, at the world level, the power imbalance between the two shores of the Atlantic is indisputable. This in turn explains the US attitude with regard to European demands within NATO in recent years: why should the US share this power with a European power which is hypothetical anyway?³⁰

But it is above all structural reasons which can cast doubt on the US desire to establish, in the future, a genuine strategic “partnership” with Europe. Admittedly, the end of the Cold War has not led the US to revert to the alternative, often denounced by Henry Kissinger, between isolationism and overengagement, between “evasion” and “crusade”: the former is no longer valid in an interdependent world, while the latter is no longer justified in the absence of a massive threat. Notwithstanding, US foreign policy today seems a far remove from the classical ideal of the author of *Diplomacy*. This has been borne out by the crisis in the former Yugoslavia: between abstention and unilateralism, US foreign commitments, increasingly dependent on domestic constraints, are difficult to modulate. Yet a genuine partnership with Europe presupposes precisely that America can measure its commitments, whether it be in supporting the Europeans in the event that they take over the management of a crisis in Europe or on its periphery, or by recognising a specific role for Europe alongside the US in an intervention beyond the Old Continent. In reality, the “all-or-nothing” attitude which increasingly characterises US foreign policy in general and its foreign interventions in particular leaves hardly any room for a genuine Euro-American strategic partnership.

³⁰. This reasoning is taken up by Philip Gordon, *op. cit.*

Moreover, has this not been borne out by recent developments inside the Alliance? In many respects, it is this “new partnership” which the Allies – starting with the French and the Americans – tried to set up between 1994 and 1997. The “reform” of NATO, launched in Brussels, finalised in Berlin then to a large extent abandoned in Madrid, primarily aimed at rebalancing Transatlantic relations at the price of the emergence of a genuine European security and defence identity. Yet it was also designed to make possible an affirmation of NATO’s role outside Article 5: in Europe first of all (the justification of the ESDI being precisely to enable the Europeans to engage in collective security operations, as the case might be without US participation) but also without doubt – of course more implicitly – outside Europe. Was not France-NATO *rapprochement*, combined with the reform of a French military tool reconfigured with a view to out-of-area operations (professionalisation, capacities for projection, etc.) a reflection of France’s availability to play a “global” security role alongside the US and Great Britain? Even though it was not spelled out, behind all this lay a sort of Franco-American (hence possibly Euro-American) tradeoff between the Europeanisation and the globalisation of the Alliance.

The failure of this attempt came to light in late 1996-early 1997, as the problem of the Southern command was situated precisely in the linkage between the two sets of problems of Europeanisation demanded by the French and the globalisation tacitly advocated by the Americans³¹. The abandonment of NATO reform, endorsed *de*

³¹. It is precisely because CINCSOUTH is a key component of the US presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East that its Europeanisation was not acceptable for Washington (for reasons which were moreover political rather than military), a factor which the French clearly underestimated. The idea of a European CINCSOUTH (above and beyond the bad-faith interpretations concerning the VIth fleet) could only be interpreted by the Americans as the disproportionate claim to European pre-eminence not in Europe, but rather out of area. The “new partnership” might have come into being if France had limited itself to its demand for a deputy European SACEUR capable as the case might be of commanding operations without US

facto in Madrid, can thus be interpreted as the abandonment of the “new partnership” suggested by the RAND authors. Yet this failure played out against a context which was altogether favourable to an overall redefinition of the Euro-American relationship. This was due first of all to the alleviation of the misunderstandings and crises of 1992-1995: the time appeared particularly conducive to such a new deal of the cards. Next, this was due to the simultaneity and the possible synergy, for the first time in decades, between the reform of NATO and that of European institutions, on the occasion of the intergovernmental conference. Lastly, this was due to an equally exceptional convergence between the willingness of the French to envisage a form of normalisation of their participation in NATO and that of the Americans to accept a real reform of the Western *ensemble*. In retrospect, few periods in the history of the past fifty years of Transatlantic relations appear as favourable for a global and simultaneous reform of European and Atlantic institutions as that of the past two years³². As a result, the failure of 1995-1997 brings us back to a more fundamental question: is a truly egalitarian and global partnership structurally possible within the framework of NATO?

■ Conclusion: The Improbable Partnership

participation: this arrangement would have established European responsibilities in Europe while preserving US pre-eminence outside Europe.

³². Previous periods have seemed equally propitious to such a global readjustment: the period of 1950-1954 with the EDC; the 1962-1963 years with the Fouchet Plan and Kennedy's proposals – already – for a “Transatlantic partnership”; the 1973-1974 years with Henry Kissinger's proposal for a “year of Europe” and the European blueprints for political and strategic affirmation. In reality, the failure of each of these attempts, far from being accidental, always brings us back to fundamental divergences over the goals of European construction and the nature of Transatlantic relations.

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Here, we have no doubt touched on one of the major problems of NATO, whose asymmetrical nature and limited scope have from the start been precisely the building blocks of the Euro-American relationship.

- First of all, the asymmetrical nature: it was indeed because Europe found itself, during the Cold War, in a state of strategic inferiority in relation to the USSR and thus in need of US protection that the Atlantic Alliance was created. Conversely, however, this same protection presupposed from the start that Europe would remain on a long-term basis in a position of inferiority with regard to the US: first, because the US could only agree to commit itself militarily to Europe in exchange for uncontested military leadership, without which it would have taken the unacceptable risk of finding itself drawn into a conflict despite itself; second, because a Europe capable of defending itself on its own would have *ipso facto* called into question the very relevance of the Alliance and the US commitment in Europe, especially for public opinion and Congress. This explains the Europeans' historical frustration with an Alliance which, while protecting them, could only maintain them on a long-term basis in a state of strategic inferiority or even immaturity in relation to the US. It also explains why the Americans view any real ambition of European autonomy as unacceptable.

- Next, there is the limited scope of the Alliance. Due precisely to the asymmetry between Europe and America, the views of the two shores of the Atlantic have differed from the start in this respect: for the Europeans, whose primary or even sole concern was the Soviet threat on the Old Continent, the Alliance fell first and foremost within the province of the defence of Europe; for the Americans, however, who were vested with global responsibilities, NATO had to transcend this narrow framework and contribute to US and Western

security above and beyond the Old Continent³³. However, the Europeans have never truly responded to the US requests in this field and, in particular, to increasing demands, from the 60s onwards (and the US engagement in Viet Nam), for NATO to take out-of-area threats into consideration, at least politically. First of all, such a broadening of the scope of the Alliance would have entailed the risk for them of weakening the defence of Europe as an indirect consequence; next, it would have no doubt signified, in reality, a pure and simple European “follow-my-leader” attitude in US foreign commitments or even adventures. This explains an American frustration, symmetrical with the first one, with regard to an alliance constantly judged too narrow by the yardstick of America’s strategic interests and also explains the Europeans’ refusal in principle with regard to a globalisation of NATO.

Theoretically, the end of the Cold War could have modified this situation; in fact, however, this has not been the case at all. On the one hand, the US could have been more open towards the idea of a European security and defence identity whose materialisation no longer threatened, once the Soviet threat had disappeared, to draw America into a conflict that it would not have chosen. Yet apart from the fact that the Europeans have proven hardly capable of asserting themselves as an autonomous strategic pole in relation to the US, the latter has retained *mutatis mutandis* the same prejudices it formerly harboured with regard to a “strategic Europe”. Although the danger for the Americans is no

³³. This difference of views explains in particular certain of the difficulties encountered during the negotiation of the Atlantic Treaty in 1948-1949 and some of its characteristics: for example, whereas the French would have preferred a sort of unilateral US guarantee extended to the Brussels Treaty, the Americans demanded a multilateral alliance in which there would be no “suppliers” on one side and “users” of security on the other. Likewise, whereas the former would have preferred to limit European participation in NATO to the members of the Brussels Treaty, the Americans demanded the participation of the “stepping stone countries” (Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal) whose territory or territorial possessions offered the possibility of ensuring not only the security of Western Europe but also organising an advanced or even global defence of the North American continent.

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longer that of being drawn by Europe into a nuclear war, it remains in their eyes the danger of being involved on the Old Continent in crises likely to degenerate into a generalised conflict. By proclaiming at the outset that the Yugoslav crisis signalled “Europe’s hour” only to end up where everyone knows, did not the Europeans demonstrate this themselves? Moreover, the Europeans could have been more favourable towards a globalisation of the field of the Atlantic Alliance which, after the end of East-West confrontation, no longer threatened to distract America from Europe’s priority defence imperatives or to let them be drawn into “peripheral” conflicts despite themselves. Yet notwithstanding the fact that the US has hardly been encouraging in relation to their strategic ambitions, the Europeans have continued to consider America’s involvement in European security as indispensable and to view the extension of NATO’s field of action as a threat to the survival of an Alliance which must in their eyes retain a primarily or even exclusively European vocation.

In these conditions, the idea of a balanced Euro-American partnership could but and can only remain in limbo. Although appealing in theory, a tradeoff (“Europeanisation” in exchange for “globalisation”) is in reality as impractical after the Cold War as during it, due to both the asymmetrical power relationship between the two so-called “pillars” of the Alliance, Europe and America, and the divergent perceptions of security problems on both sides of the Atlantic. This explains – and here we repeat ourselves – the failure of the attempt to redefine Euro-American relations in 1995-1997: the US was not prepared to accept enough Europeanisation and Europe sufficient globalisation of the Western Alliance for an agreement to be possible. Assuming that this had nevertheless been the case and that the Alliance had effectively been “refounded” on such bases, the odds are that the partnership would have remained precarious. In the prevailing circumstances – which remain the same today – the European security and defence identity would only

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have been a screen for placing Europe under strategic supervision, and the broadening of the Alliance's scope of action would have been a "strategically correct" expression for recognising the leadership or even global hegemony of the US. Would such a solution have injected anything truly new into Transatlantic relations and would it have really enabled the Allies to take up the long-term challenges previously mentioned? One may well doubt this and even think that the misunderstanding on which the Alliance was to have been refounded could only have paved the way for future crises.

Naturally, the hope of a strategic Europe capable of playing a global role alongside the US remains. Naturally, such a partner could – in theory – turn out to be a means for the US of overcoming its own dilemmas. Yet the conditions for readjusting Transatlantic relations on this type of basis do not exist. The Euro-American asymmetry, which the past decade has merely confirmed, is of a lasting nature: a balanced relationship between a US as a sole superpower and a Europe still searching for its identity appears more unlikely than ever. What is worse, the post-Cold War era seems to indicate that a Euro-American partnership within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance *at least as we have known it for a half century* is structurally impossible. Either a partnership exists but cannot be truly balanced (but is the term of partnership justified in this case?) or there is a real Euro-American balance, in which case there is no more "Alliance" with a capital "A" and the capacity of the Americans and the Europeans for coping with its challenges becomes a question which is secondary or even irrelevant in relation to a more fundamental – and unpredictable – issue: that of the nature of strategic relations between the US and a "finished" Europe.

There is no miracle solution to NATO's present and future problems. Transatlantic relations have from the start been situated in a vicious circle: it is the strategic inequality between the US and Europe that

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justifies the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, the very existence of the Alliance maintains this inequality, yet this inequality remains a source of permanent frustration for both the Americans, in search of a better burden-sharing arrangement, and the Europeans, in search of a more equitable distribution of responsibilities. Some ten years ago, Josef Joffe noted that “*conflict is built into the very structure of the Alliance*” and he attributed this “*endemic conflict*” to “*the inequality between the United States and Western Europe in power and resources*”. Far from doing away with this vicious circle, the end of the Cold War has confirmed it. Consequently, despite the illusory calm which characterises Transatlantic relations today, we can predict that “*the history of the Alliance*” will continue to be, as Joffe wrote, “*the history of its crises*”³⁴.

³⁴. Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance*, Cambridge, Ballinger, 1987, pp. XIII-XV.