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## **Burdensharing in NATO**

3

### **The German Perception**

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*Sous la direction de Nicole Gnesotto*

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Institut français des relations internationales

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# Burdensharing in the Transatlantic Alliance: The German Perception

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*Karl Heinz Kamp\**

## ■ Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most successful political-military alliance in modern history. Despite doom prophecies of a superfluous NATO having lost its *raison d'être*, the Alliance is more active than ever before. The reason for NATO's success as the central element of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is its fundamental evolution which has taken place over the last almost ten years.

NATO's adaptation to new realities has almost inevitably touched the question of how to share costs and benefits among the members of the Alliance on both sides of the Atlantic. The question of burdensharing is of particular importance with regard to Germany, since unification has fundamentally changed the size, the domestic setting and the international weight of this country. This has necessitated an essential readjustment of German policies and politics in the field of international relations – a process which has still not come to an end. It also required Germany's allies and neighbors to continuously adapt or correct their judgements and misperceptions on German intentions and strategies. Notwithstanding

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Germany's ongoing efforts to demonstrate continuity in the essentials of German foreign policy (i. e. Western orientation, European integration, transatlantic partnership, federalism etc.) there was always some mistrust that the new "Berlin Republic"<sup>1</sup> might return to old patterns of over-assertiveness or "*Schaukelpolitik*" (seesaw policy) between East and West. This in turn had raised the question of whether Germany in future will be ready to contribute a fair share to security and stability in Europe and beyond.

This article takes up the issue of burdensharing in NATO's post Cold War environment from a German point of view. First, it touches briefly on the history of the burdensharing debate in NATO to prepare the ground for the description of continuity and change. A second part deals with the present discussion on burdensharing and gives an assessment of the German contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. A third step is focused on the analysis of some future burdensharing issues which are likely to create irritations and frictions between Germany and the United States, and in general between Europe and America, in the coming years.

## ■ The Past

### *Historical Background*

The debate on burdensharing has been an inherent feature of the history of NATO since its creation in 1949. Among the various roots and reasons for the everlasting discussions on burdensharing among the allies, one issue had been of particular relevance – the contrasting view of the nature of the engagement in NATO on both sides of the Atlantic. Americans tended to regard their contribution to the Alliance more as an "advance

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1. For an explanation of the term « Berlin Republic », see David S. Hamilton, *Beyond Bonn: America and the Berlin Republic*, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, DC, 1994.

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outlay” until economic prosperity had enabled the European allies to take care of their security and defense. The Europeans, however, saw the American contributions to NATO more as a symbol of Alliance solidarity and – what is more – as a service in return for Washington’s influence in Europe.

In the course of time, economic recovery and growing prosperity in Europe almost inevitably drew the attention of the American political elite to the question of how to achieve a fair share of contributions to the common defense among all NATO members. As a result, since the mid 1960s US congress passed one resolution on burdensharing in NATO after another, always initiating a process in NATO which followed an almost identical pattern: American Senators discerned a lack of engagement of their European allies – particularly with respect to the necessity of strengthening NATO’s conventional defense posture – and presented their amendments or resolutions, warning the Europeans about the withdrawal of US forces from Europe. These resolutions, albeit rejected or vetoed by the President, regularly startled the Europeans and impelled them to promise greater financial contributions. As a result, the situation improved slightly but still remained behind American expectations in the longer run. This sowed the seed for the next round in the burdensharing debate, starting with congressional complaints again.

Prominent results of these regular transatlantic exercises were the creation of NATO’s EUROGROUP in 1968 to coordinate the activities of the European NATO partners, or the signature of NATO’s Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) at the Washington-Summit in 1978 to improve the conventional defense capabilities of the Alliance. A special case was the agreement on the Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS), since that was a bilateral German-American issue. In November 1980 the Carter Administration summarized its complaints on lacking German financial support for US forces deployed in Germany in a demarche, which was

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handed over to the German defense minister by the American ambassador Walter Stoessel. Among other things, the United States requested a “Master Restationing Plan” financed by the German government to redeploy American military units within Germany. After lengthy negotiations both sides signed the Wartime Host Nation Support document which obliged Germany to provide additional personnel and infrastructure for American troops sent to Europe in times of crisis<sup>2</sup>.

A permanent feature in all of these disputes was the different yardstick for “burden” and “commitments” on both sides of the Atlantic. American observers by and large tended to assess the allies’ contributions to the common defense of NATO mostly from a financial perspective<sup>3</sup>, taking the defense expenditures of each country in relation to its gross national product as the only yardstick. That numerical approach found its most visible expression at the NATO Summit in Washington, DC, in 1978, when all Alliance members agreed upon the self-obligation to annually increase their defense expenditures by 3 percent. European NATO partners, however, always pointed to the non-financial burden of NATO membership they are bound to bear, like the damage caused by military exercises, low level flights, the density of military sites on their territory or the social and economic impacts of conscription. Even with regard to sheer numbers of military personnel and equipment the European contributions were impressive – at least with regard to the European theater. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the European allies provided about 95 percent of NATO’s divisions, 90 percent of soldiers and artillery pieces, 80 percent of tanks and fighter aircraft, and around 65 percent of NATO’s warships.

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2. See Helga Haftendorn, « Lastenteilung im Atlantischen Bündnis », *Europa-Archiv*, No. 16, 1985, pp. 497-506.

3. See for instance Kevin N. Lewis, *Measuring the US Financial Contribution to NATO's Defense*, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1989.



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In addition, the European NATO partners frequently criticized Washington for focusing too much on the burden of alliance membership instead of taking all the beneficial side effects into account. According to this view, US presence in Europe was not a result of American altruism but was instead of vital interest of the United States. Being number one in an alliance of democratic and prosperous countries provided America with a tremendous influence in quantitative and qualitative terms, and enabled the US to shape European and global policy in a unique way.

### *1989 – The End of the Burdensharing Question?*

Until 1988, NATO's burdensharing debate always took place in the shadow of ongoing East-West antagonism and under the threat of a communist bloc led by the Soviet Union – which was perceived to be expansionist and superior in military terms. These paradigms fell apart with the fundamental changes of 1989 and beyond. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union seemed to lead to three crucial conclusions, fundamentally changing the character of the questions of alliances, commitments and contributions:

First, the end of the Soviet menace appeared to gradually erode the justification for NATO as a defensive alliance in general, since even the residual threat of a reconstituted Soviet or Russian military threat increasingly became a remote scenario. Without the glue of a common threat NATO seemed to be doomed to dissolve – and with it the question of burdensharing.

Second, to many observers it looked as if military power as a “currency” had lost most of its value in the foreign policy field, at least in the industrialized world. “Hard Power”, i.e. the ability to command others, was predicted to become increasingly replaced by “soft” (persuasive) power, and Germany and Japan were portrayed as the models of new

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“civilian powers”, dominating future international relations with their economic efficiency<sup>4</sup>. With respect to the burdensharing issue the decline of military power would – according to the advocates of the “civilization” of international affairs – defuse the debate on military commitments and financial contributions within NATO sooner or later.

A third factor which made a significant impact on the burdensharing question at the end of the 1980s was the widespread perception of the United States as a “superpower in decline”. According to analysts and historians such as Paul Kennedy, the US was confronted with the problem of an “imperial overstretch”, which would inevitably lead to a significant decrease of American power – a fate that had regularly befallen other “empires” in history<sup>5</sup>. The prophecies of America’s diminishing strength came together with suggestions of major US foreign policy changes. To reduce this overstretch, the United States should significantly diminish its international commitments, particularly with respect to its military presence in Europe<sup>6</sup>. The consequences of such a step, however, were difficult to predict. On the one hand, an America in decline would at least partly lose its leading position in NATO and would deprive Washington of the option of dominating its European allies. On the other hand, a massive withdrawal of US forces from Europe would require the European allies to at least partly fill the gaps with a military buildup, which would certainly exceed the resources devoted to NATO so far. The result would be a NATO less capable of taking on the perceived Soviet threat.

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4. See Hanns W. Maull, « Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers », *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1990/91, pp. 91-106.

5. See Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, Vintage Books, New York, 1987. The opposite view is lucidly described in: Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead*, New York 1990.

6. See Christopher Layne, « Realism Redux: Strategic Interdependence in a Multipolar World », *SAIS Review*, Summer/Fall 1989, pp. 19-44.

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The Gulf crisis of 1990/1991, triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, changed the situation entirely and proved to be the catalyst of a modified burdensharing debate. Most obviously, the success of the US-led Anti-Iraq Coalition proved two of the popular stereotypes outlined above as illusory: the belief in the decreasing relevance of military power and the gloomy anticipations of America's alleged decline. Military might and in particular the ability of power projection obviously remained an important "currency" in international relations. And the United States remained a superpower because it not only retained more traditional hard power resources than any other country, but it also had the soft ideological and institutional resources to keep its leading place in the new domain of transnational interdependence. In consequence, burdensharing remained on the agenda, not only within NATO but also within the broader framework of the entire coalition fighting against Saddam Hussein. The United States demanded the engagement of its allies and received support to an almost unexpected degree. Militarily, the US provided the lion's share of the Anti-Iraq forces: 550,000 soldiers (205,000 soldiers committed by the allies), 3,080 tanks (1,730 allied tanks), 1,300 fighter planes (468 allied). Financially, however, Washington managed to have nearly the entire costs of the Gulf War funded by its allies. They paid almost \$ 100 billion to Washington for the American engagement against Iraq.

But the Gulf War not only confirmed the ongoing relevance of the burdensharing question, it also marked a watershed with regard to the content of the debate. Unlike the situation in NATO during the Cold War, the new debate on burdensharing was not only about financial contributions or deployment of weapons and soldiers but about participation in real combat situations. In a future multipolar world with multidimensional risks and challenges, security policy was not primarily about deterrence *of* conflicts but also about fighting and dying *in*

conflicts. In consequence, the substance of the term “burdensharing” was broadened by a new dimension of “responsibility sharing”.

### *Germany After the Gulf War – Toward Political Maturity*

The war in the Gulf marked a particular turning point in Germany’s understanding of burdensharing, responsibility sharing and international engagement. Germany had not actively participated in military operations against Iraq because the country still adhered to its self-imposed restriction of not deploying its forces in military operations beyond the NATO area – a self-limitation which had been accepted and upheld by its allies for decades. But the German government had provided enormous amounts of financial support not only for the NATO allies participating in the war (US, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Netherlands), but also for the countries in the region (Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia). Altogether, Germany provided DM 17,2 billion of direct financial support in the context of the Gulf war<sup>7</sup>. But notwithstanding its enormous financial contribution, Germany earned a lot of criticism for allegedly having remained in its “observer status in world politics”. Even the financial support was misinterpreted as “chequebook diplomacy” or as a German attempt to bail out from common responsibilities.

Since 1991, however, Germany had carefully but steadily adjusted its policy with regard to international military engagement. A couple of minor but decisive steps had been taken by the government to broaden the role of the Bundeswehr and to get the public acquainted with German military forces acting beyond NATO’s traditional writ. Minesweeping in the Gulf, medical support for United Nation’s forces in Cambodia, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) missions in the former Yugoslavia or contributions to the UN-mission in Somalia were some of

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7. A detailed list with German contribution can be found in Michael Inacker, *Unter Ausschuß der Öffentlichkeit – Die Deutschen in der Golfallianz*, Bonn, 1991, pp. 104-106.

the operations which included German military personnel between 1991 and 1993<sup>8</sup>. Several of them, like the AWACS mission to support the “no fly zone” over the former Yugoslavia, caused a sharp political and legal dispute in Germany, which required final decisions by the constitutional court.

This cautious process of adaptation, which could be described as a “salami tactic” of expanding the role of the Bundeswehr slice by slice, was the basis for the German participation in the NATO peace operations in Bosnia from 1995 on. The same German public, which had waved white towels out of their windows during the Gulf war to express its protest against German military engagement and to bolster the popular slogan “no blood for oil”, now supported wholeheartedly the German inclusion in the NATO force in the Balkans. In June 1995, the German Bundestag endorsed by 386 votes to 258 the German participation in the Rapid Deployment Force in Bosnia, later renamed IFOR (Implementation Force). The follow-on mission SFOR (Stabilization Force) met with even larger approval by the German parliament. In December 1996, 499 against 93 votes supported Germany’s further military engagement in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

Today, almost a decade after the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany has visibly expressed its readiness not only for burdensharing, but also its willingness to leave its comfortable passive “niche” in world politics. Hence Germany does not only bear its fair share of alliance burden in financial terms – as it always did – but has also proven its preparedness for just responsibility sharing.

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8. For more details see Karl-Heinz Kamp, «The German Bundeswehr in Out-of-Area Operations: To Engage or Not to Engage», *The World Today*, August/September 1993, pp. 165-168.

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Nevertheless, this is by far not yet the end of an evolutionary process. Germany's foreign policy has still to overcome a number of structural hurdles at home and abroad if it is to assume a new international military role commensurate with its political and economic weight in world politics.

### ■ The Present

Germany's success story of a careful but thorough readjustment of its foreign and security policy without pursuing national interests and political leverage too assertively has found broad acknowledgement among its NATO allies, but it did not generally dissolve the burdensharing question. On the contrary, only a couple of months after the agreement on the Dayton peace accord on Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995, which underlined NATO's new role as an instrument for peacekeeping and crisis management, the old transatlantic dispute on financial contributions reemerged again. The reason for the new debate on contributions and benefits was the issue of NATO's enlargement to the East – a topic which had dominated the security policy agenda since 1993.

### *Burdensharing and the Costs of NATO Enlargement*

It is worth noting that the question of the admittance of new members to NATO had been debated for a long time without involving the aspect of burdensharing at all. Even more, discussions on NATO enlargement from 1993 to 1995 mostly contained only "positive" terms, leaving out any potentially negative implication of an extension of NATO membership. "Export of stability", "transfer of security" or "widening the community of democracies" were the catchphrases of the political exchange. Members of the US Congress or German parliamentarians paid hardly

any attention to the problems of new commitments or the question of the credibility of security guarantees for Central and Eastern European countries. Particularly American policymakers elegantly ignored obvious inconsistencies and contradictions in their position vis-à-vis an enlarged alliance. Republican Senators had no problems to combine their strong desire to reduce America's external commitments and their support of new members in NATO. In fact, they mentioned the "America First" approach in their 1994 party program *Contract With America* and their readiness to extend US responsibilities toward Eastern Europe by NATO enlargement in one breath.

The situation changed entirely, however, when the first comprehensive analysis of potential costs of NATO enlargement was published in March of 1996 – interestingly enough neither by NATO nor by the US administration but by the Budget Office of US congress. This calculation stirred up policymakers and public since it indicated overall enlargement costs ranging between \$ 60.6 billion and \$ 124.7 billion over a ten-year period<sup>9</sup>. A second study published by the Rand Corporation in August 1996 could hardly calm down the concerns in Washington and other NATO capitals. Notwithstanding the fact that the Rand analysts were regarded as "pro enlargement" they still put the most likely price tag for an expanded NATO at around \$ 42 billion<sup>10</sup>. Further cost estimates done cooperatively by the US State Department and the Pentagon or by NATO Headquarters, which calculated the enlargement costs lower and lower did not necessarily help to clarify the situation. The fact that the State Department's calculation reduced the price for enlargement to \$ 27-35 billion and NATO estimated only \$ 1.5 billion raised the suspicion that

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9. See Congressional Budget Office (CBO), *The Costs of Expanding the NATO-Alliance*, Washington, DC, March 1996.

10. See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, F. Stephen Larrabee, « What Will NATO Enlargement Cost? », *Survival*, Autumn 1996, pp. 5-26.

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any possible figure could be underpinned by a certain calculation – depending on the political preferences of the analysts.

All of a sudden two crucial questions dominated the transatlantic security dialogue: How much will enlargement really cost and how are these costs going to be distributed among NATO allies? And immediately, NATO found itself in the midst of a transatlantic burdensharing debate similar to the familiar ones of the Cold War. American Senators, like the influential Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Jesse Helms, made clear that the US is not going to pay the lion's share of enlargement costs. On the other hand, French Prime Minister Jaques Chirac reportedly stated during the NATO-Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997 that France will pay “not a centime” for NATO enlargement.

But why is it that the “classical” burdensharing quarrel reemerged so swiftly, in spite of the changes in NATO after the end of East-West conflict? Why did US congress fall back into the old patterns of demanding more money from their European allies although the burdensharing issue was increasingly more about missions and responsibilities than about financial contributions?

A plausible explanation seems to be the combination of two different factors: reflex and lack of information. In general, inter alliance discussions tend to be characterized by a mutual interest in the protection of vested rights, particularly if financial implications are concerned. This almost inevitably leads to the reflex of a “beggar my neighbor” policy – a reaction which appears to be particularly well developed among NATO parliamentarians. But this phenomenon is by far not limited to NATO alone – the present discussion on net-contributions to the European Union is another example.



The almost natural reflex to shuffle off costs or commitments was amplified by a lack of information on the real distribution of payments to the various NATO budgets among US policymakers. Discussions in Congress or even within the administration unveiled the gut feeling that the US was and still is the paymaster of NATO, providing the largest amount of money to the common defense. This was the reason for much of the criticism expressed during the debate on the ratification of NATO enlargement in the US senate. As soon as the senators became aware of the real ratio of financial burden within NATO, which is around three quarters European versus one quarter American payments, much of the skepticism vis-à-vis enlargement faded away.

### *A Balance of German Contributions to Security and Stability*

The immediate resurrection of an old-fashioned burdensharing debate on the costs of taking new members into NATO rang alarm bells within the German government. To support the ratification of enlargement and to avoid a detrimental discussion in the US on costs and benefits of NATO, Germany pursued a dual strategy to counter American misperceptions on European and German contributions. On the one hand, Germany explicitly declared its readiness to bear a fair share of alliance burden today and in the future. Defense Minister Volker Ruhe and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel visited Washington frequently in 1997 and 1998 to convey this message to key American decision-makers. Moreover, Foreign Minister Kinkel addressed the American public to demonstrate Germany's ongoing interest in a stable NATO alliance. In a Washington Post article, Kinkel emphasized that "*Europe and especially Germany are shouldering their responsibility for stability and security in Europe and [are] assuming the burdens that go along with it*"<sup>11</sup>.

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11. Klaus Kinkel, « Priceless Alliance », *Washington Post*, November 4, 1997.

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On the other hand, Germany provided US congress and administration with comprehensive information on German contributions to NATO and to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. In autumn 1997, the German Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry compiled a detailed list of German contributions to NATO and to shared roles and responsibilities. In keeping with the broader understanding of burdensharing beyond the limited scope of NATO budgets, German stocktaking of its contributions included all financial obligations applicable to defence, crisis management and security in Europe and beyond. A separate section focused on the German engagement in the Balkan region. But unlike earlier discussions on burdensharing, Germany did not bring up the “soft” burden like the problems caused by foreign troops stationed on German soil or the damage induced by military exercises. Instead, only the “countable” facts were mentioned since they were still impressive enough.

### **German Contributions to Common Security in Europe and Beyond**

With regard to armed forces in Europe, Germany provides more than 285,000 soldiers (Army and Air Force) in the CFE-area<sup>12</sup>, which is 12.97 percent of all NATO troops deployed in that region. The Europeans in general provide more than 95 percent of all NATO forces in Europe.


#### **Armed Forces in Europe** *according to CFE-counting rules*

<b>Country</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Germany	285,326	12.97
NATO-Europeans	2,091,741	95.11
USA	107,481	4.88

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12. The overall strength of the Bundeswehr is 338,000 men (as at February 1998). According to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), some categories are not counted, i. e. naval forces, reservists.

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


A similar ratio holds true for the deployment of major weapon systems in Europe (or CFE Treaty Limited Equipment = TLE) like tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft or attack helicopters.

**Major Weapon Systems in Europe**  
*according to CFE-counting rules*

	Tanks		Armoured Combat Vehicles		Artillery		Fighter Aircraft		Attack Helicopters	
		%		%		%		%		%
Germany	3,248	23.03	2,537	11.82	2,058	14.69	560	13.28	205	16.79
NATO- Europe	12,986	92.09	19,615	91.39	13,398	95.63	3,998	94.78	1,095	89.68
USA	1,115	7.91	1,849	8.61	612	4.37	220	5.22	126	10.32

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
With respect to financial contributions to NATO, Germany has provided DM 539.6 million (around \$ 310 million) for all three NATO budgets (NATO Military Budget, NATO Security Investment Program/NSIP, NATO Civil Budget) and for the two AWACS<sup>13</sup> budgets (AWACS Operating Costs, AWACS Procurement Costs). In three of the budgets (NSIP and the AWACS budgets) Germany is the second largest contributor in NATO.

### Contributions to the Three NATO Budgets and to AWACS in DM and Percent

	NATO Military Budget		NSIP		NATO Civil Budget		AWACS Operation Costs		AWACS Procurement Costs	
	%	Mio DM	%	Mio DM	%	Mio DM	%	Mio DM	%	Mio DM
Germany	18.7	149.4	25.48	347.6	15.54	42.6	28.13	101.6	28.13	60.2
NATO-Europe	65.45	541.4	70.44	70.44	71.05	194.6	49.04	177.1	50.12	107.2
USA	28.04	231.8	26.50	26.50	23.35	63.9	41.52	150	41.52	88.9

13. Airborne Warning And Control System.

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In addition, in 1997 Germany provided more than DM 123 million for activities in connection with NATO Partnership for Peace Program (DM 111 million in 1996) to provide military and civil assistance for the countries in Eastern Europe.

For the around 130 000 foreign troops deployed in Germany, the German government provides more than 900 square kilometre of land free of charge. The facilities of US forces in Germany cover more than 700 square kilometre with a current market value of DM 23.3 billion. But the value of the stationing ground goes far beyond its economic benefit. As demonstrated impressively during the Gulf war 1990/91 the military bases in Germany are of crucial importance for American power projection ambitions to defend US interests on a global scale.

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Apart from the military sphere, Germany has provided the lion's share with respect to the economic stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe and the Republics of the former Soviet Union. Up to 1996, the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe had received DM 56.6 billion of German taxpayers' money. For Republics of the former Soviet Union DM 125.7 billion were provided – 80 percent of that sum was granted to Russia. The United States provided in the same period of time a little less than DM 17 billion.

### **German Contributions to the Stabilization of the Balkan Region**

The ongoing crisis in the Balkan region required a great number of military and non-military actions in the field of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, reconstruction and humanitarian help – notably in the framework of the Dayton peace accord of December 1995. For the military stabilization of the Region, Germany provided around DM 1.8 billion:

	DM
<b>Bundeswehr Missions</b> <i>airdrops, embargo surveillance, IFOR, SFOR<sup>1</sup></i>	1.711 billion
<b>Support of Other Armed Forces</b> <i>military equipment, host nation support</i>	12 million
<b>Disarmament, Confidence Building</b> <i>technical support, inspections</i>	35 million

1. IFOR: Implementation Force, SFOR: Stabilization Force.

For the non-military efforts to stabilize the Balkan region, Germany provided more than DM 16.6 billion. Most of the money was required to host more than half a million refugees in Germany. With 400,000 people from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 120,000 from other parts of former

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Yugoslavia, Germany has taken more refugees than all other members of the European Union together:

	DM
<b>Political and Diplomatic Contributions</b> <i>Contact Group, EU, OSCE, police force</i>	46 million
<b>Humanitarian Contributions</b> <i>refugees, humanitarian help</i>	16 billion
<b>Reconstruction and Economic Support</b> <i>International Donor Conference, bilateral emergency relief</i>	575 million

In sum, Germany provided more than DM 18.4 billion for the international efforts to implement the Dayton peace process in the Balkan region.

## ■ The Future

As a rule, altruism is not a trait of political actors in Western democracies. Hence, debates on the costs and benefits of alliances and on the just distribution of resultant burdens are a constituent element of organizations like NATO. Therefore, a transatlantic debate on burdensharing will continue to exist as long as NATO remains a relevant institution. However, departing from the burdensharing controversies of the past, future debates are likely to differ with regard to topics and vigor.

With respect to the intensity or harshness of future burdensharing disputes two contradictory trends are possible – and it is hard to predict which one is going to prevail. On the one hand, there is a mollifying tendency for German-American burdensharing debates because of two reasons. First, the interest in foreign policy issues and particularly in security policy questions in Germany is constantly in decline – a development which started almost a decade ago. In the early 1970s, 47 percent of West

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Germans declared some interest in foreign policy topics. This figure rose to 52 percent in the mid-1980s, when anti-nuclear protest stirred up the whole country. Meanwhile, in 1998 the figure dropped to 42 percent in West Germany and 39 percent in East Germany. This corresponds to the level of foreign policy interest of the Germans in the early 1950s, when the entire country was preoccupied with reconstitution and recovery. In light of the pressing issues on the domestic level, e.g. unemployment or economic regeneration in East Germany, a further decrease of the foreign policy attention of the German public is very conceivable for the years to come. As a consequence, American criticism or accusations of a lack of readiness on the part of Germany (or the European allies in general) to shoulder more burdens of common defense will not meet with such a level of public attention or sensitiveness as it did in the past. Second, the option for Washington to bolster American complaints about burdensharing with warnings of significant cuts in US military presence in Europe has also diminished. Not only has the number of American troops in Germany been reduced to about 75,000 soldiers – what is more, the end of the East-West conflict has completely changed the public perception of US forces in Germany as inevitable means to counter a Soviet threat. This in turn increasingly deprives Washington of a means of putting vigor into its demands for a fair share of the burden.

On the other hand, financial and budgetary pressures on both sides of the Atlantic might contradict the soothing trends mentioned above and might lead to an aggravation of German-American burdensharing disputes. Shrinking defense budgets and the aspirations of political actors to reduce foreign policy obligations for the benefit of social and domestic expenditures are likely to intensify mutual accusations of spending too little on security and defense requirements. In addition, economic strains tend to reinforce the widespread intention of members of an alliance to pass on emerging requirements as far as possible to partners and associates. This might also increase the likelihood of discord and friction.



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With regard to the content of future burdensharing debates, the questions of responsibility and mission sharing will remain at the center of transatlantic discussions. Financial contributions will no longer be necessary primarily for defense *preparedness* – as was mostly the case during the Cold War. Instead, money and resources are likely to be required for *real military action* – be it at NATO's periphery or beyond.

In view of the ongoing developments in the security policy sphere, there are at least three concrete topics that will dominate the Euro-American respectively the German-American burdensharing agenda in the years to come:

- The European-American relationship in general.
- The development of a European pillar in security and defense matters.
- The further evolution of NATO.

All topics are closely intertwined and already existing differences on most of these topics might increase further and might lead to major disagreements on burden and contributions.

### *The European-American Relationship*

Judging from photographs taken of American and German politicians meeting in Washington, DC, or Bonn, things have never been better in the relationship between the two countries – not least thanks to the close personal ties between Chancellor Kohl and President Clinton. There are no major differences in assessments of political developments and in strategies vis-à-vis existing challenges. Upcoming irritations, like American accusations of German discrimination against the Church of Scientology, had mostly proven to be “storms in teacups” and did not lead to major divergences between Germany and America.

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However, beneath the surface of harmony, potential sources of transatlantic trouble are already looming. Not only are the two countries far apart on some basic issues, for instance on the reduction of greenhouse emissions as displayed at the Kyoto world climate conference or on how to deal with countries like Iran. Even more important is the growing uneasiness about Washington's over-assertiveness or even arrogance toward the European allies. The American self-image as the "indispensable nation" – as President Clinton had put it in his inaugural address in 1996 – had an unpleasant taste to the European audience, since it raises the impression that other nations are regarded as "dispensable". What is more, the American way of pursuing national interests by pushing the allies into the direction of US political preferences has been increasingly perceived in some European capitals as being spoon-fed by a cocky superpower.

Reasons and occasions for the European perception of American unilateralism and self-centeredness were manifold. Prior to NATO's Madrid Summit in 1997, the United States insisted on limiting the number of new members in NATO to three countries, notwithstanding the preference of other NATO countries for the admission of four or five applicants. With regard to the United Nations, Washington has constructed a linkage between the American willingness to at least partly pay their debts to the UN and a comprehensive UN reform along the lines of American suggestions. With respect to EU enlargements, the European Union feels snubbed by the unconcealed American attempt to push for the rapid admission of Turkey to the EU. In the field of global trade US Congress has imposed economic sanctions legislation, penalizing foreign firms that do business with Libya, Iran or Cuba. When the European Union filed a formal complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO) about the so-called "Helms-Burton Legislation" on Cuba, Washington claimed that because Cuba was a national security issue it would not cooperate with the WTO.

But notwithstanding the popularity of an at least subliminal “America bashing” in some European capitals, the accusation of American dominance or even arrogance tends to miss a crucial point: the American behavior vis-à-vis its European allies will always be a function of the European ability to act coherently and consistently in all matters of mutual interest. A Europe that is ready to take on upcoming risks and challenges in a unified and effective manner will have an entirely different weight and influence within the transatlantic partnership than a Europe subdivided and paralyzed on key foreign policy issues. Up to now, however, the record of a common European policy in foreign and security issues is poor. Neither within Europe’s geographic boundaries nor outside of Europe (North Africa, the Gulf region) has the European Union proven to be a powerful actor able to contribute significantly to the settlement of regional crises. Even in a situation where EU members had been directly involved, like in the dispute between Greece and Turkey over an Aegean island, it was the US president who successfully intervened to prevent a conflict while the Europeans were “literally sleeping through the night”<sup>14</sup>.

This has led to a difficult situation and has sown the seeds for future European-American disputes. European indecisiveness will further fuel the American belief in its own indispensability, while Europe will further suffer from the perception of dependency and subordination. At the same time, Europe is unable to do without the advantages of American “indispensability”. As NATO’s General Secretary Javier Solana has put it lucidly: The problem is not “too much United States” but “too little Europe”<sup>15</sup>.

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14. US Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke, cited in Lionel Barber, Bruce Clark, « US Polices Aegean “While EU Sleeps” », *Financial Times*, February 8, 1996.

15. Speech by Javier Solana at the 1997 Munich Conference on Security Policy (Wehrkunde Conference), February 7-8, 1997, Internet version: <http://www.nato.int>.

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But even a “more of Europe” will not necessarily prove to be a panacea to avoid future transatlantic trouble, since the American request for a unified Europe which is able to shoulder a greater share of the burden always implies some ambivalence. A Europe that manages to speak (and act) with one voice will almost inevitably diminish US influence in NATO and could even become a competitor not only in economic but also in political terms. To be confronted with a pre-consulted position of a “European caucus” would be an experience which might be hard to swallow for American policymakers. The best – but not necessarily the most likely – outcome would be that both sides of the Atlantic gradually adapt to their new roles within the transatlantic partnership. Washington would have to come to grips with the fact that the increasing influence of the Europeans would go along with the slightly decreasing role of the United States.

## *European Defense Capabilities*

Alas, a development – be it gradual or erratic – of a unified Europe in security policy terms is presently not in sight. Notwithstanding the communiqué language of EU Summits, there will not be a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the foreseeable future. The EU’s Intergovernmental Conference, which ended with the Amsterdam Summit in July 1997, attempted to carry the existing intergovernmental cooperation based on consensus further to true common decision-making in foreign and security policy matters. This particular effort failed in Amsterdam as it did in Maastricht seven years ago.

It is worth noting that the problem is not so much a lack of readiness to cooperate on the military side. A number of multinational forces earmarked for military operations under a European command already

exist<sup>16</sup>. The real difficulty lies in the EU's political inability to subordinate national interests and preferences of the various member states to a common position in an external crisis<sup>17</sup>. This lack of cohesiveness and unity has repercussions on the field of existing defense capabilities, where the military postures of most countries are still only partly able to cope with new challenges beyond the traditional geographic boundaries. For decades, most European armies had been adjusted to the Cold War contingency of a massive Soviet attack in central Europe. Hence they are still lacking key assets for power projection beyond European borders, like strategic intelligence, air transport or theater missile defense. In NATO these "force multipliers" are provided by the US. But in spite of these shortcomings the EU members or even the European members of NATO have been unable to agree on concrete measures and to provide sufficient resources to overcome these deficiencies. As a result – even if Europe should agree politically on a common military action beyond the territory of its member states – only very limited measures would be possible since the key requirements for a common and effective "power projection" are still missing.

Within NATO, a pragmatic way of easing the problem has been found. With the agreement on NATO's Combined Joint Forces Concept (CJTF) the European NATO members could make use of American military equipment for military contingencies under European command. US satellites or transport aircraft would enable the Western

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16. EUROFOR is a four-nation (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal) rapid deployment force of division size. EUROMARFOR is a maritime force made up of the EUROFOR countries. EUROKORPS is a five-nation combat unit (Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg). The EURO-AIR-GROUP is a Franco-British permanent planning group located in High Wycombe (U.K.).

17. See Philip H. Gordon, « Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy », *Survival*, Winter 1997/98, pp. 74-100.

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European Union or a “coalition of the willing” to carry out military operations without direct American participation.

However, what seems to be a reasonable solution for an immediate challenge could prove to be a nightmare in burdensharing terms for at least two reasons. First, the CJTF concept is based on the principle of unanimous support of all NATO members and in particular on the consent of the United States. In fact, Washington has a “double veto” with respect to future CJTF operations. US approval is not only necessary to initiate a CJTF mission. What is more, Washington is always able to withdraw its consent during the operation and to remove its assets whenever it deems necessary. Hence bitter disputes over the necessities and feasibilities of military operations are preconditioned. Second, as in the first years of NATO’s history, Washington tends to see its readiness to provide Europe with military means for power projection more as a short-term solution to overcome existing deficits, an “advance outlay” until the European allies have restructured their military means to the post-Cold War requirements. Most European countries, however, still banking on a peace dividend, do not show too much enthusiasm to provide funds for the procurement of lacking military hardware. This will sow the seeds of future American criticism of European indecisiveness and free-riding.

Germany will not be excluded from this presumptive reproach, since for the German defense budget only very minor growth rates can be expected in the coming years. In addition, there will still remain a striking disproportion between operational costs and investive expenditures. The “Medium-Term Defense Plan” for the years 1999 to 2001 which the German government agreed on in July 1997 foresees only a moderate increase of the procurement budget and even decreasing expenditures for military research and development (R&D).

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**Medium-Term Defense Plan**  
*in DM billion*

	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
Federal budget	461.0	462.3	471.1	480.0
Difference (%)		+ 0.3	+ 1.9	+ 1.9
Defense budget	46.67	47.5	48.3	48.6
Difference (%)		+ 1.8	+ 1.7	+ 0.6

**Operational Costs and Investment Costs**  
*in DM billion 1999-2001*

<b>Operational costs</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
Personnel costs	23.77	23.78	23.84
Maintenance of equipment	3.88	3.87	3.84
Other operational costs	7.41	7.36	7.27
<b>Total operational costs</b>	<b>35.08</b>	<b>35.03</b>	<b>34.96</b>
<b>Investment costs</b>			
Research & Development	2.70	2.86	2.78
Procurement	7.48	8.13	8.53
Military facilities	1.87	1.94	1.99
<b>Total investment costs</b>	<b>12.48</b>	<b>13.34</b>	<b>13.70</b>

It is worth noting, however, that the slight increase of the procurement budget will become more than outweighed by major procurement projects, which need to be financed in the coming years and which will preclude other military investments. The most important example of such a “crowding out” effect is the procurement of the European Fighter Aircraft, approved by the German parliament in November 1997. The price tag of the Eurofighter program is almost DM 23 billion – weaponry and ammunition excluded and to be covered by other parts of the defense budget. Other projects, like the procurement of two support vessels for the German Navy or the modernization of the Patriot air defense system have already been cancelled or delayed. Meanwhile, informed observers criticize the widening gap between the emerging tasks and roles for

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German armed forces and their de facto capabilities to match these requirements<sup>18</sup>.

## *The Future Evolution of NATO*

In spite of the difficulties to be expected from the CJTF concept in burdensharing terms, it can certainly add a great margin of flexibility to NATO's scope of action. This however almost inevitably raises the question: flexibility for what? What will be NATO's future roles and missions in an era which is no longer characterized by East-West confrontation but by cooperation and dialogue?

The debate on NATO's future role is not only confined to NATO's Policy Coordination Group, which started developing a new Strategic Concept in January 1998. Instead, the discussion on the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is heating up in academic and political circles on both sides of the Atlantic and already displays differences and irritations between the United States and most of its European allies.

Already in 1993 there were voices in the US – mostly in the academic world – which argued vigorously for a “globalization” of NATO. According to these views, NATO has to take on global responsibilities, since only an alliance which is able to act in a military crisis in the Persian Gulf or in South East Asia will find lasting support from American voters. Any European reluctance to “buy” NATO's global orientation would significantly erode transatlantic stability and would undermine NATO's justification for its existence<sup>19</sup>. This argumentation, albeit convincing at first glance, did not find much support, neither in

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18. See Franz-Josef Meiers, « Obsolet, überdimensioniert, unterfinanziert », *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 14, 1998.

19. For a description and critical analysis of that argument see Michael Ruehle, « Why NATO Will Survive », *Contemporary Strategy*, No. 1/1997, pp. 109-115.



Congress nor within the Clinton Administration. The reasons for the lack of interest at that time were twofold. On the one hand, NATO's engagement in Bosnia and the successful negotiation of the Dayton agreement had restored NATO's damaged reputation and re-established its cohesion. On the other hand, the implicit linkage within the globalization-concept (i.e. European engagement on a global scale as a pre-condition for further US support) completely missed the crucial fact that the United States has a fundamental interest in the further existence and indeed enhancement of NATO. America's leading status in the alliance is a necessary precondition for being and remaining a superpower. Thus, any kind of linkage using the threat of American isolationism was politically a non-starter.

Meanwhile, however, there is increasing evidence that the idea of widening NATO's role from the original task of self-defense toward world-wide military intervention capabilities falls on fertile ground in Washington's leading political circles. Similar ideas have been raised openly or covertly in the context of the congressional debates on the ratification of NATO's enlargement to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Former prominent secretaries of state and defense like Warren Christopher and William Perry defined NATO's future capability to defend European and American interests in the world as a "strategic imperative"<sup>20</sup>. Influential Republican Senator Jesse Helms blamed the Clinton-Administration for not paying enough attention in its NATO concepts to challenges posed by rogue states like Libya. Even the pro-NATO-oriented Senator Richard Lugar pointed to the "global priorities" of the United States and claimed that in the upcoming discussions on the "strategic purpose" of NATO, potential crises in the Gulf or in the Taiwan Strait should be taken into account. Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared that the future strategy of the alliance should be focused

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20. See Warren Christopher, William J. Perry, « NATO's True Mission », *New York Times*, October 21, 1997.

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much more on “power projection” instead of on rigid self-defense concepts. President Bill Clinton himself mentioned in a letter to Senator John Warner that NATO’s enlargement to the East served – among other reasons – the “*development of new capabilities to meet evolving challenges*”<sup>21</sup>.

The upcoming discussion of NATO’s global role is politically of an explosive nature, since it is far from certain that a transformation of NATO’s strategic course from the purpose of the *common defense of NATO’s territory* to the principle of the *defense of common interests* will find the support of all allies. In the case of Germany, American ideas on the future of NATO are of particular importance for at least three reasons. The first one is that the question of NATO’s future role needs to be answered by Germany as well. Second, there is no doubt that Germany too pursues its national interests on a global scale, for instance with regard to economic issues or with respect to a necessity of containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And finally, Germany emphasizes the indispensability of stable transatlantic relations more than any other ally and pays therefore particular attention to US security policy positions.

There is no doubt that – also from a European perspective – there are a number of arguments which clearly support the idea of widening the geographical horizon of the Atlantic alliance. Unlike the epoch of Cold War bipolarity, future military crises will inherit much more potential for escalation in a sense that conflict cannot necessarily be regionalized any more. Technological progress tends to turn geographical distance into a factor of decreasing relevance. In the year 2010 about 80 percent of NATO’s present territory will be within the range of ballistic missiles

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21. See *The Inner-American Debate on NATO Enlargement on the Eve of Ratification, Commentary and Documentation*, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Washington, DC, November 1997.

launched from the Middle East or from Northern Africa. The growing proliferation of missile technology significantly aggravates the danger posed by nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Present efforts to bank on existing non-proliferation regimes – however rigid or successful they may be – are likely at best to slow down the spread of weapons of mass destruction, but cannot interrupt it completely. As recent events in India and Pakistan have shown, the number of biological, chemical or even nuclear players in world politics is going to rise. Hence, NATO-allies are likely to face future military threats from regions far beyond the borders of traditional NATO defense planning. Moreover, vital challenges are not limited to the strictly military sphere alone. A sudden cut of the energy supply from the Gulf region or the interruption of the trade routes from East Asia, would undoubtedly be an essential threat to Europe. These future challenges have to be included in any precautionary security policy strategy.

In examining the arguments for widening NATO's outreach more precisely, however, one can discover some analytical weaknesses in many of the American appeals for "globalization" of NATO. It is far from clear, for instance, who is going to define the "common interests" which should be defended by a future NATO. American global concerns do not necessarily coincide with the vital interests of the European allies and even within (NATO)-Europe perceived challenges and political preferences differ significantly. In the light of the divergent positions of most NATO allies, consensus-building for common military action beyond the self-defense obligation according to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will always be a very difficult process – as NATO's Bosnia engagement has proven conspicuously. The general difficulty of forging unanimous consent is likely to aggravate the more members a future NATO will have.

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Moreover, there is no doubt that any formal extension of alliance obligations, for instance by re-negotiating the Washington Treaty, is politically not feasible – not least because some NATO-partners might suspect that this would degenerate NATO to an instrument of America's global strategy. This would inevitably cause an “anti-American reaction” particularly on the French side, which would further imperil the efforts to bring France back into NATO's military integration. At the same time, a vociferous discussion of NATO's globalization would almost inevitably endanger the previous successes in firmly embedding Russia into Euro-Atlantic security structures, since Russia would surely rate the perceived widening of NATO's strategic direction as a confrontational measure. To some degree, Russia might even fear becoming the target of NATO's actions to serve alliances' interests one day. A final inconsistency from the European point of view is the very practical question of the existing level of intelligence information as a precondition for European action. At present, only the United States has sufficient global intelligence capabilities at its disposal, and it is most likely that American sources will share this information with the European allies only on a selective basis. This implies, however, that the Europeans are expected to join a common military operation merely “blind” or with filtered information at best.

These open questions have not yet been sufficiently answered in any of the existing American statements on NATO's global role. Instead, it is hard to discern what is actually meant by the term “globalization” as used by American observers. Is *globalization* about formal changes of NATO's Treaty within the meaning of a “global Article 5-obligation” or is it purely about the capability to act militarily beyond self-defense measures? The latter demand already exists – provided that there is an appropriate political will within NATO. Obviously the claims of some US-politicians mirror much less a cohesive and operationally conclusive concept, but instead express much more some kind of political discomfort

about the perceived absence of European eagerness to take part in interest-guided power projections.

However, lacking conceptual clarity is not likely to keep American politicians and parliamentarians from calling for more engagement from the European side or even for NATO's readiness for "world-wide military action". These requests are not only a result of specific American views of the strategic situation after the end of the Cold War and a similarly specific self-assessment of America's future position in the world. As the one remaining superpower, the United States pursues its interests globally and therefore requires an apparatus to implement power-politics. Most European allies, however, still have – rightly or wrongly – a more regional approach to security requirements. As long as these different perceptions exist, NATO will suffer from transatlantic disputes on engagement, contributions and burdens.

## ■ Conclusions

Debates and arguments on burdensharing are an inevitable part of NATO's reality. Transatlantic discussions on this issue are regularly fed by two different sources. First, political players have an almost intrinsic interest in maximizing benefits but minimizing the costs that they entail. Second, on both sides of the Atlantic there are different self-assessments and divergent judgements on the strategic necessities of pursuing the various "national interests".

With the end of the Cold War and Germany's growing maturity in foreign policy terms, the range of burdensharing issues has extended from a narrow focus on financial aspects to a wider agenda of missions and responsibilities. Future German-American burdensharing debates are likely to concentrate on NATO's roles and aims beyond the purpose of

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self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as well as on the military capabilities to contribute to NATO's newly defined tasks. This will leave room for bitter disputes and for mutual reproaches about perceived shortcomings. Germany could accuse the United States of being too impatient with regard to Germany's adaptation to the newly emerging challenges in a multipolar world. To demonstrate its contributions to security and stability on the continent, Germany might keep on pointing to the 680,000 Bundeswehr soldiers that could be mobilized in times of crisis<sup>22</sup>. The United States, however, might continue to emphasize the future relevance of NATO beyond the European borders. That would raise the question: which realistic military contingency would require a German contribution of more than half a million men under arms? Is the Bundeswehr in its present form and structure really capable of taking on the military challenges ahead?

It is worth noting, however, that these disputes – despite their potential bitterness – are unlikely to lead to a fundamental rift in German-American relations, since both sides are well aware of what is at stake. Europe in general and Germany in particular will continue to play a key role in the US security calculus. In a sense, the American engagement in Europe is a precondition for America's status as a global power. Hence, US administrations have always realized that the American contribution to NATO is not an act of charity but instead serves American vital interests. Germany, on the other hand, has generally accepted that for many years to come the American global hegemony will remain the girder for upholding the international order. Notwithstanding occasional disturbances in German-American relations, Germany still views the

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22. Defense Minister Ruehe makes this point frequently. See for instance *Europe's Security in the Next Millenium*, Lecture given by the German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe, Stanford University, May 21, 1998.

United States rift as the “benevolent empire”<sup>23</sup> inevitable for peace and security and irreplaceable by any other authority.

## ■ Addendum: German Foreign Policy After the Elections

In October 1998, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party and the Greens led by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder replaced the Kohl government after sixteen years of conservative-liberal leadership. Swiftly, op-eds appeared in the opinion sections of the international press, expressing concern and worry about Germany’s future political course. Some observers even predicted that “*a Schroeder-led government will be radically different from the ones that have presided over Germany for the past 16 years*”<sup>24</sup>. Such disquieting assessments, however, tend to ignore that the major reason for Schroeder’s victory was the widespread desire for a change of face more than a change of policy. A simple but lucid observation stated that Schroeder had won the elections “*because he wasn’t Kohl*”<sup>25</sup>.

It is certainly too early to assess the foreign policy concepts of the Red-Green government, however it is not daring to assume that continuity will be the prevailing element of future foreign and security policy. The evidence supporting that prediction is manifold. Already during the election campaign Gerhard Schroeder had frequently used terms like “reliability” and “calculability” to characterize the foreign policy of an SPD-led government. Right after his electoral triumph Schroeder made a point of congratulating Helmut Kohl on his merits in the field of foreign

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23. See Robert Kagan, « The Benevolent Empire », *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1998, pp. 24-34.

24. See Mark Mitchell, « How Schroeder Will Change Germany », *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, October 5, 1998.

25. See *USA Today*, September 29, 1998.

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policy, and – what is more – in the interim period between election day and the inauguration of the new chancellor the “old” and “new” governments consulted frequently on pressing foreign and security policy issues. Even the Greens, who originated from the anti-nuclear and anti-NATO movement of the 1970s, suddenly mutated toward pragmatism and foreign policy consensus. Fundamentalist pacifists lost ground to those who have increasingly realized that conflict is an inevitable reality political decision-makers have to deal with in international relations. It remains to be seen whether the Green “learning curve” means a lasting transition or a temporary development primarily caused by the desire to make it into a coalition government after so many years in opposition.

Nevertheless, the apparent trend toward continuity is not only a result of the political preferences of the future decision-makers in the foreign policy field, but is also dictated by the political agenda and the foreign policy schedule in the months to come. The Kosovo crisis and the lurking humanitarian catastrophe in the Balkans changed the minds of even those who traditionally rejected any German military engagement abroad. The pressing foreign policy agenda that lies ahead – ranging from Germany’s presidency of the European Union in 1999 to a number of summits of EU, NATO and G8 – requires coherent decisions instead of programmatic debates on the basics of German foreign and security policy.

However, continuity does not necessarily imply the sheer reproduction of the foreign and security policy established over the past 16 years. Notwithstanding the fact that a Schroeder foreign policy is unlikely to veer markedly from the course set by Helmut Kohl, it will doubtlessly show different nuances and facets. This will hold particularly true with respect to European integration and Franco-German relations. On the one hand, Schroeder had indicated that he will proceed more cautiously with the expansion of the European Union into central Europe, and analyze more carefully the implications of such a step. On the other hand, he



might cultivate closer relations with Britain to make the core European relationship three-sided rather than two-sided in the future. Should these new trends become a reality, this might lead to periodic irritations among the key allies but hardly any serious confrontation.

In general, one might agree with the view of some foreign observers who suspect that the former “strategic” model of German foreign policy will be replaced by “*a more eclectic process of ‘whatever works’, or in a more pejorative description ‘government by polls’*”<sup>26</sup>, but this will certainly not affect Germany’s basic political orientation.

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26. See Brent Scowcroft, « Kohl’s Departure Is the End of an Era for the Atlantic Community », *International Herald Tribune*, October 7, 1998.



## Author

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*Strategic Review, Survival, International Defense Review, Internationale Politik, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Financial Times, Die Welt, Christian Science Monitor, Defense News, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Washington Quarterly.*

## Acronyms and Conventions

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ARRC :	Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, Force de réaction rapide sous commandement de l'OTAN
AWACS :	Airborne Warning and Control System
C4I :	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
CBO :	Congressional Budget Office
CFE :	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CFSP :	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF :	Combined Joint Task Force
CR :	Congressional Record
DoD :	Department of Defense
ECHO :	European Community Humanitarian Office
ESDI :	European Security and Defense Identity
EU :	European Union
FoFA :	Follow-on Forces Attack
FORPRONU :	Force de protection des Nations unies
GAO :	General Accounting Office
GFIM :	Groupes de forces interarmées multinationales, Combined Joint Task Forces, CJTF
IFOR :	Implementation Force, Force multinationale de mise en œuvre de la paix
IISS :	International Institute for Strategic Studies
KEDO :	Korean Energy Development Organization
LTDP :	Long Term Defense Program, NATO
NATO :	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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NDU :	National Defense University
NSIP :	NATO Security Investment Program
PIPA :	Program on International Policy Attitudes
R&D :	Research and Development, Recherche et développement
RMA :	Revolution in Military Affairs, Révolution dans les affaires militaires
SACEUR :	Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe
SFOR :	Stabilisation Force, Force multinationale de stabilisation
TLE :	CFE Treaty Limited Equipment
UN :	United Nations
UNPROFOR :	United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
USAID :	US Agency for International Development
USEUCOM :	US European Command
WEU :	Western European Union
WHNS :	Wartime Host Nation Support
WTO :	World Trade Organization
WTP :	Weapons of Mass destruction

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