Questioning Algeria’s Non-Interventionism

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Given its colonial history, Algeria does not want foreign powers involving themselves in internal affairs. Likewise, Algiers refrains from military intervention outside its borders. Non-interventionism has even been written into the country’s constitution. However, given how serious the region’s situation has become, marked by the rise of different jihadist groups, this principle could be reconsidered.

Algeria is one of the few countries in the world that so clearly and so consistently articulates its foreign policy principles. Ever since independence in 1962, Algeria has adhered to a foundational principle of non-interventionism. Article 26 of Algeria’s 1989 and 1996 constitutions states: “Algeria does not resort to war in order to undermine the legitimate sovereignty and the freedom of other peoples. It puts forth its efforts to settle international disputes through peaceful means.” While other aspects of the Algerian constitution have been flexibly implemented, Article 26 is almost never challenged or questioned. (Article 89 of the 1976 Constitution contains similar wording, although the original 1963 constitution did not.) Unlike other countries, which may or may not engage in cross-border or extraterritorial conflicts according to specific circumstances and in pursuit of specific interests, Algeria never does. This position has numerous advantages, but also significant disadvantages. The unprecedented worsening security situation surrounding Algeria in Libya, Mali, and Tunisia will put the country’s commitment to its principles to its hardest test yet.
Algeria’s adherence to non-interventionism

Why Algeria maintains this strict adherence to non-interventionism is complex. In part it has to do with Algeria’s historical experience and in part it has to do with what Algeria wants in the future. It is often said that policy is the nexus of memory and desire. When states make policy, they base their decisions on what they have experienced – or what they remember of those experiences – and what they want in the future. And this combination is precisely from where Algeria’s commitment to non-interventionism arises.

A large reason underlying Algeria’s non-interventionist stance is the country’s colonial legacy. Algeria emerged from a prolonged colonial experience frustrated, anguished and angry at having borne the yoke of oppression for so long and having had to fight so hard to free itself. Algeria suffered foreign intervention in its most egregious form for so long that it was committed to never to subject another country or people to the same hardships.

As an expression of this desire to protect its sovereignty and the sovereignty of others from imperial or neo-imperial interference, Algeria joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as soon as it was able and it has remained a committed member ever since, even as the Non-Aligned Movement’s raison d’être has waned. In fact, in 1973 Algeria hosted the NAM’s 4th summit under the leadership of the NAM’s Secretary General, Algerian President Houari Boumediene. The high-profile event was intended to convey to the world Algeria’s commitment to the NAM’s guiding principles, including, according to the NAM Charter, “abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country… Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country… [and] settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.”

Other countries’ commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement’s principles may have weakened, especially with the end of the Cold War, but Algeria has remained an active NAM member. In fact, as recently as May 2014, it assumed the presidency of the movement and hosted the

2. Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Methodology of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, Caratagena de Indias, 1996.
NAM’s 17th Ministerial Conference. Algerian Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra reiterated Algeria’s commitment to the NAM and its capacity to be a useful institution for the peaceful resolution of problems related to security and conflict.  

Non-interventionism is intended to augment and legitimize the role that Algeria has cast for itself on the international stage, but has only infrequently been able to play. Algeria sees itself as an above the fray arbiter, an impartial actor pursuing only peace and stability. For Algeria, the real life manifestation of its vision of itself, when it was fully able to be how it envisioned itself, was its role in the resolution of the 1979 hostage crisis. In 1980, Algerian Foreign Minister Mohammed Seddik, working alongside the American Secretary of State Warren Christopher, negotiated the release of American hostages who had been held captive in Iran for 444 days. Upon their release, the Americans boarded an Air Algerie plane and flew to Algiers before traveling onward to the US.

The importance of this event still resonates today and represents the archetype of how Algeria sees its role in the international community. For example, in April 2013, the former Secretary General of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the hostage crisis, Mohamed-Salah Dembri, led a conference on the subject. According to El-Moudjahid, the official Algerian state media outlet, Dembri emphasized how important Algeria’s role was in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis at such a “critical time in international relations.”

Lastly, Algeria’s commitment to non-interference is the inverse manifestation of how Algeria wants to be treated by others. Algeria is very protective of its own borders and is very sensitive to any perception of threats to its sovereignty. For example, in March 2008, Algeria accused the United States of interfering in its internal affairs after the US Ambassador met with leaders of political parties and civil society. Similarly, on the grounds of protecting its sovereignty, Algeria resisted World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements that it allow for alcohol imports if Algeria wished to join the organization. Thus in a certain sense, Algeria abstains from interfering in the affairs of others because it does not want others to interfere in its own.

4. “Affaire des otages américains en Iran : Mohamed-Salah Dembri évoque à Annaba la médiation algérienne,” El-Moudjahid, 28 April 2013
The advantages of maintaining a clear policy

There are obvious advantages to maintaining a clear and immutable policy stance, and especially so when that stance pertains not just to domestic audiences but to the international sphere as well. For one, stating a policy position and adhering to it clearly identifies the policy options for any given problem. Algeria’s strict adherence to its policy of non-interference provides clear boundaries for domestic policymakers and the Algerian military. Rather than open-ended, often unproductive, policy debates premised on “all options on the table,” Algerian debates regarding its foreign policy begin from fixed understandings. Members of parliament and cabinet ministers know that there is no possibility of sending Algerian soldiers beyond Algeria’s own borders. The remit of parliamentarians and ministers is to determine the parameters for peaceful resolutions to external problems and the role that Algeria can or should play in facilitating dialogue that could lead to the resolution of a given problem. Knowing the limits of Algeria’s foreign policy options also allows domestic decision-makers to focus their efforts on domestic policy and to addressing the challenges that Algeria faces at home.

For its part, the Algerian military knows that it will not be deployed on foreign soil, which aids it in its ability to strategize and plan. It is able to focus on the positioning of troops and allocation of resources within its own borders rather than plan for the unknowns of overseas deployments. In addition, the military knows that civilian political leadership will not jeopardize the lives of Algerian soldiers by sending them on uncertain overseas adventures. To a certain extent this fosters trust between military and civilian leadership. Valuing the wellbeing of the Algerian military also contributes to the popular credibility of civilian political leadership. The broader Algerian population knows that its political leaders will not risk the lives of Algerian men and women in uniform in foreign conflicts.

Having a clearly defined and immutable foreign policy platform is also helpful to Algeria’s diplomatic partners. Rather than squandering valuable time and political capital trying to persuade Algeria to pursue a range of policy options, Algeria’s partners and allies know that it is fruitless to craft policies issues that rely on or incorporate Algerian military involvement. Algeria’s partners know what its role is or can be and this allows them to engage with Algeria at an advanced stage and to turn elsewhere for components of regional strategies that Algeria will not accept.

The disadvantages of a rigid policy stance

Algeria’s overt and immutable policy of non-interventionism, however, also has disadvantages. Obviously, foremost of these is the self-imposed limit
on policy options. Algeria’s refusal to deploy its military beyond its borders eliminates a powerful diplomatic and political tool that states conventionally have at their disposal. Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote, “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”6 Algeria deprives itself of this ability to continue politics and diplomacy.

But short of a utopia, conflict and strife are inevitable. Algeria’s refusal to use its military extraterritorially cedes the battlefield to others that may not share Algeria’s position or its interests. And by ceding conflicts to others, Algiers may inadvertently endanger itself. For example, Algeria vehemently opposed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military intervention in Libya, arguing that what eventually became known as the 17 February Revolution was an internal Libyan affair.7 The NATO campaign went ahead anyway and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, Libya has become acutely unstable. In addition to a protracted civil war, violent Islamist terrorist organizations like the Islamic State have also established themselves in Libyan territory and pose a direct threat to Algerian safety and security. Algeria was also opposed to France’s military intervention in Northern Mali in January 2013. Algeria argued that the way to establish an enduring solution to the destabilization of Northern Mali by competing groups of violent non-state actors was to pursue a political solution, not a military one.8 However, a quick armed offensive southward by one faction from Northern Mali prompted France to launch a campaign to protect the Malian capital.9 Four days after the start of the French campaign, a terrorist organization attacked a large gas facility in Algerian territory, with the attackers claiming that they had done so in response to France’s military activity. (Evidence discovered later, showing that planning for the attack had begun several months earlier, makes it impossible for this explanation to be the only cause.10)

Even in instances where other states do not intervene in conflicts that potentially impact Algeria’s own interests, Algiers’ strict policy of non-interventionism presents other risks. By refusing to engage in cross-border military activity, the country’s policy has the potential to allow external threats that do not pose a direct risk to Algeria to grow and to worsen to

9. Giorgio Cafiero, “Can Mali Reunite?,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 5 August 2013
the point that they pose internal threats to the latter. In short, by not being externally proactive, Algeria obliges itself to be internally reactive, and by not being offensive, it is forced to be defensive.

Algeria’s non-interventionist stance also has the unintended consequence of broadcasting its intentions to its enemies. Just like Algeria’s allies, who are well apprised of its policy positions, state and non-state actors that wish Algeria harm or whose interests are at cross-purposes with Algeria’s are well aware of the limits that Algeria has imposed upon itself. This gives them a tactical advantage and potentially additional room to maneuver. For example, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former member of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and leader of al-Mourabitoun, an al-Qaeda allied terrorist organization, fled Algeria in the early 2000s in the face of intensified military pressure. He sought refuge in Northern Mali, from where his followers and supporters continued to carry out attacks against Algerian interests and within Algeria itself. Belmokhtar knows, however, that Algeria will not cross its borders in pursuit of him. While Algeria’s allies in the region have hunted Belmokhtar and attempted to capture and kill him, Belmokhtar knows that as long as he stays out of Algerian territory, he does not have to worry about being pursued by Algerian soldiers. Others groups have similarly benefited. The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) attacked a military post in the Algerian city of Tamanrasset in 2012, but the group has not been pursued by Algerian forces in its strongholds in northern Mali.

But there are Algerians outside of Algeria as well and its policy of non-interventionism can put their lives in danger. For example, Algeria’s consul in the Northern Malian town of Gao and six members of his staff were kidnapped and taken hostage in April 2012 by MUJAO and were held in captivity for two years. During that period the kidnappers murdered the consul and one of the other hostages died due to illness. Algeria, however, persisted in trying to secure the release of the remaining hostages through non-violent means. Algiers ultimately succeeded, with the remaining hostages being released in Bordj Badji Mokhtar in August 2014, but not without the loss of life.11

And finally, Algeria’s rigid non-interventionist stance can frustrate relations with its foreign partners and encourage them to forge new relationships that may not immediately meet the foreigner partners’ needs but may do so better than had they been compelled to remain bound to an

inflexible Algeria. This can be diplomatically costly for Algiers on issues that are important to it. For example, as a result of Algeria’s enormous military capacity, the United States has tried to cajole it into playing a more proactive regional security role, but faced with Algerian resistance to do so, Washington is increasingly looking to Morocco for regional security assistance, despite the fact that Morocco’s military capacity are considerably less than Algeria’s.12 The growing military ties between Washington and Rabat, illustrated by events like Operation African Lion in May 2015, have given Morocco a leg-up in the perennial competition between Morocco and Algeria. Morocco uses these reinforced ties with the United States to advance its own foreign policy priority – recognition of its sovereignty of the officially disputed territory of Western Sahara, which is something that Algeria is directly opposed to. Although not explicitly expressed as a quid pro quo, the 2015 Appropriations Bill passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2014 directly mandates that U.S. assistance designated for Morocco be made available for development in the disputed territory. The Moroccan lobby in Washington interpreted this as “further reinforces US policy supporting [the] Moroccan autonomy plan” for Western Sahara.13

New threats pose news tests for Algeria’s non-interventionist stance

The advantages and disadvantages of Algeria’s non-interventionist stance will become more and more apparent in the coming months and years. Historically, the threats to Algerian security and stability were internal. Now, Algeria is facing external threats unlike any it has ever seen before. Thus, while a firm non-interventionist posture may have been appropriate in the past, its appropriateness will be tested in the future.

Over the course of Algeria’s independent history, threats to its stability arose from within the country. The most egregious example of this was during the 1990s when Algeria was challenged by a violent Islamist insurgency. The state fought a grueling battle against different terrorist organizations. Ultimately, the population tired of the conflict and insecurity and the state outlasted the violent Islamists. By the mid-2000s, the threat that the Islamist insurgency posed to the state had dissipated. Although terrorist groups, particularly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), persisted, they posed an intermittent and sporadic threat to the state rather than a continuous one.14

Algeria’s neighbors, however, were largely stable throughout the 1990s. Libya was under the brutal rule of Muammar Gaddafi who did not tolerate any dissent or opposition. Similarly, Tunisia was ruled by Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali who repressed any criticism of his rule. To the west, Morocco was also stable, under the heavy hand of King Hassan II and his Minister of Interior Driss Basri. There were periodic Tuareg uprisings in Mali and Niger in the 1990s, but nothing of the kind that posed a cross-border threat to Algeria.

The situation today is markedly different. Internal threats remain, particularly in the form of AQIM in the Boumerdes Mountains, but they have decreased relative to a severely worsening external situation. Unlike at any time in its independent history, Algeria is facing potential cross-border threats emanating from Libya, Tunisia and Mali. Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, the country has descended into chaos. Formal and informal forces allied with two different governments, one in Tobruk and the other in Tripoli, battle each other daily, including using aircraft, heavy artillery, and small arms. Terrorist organizations, some of whom have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and others who remained allied to al-Qaeda, have exploited the civil war between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments and have captured and held territory within Libya. These groups administer parts of cities like Derna and Sirte and operate with impunity. In addition, they have created training camps for like-minded terrorists. Individuals who train in these camps do not only carry out attacks in Libya itself, but have also participated in attacks in neighboring countries. Two Tunisians involved in the 18 March 2015 attacks at the Bardo Museum in Tunis, Tunisia allegedly trained in Libyan terrorist training camps. Libya’s collapse has also created large ungoverned spaces directly on Algeria’s border which terrorists have used to launch attacks against Algerian interests within Algeria as well as within Libya itself. The 16 January Tigantourine Gas Facility attack, carried out by a group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, was launched from Libyan territory. During a visit to Washington in September 2014, Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra acknowledged that terrorists in Libya would be able to penetrate Algeria’s borders. And the situation in Libya is only likely to get worse, with little prospect for a near-term political solution to the conflict and an economic crisis pending.

16. Ibid.
The deteriorating security situation in Tunisia also poses a threat to Algeria. Unlike during the Ben Ali era, Tunisia now has a terrorism problem. The Uqba ibn Nafi Brigade, which operates primarily in the Djebel Chaambi region close to the Algerian border, has staged multiple attacks in Tunisia since the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Since the emergence of the Islamic State or Daech in Libya in 2014, there have also been expressions of support for Daech in Tunisia. A group of unknown size and capability, calling itself Jund al-Khilafah fi Tunis, has announced its presence. Daech claimed credit for the 2015 Bardo attack and the Islamic State praised a May 2015 attack on the Bouchoucha military base in Tunis. Tunisian security services did not have extensive experience combating terrorism prior to the Jasmine Revolution and they counterterrorism capabilities are gradually improving. It is possible that in the face of increasing pressure from Tunisian security forces that terrorist organizations in Tunisia may attempt to retreat across the Algerian border.

Likewise, Algeria is facing new threats from Northern Mali. Unlike earlier episodes of unrest in this region, violent non-state actors in Northern Mali now include jihadis alongside ethnically-based groups. These groups, like MUJAO and AQIM, have already shown the desire and the ability to attack inside Algerian territory. Although the continued presence of foreign military forces in Northern Mali has reduced the threat that these groups pose to Algeria, the duration of the foreign military presence is uncertain. Were foreign militaries to reduce their presence in the area it is possible that MUJAO and AQIM could resume their operations against Algerian targets.

Algeria unfazed

Yet despite the worsening security situation and unprecedented external threats to Algeria’s security and stability, Algeria is sticking to its non-interventionist approach. Instead of relying on force to mitigate external threats, Algeria promotes negotiated political solutions to the crises that surround it in Mali or Libya. The dialogues urged and hosted by Algeria aim to be as inclusive as possible. To build the most solid foundation, Algiers argues that negotiations should take into account the positions and preferences of the full range of stakeholders.

To wit, Algeria initiated the Inclusive Inter-Malian Dialogue in January 2014 in order to try to craft a peaceful solution to the conflict in

Northern Mali. Since then the dialogue has brought together at numerous sub-state Malian groups, five governments (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) and five multilateral organizations (the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and ECOWAS). Over the course of the last sixteen months the dialogue has made uneven progress, yet Algeria persists in supporting them. But the attacks persist as well. Gao in Northern Mali remains subject to periodic rocket and mortar attacks by Islamist terrorists who remain at large.

Algeria also launched the Inter-Libyan Dialogue to devise a solution to Libya’s civil war. The Inter-Libya Dialogue was intended to bring influential Libyan stakeholders to the table, including former associates of Muammar Gaddafi and former members of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a terrorist organization that was eventually absorbed by al-Qaeda. In addition to Libyan influencers, Algeria coordinated the participation or involvement of ten other governments. Even as the situation in Libyan has continued to worsen, with two governments engaged in violent conflict and the Islamic State having carved out fiefdoms in the east and center of the country, Algeria has remained committed to dialogue and has expressed reservations about further foreign military intervention in Libya. The most recent round of inter-Libyan talks in Algiers began on 3 June, hosted by Abdelkader Messahel, Algeria’s Minister for Maghreb Affairs, the African Union and the Arab League.

Signs of softening?

There are signs, though, that Algeria is experimenting with a certain degree of flexibility in regard to its foreign policy. During France’s Operation Serval that targeted Islamist groups in Northern Mali in early 2013, Algeria allowed for French overflight of its territory. While granting France permission to use Algerian airspace is not Algerian intervention in a foreign territory, it does qualify as Algerian support for another country’s foreign intervention and in that sense it is a softening of Algeria’s rigid non-interventionist stance.

Algeria’s May 2014 military cooperation agreement with Tunisia is another instance where Algiers may be becoming more flexible in order

to face emerging cross-border threats. Although the specific terms of the agreement remain secret, it has been reported that in addition to intelligence sharing between the two countries and coordination of military activities, the agreement permits Algerian troops to pursue terrorists a limited distance beyond Algeria’s border with Tunisia.\(^{24}\) Algerian authorities have denied that this is the case and reiterated Algeria’s commitment to non-interventionism.\(^{25}\)

Lastly, Algeria stopped short of condemning Egyptian air strikes in Libya in February 2015. Foreign Minister Lamamra repeated his support for a political solution to the conflict between Tripoli and Tobruk, but he did not criticize the Egyptian strikes directly.\(^{26}\) On the one hand, Algeria’s refraining from criticizing the attacks may be a reflection of its recognition that it was unable to prevent them from occurring and would be unable to stop Egypt from carrying out further strikes if it so chose. On the other hand, though, Algiers’ decision not to condemn the attacks could be an indication that Algeria is willing to tolerate a degree of regional cross-border intervention.

**Two ticking clocks**

But there are two clocks ticking. One clock is Algeria’s commitment to non-interference and the negotiations that have ensued. The other clock is the threats to Algeria that are growing outside the country. The question for Algeria is which clock is ticking faster. Will Algeria be able to arrive at a negotiated solution to the conflicts around it more quickly that the threat to it intensifies? Or will the threat develop before negotiations succeed?

Making matters more complicated, neither clock is ticking in a vacuum. Instead, there are external hands that could speed them up or slow them down. Other international actors – France, the United States, the European Union, NATO, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, for example – are watching events in Tunisia, Libya and Mali and may decide to intervene before Algeria’s diplomatic approach concludes (or may already be indirectly involved). Although Algiers may try to dissuade international actors from interfering in growing regional problems, it cannot actually stop them should they decide to act. Algeria has already paid a price in blood and treasure for instability in Libya and Mali. It


\(^{25}\) “L’engagement de l’armée algérienne,” El Watan, 4 August 2015.

nonetheless remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the conflicts there and to bolstering its defensive stance rather than shifting to the offensive. Faced with new and unprecedented external threats, Algeria may be forced to ask itself for the first time whether the advantages of its clearly articulated commitment to non-interference will continue to outweigh the disadvantages.