Ahead of the G7-G20 Summits:
Debating Global Governance on Trade and Innovation
- France and Japan perspectives -

Report of the Conference held at Ifri, Paris, on September 6, 2019

Panel 1: Opportunities and challenges for France-Japan economic cooperation in Africa

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Japanese development cooperation in Africa: its new trends and the possible prospects for cooperation with France

The Seventh Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD7) was held in Yokohama on 28th-30th August, 2019 and co-hosted by the Japanese Government, the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank, and the African Union Commission. TICAD provides an open and inclusive platform for cooperation and networking for the advance of African development. 53 African countries and 42 African leaders participated. Thousands of Japanese participants from private sector actors to academics joined the discussion. The Yokohama Plan of Actions 2019 was adopted at the conclusion of the Summit.

The 7th TICAD is about positioning business at the center. Prime Minister Abe said this TICAD was focused on two Es: Entrepreneurship and Enterprise and two Is: Investment and Innovation. He made a pledge that Japan would do its utmost to surpass 20 billion USD of private investment to Africa in the next 3 years.

The development of Africa relies on three pillars: economy (industry, infrastructure, debt sustainability), society (SDGs, health, education), peace and stability (institutions). Japan’s government set up a number of mechanisms and initiatives
(like the Japan Business Council for Africa (JBACA) to promote Japanese companies' businesses in Africa through PPP or the Facility for African Investment and Trade Enhancement (FAITH) of JBIC) to promote financial and technical support for the Japanese companies in Africa, as well as cooperation with international and regional institutions. Human resources are also considered as key and are promoted through programs such as the African Business Education Initiative for Youth (ABE initiative), that grants Africans the possibility to study and work in Japan. Indeed, entrepreneurship and education are among the Japanese priorities.

About the cooperation between France and Japan, many bilateral plans are already implemented. For example, the “Roadmap on Japan-France Cooperation for Opening New Horizons between Japan and France Under an Exceptional Partnership (2019–2023)” issued by President Emmanuel Macron and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on June 26, 2019 strengthens the bilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and promotes cooperation between JICA and AFD based on the “Japan-France Plan for Sustainable Development, Health and Security in Africa”. The “Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership”, released on August 25, 2019 also provides a platform for cooperation. Its three areas of focus are: promoting women’s entrepreneurship in Africa, Digital transformation in Africa, and transparency in public procurement and the common fight against corruption.

Three hundred potential projects were identified for future collaboration between Japan and France in Africa, with examples such as a Sub-Regional Corridor Development, in Eastern (Nacala corridor) and Western Africa (West Africa Growth Ring), or a Urban masterplan in Abidjan developed by JICAD and AFD, focusing on transport, water, sanitation and energy. Japan and France can set up their cooperation on the common ambition to provide quality growth and infrastructure to Africa, though an inclusive, sustainable and resilient approach.

Professor Kitano finally introduced the concept of Afrasia, which might bridge the perception gap between Japan and Africa by emphasizing that Africa and Asia as two neighboring continents.
French development cooperation in Africa and partnership with Japan: main features

The political context and the framework set by the French government should be emphasized first: Africa is a priority of France’s international action. A few months after he took office, President Macron made a speech in November 2017, stating that the French approach in Africa should be redefined to be less centered on the State and more on civil society and particularly on youth aspirations and inclusion. This meant for the AFD to revisit its support to the African private sector: 1 billion euros were pledge for African small and medium enterprises. Focus was also put on girl education, vocational education, strengthening of the health system, agriculture and sustainability, as climate change has become a strong dimension of the AFD’s activities. Projects relating to migrations are also in progress (regarding African diasporas for example).

The next milestone in the French-African relationship will take place in Bordeaux, during the French equivalent of TICAD. The first conference of that kind was launched in 1973 by President Pompidou with the different Francophone African Presidents, but now it incorporates all the Presidents. The talks in the recent years revolved around sustainable cities and territories. There is also a focus put on the Sahel region, followed by all the G7 members. The Sahel alliance has been extended to new members; Japan had joined as an observer.

AFD includes 3000 employees, 4000 projects in 150 countries, 85 local offices in the field and 17 regional offices covering a few local offices. AFD’s purpose is to pursue the SDGs, and, in order to do so, it follows five commitments regarding population (100% social link, meaning not harming social cohesion), planet: 100% Paris Agreement, peace: 3D Nexus (Diplomacy-Defense-Development), prosperity: Priority to non-sovereign sector, and partnership.

AFD focuses on 4 areas: 46% of its funding is dedicated to Africa, 13% to Latin America, 25% to the “Orient”, including Asia. As JICA, AFD considers Africa as a whole with its idea of “tout Afrique”. On the African continent, AFD focuses on 16 priority countries and uses tools such as sovereign loans for states and non-sovereign loans for civil society, as well as grants, guarantees and equity. It is present in all sectors, mostly focusing on infrastructure, the production sectors and agriculture. Sahel is a strong priority, with 3 billion euros committed in the past 6 years, in order to fund many initiatives for peace and resilience.

Among the AFD’s programs, we can find “Choose Africa”, a big program for micro, small and medium enterprise, in private equity. Regarding the JICA/AFD
cooperation: the main cooperation takes place in the Ivory Coast, with collaboration in fields such as sanitation, infrastructure.
Patrice Fonlladosa  
President, Medef Afrique

Comments on the presentations, from the private sector perspective

- As Sebastien Minot suggested, “Africa as one” is indeed a new step taken by the French institutions that now see Africa as united and not divided according to historical experiences.

- The presentations lacked the acknowledgment of the demography issue. Indeed, demography is at the heart of the development in the 15/20 years to come. Niger tries to control birth, but nothing can be done because of their culture, their religion.

- Peace and stability are necessary to have a stable economy, so they should come first, and these two dimensions are intertwined. This is a question of long-term stability and development.

- In Africa, support for education and vocational training is critical. The World Bank share the same goal as the AFD in education.

- Cooperation between the French and Japanese private sectors should be further developed. Not enough is done yet in Medef, but as France and Japan have a lot in common, we can find projects together. However, we can cite two main difficulties to work in Africa: first, the contract enforcement difficulties, and second, the delay of payment that can be very long. These are the reasons why some large groups decided to withdraw from the continent. A close cooperation between public and private sectors is indeed necessary. The African private sector is dynamic and very innovative (telecoms, infrastructure), and thus provide great opportunities for the future.
Reactions

N. Kitano:
In the 22th century, the population of Afrasia will represent 80% of the world population. The population issue is far more important in the African continent than anywhere else in the world. Need for human resources development, creating decent jobs and focus on urban development are thus crucial. A collaboration between public and private sectors is indeed needed in this perspective. Moreover, there is no question that peace and security is a condition for development. This should be emphasized.

S. Minot:
Demography is the main challenge. We cannot promote birth control ourselves, even if it is the most efficient way to solve this issue. New cities are going to appear; thus, peace and stability are necessary: the EU has acknowledged that peace and stability is fundamental and essential to any development. In addition, many counties have ambitious projects on vocational training.
To conclude, legal security is essential to any private sector activity. The sector of governance has been added to the mandate of AFD. It is hard to work in that field but there are projects in the area (linked to justice for example). The focus is also put on the regional integration of Africa, such as an African Union and the perspectives of a free trade zone. France also supports ECOAS, a project for common currency in west Africa.
Q/A session and discussion

- What are the tools to advance the French-Japanese cooperation in Africa? What could be done to widen the scope of the cooperation JICA/AFD?

- Is there any project targeting Central African countries?

- What is your take on Chinese policies on the African continent that can be detrimental to governance?

- Japan recently changed its law on migration, focusing on Asian countries, will the new conditions be extended to African countries as well?

- Regarding “Afrasia”, aren’t there too many concepts already, if we consider the Indo-Pacific and Belt and Road initiatives?

_S. Minot:_
A continuous dialogue has been institutionalized between AFD and JICA. Talks also occur within the International Development Finance Club (IDFC): a group of 23 bilateral development agencies, such as JICA, the AFD, but also the Chinese development bank, the South Africa development bank etc.. The topics revolve around climate, finance or social cohesion for example. JICA et AFD share the same approaches on a philosophical level, and thus can sensitize the other agencies on those issues. However, from an operational standpoint, JICA and AFD have different methods, making it hard for them to directly co-finance the same projects.

Central Africa is important for France and AFD, as it is a part of the Zone Franc, and many priority countries are located there (RDC, Central Africa Republic, Chad) but not all the countries are poor, so the participation varies according to the needs. Congo Brazzaville is an important location for operations, with initiatives such as the C2D or the recycle council department. Avoiding a crisis in Congo, is not in AFD’s mandate but relies more on the Foreign Affairs Minister, as AFD works on governance but not on the political management of local authorities.

Regarding China, AFD does as much as it can in the IDFC to dialogue with the China Development Bank and the Chinese authorities and conceive together a project in Africa. With China there are difficulties because not only their methods are different, but also their philosophy is completely different. Thus, it is hard to find a common ground, but they are active on climate issue so an interesting dynamic could appear.
**N. Kitano:**
Regarding the issue of immigration in Japan, in the Yokohama plan, one of the actions is to “support African students in Japan and help them find employment in Japanese companies”, but it is not clear if they are going to work in Japan or work in Africa.

**P. Fonlladosa:**
Regarding governance in Africa, we should admit that the responsibility taken by governments and institutions that sign contact with large Chinese companies is full, but at the same time, seeing how little people are paid in the public sector, one must be pragmatic. Chinese do not have the same rules of engagement in business like we have, we need to find common grounds in joint companies, joint projects between the Chinese capacities and the French skills.
Panel 2: French and Japanese security cooperation in Africa and prospect for bilateral coordination

Kenichi Matsui  
Deputy Defense Attaché, Embassy of Japan in France

In Biarritz, a lot of time was devoted to the Sahel security and the Sahel partnership action plan focused on peace and security in Africa. During the TICAD, Prime minister Abe co-chairing with the president of Egypt and in the presence of 42 African head of state, adopted the Yokohama declaration. Among other measures, it mentions the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept that aims to maintain a rules-based maritime order and promote economic growth. They also took measures regarding piracy and illegal fishing. Maritime security was indeed a burning issue during those talks.

The FOIP concept relies on 3 pillars:
- Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade
- Protection of economic prosperity
- Peace and stability

If we look back on the France-Japan cooperation on sustainable development, health and security in Africa. we can cite 2 examples:
- In November 2017, the Japan coastguards held a seminar in the Djibouti regional training center for maritime security, co-sponsored by the French and the Japanese embassies. Through the International Maritime Organization, 3 instructors from the Japanese coastguards gave lectures and training regarding maritime laws enforcement on piracy and smuggling.
- The Self Defense force sent instructors to the PKO centers in Africa supported by France, the purpose is to support self-help efforts by Africans in peacekeeping operations.

For the coming 5 years, we hope there will be a strengthened cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, a deepening cooperation in the security field as well as a development of collaboration in information sharing and awareness. Indeed, maritime domain awareness is an area in which both Japan and France share interest, interest which could cover other nations.
What can Japan do in African security? Possibilities of international cooperation

Japan has the political will, potential and capacity to cooperate with France in Africa, especially on peace and stability, but at the same time, the Japanese government and public opinion do not have a clear idea on how Japan should act. 3 issues can be cited:
• Why Japan should commit to the security in Africa?
• In what field can/should France and Japan cooperate?
• What are the challenges and constrains for Japan?

In Biarritz and TICAD, security in Africa was on the agenda in both conferences, tackling themes such as Libya and the Sahel Partnership Action Plan. The third pillar of the TICAD 7 is to assure strength peace and stability in Africa through the establishment of rule of law, good governance and with a concern for humanitarian aspect (with refugees and IDPs for example).

What are the characteristics of Japanese security policy in Africa? The objectives of Japan are to secure the condition for Japanese trade in Africa, with multilateral cooperation, and actions to keep international stability. The principles to respond to those objectives are to follow a needs-based approach (ownership of the African countries and civil society), a grass-roots approach (human security) and an “All Japan” or Comprehensive Approach through a 3D approach (Defense, Development, Diplomacy). The tools that can be used are financial contribution (100 million USD for 15 countries (2008-19), UN Peacekeeping participation (capacity building), anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and contribution to human security through ODA. Japanese self-defense forces (SDF) have a facility in Djibouti since 2011. In South Sudan, Japanese sent a JSDF engineer unit. Another example of Japanese activity is its participation to the UN Project for African Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC), which has taken place in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Uganda since 2015. 40 million USD were given to the UN for the training and procurement of heavy equipment and almost 150 officers were sent.

The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision was presented at the TICAD 6, in August 2016 in Nairobi. It was presented as an international public good through the rule of law, economic prosperity and commitment to peace and stability through capacity building. However, questions have risen: Is African continent really included in this vision? Some eastern parts are, but not all the continent. However, this could change. This vision is focusing on maritime security: the coastguards, maritime crime, piracy, important sea lanes (Comoros, Seychelles).
What are the conditions to advance the France-Japan security cooperation?
France and Japan share the same principles (democracy, rule of law), however the Japanese side feels a kind of remote when thinking about African affairs. Also, Japan may not have the capacity to help Africa.

What are the best tools to cooperate in Africa?
On a bilateral level: capacity building (Security Sector, Maritime etc.), norm/standard setting and counter terrorism through technological assistance seems to be the most relevant. On a multilateral level: the cooperation could go through the UN, the EU or the African Union.
Aline Leboeuf  
Research Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Ifri

France's capacity-building activities in Africa and prospects for cooperation with Japan

Since 2015 and the adoption of the “Plan for sustainable development, health and security in Africa”, efforts in the cooperation in the security and defense field have been made between France and Japan. In 2019, a “feuille de route” that mentions cooperation in Africa followed this trend, however this document remained vague and the actions are not always visible or on a regular basis, even though progress has been made (in Djibouti, in Sahel).

The will to cooperate is strong, but it remains limited: why and what can be done? This presentation focus on the bureaucratic nature of France to better understand the administrative framework.

In France, DCSD (Defense and Security Cooperation Direction) oversees the structural security cooperation in Africa. DCSD is a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the end of the 1990s but is also linked to the Ministry of defense. So it is a “hybrid institution”, as it includes diplomats, militaries, civilians from the security sector and so on.

A key concept for DCSD is Security Sector Reform (SSR). France is in the process of drafting an SSR strategy that will help coordinate French engagement in this field and clarify goals, roles and methods within the French government.

DCSD’s working culture is inherited from its military past but it has opened up in the recent years. It cooperates more with other institutions (AFD, Expertise France…) and as it started to raise funding from external donors, especially for civil protection donors like the EU. This transformation is still ongoing but could be a good signal for the French-Japanese cooperation.

The two missions of DCSD are to train (short term and long-term training both in France and abroad) and to advise (embedded advisors at the top level in many defense and security administrations in Africa).

DCSD also has a special tool: the ENVR (national training centers with a regional focus) that date back to 1997. All have a specialization like demining, military engineering, health, and so on, and are paid in part by France with contributions from other countries. France usually posts one to three embedded officers in the school to support it, and this support can take many different forms. These training centers are quite different from the peacekeeping schools as the training is longer and the requirements are quite high.

The best way Japan and France could cooperate would be to decide key countries to focus on and act in them, for example through a common SSR strategy, in Niger for example. Ideally, rather than having one of the partners supporting limited actions of the other partner, the two partners could try to come up with strong development and
security programs.
One major obstacle to this approach is that DCSD has almost no budget and human resource that can be dedicated to new ambitious projects or programs. It is therefore easier for DCSD to cooperate on existing programs rather than new ones. However, a common SSR strategy could be a solution for compromise, as it can reorganize and change the scope of existing projects without creating new expensive ones. However, there is a feeling that it is safer to start to cooperate on smaller projects to build confidence and know-how and to then only broaden the scope to other dimensions.

Here are some fewer demanding options:
- Finding areas of interest common to both France and Japan, where they could exchange lessons learned and best practices and not only funding for example. One example is the civil protection focused on assisting victims of crisis like terrorist attacks or natural disasters.
- Military engineering may also be an area offering options for cooperation.
- Last, France and Japan have a common interest in preventing pandemics and the French ENVR supporting African Military Health systems could benefit from learning from Japanese experience in that field.

In thinking about common areas of interest, one should keep an open eye on the unexpected dimensions of the partner’s engagement in Africa’s security issues. For example, Japan provides face recognition systems for reinforcement of border control in Rwanda or fingerprint authentication system for the police of Côte d’Ivoire. This is a field where French and Japanese cooperation could be interesting as French companies like Thales are also involved in smart cities development in Africa and compete with Chinese companies like Huawei.
Comments

**K. Matsui:**

Regarding Mika Inoue-Hanzawa’s presentation:
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision includes the Africa continent is included for two reasons:
- Sea-lanes are continuously connected between east and west, south and north. The Pacific Ocean and the Western Indian Ocean are inevitably important to maintain the sea-lines of communication for Japan and France but also other European countries and African countries.
- In Madagascar, there is a regional Maritime Information Fusion Centre. The area of interest of this centre is responsible to the 76.5-degree longitudes east, which is the southern end of India. Currently, France and Japan discuss how to build cooperative relations in the maritime order, including in this area.

Regarding Aline Leboeuf’s presentation:
Regarding the Japan policies in Africa for defense, Japan government established guidelines in the end of 2018 that mention how to use effectively the facilities in Djibouti. As for France-Japan cooperation, the 2019 roadmap states that the two countries examine the modalities of contribution to the strengthening of the maritime capacity of coastal countries of the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean and that they work to develop actions of France-Japan cooperation by relying on the presence of the two countries in Djibouti. Therefore Djibouti is a relevant place to start activities.

Japan relies heavily on foreign resources, food and overseas markets. Therefore, ensuring the safe navigation of Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden is the lifeline for Japan, and securing the sea line of communication is vitally important. This is also the case for France, which lays a foundation for joint cooperation.

Two propositions:
- In Djibouti, the Ministry of Defense of Japan cannot offer defense equipment free of charge due to various restrictions. It can do capacity building and just offer knowledge. If France can provide equipment, we can combine forces. France would buy the material and then Japan and France would train the Africans.
- Help establish the Ethiopian navy. Ministry of Defense of Japan could consider to cooperate with France to establish the Ethiopian Navy. The future Ethiopian Navy could be the big actor in the region because Ethiopia is one of the largest nation in Africa. The future Ethiopian Navy would contribute to maintain the maritime order.
Q/A session and discussion

- To Inoue, if one the main reasons of the French-Japanese security cooperation is ultimately to secure trade, isn’t that in contradictions with the competition in trade between the two countries?
  To Matsui: Regarding the cooperation in the Gulf of Aden, there is also piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, thus could cooperation emerge in this location?

- Could the speakers elaborate on the question on the arms control?

  **M. Inoue-Hanzawa:**
  - For the Japanese government, the support in Africa is not only for Japan, but also to promote basic principles of the international community (democracy, human security), thus it thinks it’s positive for both Japan and Africa.
  - Regarding the FOIP vision: K. Matsui already mentioned the importance of Djibouti for Japanese maritime security, the question is whether Djibouti is enough.
  - France and Japan have different history and perspectives, the focus of the Japanese government is mainly not on the African continent as a whole, it focuses more on the Pacific Ocean.
  - Japan also contributes to peace in south Africa and West Africa, where a lot of projects are conducted. But the Japanese people are not very familiar with Africa, and are no understanding on why they have to support peace and stability there.
  - Regarding arm control, the best policy would be to install border control and monitor illegal trade.

  **K. Matsui:**
  In West Africa, Japan is observer for Alliance Sahel.
  Japan also offers some materials for western Africa nations such as Niger or Mali. Illegal fishing in Gulf of Guinea was the biggest topic in TICAD. But in the question of how to cooperate in Africa, we should start and focus on Djibouti to make a good case.
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