

# Digital Technology and Democracy in Taiwan


Dr. Yeali S. Sun, Commissioner

Taiwan National Communications Commission (NCC)



### Taiwan's National Policy: "Digital Nation, Smart Island"

- ❖ Digital Nation, Innovative Economic Development Program (DIGI+ 2017-2025)
- To accelerate Industrial Innovation and Economic Prosperity



5+2 Focused Industry Sectors

5G



### Highly Developed Broadband Internet Access Services in Taiwan

Size: 36,200 km<sup>2</sup>

• PSTN Licenses: 16

Subscribers: 11,453,595

Broadband Subscribers:

4,476,292



**Fixed Networks** 



3G Licenses: 5

4G Licenses: 9

Voice Subscribers: 28,656,487

Broadband Subscribers:

24,427,934

• 5G Licenses (2020)

 Radio Licenses (AM, FM and SW): 171

DVB-T Licenses: 6



**Broadcasting** 



**Cable** 

• Licenses: 65

**Subscribers: 5,225,255** 

• Broadband Subscribers:

1,346,602

• Satellite Licenses:

- Fixed: 4

- Live Broadcasting: 5

Channel Licenses: 290



Satellite

IASP Licenses: 225
IXP Providers: 4

**Internet** 

Source: NCC in 2017



- We are embracing and maximizing the upside of digital technology at full speed (e.g., expediting digital transformation in all sectors)
- While undertaking progressive digitization of many facets of our society and economy, we are encountering and combatting the cyber threats and various societal and economic issues brought in by the technology such as
  - Disinformation
  - Hacking and theft of online public and private information
- > How to mitigate the threats to our open society and national security is an imperative issue!

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# What are our Priorities to defend democracy?

- "Cybersecurity is national security"
- Free and Fair Elections

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## Nation-state Cyberattacks

- The attack vector continues to evolve and accelerate.
  - Efforts to acquire and steal technology, classified information and trade secrets of critical industry and high-tech companies
  - Developing a network of scientific, academic and business contacts to collect information and to infiltrate
- The damage has been increasingly borne by the private sector.
  - the *intended victim* or the *unwitting pawn* in an attack on other companies





Cybersecurity

Management Act,

(Jan. 1 2018)

### **Our Missions**

Cyber Security Office, National Security Council

National Security

Tri-pillar coordination

**Public Security** 

Executive Yuan (Cabinet)

Communications Security

National Communications Commission

Missions

#### **EIGHT** Critical Infrastructures

- ① Energy
- 2 Water
- **3** Communications
- Transportation
- S Banking and Finance
- © Emergency Services and Public Healthcare (hospitals)
- ② Hi-Tech Industrial Parks
- ® Government
- To optimize National Cybersecurity mechanism for assuring homeland security and sustainable digital economy
- To strengthen Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure
- Promote and develop public-private partnerships to enhance mutual trust through collaborations, consolidated defense and information sharing



# National communications sector protection: mission and goals

✓ Tailor the regulations, strategic guidelines and mechanisms to the unique operating conditions and risk landscape of Taiwan's communication sector.

#### **Mission**

### Secure, Reliable and Resilient Communications Sector

#### **GOALS**

Build
Strong
Security
Policy and
Legal
Framework

Establish a
Joint
PublicPrivate
Defense
System

Protect and
Enhance
the Overall
Physical
and Logical
Health of
Communic
ations
Sector.

Rapidly
Reconstitute
Critical
Communications
Services in the
Event of
Disruption and
Mitigate
Cascading Effects

IoT Devices Security Certification



### Communications Sector's Security and Resilience Project (2017-2020)









### National Communications & Cyber Security Center (NCCSC)

#### C-NOC

Collect, integrate and analyze information & events from the six segments

C-SOC

Identify Threats and Attacks and Situation

**Awareness** 

**C-CERT** 

Event Reporting & Incident Response

C-ISAC

Information & Threat Intelligence Sharing and **Analysis** 

### **Public** Sector





**Cable** 



**Broadcasting** 



Satellite









(IASP, IXP, DNS)

**Private** Sector



### Secure Communication Sector in Taiwan

- #1 Ban of Chinese-made equipment in 4G and 5G, and all communications networks.
- #2: Security by design



US-Taiwan
5G Security
Joint Declaration
on August 26,2020



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## Defense In-depth at Scale

Q1: Can we gain *better* and *in-depth* understanding and insights of what attacks or attempts are?


Q2: Can such knowledge help us prevent cyber attacks, reduce cyber risks and better govern the whole cybersecurity process?

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


# Proactive Defense In-depth at Scale: Analytics Capabilities: Data Analysis, Machine Learning and Al

- Historical (what has happened)
- Operational (what is happening now)
- Analytical (why did it happen)



- ✓ <u>Predictive</u> (what might) happen) (what-if)
- ✓ Prescriptive (what should I) do about it)
- ✓ Exploratory (what's out there) that I don't know about)



Learning)





# Disinformation in Taiwan 2018 Elections: threat and challenge

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# Channels of Dissemination of Disinformation – Social Media + Traditional News Media

- Exerting the impact and influence!
- a) Social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Tweeter, Line, and PTT and 24-hour television news stations.
- b) Disinformation or fake news were repeatedly broadcasted, and appeared on users' newsfeed.
- c) The "then social media algorithms" tended to generate a *distorted* system in evaluating information (more-reiteration and share of the same info -> more popular).
- d) Every social media user can be a news publisher.
- e) The use of troll and bots on social media (i.e., fake accounts) to *trend* the disinformation, and make them visible, i.e., reaching out.



## Disinformation Threat in 2018 Elections

- The threats brought in
  - Created tensions between populace and within society and nation
  - Polarized and fragmented the society
  - Undermined the trust in government and political leaders
  - Destablized society and state
  - Manipulated psyches of the population (casting doubt and public cynicism)
- Big Threat to Democracy
- Delegitimizing the power and authority of the government





# Government Emergence Response Team to Disinformation (1/2)

### Step 1 – Clarification

Q1: Who is in charge?

### A1:

- Government agencies, third-party fact-checking institutes, media literacy ...
- > Principles
  - 1) To be effective, rapid response and timeliness
  - 2) Reachableness of incident response, comparable with the rapid speed and coverage of the dissemination of disinformation?
- Almost every agency created an official account on MAJOR social media platforms such as FB and line to post clarification messages.



# Government Emergence Response Team to Disinformation (2/2)

### Step 2 – Attribution

Q2: How to find the disinformation sources, actors and perpetrators accountable?

A2: Very difficult ...

Nation-state disinformation-specific cyber attacks have been continuing to evolve and accelerate.



Prevention

Suppression

## FOUR Strategies to Combat Disinformation while Protecting Freedom of Speech

- Media Selfregulation
- Enhance media literacy, and develop independent judgment
- Transparency
- Openness
- > Trust
- Strengthen cooperation between Gov. and Media
- Effectively curb the spread of harm (Both legal and technology)
- Supervision by the
   Public

O Identify
Disinformation
2 Suppress
4 Punish

- Improve the efficiency of the clarification mechanism
- Leverage thirdparties' help and momentum on factchecking
- Rapid response and Timeliness
- Impose illegal liability
- Harden legal system
- Ensure fair and independent judicial review
- security and human rights

At Cabinet-level and Ministrylevel every gov. agency establishes a fact-clarification area



# NCC Media Regulations: Fact Checking and Verification

 Fact checking principles in the Satellite Broadcasting Act (2016)

"... prevent instances such as misinformation, false context, sensationalism, exaggeration, and media bias ..."

- Media outlets have responsibility to provide reasonable grounds on accuracy (although it is not required to prove authenticity of the evidence and sources of information presented)
- NCC established a fact verification guideline in 2018 for broadcasting industry to follow.

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## ALL Major Stakeholders Must Collaborate

- 1) Taiwan government responds rapidly and takes appropriate actions in combatting disinformation
- 2) Strict legal system
- 3) Use of Technology
- 4) **Involving all major parties** including government agencies, ISPs, social media platform providers and civil societies
  - All are actively collaborating and cooperating with each other on information clarification and stopping dissemination of disinformation.
- **Taiwan people strictly comply with the orders** from CECC and the law
- **Taiwan people are more literate and smart** in terms of recognizing false information and not forwarding doubtful information
- → Strong partnership and cooperation between the government and private sector






- Digital nation and promoting innovative economic development are our national policies.
  - expediting digital transformation in all sectors
- Cybersecurity is national security"
- The privacy protection and security battle in digital age is just on ...
- Cybersecurity capability building is imperative for network operators, service providers and regulatory government agency.

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## Digital Governance

# <u>Content</u>: big data ethics, child safety online, freedom of expression, social media




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## Digital Governance

### **Network Governance: Principles**

Multilateralism, Transparency,
 Democracy, Multistakeholderism and Inclusiveness



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