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# **From Friends to Partners?** The Changing Nature of Sino-Tanzanian Relations



Sub-Sahara  
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Muhidin SHANGWE

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**Ifri**

27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE

Tel. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 – Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60

Email: [accueil@ifri.org](mailto:accueil@ifri.org)

**Website:** [ifri.org](http://ifri.org)

# Author

**Muhidin Shangwe** is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Dar es Salaam where he teaches International Relations.

His area of research is Sino-African relations, particularly on the aspect of Chinese soft power.

# Abstract

For decades, China and Tanzania have maintained a close diplomatic relationship. There is a shared perception, at least in the official narrative, that the relationship between the two countries embodies “all-weather friendship”, a term usually used to characterize the relations between China and other African countries.

Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, Sino-Tanzanian relations earned “special” status, illustrated by China’s seemingly unconditional support for Tanzania, despite being a poor country itself. At the core of this relationship was the two countries’ commitment to anti-imperialism and the promotion of socialism in the global south. However, since the market reforms and opening-up in China and Tanzania that began in the later 1970s and mid-1980s respectively, the relevance of these political aspects has been reduced by the overriding economic interests of both countries. Therefore, one wonders whether the two countries still maintain the special bond they had in the past.

In response to this question, we find that the changing global context has not only reoriented the economic policies of the two countries but has led to the emergence of new stakeholders competing with China for privileged economic and strategic relationships with Tanzania.

# Résumé

Depuis des décennies, la Chine et la Tanzanie entretiennent des relations diplomatiques étroites. Il y a une perception partagée, au moins dans le récit officiel, que la relation entre les deux pays incarne « l'amitié par tous les temps », un terme généralement utilisé pour caractériser les relations entre la Chine et les pays africains.

Pendant la majeure partie des années 1960 et 1970, les relations sino-tanzaniennes ont formé un statut spécial, illustré par le soutien apparemment inconditionnel de la Chine à la Tanzanie alors qu'elle était un pays pauvre, l'engagement des deux pays contre l'impérialisme et leur promotion du socialisme dans le Tiers Monde. Cependant, depuis les réformes économiques et l'ouverture de la Chine et de la Tanzanie à partir de la fin des années 1970 et du milieu des années 1980 respectivement, la pertinence de ces liens politiques a été réduite par les intérêts économiques prépondérants des deux pays. Par conséquent, on peut se demander si les deux pays conservent encore le lien spécial qu'ils avaient dans le passé.

En réponse à cette question, nous constatons que le contexte global changeant a non seulement réorienté les politiques économiques des deux pays, mais aussi conduit à l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs en concurrence avec la Chine dans les domaines économiques et stratégiques en Tanzanie.

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# Introduction

Tanzania occupies a special place in Sino-African relations. The official narrative of all-weather friendship and win-win cooperation promoted in government circles has, in part, helped in painting an image of a relationship of genuine brotherhood/sisterhood. This representation is rightly held and persists as the essence of Chinese soft power in Tanzania. A rich history of mutual interests, exchanges and comradeship puts Tanzania ahead of other African countries in terms of its level of engagement with China. The positive image of China as a reliable economic partner and a true friend of the Tanzanian people is thus not artificial, but is based on tangible results and history. A survey conducted in 2016 by Afrobarometer, for instance, showed that 71% of Tanzanians interviewed believed that China's economic and political influence in their country was positive, while 52% saw China's economic assistance as helpful. In addition, 30% viewed China's model as the best for the future development of their country.<sup>1</sup>

However, the all-weather friendship and win-win cooperation narrative does not fully reveal the dynamics of the relationship. Challenges have emerged around the issues of trade imbalance, debt burden, natural-resources exploitation, and illegal activities by both countries' nationals, to mention only a few.<sup>2</sup> This warrants a critical assessment of the relationship so as to determine the true nature of past and present relations. The key question we aim to answer is whether the relationship still maintains its special status.

Given the rich history of the relationship between China and Tanzania, most studies have focused on the exchanges of the past. Contemporary Sino-Tanzanian relations have thus been under-researched. In view of this, this paper adopts an explanatory research approach to make sense of past and present relations. It intends to provide a broad understanding of Sino-Tanzanian relationships that spans nearly six decades. It reflects on two eras of Sino-Tanzanian relations: the socialist ideology era between 1961 and 1990, and the globalization era from 1990 onwards.

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1. Afrobarometer, 2016, available at: [www.afrobarometer.org](http://www.afrobarometer.org).

2. "Chinese Bribe in Dar, Admits Envoy", *The East African*, July 15, 2014, available at: [www.theeastafrican.co](http://www.theeastafrican.co); "Q & A: Can Tanzania Resume and Reimagine Agricultural Trade with China in a Post-COVID-19 World?", *Development Reimagined*, October 12, 2020, available at: [www.developmentreimagined.com](http://www.developmentreimagined.com); "Tanzania Government Takes Over \$1trillion Housing Debt", *The Citizen*, November 25, 2019, available at: [www.thecitizen.co.tz](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz).

This paper assesses events in the two timeframes. It first discusses the politico-diplomatic relationship in the two eras, followed by a presentation of economic relations. Thereafter the discussion moves to a detailed account of sectoral relationships in the areas of agriculture, health, education, culture and the military.

# Building socialism to fight imperialism: Sino-Tanzanian diplomatic relationships during the socialist era

For the purpose of this paper, the socialist ideology era covers the time when Tanzania was under Julius Nyerere, the country's first president who stepped down in 1985. For China, it includes the time of Mao Zedong's leadership, with a focus on the period from the early 1950s to the late 1970s. In the construction of their relationships, both governments were driven by political intentions. China's objectives were concentrated on improving its international standing vis-à-vis the global strategies of Washington and Moscow. It is for this reason that Beijing approached Tanzania with more urgency and purpose in seeking to attain those goals.<sup>3</sup>

Tanzania is a merger of the two countries of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The former became independent on December 9, 1963; the latter on December 10, 1963, both from British rule. China diplomatically recognized Tanganyika on its day of independence, whereas diplomatic ties with Zanzibar were established on December 11, 1963. On January 12, 1964, a Marxist-inspired revolution broke out in Zanzibar, overthrowing an Arab sultanate.<sup>4</sup> China quickly recognized the revolutionary government. When the merger to form the United Republic of Tanzania happened on April 26, 1964, China recognized the new union government on the same day. Immediately after the union, Tanzania's relations with major Western powers soured, which encouraged the country to strengthen ties with the communist world. In 1964-1965, for instance, relations with the

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3. A. Ogunsanwo, "China's Policy in Africa 1958 - 71", *LSE International Studies*, Cambridge, 1974. Ogunsanwo observed, "On the whole Chinese policy in Africa has resulted from the diplomatic initiative of the People's Republic of China rather than of the African states themselves."

4. China's role in the revolution manifested in the form of local Zanzibari nationalists who courted Chinese assistance to advance their cause. For instance, Abdulrahman Babu, then the Secretary General of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and a Marxist, became the first liberation fighter from East and Central Africa to visit China - in 1959. See A. Altorfer-Ong, "Old Comrades and New Brothers: A Historical Re-Examination of the Sino-Zanzibari and Sino-Tanzanian Bilateral Relationships in the 1960s", PhD thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014.

United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) broke down.<sup>5</sup> Around the same time, relations with China gained traction. In 1965, the Sino-Tanzanian Friendship Treaty was signed, and the two countries committed to deepened cooperation and solidarity in the fight against imperialism. Two years later in 1967, Tanzania adopted the Arusha Declaration, a left-leaning political and economic blueprint that would guide the country into a socialist future.

Tanzania's political significance in China's Africa policy rested on its commitment to African liberation. This made it a potential strategic ally in China's anti-imperialist drive.<sup>6</sup> The achievement of that goal depended to a great extent on maintaining good relations with Tanzania, so as to gain access to nationalist groups in the region.<sup>7</sup> China was also pivotal in supporting the African Liberation Committee (ALC), an organ of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) tasked with the liberation of Southern Africa.<sup>8</sup> To further underscore its political agenda, China constructed an 1860-kilometer railway connecting Tanzania and landlocked Zambia. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) is, appropriately, known as "the Freedom Railway". It was, and still is, essentially a political project in that it has never reaped the economic returns envisioned by its champions. Its construction was thus a case of economic viability being overridden by political priority.<sup>9</sup>

Sino-Tanzanian relations during the era of socialism were also characterized by comprehensive party-to-party diplomacy. The relationship between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Tanganyika African Union (TANU) therefore became as important as the state-to-state relationship. This was especially because both countries were one-party states,<sup>10</sup> resulting in state-party fusion. The centralized political systems meant that there was little, if any,

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5. S. Mushi, "Tanzania Foreign Relations and the Policies of Non-alignment, Socialism and Self-reliance", in: K. Mathews and S. Mushi (eds.), *Foreign Policy of Tanzania 1961-1981: A Reader*, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House, 1981.

6. Chinese diplomacy in the 1950s and 1960s focused on pushing back this international isolation by "contesting the military dominance of the USA, contesting the ideological attractiveness of Soviet foreign policy, securing its position in the UN Security Council, adapting to and easing the growing capitalist dominance that Euro-American businesses and associated political policies had over much of the world" (Prah, 2020:168).

7. A. Altorfer-Ong, *op. cit.*, 2014.

8. The ALC headquarters were in Tanganyika's capital of Dar es Salaam. By 1972, 75 percent of OAU's military aid came from China. See A. Ogunsanwo, "China's Policy in Africa 1958-71", London, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

9. A. Altorfer-Ong, "Tanzanian 'Freedom' and Chinese 'Friendship' in 1965: Laying the Tracks for the Tanzam Rail Link", 2009.

10. Tanzania became a one-party state in 1965, making the ruling TANU the only party in the country. Zanzibar, which had maintained a degree of autonomy, had one party, the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP). The two parties merged in 1977 to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM).

interaction happening beyond state/party-sponsored initiatives. The relationship was thus state-centric by nature. In addition, the party-to-party relationship had an ideological dimension because the CPC at the time prioritized interaction with socialist or left-leaning parties.<sup>11</sup>

Both Tanzania and China benefited from this politically driven relationship of the socialist era. The former consolidated its positioning as a Mecca of freedom fighters, increasing its soft power and regional influence. It also benefited from Chinese multisectoral assistance (see section 2). On the other hand, China did achieve some political objectives, which improved its international standing. In 1971, China's seat in the UN was restored, with Tanzania playing an active role.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the Chinese development model earned admiration from President Nyerere who initiated socialist programs partly influenced by the Chinese experience.<sup>13</sup> In the same period, high-level state visits symbolized robust relations between the two countries. Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Tanzania twice, in 1964 and 1995, while Nyerere visited China five times during his presidency.

## **From friends to partners: commercialized diplomatic relations in the globalization era**

The second era of the Sino-Tanzanian relationship starts in 1985, the year Nyerere stepped down. It is the era of deepening globalization and neoliberalism, during which commercial engagements replaced the ideological friendship of the 1960s and 1970s. While some political elements still shaped the relationship, they were overridden by economic motives. In addition, the language of friendship was still used in government circles despite both countries embracing business-oriented approaches. For this reason, contrasting current with past relations, some observers have described this development as a case of relative decline of the special relationship that existed in the 1960s and 1970s.

Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China embarked on economic reforms. They marked a major ideological shift in favor of the market economy. In foreign relations, it meant that China no longer prioritized ideology as a prerequisite of

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11. The CPC also established robust relations with liberation movements/parties in the southern African states of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

12. L. Morangi, "China Awards Prestigious Honor to Former Tanzania PM", *China Daily*, September 29, 2019, available at: [www.chinadaily.com](http://www.chinadaily.com).

13. During his visit to Beijing in 1974, President Nyerere spoke of China as a source of inspiration for small countries that sought to build socialist societies. The establishment of the Ujamaa village is believed to have been partly influenced by Chinese communes.

international cooperation with other countries. Since then, China has become the “factory of the world” and recorded rapid economic transformation. Through its “Go Out” policy, which encourages business opportunities overseas, private and state-owned companies have become important actors shaping China’s international relations.

### Box 1: The changing nature of CPC-CCM party diplomacy

Party-to-party diplomacy, an integral political aspect of the two countries' relationship, persists. However, the nature of this diplomacy has been affected by the reforms in both countries. Unlike in the past, the CPC now has to be mindful of the presence of other parties in Tanzania or face the consequences. In 2014, for instance, Chinese ambassador to Tanzania Lu Yangqiu broke diplomatic rules by donning a CCM hat at a rally and even chanting the party's slogan. The incident sparked uproar from the opposition parties, which threatened to report the incident to the UN. In another example, the Julius Nyerere Leadership School, a USD50 million facility built with financial support from China, will train aspiring leaders from CCM and the opposition parties. The school was founded by six ruling parties from Tanzania, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola.

Source: Author.

Tanzania went through a similar transition after it was evident that the *Ujamaa* policy<sup>14</sup> had failed to live up to expectations. The *Ujamaa* villages, for instance, drew comparison with “new colonialism” as forced relocation and excessive party control destroyed the social and economic fabric of the society.<sup>15</sup> As a result, between 1964 and 1975, agricultural productivity fell. An increase in population undermined the few gains that had been achieved.<sup>16</sup> Nyerere’s successor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, oversaw the transition to a market economy under the tutelage of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The country adopted multipartyism in 1992 and has moved on to embrace the agenda of democratization, albeit with mounting challenges. These developments changed the nature of Sino-Tanzanian relations as “economic diplomacy” became the priority of Tanzania’s foreign policy.

14. *Ujamaa* literally means “familyhood”. In ideological context, it was a variant of African Socialism, inspired by communal life of African traditional societies. Villagization was a policy by the Tanzanian government in the 60s and 70s to set up *Ujamaa* Villages where people were made to come, live and work together. These arranged settlements would ease social service provision by the government and boost agricultural production.

15. R. Ibbott, “*Ujamaa: The Hidden Story of Tanzania’s Socialist Villages*”, London, Crossroads Books, 2014; G. Frankel, “Tanzania Symbolizes Failed Growth Model”, *The Washington Post*, 1984.

16. J. Hartmann, “Development Policy-Making in Tanzania 1962-1982: A Critique of Sociological Interpretations”, University of Hull, 1983.

One of the most important elements of the diplomatic relations between China and Tanzania since the neoliberal turn has been high-level visits. Except for the late President John Magufuli, all other former Tanzanian presidents visited China twice during their time in office.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (2006), President Hu Jintao (2009) and incumbent President Xi Jinping (2013) have all visited Tanzania. Xi's visit had symbolic meaning as he made Tanzania his second foreign stop after assuming office, and first on the African continent. These high-level visits can rightly be seen as evidence of deepened cooperation between the two countries in a period during which Tanzania was diversifying its foreign relations more globally, especially under Kikwete's presidency.

## **A break with the past? China and Tanzania under Magufuli's presidency**

These friendly diplomatic relations changed when John P. Magufuli took over the presidential office of Tanzania in 2015. Between then and his death in March 2021, he did not visit China. While this can be seen as a break from the norm, he did not undertake any foreign trip outside the African continent. His mandate was built on a rather inward-looking foreign policy that put Tanzanian interests first. His administration even put Sino-Tanzanian relations in the international spotlight because of its perceived anti-China stance. However, Magufuli's animosity in the area of international relations concern not only China but also Western interests. His resource nationalism, or as he used to call it economic warfare, started by targeting foreign mining companies with the aim of gaining greater control over the extractive sector.<sup>18</sup>

China, too, fell victim to Magufuli's shakeup, which was reflected in two major decisions by his government. The first was the decision to award the tender for the construction of a standard-gauge railway (SGR) from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma to Turkish company Yapi Merkez and the Portuguese Mota-Engil, although in 2015 the previous administration had signed a contract with the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) for the same project. The Magufuli administration accused the Chinese company of

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17. Presidents Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1987-1992), Benjamin William Mkapa (1998-2000) and Jakaya Kikwete (2006-2008) all visited China.

18. T. Jacob and R. Pedersen, "New Resource Nationalism? Continuity and Change In Tanzania's Extractive Industries", *The Extractive Industries And Society*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2018, pp. 287-292; D. Paget, "Tanzania: Magufuli's Mining Reforms Are a Masterclass in Political Maneuvering", *African Arguments*, July 17, 2017, available at: [www.africanarguments.org](http://www.africanarguments.org).

irregularities and barred it from re-entering the race after a fresh tender was announced.<sup>19</sup> It has since been learnt that those irregularities included acts of corruption.<sup>20</sup>

The second decision was to halt the construction of Bagamoyo port (Box 2), a flagship project for China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). That decision should be analyzed in the context of Magufuli's economic warfare, which sought to break with the past. Since the adoption of neoliberal policies in Tanzania, public concerns have arisen over the ownership of the country's resources. The privatization of public enterprises, which mostly happened between 1995 and 2005 during President Mkapa's administration, were seen by some as the handing-over of resources to foreigners or those not considered to be "indigenous" Tanzanians.<sup>21</sup> At the receiving end of this were Tanzanians of Asian origin, who were derogatively referred to as *magabacholi*.<sup>22</sup> During Magufuli's presidency, nationalist rhetoric gained traction, usually expressed in the anti-imperialist language that had been popular in the days of the liberation struggle. The term *mabeberu* (imperialists), for instance, regained popular usage. While *ubeberu* (imperialism) was historically used to refer to Western colonial powers, it is currently a generalized term to refer to any form of foreign relationships perceived to be exploitative of Tanzania.

The decision against Bagamoyo port was partly influenced by the dynamics of local politics. Until 2015, much of the criticism leveled against China had come from the opposition.<sup>23</sup> Facing this pressure, CCM nominated its presidential candidate Magufuli and presented him as the fixer of past mistakes. This, however, meant appropriating the opposition agenda, which by extension included acting tough against countries such as China. Those dynamics were not just confined to the tug-of-war between the ruling party and the opposition; it also ensued within the government. This is corroborated by Cheng Wang, who worked for the Chinese Ministry of Finance and Commerce as an officer in charge of East African Affairs.

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19. "Tanzania's Turn to Turkey for Sgr Funds Leaves China in Limbo", *The East African*, 2017, available at: [www.theeastafrican.co.ke](http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke).

20. T. Zajontz, "The Chinese Infrastructural Fix in Africa: A Strategic-Relational Analysis of Zambia's 'Road Bonanza' and the Rehabilitation of TAZARA", Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of St Andrew's, July 28, 2020.

21. B. Heilman, "Who Are the Indigenous Tanzanians? Competing Conceptions of Tanzanian Citizenship in the Business Community", *Africa Today*, Jul.-Dec., 1998, Vol. 45, No. 3/4, pp. 369-387.

22. This refers to "rich, corrupt" Asian businesspeople.

23. In its 2015 election manifesto, for instance, the main opposition party *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* (CHADEMA) mentioned China in the context of illegal logging and the ivory trade. CCM's manifesto, on the contrary, mentioned China in the context of the opportunities it presented and the good cooperation it has had with Tanzania.

Wang suggests that Tanzanian government officials were split between pro-port lobbyists and anti-project critics.<sup>24</sup>

Despite those two decisions against Chinese interests, a significant level of political engagement persists. On December 15, 2020, President Magufuli held a phone call conversation with his counterpart President Xi; among other things, they exchanged pleasantries on the former's reelection in the October election of that year. A press release by the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that Tanzania had pledged support for Beijing's position in Hong Kong and Taiwan and that they agreed on the promotion of the BRI through infrastructure development. In October 2020, China became the first non-African country to congratulate President Magufuli in an election that was widely criticized by local and international actors. Before the election, the Chinese ambassador to Tanzania stated that her government was satisfied with the electoral process and urged foreign elements not to interfere in the country's internal affairs.<sup>25</sup>

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24. E. C. Olander, "Did Tanzania's President Really Cancel the Bagamoyo Port Deal with China? Probably Not", April 27, 2020, available at: [chinaafricaproject.com](http://chinaafricaproject.com).

25. "China Upbeat on Smooth Elections in Tanzania", *The Citizen*, 2020, available at: [www.thecitizen.co](http://www.thecitizen.co).

## Box 2: The Bagamoyo port project



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Bagamoyo is a historic town 60 kilometers from Dar es Salaam. The USD10 billion port project was announced by President Xi when visiting Tanzania in 2013. Apart from the port, there are plans for a Bagamoyo Special Economic Zone consisting of 700 industries. It would be constructed and mainly funded by the China Merchant Holding International (CMHI). The other funder would be the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) and the Omani sovereign wealth fund.

However, the project was halted in 2016 by the Tanzanian government. Magufuli publicly stated that only a “mad person” would agree to the terms of the deal, officially signed in 2015.

CMHI and SGRF proposed that they be given a 99-year land lease; a tax holiday; special status for utilities; permission to conduct other businesses deemed necessary inside the port, and that nearby ports cannot be developed to compete with Bagamoyo. However, the Tanzanian government countered these proposals, insisting on: a 33-year land lease; no tax holiday; investors to pay market rates for utilities; no other business to be conducted inside the port without government authorization; and the government being free to develop other ports to be in competition with Bagamoyo.

*Source: Olander (2020) for information on the project financiers, Onyango (2020) for the information on the terms of the project.*

# Unequal equals?<sup>26</sup>

## Sino-Tanzanian skewed economic relations

In this section, we discuss the economic aspects of the relationship. Overall, economic relations are significantly skewed in favor of China, which acts both as a donor and an investor.

### Chinese aid

China has continued to assist Tanzania financially, as illustrated in the following sections. Chinese aid in Tanzania is as old as the relationship between the two countries (see Figure 1). However, there has been a shift from bilateral aid and economic and technical assistance to more flexible use of Chinese loans.<sup>27</sup> Chinese loans to Africa have recently been put in the spotlight, especially with the emergence of “debt-trap diplomacy” – the idea that China is deliberately loaning to poor countries knowing that they will eventually default. According to this narrative, defaulting makes those countries vulnerable to Chinese demands and could also lead to asset seizure. However, Tanzania’s Chinese debt stands at USD2 billion, a modest amount compared with other countries such as Kenya (USD9 billion), Angola (USD43 billion) and Zambia (USD9.7 billion).<sup>28</sup> Still, debt has remained an issue in current Sino-Tanzanian relations. When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Tanzania in January 2021, Tanzania’s President John Magufuli used the occasion to appeal for debt cancellation and cheaper loans.<sup>29</sup> The appeal included a USD15.7 million debt from the loan used for the construction of TAZARA, and another USD15 million for the construction of the Tanzania-China Friendship (Urafiki) Textile Mill. No guarantees were given by the Chinese side.

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26. At a state banquet during Zhou Enlai’s visit in 1965, Nyerere described the relationship between the two countries as friendship between the most unequal equals, in reference to their physical size. Read M. Bailey, “Tanzania and China”, *African Affairs*, 1975.

27. J. Jansson, C. Burke and T. Hon, “Patterns of Chinese Investment, Aid and Trade in Tanzania”, A briefing paper by the Centre for Chinese Studies prepared for the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), October 2009.

28. “Chinese Loans to Africa Database”, CARI, 2020, available at: [chinaafricaloandata.org](http://chinaafricaloandata.org).

29. A. N. Malanga, “President Magufuli Calls for Cheaper Loans, Debt Cancellation”, 2012, [www.thecitizen.co.tz](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz).

**Figure 1: China's aid to Tanzania, 1964-1966**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Amount (million Shs.)</i>	<i>Form</i>	<i>Government</i>
February 1964	4	grant	Zanzibar
June 1964	100	loan	Tanzania (Zanzibar)
June 1964	200	loan	Tanzania (Mainland)
June 1964	20	grant	Tanzania (Mainland)
June 1966	40	loan	Tanzania (Mainland)
June 1966	20	grant	Tanzania (Mainland)

© Source: M. Bailey, "Tanzania and China", *African Affairs*, 1975.

The fact that Tanzania still owes China for the two projects, which were built around half a century ago, sheds some light on the current nature of the two countries' relationship. As previously shown, TAZARA was built when China was still a poor country. Today, China is the world's second largest economy, which means it is in a stronger position to respond to debt relief or cancellation pleas from traditional friends. Given the political significance of TAZARA, it was perhaps expected that China would be willing to cancel the debt. However, this also points to China's shrewd business-oriented engagement, where friendship and business do not mix.

During Wang's visit, contracts were signed between the government of Tanzania and two Chinese companies that will build the 5<sup>th</sup> phase of the SGR from Isaka, a border town between Tanzania and Rwanda, to Mwanza, a major business center on the shores of Lake Victoria. The project is financed by the Tanzanian government, although President Magufuli revealed that negotiations were ongoing on a potential Chinese loan to fund the third and fourth phases of the SGR. However, the fact that negotiations for the loan have been going on since 2019 may point to a change in lending policy that makes it relatively more difficult for African countries to access Chinese loans. In April 2019, China issued a document called *The Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative*. The document marked a departure from "open cheque diplomacy", whereby Beijing would lend money without keenly looking into how it would be spent. This approach has been criticized for resulting in white-elephant projects, damaging China's reputation. The new framework thus aims at addressing this problem by adding sovereign risk assessment to the lending policy. If this is the case, the slow pace of the negotiations could mean that Tanzania has already missed the opportunity for a Chinese loan to fund its SGR. This latest development in the Chinese lending framework is a stark difference from past engagements, where assistance would be given even for projects that were not economically viable.

## Trade and investment

Chinese engagement in Tanzania during the socialist era was not associated with trade and investment. But, since the 1990s, both have been at the center of not only the relations between two countries but between China and other countries in the region. According to the East African Community (EAC) Trade and Investment Report 2019, China is the region's largest trading partner, with total trade amounting to USD8.2 billion. The Tanzania-China trade volume stands at USD4 billion,<sup>30</sup> roughly half of the region's total trade with China. However, the trade is heavily skewed in favor of the latter. Tanzania's export value to China has in fact been declining, while the import value from China to Tanzania has seen significant increase. For instance, Tanzania's exported goods were worth TZS 1,130,503.4 million in 2014 and only TZS 532,207.1 million in 2019. The value of imports from China, on the other hand, grew from TZS 2,597,174.8 million to TZS 4,596,417.4 million over the same period.<sup>31</sup>

Tanzania's exports to China include oilseeds, copper and iron ore, refined copper and precious metals. Chinese imports to Tanzania include capital goods, electronics, chemicals, consumer goods and textile clothing. According to the Bank of Tanzania's 2019/2020 annual report, China was the number one source of Tanzanian imports in that year.<sup>32</sup> As for exports, China was 7<sup>th</sup> on the list of destination countries for Tanzanian exports for three years, starting from 2016. This data makes China Tanzania's largest trading partner, accounting for 20% of its total imports.

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30. "Ambassador: China Now Tanzania's Largest Trading Partner", *The Citizen*, 2019, available at: [www.thecitizen.co.tz](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz).

31. Annual Report, Bank of Tanzania, 2020, available at: [www.bot.go.tz](http://www.bot.go.tz).

32. *Ibid.*

**Figure 2: Chinese FDI in EAC member states**

Country	Investment value in USD million			
	2017	2018	2019	Total
Tanzania	330.1	264.5	530	1,124.6
Kenya	45	45	407	497
Uganda	303.3	362.2	421.2	1,089.6
Burundi	NA	1.5	13.5	15
Rwanda	56.8	61.5	120	238.3
South Sudan	NA	355.4	1,450.9	1,805.9

© Source: East Africa Trade and Investment Report, 2019.

Over the years, growing trade between the two countries has encouraged movements of traders in both directions. Many Tanzanian traders have been travelling to China. Official records are hard to find, but in 2014, for instance, it was reported that a total of 6,000 Tanzanians had travelled to China for business purposes in that year alone.<sup>33</sup> Conversely, the presence of Chinese retailers in Tanzania has become noticeable since the early 2000s. Although their presence has generally been tolerated, friction has also been reported. In 2011, the then Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Marketing, Lazaro Nyalandu, gave Chinese traders at Kariakoo market in Dar es Salaam a 30-day ultimatum to vacate.<sup>34</sup> This followed complaints from locals that Chinese traders were taking up opportunities meant for them. They wanted a measure of protection from the government. Nevertheless, the Chinese presence has survived such anti-Chinese sentiments and has continued to grow in the Kariakoo area.<sup>35</sup>

According to the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) in 2019, China was Tanzania's largest source of foreign direct investment, surpassing traditional partners such as the UK, the US and India<sup>36</sup> (Figure 3).

33. "Sino-Tanzania Relations Strengthened Under Kikwete", Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Tanzania, April 10, 2015, available at: [www.tz.china-embassy.org](http://www.tz.china-embassy.org).

34. "Tanzania Orders Chinese Out of Dar ES Salaam Market", BBC, January 7, 2011, available at: [www.bbc.com](http://www.bbc.com).

35. Kariakoo is Dar es Salaam's biggest and busiest market.

36. J. Namkwahe, "Tanzania: Why China Has Become Leading Foreign Investor in Tanzania", *The Citizen*, May 16, 2019, available at: [www.allafrica.com](http://www.allafrica.com).

**Figure 3: Tanzania's major sources of FDI, 2017-2019**

2017				2018				2019			
Origin	No of Proj-ects	Em-ploy-ment	Value US\$ m	Origin	No of Proj-ects	Em-ploy-ment	Value US\$ m	Origin	No of Proj-ects	Em-ploy-ment	Value US\$ m
Germany	2	4,840	1,890.4	China	86	20,794	264.5	China	196	5,777	530.0
China	67	16,774	330.1	Singapore	1	251	51.2	Mauritius	11	2,042	297.8
UK	14	1,017	178.3	India	11	827	41.7	Canada	3	2,125	60.4
India	29	1,953	167.9	Kenya	12	1,012	36.9	India	33	2,138	50.4
Luxem-bourg	1	2	110.0	Mauritius	9	890	29.0	UK	22	1,433	34.2
Australia	4	477	92.0	Australia	3	308	27.0	Australia	9	52	31.9
Mauritius	4	412	49.0	South Africa	9	299	14.1	United States	3	618	20.4
Kenya	16	701	29.1	Saudi Arabia	1	305	13.0	South Africa	15	262	17.3
UAE	3	160	26.7	Belgium	1	384	12.8	UAE	5	266	13.5
Ukraine	1	324	25.0	Switzer-land	2	573	12.2	Ethiopia	6	352	10.6
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>26,660</b>	<b>2,898.6</b>	<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>25,643</b>	<b>502.4</b>	<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>15,064.9</b>	<b>1,066.4</b>
Others	81	4,082	152.8	Others	135	17,378	2,619.8	Others	472	31,700	1552.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>30,742</b>	<b>3,051.4</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>43,021</b>	<b>3,122.2</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>775</b>	<b>46,765</b>	<b>2,618.7</b>

© Source: East Africa Trade and Investment Report, 2019.

However, reporting Chinese investment data has always been a daunting challenge, sometimes resulting in statistical inconsistency. Attention also needs to be paid to the gap between announced, registered and finally implemented projects, and initiatives that are actually in operation.<sup>37</sup> However, Tanzania still leads in terms of attracting Chinese FDI among the five member states of the EAC. In 2014, China even expressed intentions to make Tanzania a regional industrial hub by implementing a five-year plan that aimed at establishing 500 industries – 100 each year. When President Xi Jinping visited Tanzania in 2013, it was reported that a total of 19 deals were signed. It has also come to be known that Tanzania, Mozambique and Ethiopia were designated as models of Chinese industrialization in Africa. With the stalling of the construction of Bagamoyo port and China's limited role in the SGR construction, it remains to be seen how the plan will evolve.

37. Y. Xia, "Chinese Manufacturing and Agricultural Investment in Tanzania: A Scoping Study", *CARI Working Paper Series*, CARI, August, 2019, available at: [www.static1.squarespace.com](http://www.static1.squarespace.com).

# Sectoral relationships

The previous section discussed some key areas of economic relations between China and Tanzania. This section looks at Sino-Tanzanian relations in selected sectors. By using a historical approach, it provides detailed accounts of sectoral events and programs that were a result of Chinese engagement in Tanzania in both the socialist and globalization eras.

## Agriculture

Cooperation in agriculture is an important element of Sino-Tanzanian relations. The sector was particularly vital because Tanzania was a peasant rural economy. China's involvement in agriculture during the socialist era mainly consisted of supporting large state farms.<sup>38</sup> Six China-affiliated agricultural projects in Tanzania, built between 1965 and 1978, are presented in Figure 4. China also helped in building factories to provide much-needed linkages between agricultural production and industrial processing. The factories are the Friendship Textile Mill (Urafiki) and the Ubungo Farm Implements Factory (UFI).

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38. D. Brautigam and X. Tang, "An Overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Tanzania", *IFPRI Discussion Paper 01214*, IFPRI, October, 2012, available at: [www.ebrary.ifpri.org](http://www.ebrary.ifpri.org).

**Figure 4: Chinese agriculture-related assistance to Tanzania**

Project	Time	Size and/or location	Means of and/or source of financing
<b>Ruvu State Farm</b>	Started in 1965	2834 hectares, 50km west of Dar es Salaam	Co-financed by Tanzanian and Chinese governments (China agreed to meet recurrent costs until the farm became self-sustaining; it also funded a \$14 million irrigation and hydroelectric dam for the farm.
<b>Upenja State Farm</b>	Funded 1965-1969	256 ha, Zanzibar	Chinese aid
<b>Mahonda Sugar Cane Farm and Processing Factory</b>	Built in 1974	1216 ha, Zanzibar	Chinese aid
<b>Mbarali Rice Farm</b>	Built 1971-1976	3530 ha, Mbeya region	Chinese aid (\$13.4 million)
<b>Urafiki Textile Mill</b>	Opened July 1968	Dar es Salaam	Built by China at estimated cost of £2.5 million and £3.32 million
<b>Ubungo Farm Implement</b>	Built 1968-1970	Dar es Salaam	Built by China at cost of \$756,000
<b>Agricultural Extension and Farmer Training Stations (AEFTS)</b>	Five AEFTS, three built 1967-1968 and two more in the late 1970s and 1980s.	Mbeya, Kagera, Dodoma, Manyara and Morogoro	Financed and built by Chinese aid. Three stations built in the late 1960s cost \$64,000; Mbeya Farmer Center cost \$14,000.

© Source: D. Brautigam and X. Tang, "An Overview of Chinese Agricultural and Rural Engagement in Tanzania." IFPRI Discussion Paper 01214, 2012.

Most of these projects have not lived up to the expectations of generating profit. When Tanzania adopted neoliberal policies in the 1990s, most of them were put up for sale. At the time, China had reoriented its approach to an emphasis on commercial and investment activities. This was not without resistance from the Tanzania side, mainly because foreign ownership was unpopular among citizens. Aware of this, politicians would sometime take populist decisions to maintain their political base. In the case of the Mbarali Rice Farm, for instance, Chinese investors had investigated the possibility of buying and taking full control of the management in

the 1990s.<sup>39</sup> This was after years of mismanagement that led to underproduction. The Tanzanian government refused, insisting that Tanzanians should form the majority. Similar cases of embezzlement and mismanagement were reported in the case of Mahonda State Farm and Urafiki Textile Mill in the 1990s. In the latter, Chinese company Changzhou Textile obtained a 51% share and has had a tumultuous period since then. Production has been affected by incidents of labor tensions resulting in strikes. Urafiki was, for instance, sued by a labor union and made to pay about USD2 million after it lost the case.

However, as part of commitments made during the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting, China has continued supporting Tanzania's agriculture sector. One aspect has been the creation of Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCs). Their purpose is to provide African countries with a model of agricultural technology that would increase productivity. In line with this, China has been sending agriculture experts to Africa. In 2010, for instance, it sent 100 experts to several African countries, with Tanzania receiving three of them. More recently, China and Tanzania have signed agreements that allow the latter to sell cassava and soyabeans to the Chinese market. The USD1 billion cassava deal was signed in 2017, whereas one for soyabeans was signed in 2020.

## Health policies

Sino-Tanzanian relations have also affected the health sector, through medical training and aid, starting in the late 1960s. A total of one thousand Chinese medical personnel had served in Tanzania by 2008.<sup>40</sup> In 2018, it was reported that 32 Chinese medical teams were operating at the Muhimbili National Hospital and other hospitals in Zanzibar.<sup>41</sup> Sino-Tanzanian medical cooperation is partly informed by the interest in developing traditional medicine in both countries. Already in 1987, Julius Nyerere invited Chinese traditional medicine doctors to Tanzania to study the possible usefulness of their medicine for people living with HIV.<sup>42</sup>

Following the outbreak of the coronavirus in early 2020, China was quick to offer assistance to Tanzania in the form of personal protective equipment (PPE) and testing kits. The assistance did not

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39. *Ibid.*

40. J.-P. Cabestan and J.-R. Chaponnière, "Tanzania-China All-Weather Friendship From Socialism to Globalization: A Case of Relative Decline", May, 2016, Centre for Chinese Studies Discussion Paper, available at: [www.scholar.sun.ac.za](http://www.scholar.sun.ac.za).

41. "China Offers Dozens of Medical Scholarships to Tanzanian Students", China Central Television Network, CGTN, August 13, 2018, available at: [www.africa.cgtn.com](http://www.africa.cgtn.com).

42. *Ibid.*

only come from the Chinese government but also private entities. Chinese billionaire Jack Ma through his Alibaba Foundation, for instance, donated 100,000 face masks, 20,000 testing kits and 1,000 protective suits. Other assistance came from the Chinese community in Tanzania. However, Tanzania has attracted regional and international attention for its Covid denialism, with Magufuli more than once declaring the country free from the disease.<sup>43</sup> This Covid-19 approach by the Tanzanian government has had an impact on Sino-Tanzanian relations. First, it stands squarely in contrast with the Chinese strategy, which adheres to strict health measures and a highly efficient case-tracking system. In May 2020, President Magufuli questioned the accuracy of Covid-19 testing kits, even suggesting that some of the donated equipment from outside the country had already been infected. The statement came about a month after Jack Ma's coronavirus aid had arrived in the country, and when the Chinese embassy was coordinating donations from other stakeholders. The Tanzanian government's position discouraged members of the Chinese community in the country from making further contributions. Second, national carrier Air Tanzania (ATCL) was expected to make its maiden flight to the Chinese city of Guangzhou on March 20, 2020, but cancelled the flight, citing Covid-19 control measures put in place by Chinese authorities.<sup>44</sup> The trust of Chinese health authorities has been eroded by Tanzania's (mis)handling of the pandemic.

## Education and culture

Tanzania and China have several programs that facilitate cooperation in the fields of education and culture. The number of Tanzanian students in China has increased over the years, which can partially be attributed to Chinese government scholarship slots. Figures are difficult to obtain but, according to the Culture Councilor at the Chinese embassy in Tanzania, the number of Tanzanian students in China in 2014, for instance, was 1,400.<sup>45</sup> Some of these are self-sponsored, of course. Chinese scholarships come in different categories. Apart from those offered by the Chinese Scholarship Council (Chinese government scholarship), other arrangements involve the Confucius Institute and provincial government scholarships. Tanzania has also been a beneficiary of the 20/20

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43. "President Magufuli Declares Tanzania Free from Covid-19", *The Citizen*, July 20, 2020, available at: [www.thecitizen.co.tz](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz).

44. "Air Tanzania Suspends Maiden Flight to Guangzhou", *The Citizen*, March 20, 2021, available at: [www.thecitizen.co.tz](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz).

45. M. J. Shangwe, "China's Soft Power in Tanzania: Opportunities and Challenges", 2017, World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, Vol. 3, No.1, available at: [www.worldscientific.com](http://www.worldscientific.com).

program that partners 20 African universities with 20 Chinese universities. The University of Dar es Salaam, for instance, collaborates with 16 Chinese universities through research programs, and students and staff exchange. In 2018, a USD40 million Chinese-built state-of-the-art library as well as a Confucius center were completed at the University of Dar es Salaam. The entire project was funded by a grant from the Chinese government.

However, despite these gains in terms of educational exchange, China is still not the preferred destination for Tanzanian students, who tend to prefer US and Scandinavian countries for overseas studies. China has been an option only after opportunities to go to those countries fell short. The reasons why Tanzanians hesitate to go to China include the language barrier, particularly for those who are required to study Chinese before embarking on their degree programs, and the relatively lower monthly stipend compared to Western countries.

Tanzania was the first country in East Africa to open a Chinese cultural center in 2015. Located in the commercial capital of Dar es Salaam, the center showcases Chinese culture through festivals and other events. It also provides short-term training for Tanzanians. Tanzania currently has two Confucius Institutes, located at the University of Dar es Salaam and University of Dodoma. There are also Confucius classrooms at the Morogoro Muslim University and the Zanzibar Journalism and Mass Communication College. The Confucius Institute is not only about the Chinese language; it also promotes other cultural aspects such as singing and martial arts. Recently, the government of Tanzania introduced Chinese language study in two advanced-level secondary schools: Usagara Boys Secondary School and Morogoro Girls Secondary School.<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile, Tanzania has been able to maintain a certain level of cultural presence in China through its national language: Kiswahili. The teaching of Kiswahili in China started in the 1960s at the Communication University of China and the Beijing Foreign Studies University. In 2019, the Shanghai International Studies University also started offering a Kiswahili degree program.

Chinese content is also finding space on local television channels. They include Chinese television dramas, which are dubbed in Kiswahili, and attract a considerable following. Examples include a television drama called *Dou Dou na Mama Wakwe Zake* (Dou Dou and Her In-laws), which was aired on the national broadcaster, the Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), in 2011, *Maisha ya Mama* (Mother's Glorious Life) in 2013, and *Let's Get Married* in 2015. The dubbing is done by Tanzanian artists who have to travel to China for training.

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46. "Government Announces New Combinations at A-Level", *The Citizen*, March 29, 2021, [www.thecitizen.co.tz](http://www.thecitizen.co.tz).

Between 2011 and 2015, these dramas enjoyed significant viewership because, apart from the fact they were Kiswahili-dubbed, they were aired on the national broadcaster, which does not require viewers to pay huge subscription fees. However, recently there has been increased competition from Turkish television dramas, which are also becoming very popular. They are aired on Azam Television, a major media company.

In the area of sports, Tanzania has benefited from what observers have termed “stadium diplomacy.” China co-funded the construction of the national stadium, which was inaugurated by Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete and President Hu Jintao, during his 2009 visit. In 2019, China and the revolutionary government of Zanzibar co-funded the rehabilitation of the Mao Tse Tung stadium. The stadium name itself offers a glimpse of Chinese influence in Zanzibar. It was formerly known as Sayyid Khalifa stadium, Khalifa being the Sultan of Zanzibar late in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

## Military affairs

Sino-Tanzanian military cooperation has its roots in the troubled period of the early 1960s. In response to an army mutiny that took place in January 1964, China moved quickly to provide military assistance, at the request of the Tanganyika government. Chinese support in rebuilding a new army, the People’s Defense Force (TPDF), was immense.<sup>47</sup> The organization of the TPDF was molded on that of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China in that it not only recruited party loyalists but had representation in the party’s National Executive.<sup>48</sup> The support included the construction of a naval base in Dar es Salaam in 1971, and an air base at Ngerengere in Morogoro in 1974. The scale of Chinese assistance was such that by 1972, Beijing had become Tanzania’s largest source of military assistance – valued at USD41 million.<sup>49</sup> That assistance also came in the form of personnel training. It is estimated that, by 1978, some 1,000 Tanzanian military personnel had been trained in China.<sup>50</sup>

In the era of globalization, military cooperation is still an important aspect of Sino-Tanzanian relations. This has manifested, for instance, in high-level visits of military officials from both countries and Chinese assistance to the TPDF.<sup>51</sup> Recently,

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47. M. Bailey, “Tanzania and China”, *African Affairs*, 1975, Vol. 74, No. 294, pp. 39-50.

48. A. Altorfer-Ong, *op. cit.*

49. M. Bailey, *op. cit.*

50. D.H. Shinn & J. Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, June 20, 2012.

51. H. Moshi, “Africa – China Economic Relations: The Tanzanian Case on Investment and Trade: a Paper Presentation at the Esrf’s High Level Thinkers”, *Dialogue on Development*

the cooperation also included joint military exercises.<sup>52</sup> In 2011, for instance, the National Defense College (NDC) was completed in Dar es Salaam. It was financed by both governments but built by a Chinese contractor. Seven years later, in 2018, a USD30 million Chinese-built military training center was opened.<sup>53</sup> China has also expanded its naval presence on the coast of East Africa, with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) deploying its "Peace Ark" hospital ship to provide free medical aid to Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti.<sup>54</sup> China is also a major seller of arms to Tanzania. Between 2000 and 2018, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zambia all received more than 90 percent of their arms transfers from China.<sup>55</sup>

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Cooperation between Tanzania and China: Focusing on Investments and Trade, July 17, 2017.

52. "China, Tanzania Conclude 'Sincere Partners 2019' Joint Military Training", China Military Online, January 21, 2020, available at: [www.eng.chinamil.com.cn](http://www.eng.chinamil.com.cn).

53. A. Mishra, "China's Growing Security Activism in Africa", October 7, 2020, available at: [www.orfonline.org](http://www.orfonline.org).

54. C. S. Hendrix, "Arms and Influence? Chinese Arms to Africa in Context", July 7, 2020, available at: [www.pjie.com](http://www.pjie.com).



55. *Ibid.*

# Conclusion

In the past, the relationship between China and Tanzania was built on the promotion of political and ideological aims. Tanzania's role in the liberation struggle of southern Africa and its socialist ideals under Nyerere made it a unique country to ally with and advance China's Third Worldism – the movement to promote solidarity among developing countries. This is what made the relationship special. However, the changing nature of the international political landscape has had an impact on both countries' domestic and foreign policies, so much so that the relationship has lost its past uniqueness. Factors include the end of the Cold War and domestic developments such as regime change. Consequently, China is no longer on the periphery of the international system. Not only is it an active member of the UN with a veto power, but it has also joined other multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Tanzania, on the other hand, is a shadow of its former self. The days of liberation struggle are gone, and elements of Pan-Africanism in the country's foreign policy either lack emphasis or are altogether non-existent. These developments have redefined Sino-Tanzanian relations; economic interests come before political and ideological interests.

In addition, more actors have joined the scene of African international relations, providing competition vis-à-vis not only China but also traditional key players. A recent development, where Tanzania decided in favor of a Turkish company to build its first and second phase of SGR, underscores this point. Apart from Turkey, others such as India, Brazil, Russia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar are becoming increasingly active on the African continent. For a long time, analysts saw the challenge posed by these “new players” as affecting only the so-called “traditional partners,” the argument being that the latter were now facing competition from emerging economies. Often overlooked is the competition among the new players themselves. This situation, however, could be seen as an advantage for African countries as it gives them a rare window of opportunity and leverage in their decision-making. The Tanzanian case shows that, should a deal with China be unfavorable, numerous options remain other than solely relying on traditional partners. This means that the relationship with China may decline, but not necessarily to other countries' advantage. Tanzania's political stability, natural-resources endowment and strategic geographical location may continue to give it an edge compared to other countries in the region in their relationship with China.

After a relatively turbulent spell under the Magufuli presidency, the future of Sino-Tanzanian relations rests on the direction the new President Samia Suluhu Hassan will take. Since her mandate started in March 2021, she has already hinted that her government will take different approaches in areas that may affect the relationship with China. A little over a month into her presidency, President Hassan indicated that she would adopt a different Covid-19 strategy from her predecessor, one that will be more in line with the World Health Organization's (WHO) protocols. She has also met leaders of the Chinese business chamber, and even stated that her government will encourage industrial parks, potentially offering hope that the Bagamoyo port project can still go ahead.



27 rue de la Procession 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – France

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