A Global Governance That Protects?
Global governance and the defence of democracy

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Introduction

Global governance emerged to deal with the gap between the plurality and diversity of states and the collective and transnational nature of increasingly complex global affairs. In a world where global government seems neither a realistic, nor even a desirable goal – in any case not in the immediate future – it remains necessary to have some “governance without government”\(^1\) as the famous expression goes: a set of institutions, arrangements, norms, and processes that occur between and among states, but also non-state actors, with a view to dealing with collective interests, including by settling disputes.

The G7 played a key role in favouring the development of global governance. It was instrumental in pulling poor countries out of high indebtedness, in fighting money laundering and terrorism financing, in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and in helping establish the Global Fund against AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. It was also a place for informal discussions that helped unlock some disputes between major powers, as in 1999 over the status of Kosovo after NATO’s intervention. Against this backdrop, the group’s current difficulties, in terms of both clarity on its role as well as strategy and ability to reach consensus, are testimony to the broader challenges posed to global governance.

The need for more effective global governance, and for a G7 able to play its role in that network, remains. Arguably, the gap between global challenges and global responses has even grown larger in the recent period. But by now, all should have realised that necessity is not enough. Slogans such as “we need global responses to global challenges” and “no power, including the major one, can address the current threats and risks alone” may be true. But they are not sufficient to solve the issues that impede collective action, and are likely not to sustain states’ willingness for international cooperation. Actually, interdependence itself has shifted from being a key driver of closer cooperation to being weaponised into great power competition. On the contrary, the many flaws of global governance

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and lack of states’ appetite to cooperate seem to steer powers in a different direction.

This paper details some of the major challenges currently posed to global governance. After having taken stock of where international cooperation stands today, it stresses how there is no going back, and why those who favour a multilateral and rules-based order cannot settle for the defence of the status-quo but need to push for reform. The defence of democracy, an issue raised by the G7 at Charlevoix, actually fits with this broader agenda, especially as the upcoming international order has to be about making the world safe for democracy, but also because respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs is obviously a pillar of such a rules-based order.\(^2\) In this context, this paper then explores some of the roles that the G7 could usefully undertake and suggests a few directions in which it could bring decisive impulses for a broader reform of our global governance framework.

In particular, a key issue underpinning such efforts should have to do with addressing the people’s sense of vulnerability and powerlessness in the face of many global events and trends. That should be the guiding idea of a “**global governance that protects**” and does so by fostering and improving control over events and international cooperation rather than through withdrawal and protectionism.

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Six major challenges posed to global governance

Effectiveness is obviously the major challenge facing global governance. Major crises that collective action was meant to prevent or tackle nonetheless took place and persisted. On security, the issue is not just about persistent armed conflicts, resilient terrorist groups and accelerating proliferation. Long upheld taboos on territorial acquisition through force, the neutrality of humanitarian workers or the use of chemical weapons are violated, putting a cornerstone of the multilateral system, i.e. the framework for the use of force, to a series of severe tests. Moreover, crises have also erupted in the economy, in global health and around the environment.

Effectiveness has been a major concern for a couple of decades. At some point, it even gained the upper hand over concerns related to legitimacy, to which some argued it was opposed. But effectiveness and legitimacy are mutually reinforcing and can hardly be distinguished in the long run. As a consequence, legitimacy has made a comeback as another major challenge for global governance. This goes beyond the more or less traditional revindications against a global governance architecture inherited from the post-WWII or the immediate post-Cold War periods. As a consequence, global governance institutions have become tools and battlefields for great power competition, as seen with the deadlocks in the UN Security Council or at the WTO as well as with the proliferation of new and partial institutions, often implicitly or explicitly meant as alternatives to the existing organisations and as levers to hedge against other powers.

In this context, state behaviour is key. The fact is that appetite for cooperation and the acceptance of legal or political constraints is being undermined by those concerns over both effectiveness and legitimacy. It is also held back by suspicion as well as evidence of free riding by other powers, disputes over burden sharing and the enforcement predicament. This problem has been made highly visible with the recent withdrawals from treaties and institutions.
But it actually also shows with more general trends such as the drop in development aid, unpaid dues to international organisations, or the failure to meet commitments under international law.

This challenge at the state level is paralleled by growing discontent at the popular level. Even before the rise of populism, protests against international deals and summits expressed frustration and defiance toward globalisation and how it is run. This movement has now expanded from trade to other issues like migration, international criminal justice, etc. As recent protests on climate change show, this discontent is not necessarily a rejection of international action. And many polls suggest that, at least in the western world, there is significant support within the public for international cooperation as well as for organisations such as the United Nations. But the frustration with global governance remains strong and, as the debate on the UN Global Migration Compact proved, has turned into mistrust.

Actually, global governance is not criticised only in practice anymore, because of its shortcomings and failures. It is now also attacked in principle.\(^3\) “Globalism” is now an enemy of choice for those who want to “take back control”, including some of the most powerful world leaders. Some features of international institutions that used to be seen as benefits – e.g. to provide rules, possibly with verification and/or dispute settlement mechanisms, to be inclusive of most if not all stakeholders, or to improve predictability – are now perceived as key reasons to bypass these institutions.

And, as if another challenge was needed, the international system is going through a deep transformation, with a redistribution of power, which first occurred on the economic front, but is now expanding to the political and strategic realms. As a consequence, powers are competing more forthrightly, most of them staking a claim in the next international order. In addition, this redistribution coincides with the “rise of the rest”\(^4\), pointing not just to the end of the western domination of global governance, but also to the end of illusions of a political, cultural, and normative convergence of states and societies. Lastly, this transformation also includes power decentralisation, with middle and regional powers taking advantage of the current environment, but also non-state actors becoming increasingly important, and trans-national flows


posing a challenge to a mostly international global order. Such trends easily result in divergences and mistrust, which then tend to prevail over common challenges and interests.
All in all, this situation does not mean the multilateral system is waning yet. For instance, to this date, there are still 197 parties to the Paris Agreement on climate, 185 of which have ratified the convention. More broadly, global governance has continued to work. For all the problems met by international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), they have been able to achieve some major successes, from coordination under the Millennium and now Sustainable Development Goals to the conclusion of the Paris deal on climate change. Efforts have also occurred under more informal and ad hoc formats, occasionally including non-state actors, and have met significant results too, from the G-20 led response to the 2008 economic crisis to the Global Fund’s contribution to saving millions of lives from contagious diseases. But this track record, for all its achievements, is not up to what is at stake.

As a consequence of the suspicion against and dissatisfaction with multilateral organisations, international cooperation has morphed towards formats which are rather informal, flexible, limited in size, and ad-hoc. In many instances, loose coordination between nationally determined targets is substituting to collectively fixed and verified goals. Voluntary and earmarked funding is taking a growing role. National independent bodies, such as competition authorities or supreme courts, have established contacts that allows for ad hoc coordination between them – for instance, to the point where central banks played a bigger role through their liquidity swaps than the IMF as a lender of last resort.

Such trends were responses to pressing needs and constraints. But as such, they did not prove sufficient to finding better responses to the challenges facing global governance, and actually facing the states and the people. Multilateral cooperation was always based in more informal and limited formats that helped lead the way, steer a more global effort, and shape compromises. But in the current

period, those informal formats and more flexible arrangements which have proliferated seem to be **alternatives** rather than complements to (or pioneers within) multilateral institutions. And, in quite a few instances, a number of these formats have emerged that ended up competing between themselves rather than steering the global efforts or providing the right incentives to tackle the burden sharing and free-riding challenges.

On top of this, as the US and other powers are curtailing their contribution to global governance, others are on the contrary taking advantage of this **vacuum**. China is for instance investing more and more heavily and assertively into multilateralism, both by increasing its contributions to existing organisations and setting up its own institutions. As others, it is increasingly apt to build the coalitions and use the toolbox that will help it shape institutions, norms and policies to its advantage.
There’s no going back: why reform is needed

In any case, there is no going back. It is not just that the world has already changed too much since the end of the Cold War, or that the trend towards more informal and ad hoc cooperation cannot be reversed. It is also that such nostalgia would be misplaced, as global governance was not that effective in the immediate post-Cold war world: actually, it is part of what drove us where we stand now.

As a consequence, if turning away from global governance seems short sighted, defending the status-quo is equally misplaced. Those powers which still believe in the need for global governance will have to push for bold reforms in our global governance system. Some specific reforms needed are well known, if only because they have been discussed for too long, having missed either the creativity or the political heavy-lifting to bring them to completion. But this agenda can be complemented, and policies even more than institutions need to be adapted and deliver on their goals. A more effective and more legitimate set-up, that better respond to states’ concerns and people’s needs, and paves the way for the next world order, seems the only response able to overcome existing reluctance. And, obviously, state behaviour will be key to move towards this goal.

Alternatives do not add up. Unilateral decisions and bilateral relations are legitimate, and even necessary. But alone, they do not allow to address the challenges and risks which are global by nature. For instance, to deal with trade imbalances and market-distorting practices through a mix of unilateral coercion and bilateral deals is more likely to cause a fragmentation of the world economy and a politicisation of economic relations than to produce a level playing field at the global level. The risks associated with a weakened global governance framework include similar fragmentation at the political

level, as illustrated by some powers’ current efforts to re-establish some sort of spheres of influence.

Against this backdrop, **international cooperation and a rules-based order are important**, both to avoid a violent escalation of great powers competition (or to give a free rein to destabilising behaviours by middle and regional powers) and to tackle the challenges related to global public goods. And yet, these alternatives are taking shape in front of our eyes, as powers redirect their efforts, or simply hedge against what they see as global governance’s shortcomings and failures. For all their pressing character, the challenges posed to global governance are not sufficient to impose reforms, or even just to make them more plausible.
The defence of democracy

One important aspect of this issue has to do with the situation of democracy. The idea of a liberal international order was built upon the notion of liberal policies as well as liberal states: an open world was perceived as dependent on open societies. But the fact is that, in our current international environment, democracy is not the ultimate fault line on many pressing challenges and threats. Fighting against terrorism, preventing proliferation, containing and adapting to climate change, ensuring mutual gains through trade: all these endeavours require dealing with non-democratic powers.

But the coexistence of democracies and non-democracies within international institutions is not the only challenge faced by global governance in this context. The defence of democracies itself has become a major topic, and global governance again needs to be about making “the world safe for democracy”8. Basic tenets of the current global governance system are principles that can help with this goal: after all, the sovereignty principle has such implications as the “sovereign equality” between states, “non-interference in internal affairs”, and the people’s “right to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural system”.9 But examples abound of how these principles are insufficient.

Protection against external interference in electoral processes and against “information manipulation”10 has been a key theme in recent years, leading to various efforts to engage with services providers and platforms, to educate the public and to increase public data security and integrity, as well as transparency over political parties’ and political advertising funding. Recognising that platforms may have a hard time self-regulating, but also that in any case, it should not be for them to draw the balance between free speech and manipulation, was a major step forward.

Russia’ exclusion from the G8 in 2014 was not motivated by the nature of its political regime, but by its annexation of Crimea – a key violation of both principles of territorial integrity of sovereign states and of self-determination of the people. And Russia’s possible return in the medium run to the Group should not be conditioned first to the evolution of its domestic political situation. Of course, the current situation is a failure of the co-optation and socialisation strategy that helped justify Moscow’s gradual inclusion in the 1990s. But the G7 should not give up on engagement and co-optation and become an exclusive club of western democracies.

Africa’s efforts to promote and defend democracy through its governments, and more importantly through its pan-African institutions and its civil society, is another illustration of the role global governance can and should play to defend democracies. It has in particular helped to put emphasis on the importance of electoral integrity, the prevention and mediation of potentially violent national election processes, good governance, the provision of political, social and economic public services, and the role of regional and sub-regional organisations as well as that of non-governmental actors.
A role for the G7

On all the issues mentioned above, the need for such a capacity to take initiatives across the system and to give strong impulses – a quintessential characteristic of the G7 – is undisputable. Of course, it is likely that currently, the G7 may not be in a situation to establish consensus on all these issues. However, the need for initiatives and impulses is too pressing to accept a deadlock, and members of the G7 should consider partial agreements and mini-lateral efforts. The fact that some members of the G7 highly disagree with the others on issues as sensitive as international criminal justice, trade, climate change, etc., cannot be an excuse to postpone the necessary steps and reforms that these issues are precisely calling for. Still, the G7 as a whole has a key role to play – especially on central issues related to international stability, including the use of force and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – and should take responsibility to embody the push for reform that is currently needed in cases where consensus is possible.

Because of its informal nature and its limited composition, the G7 is ideally placed to establish dialogue and frame negotiations on issues where it may be needed to overcome divergences and even to defuse tensions. That is true between members of the Group (on issues ranging from trade to the Iran nuclear deal) and with participants of its meetings, but even more so beyond those states. The two latest summits are a case in point to the notion that a degree of informal and open exchange between leaders could be more important than the process-driven goal of agreeing to numerous final communiques.

The fact that the issue of defence of democracy was elevated to the Charlevoix summit’s agenda was in itself an important fact, which helped raise awareness on malign international efforts, including by state actors, that aim at undermining democratic societies and electoral processes. Yet, it remained focussed on national responses and security responses. As the Charlevoix commitments paved the way for collective and not just individual responses to these challenges, that aspect needs to be reinforced, moving beyond sharing lessons learned and best practices, and
adapting to new technologies as well as tactical shifts. Responses must also cover the less technological side of things, from the regulation of political parties’ and political advertising funding to the protection of journalists, to tackle the crisis of trust in elites, media and experts that provided a fertile ground for such interference in the first place. Last, those efforts need to be expanded beyond the G7 members and address the domestic challenges to electoral and information integrity: support to nations engaged in difficult democratic processes would be an important signal, in Africa and elsewhere.

On conflict resolution and security issues, in addition to discussing the most pressing crises, the G7 should start to address more transversal issues. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Sahel all seem to point to how armed conflicts are more difficult to settle (or even to stabilise) than before, and how military successes in the fight against terrorism are insufficient to achieve local peace and international security. Countries involved in managing those crises and tackling those threats should engage in some deeper discussions on the effectiveness of their (and the broader international) stabilisation and peace-making efforts, including on the link between security, politics, development, and humanitarian assistance. More generally, as increasing strategic instability and uncertainty suggest, we are reaching a point where we should see that the international security regime cannot result in the mere addition of national security policies and decisions.

On the economy, the topics for discussion and coordination within the G7 – including before bringing these issues to other forums such as the G20, the IMF, the World Bank, the OCDE or the WTO – abound: tax cooperation, renewed efforts on preventing high indebtedment for developing countries, trade, the implication of automation, the digital economy, incentives for the energy and ecological transition... But it may seem important to also instigate a broader discussion on the recent troubles and tensions over interdependence. A direct result of the globalisation of the economy, the very interdependence that global governance seemed to seek is both leading to feelings of powerlessness and creating a

battlefield in the context of great power competition. On top of the return of a more mercantilist approach to economic exchanges, interdependence is indeed increasingly being weaponised, sometimes in a highly visible fashion as in the case of sanctions overreach.\(^\text{14}\) This trend too carries a direct risk of fragmentation of the global economy, in terms of payment channels, use of encrypted currencies, de-structuring value chains, norms and due diligence standards, etc. This trend, which goes well beyond economic and financial exchanges, as energy, migration, technology also allow for asymmetric interdependences to be weaponised, should be addressed by the G7.

**Climate and the environment** are one of the most difficult issues for the G7. This is likely to be one topic where the Group is not able to achieve consensus, and majority statements should be preferred over unanimity. If not the G7 as a whole, its members can reaffirm the importance of existing commitments, as well as the role of non-state actors (especially in the US since its government decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement) and the importance of Africa to meet our collective goals, especially in the face of its sustained demographic growth, rapid urbanisation, and necessary development. But G7 members also need to insist on the need to go beyond the existing commitments, and to find ways to lead by showing the example and triggering a critical mass of initiatives that creates sufficient incentives to go through with the green transition.

Another major system-wide challenge for global governance has to do with how it has evolved in a piecemeal manner, and therefore suffers from imbalances and at time contradictions between its different regimes.\(^\text{15}\) **Coordination** between trade, environment, an inclusive economy, security, human rights, and technological changes is an old concern, and most ideas to find comprehensive institutional solutions seem bound to fail, or at least to protract. However, greater dialogue between relevant organisations and regimes could be welcomed, and the G7 could play a role in this regard through inviting these institutions. In the context of current trade tensions, the idea of a levy depending on the respect for climate (or social) standards, seems quite difficult. Bottom-up

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\(^\text{15}\) J. Pisani-Ferry, “Should we give up on global governance?”*, Policy Contribution*, Bruegel, n° 17, October 2018, [www.bruegel.org](http://www.bruegel.org).
approaches could therefore be encouraged too, especially under a G7 initiative, so as to push private actors to internalise standards.
Impulses for the broader global governance

Innovation across global governance already exists. But it is often short-term, partial and ad hoc. As such, it fails to bring global governance reform up to the stakes. A number of ad hoc ideas could bring significant improvements to the current architecture and policies in place: an international tribunal for Daesh fighters, rules for the road to peace in the cyberspace (including state and non-state behaviours)\textsuperscript{16}, coordination on regulations for data privacy, and modernised arms control are some of the obvious candidates for such innovation. The G7 is an ideal base to start and support such efforts. But deeper impulses are needed across the board.

The G7 is also a good place to inject more long-term thinking into global governance. In a world where immediate threats and short-term challenges are consuming most of the political space and energy, long-term challenges are too often taking a back seat.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, on many fronts such as climate change, migration, or biodiversity, we have already reached a point where these long-term challenges need immediate action. Other issues – like automation and artificial intelligence, antibiotic resistance, urban development, deforestation, and outer space – need the same kind of advanced mobilisation. And crisis prevention, although often mentioned as an imperative for a more cost-efficient and stability-driven strategy on global health as on armed conflicts, to mention only these two areas, remains under-developed as a global effort.

Institutional reforms of the broader global governance architecture are often overlooked, as it seems like one of the least likely aspects of the reform agenda to come to fruition. Yet this impression is misplaced on two counts. First, institutional reforms are looked at mostly in terms of composition and voting powers, when institutional set-ups include many other aspects, from accountability and transparency to diversity of staff, to readiness and operations. Second, composition is certainly a difficult topic, but it is

\textsuperscript{16} “Crafting Peace in Cyberspace”, \textit{Paris Peace Forum}, 11 November 2018, \url{www.youtube.com}.

\textsuperscript{17} “Ideas for Modernizing the Rules-based International Order », \textit{Chatham House Expert Perspectives}, May 2019, \url{www.chathamhouse.org}.
also an essential one: deadlocks at this level are a key driver of the weakening of global governance’s legitimacy and the development of parallel institutions and formats. In addition, the return of great powers competition must not drive our focus only on these countries, but also on other ones, who also need a seat at the table. The G7 is ideally placed to start this conversation, both between its core members and with the many interlocutors that it engages with, from emerging powers to African stakeholders.

Rules is another area where an impulse is needed. The notion of a rules-based order is at stake, and although it has become a mantra of the global governance discourse, it is rarely unpacked in policy terms.\textsuperscript{18} Not only is there a need for rules that match upcoming challenges, for instance in the cyberspace, but there is also the necessity to strengthen and streamline the mechanisms that help enforce these rules. The International Criminal Court’s difficulties also have to do with its costly but disputable track record so far – even only from the perspective of the good administration of justice and the fight against impunity. In addition, as the case of the WTO shows, the stalemate on global discussions and agreements often ends up accumulating so much tensions on the verification and dispute settlement mechanisms that the latter is at risk of becoming a source of additional disputes, rather than serving as a device to deal effectively with these tensions.

A deeper difficulty comes from the fact that agreeing on the facts, which is a key starting point for most collective and multilateral efforts, has become more and more difficult, not just because of the growing diversity of states and international actors, but also because of the weakening of most of the mechanisms and instruments that are precisely tasked with establishing the facts – on climate, nuclear activities, chemical attacks or human rights violations. It is not just cooperation, but also dialogue and diplomacy which are made more difficult by these mounting – and at times deliberate – challenges. Global governance would certainly be reinforced by an international dialogue to re-establish consensus on this fact-finding and verification endeavour as an essential stepping stone for cooperation.

One of the key aspects of a reformed global governance is that it will need to be multi-stakeholder to a much greater scale than it

already is. Non-state actors are already increasingly taken into account, including as participants to global governance. Their contribution is often instrumental, complementing or even at times compensating for the lack of commitment by major powers. In this respect, solution-oriented forums that can give space to both top-down and bottom-up approaches, like the Paris Peace Forum,¹⁹ are important to figuring out where and how to strengthen this space.

And efforts by authoritarian regimes (and a few democracies too) to limit or coerce non-governmental actors’ access to global governance forums need to be addressed much more firmly than they are for the time being. Of course, it remains nonetheless important to avoid the privatisation of global governance, as the recent conversion on the public intervention and regulation of major digital platforms shows.²⁰

The relation with the public may be one of the trickiest challenges.²¹ As already mentioned, global governance needs to be more responsive to the public’s vulnerabilities, taking into account their concerns and delivering to their needs. That is the case for substance, where key issues such as migration, poverty, equality, food security, terrorism, and trade are shaping the public’s daily lives and have become major priorities for voters. That is also the case in terms of methods, given the perception existing among a quarter of the public that international institutions and norms deprive the people of control over their lives, or at least weaken this control. To the extent there is a demand for global governance, it does not amount to support for binding policies and formal institutions. The G7’s outreach groups represent a progress in this direction, but they are insufficient to deal with the need for explanation and participation. The debate on sovereignty is a good illustration of this difficulty, when the notion that powers should be accountable to the commitments they undertake freely – rather than able to change their mind when they see fit – is more and more understood as opposed to sovereignty rather than as a consequence of it.²² In this context, it needs both to be explained how a rules-based world order is a condition for the principle of the sovereign equality between

¹⁹. https://parispeaceforum.org/
states, but also to find different ways to make and assess these rules and policies.

The risk with this current frustration is that it pours into protectionist and closure demands: on trade, but also on migration, security, etc. At a time when the public is concerned, or even afraid, of what the constraints and flows coming from the international system mean for our day-to-day lives, a **global governance that protects**, i.e. that responds to the public’s feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness, is needed. Only with public support will international cooperation regain the level of trust and legitimacy that will enable it to address our most important challenges.

If the world is indeed engaged in a transition, then the G7 would make a major contribution to stability and prosperity if it was able to articulate a vision of what the next global order could be.²³

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