

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN RECONCILIATION AND OTHER EXPERIENCES IN POST-CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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Contents

Introduction	3
--------------------	---

PART 1

DEFUSING THE PAST: THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY	8
--	---

Recollections of Hope <i>Kuldip Nayar</i>	9
--	---

European Unity and Franco-German Reconciliation <i>Gérard Bossuat</i>	14
--	----

Citizen Diplomacy and Civil Society Contacts <i>Asma-ul-Husna Faiz</i>	30
---	----

PART 2

HISTORY AS A METAPHOR OF ESTRANGEMENT/ RAPPROCHEMENT	47
---	----

Post-Conflict Memory and Representation: How Trafalgar Affects Franco-British Relations Today <i>Claire Sanderson</i>	48
---	----

Distortion and the Historiography in Pakistan <i>Ahmad Salim</i>	57
---	----

From Enmity to Reconciliation: The Role of Franco-German Bilateral Institutions <i>Martin Koopmann</i>	66
--	----

PART 3

UNLOCKING CONFLICT NARRATIVES 73

**The Role of Media in India-Pakistan Relations:
A Reflection on Agra Summit
Nazir Hussain..... 74**

**Communicating and Exchanging Peace Narratives
Through Art and Culture
Shahid Nadeem and Madeeha Gauhar..... 88**

PART 4

**OVERCOMING THE TRUST DEFICIT:
OTHER PARADIGMS IN RECONCILIATION 105**

**From Hatred to Friendly Cooperation:
Poland and Germany After the Second World War
Klaus Ziemer..... 106**

**Reawakening of Sino-Japanese War Memories
Hugues Tertrais 122**

**The My Lai Massacre and its Memory:
the Long Path Toward Reconciliation
Between Vietnam and the USA
Pierre Journoud..... 129**

**Overcoming 60 Years of Strategic Hostility:
Challenges before the Subcontinent's Peace Movement
Praful Bidwai..... 147**

Introduction

The reactions in India and Pakistan to the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 have shown the fragility of the apparent *bonhomie* resulting from the composite dialogue started in 2004. The air was soon thick with accusations and counter-accusations on respective responsibilities and motives. The veneer of trust that has been developed over the last few years evaporated quickly. Suspicions and bitterness resurfaced. Once again, the international community could only hope that the tense situation would not get out of hand. It is still a long way to go before the bilateral relations move from roller coaster to smooth sailing. Also the question remains: How to sustain trust and understanding so that it convincingly overcomes inimical mindsets in a conflict-prone subcontinent?

Based on a seminar held in Lahore in the summer of 2008, the present collection intends to highlight a comparative approach towards managing post-conflict situations and the construction of “living together (peaceful symbiosis).” These proceedings not only reflect the past but also recommend actions relevant for experts and policy-makers.

Two dimensions are emphasized. The first one is the narrative of wars/conflicts and the treatment given to memories attached to adversarial relations. Those imprints of war, physical and mental, and the post-conflict representation of the “other” can be projected in different forms: official celebrations, memorials, textbooks, etc. The challenge to find ways and means of closing the divide without abjuring the past and its often painful memories is a delicate balancing act since it could also reinforce the distance with the “enemy.”

The second dimension deals with the multifarious ways of peace-building so as to extol the tools which could have a far-reaching and positive impact. A fresh thinking comes from the experiences shared in different parts of the world on how to overcome a traumatic past and build a process of reconciliation. Does it imply the reconstruction of identity? What are the factors into play which foster bridge-building from below, but do not contradict state-induced strategies of reconciliation?

History can indeed teach a few lessons and show a path forward while keeping alert to the fact that the nature of the conflict can be different and sometimes still simmering. The in-depth reconciliation process between France and Germany after three traumatic wars in less than a century is a case in point. The context is different for India and Pakistan. The two young and asymmetrical

post-colonial states were born out of a bloody vivisection and therefore carry a common historical baggage which generates a “part of us” feeling. Yet, in spite of commonalities, one (Pakistan) defines its existence largely in opposition to the other (India). Other pairs are looked at in this collection of essays: China and Japan, Germany and Poland, United States and Vietnam. The cross examination of experiences in different parts of the world with different cultural background, different political environment can give useful insights into success and failure of past and present reconciliation processes.

The first part of this book looks at the role of the civil society in defusing the past. Kuldip Nayar, a leading Indian journalist born in Sialkot (Pakistan), is well-placed to discuss this issue because of his lifelong commitment to Pak-India understanding. His prolific writing relies on his own personal experience. He extols the virtues of people to people contacts to soften the crust of hostility which more than once is sustained by half-hearted politicians, an uncooperative bureaucracy, not to mention the military establishment. He claims that reconciliation starts with a liberal visa regime and the absence of police reporting. People must be allowed to meet for bilateral hostility to recede. If visas are a thing of the past for Europeans crossing borders within the continent (a requirement abolished in the 1950s for the original European Economic Community member-countries), Gérard Bossuat, who holds the Jean Monnet chair at the University of Cergy-Pontoise (North of Paris), reminds us that during the formative years the people have rather reluctantly followed the integration process than actively pushed for it. In the case of France, the reconciliation with Germany responded first of all to a rational impulse driven by strategic and economic imperatives and the constructive attitude of some dedicated individuals. Asma-ul-Husna Faiz, from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, brings us back to the India-Pakistan divide. She expounds on citizen diplomacy as a necessary complement to official dialogue. The pursuit of durable peace through a vigilant attitude in deflating tensions diminishes stereotypical images of the “other” and bridges “the perceptual divide.” But this is only part of a multilevel process which needs to involve a wide range of persons. Also, there is an inherent difficulty in quantifying the impact of citizen dialogues on conflict resolution and on the decision-makers.

The second part is looking at history as a metaphor of estrangement or rapprochement. Claire Sanderson, who is teaching at the University of Paris VII, points to the battle of Trafalgar as an example, how conflicts can be represented very differently in the collective memory and how it can affect bilateral relations. One may be reminded of the two narratives in India and Pakistan on who initiated and who won the wars. No reconciliation process is worthwhile if prejudices go from one generation to the next through school textbooks. Ahmed Salim, a senior research associate with the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad, dwells on the politics of history and underlines the narrow nationalism propagated

by school textbooks. He argues that the representation of leaders associated with the anti-colonial struggle has fueled a confrontational mindset from childhood. In this regard, the initiative taken in 2003, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, to have joint Franco-German history textbooks is worth commending. Martin Koopmann, who currently is the Director of Stiftung Genshagen—Berlin-Brandenburgisches Institut für Deutsch-Französische Zusammenarbeit in Europa after heading the Franco-German relations program at the German Council on Foreign Relations, reminds us of the necessity to build and sustain institutions able to withstand political hazards. It brings to mind what Jean Monnet once said: “Nothing is possible without men; nothing is lasting without institutions.” History shows that reconciliation needs men of vision and strong-willed political leaders to start with but ultimately gets its sustenance from civil society, especially the youth. Nevertheless, an entrenchment in a web of multilateral institutions and regional cooperation is helpful.

The third part is on unlocking conflict narratives. Nazir Hussain, associate professor at the Department of Strategic Studies of Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, addresses the all-important role played by the media in shaping the public opinion especially during eventful times (the Agra summit of July 2001 in the case under study). India and Pakistan have seen a mushrooming of TV channels and electronic media over the last decade which no active diplomacy can ignore. Arts can also provide an alternative channel of dialogue through which populations can communicate to each other. Shahid Nadeem, a Pakistani playwright, and Madeeha Gauhar, an actress and theater director, have been deeply involved in non-governmental cultural diplomacy with the Ajoka theater troupe. Here they recount their experience at working on narratives reminding the sub-continental audiences, through the plays performed, of the shared history and cultural heritage. Ajoka was the first Pakistani troupe to perform in India after the Mumbai terror attacks.

The fourth part looks at other examples of bilateral animosity and how the trust deficit was (or was not) handled. Klaus Ziemer, director of the German Historical Institute of Warsaw, shows how a divisive past can be overcome and lead to far-reaching attitudinal changes and a multifaceted partnership between Germany and Poland. It is interesting to note the role of churches, as significant actors of civil societies, which altered the public discourse in both countries. Coming to grips with the past is an indispensable element of any reconciliation processes. In this regard, the symbolism attached to commemorations can have cathartic effects. One remembers the image of the then French President François Mitterrand holding hand with the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in 1984 at Verdun, a city which witnessed in 1916 one of the most ferocious battles in the history of humanity. Charged in symbolism was also the visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February 1999 to the Minar-e-Pakistan which commemorates the Lahore declaration of

March 23, 1940 demanding a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The Lahore spirit was unfortunately soon to be eclipsed by the Kargil conflict. Looking at the equally thorny relations between Japan and China, Hugues Tertais, professor at the University of Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne and director of the Centre d'Histoire de l'Asie Contemporaine (CHAC), shows in his paper the sensitivity of war memories, referring precisely to the controversial visits of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni shrine and the commemorations of the Nanking massacre of 1937. Forging a collective memory by building monuments and organizing national commemorations requires a delicate handling, since the same acts can ignite negative feelings rather than cautioning about the future. In 1985, a proposal was made by the then governor of Punjab, agreed by Zia-ul-Haq, to built a memorial at Walton which was the first camp set up for refugees from India "who made Pakistan" after Partition. His controversial nature ensured that the project never really took off until 20 years later when another General, Pervez Musharraf, went ahead with a ground-breaking ceremony of Bab-e-Pakistan (Gateway of Pakistan). This reminds us that after six decades the historical inquiry about the acts of brutality committed at Partition and their perpetrators has never really been conducted. Pierre Journoud of the Centre d'Etudes d'Histoire de la Défense (CEHD) in Paris turns his attention to another tragic event, the My Lai massacre of 1968 where hundreds of Vietnamese civilians were executed by American soldiers. He stresses the positive role played by American non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in uncovering a distressing truth and in helping to heal the deep wounds endured. Private initiatives can be a useful addition to official diplomacy in pacifying painful memories.

The final paper is written by Praful Bidwai, an Indian journalist and peace activist. He is of the opinion that mitigating the adversarial relations between India and Pakistan is complicated by the unique case of neighboring countries directing nuclear weapons at each other. "Weaponization" of their relations has its own impetus with vested interests feeding on it. He has no doubt that the India-Pakistan reconciliation is going to be a long process but also an urgent necessity: "Strengthening it and energizing it brooks no delay."

The editors and organizers of the project were fully aware of the caveats imparted by historicism and false analogies. Nevertheless, one can draw from those essays some conditions necessary to an effective reconciliation process. A basic condition is the emergence of a mindset allowing a shift from a confrontational perception of the other. If the personal involvement of a committed political leadership able to get over skeptical views can give considerable impetus to a more serene bilateral relation, it will only generate its own momentum if the citizenry on both sides bridges the divide by regular exchanges involving multiple segments of the society, notably the youth. For the latter to happen, the educational discourse is an important element in altering any adversarial content.

In regard to war memories, the search for an unadorned reading of past events, however excruciating, carries a cathartic effect that is always more constructive than distorted facts and exacerbated nationalism. An institutional mechanism definitely helps to make high-level contacts commonplace. Building trust can also benefit from cooperative action within regional structures.

One just hope that viewing beyond the horizon of cultural, geographic and historic borders may be a fruitful exercise, which could contribute to the rethinking of South Asian relations.

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PART 1

DEFUSING THE PAST: THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY

Recollections of Hope

Kuldip Nayar

I studied from 1941 to 1946 at Lahore, then the cultural center of the north. Those were happy days when we, the students, constituted a cosmopolitan society, eating together, living together and thinking together. People had a lot of understanding and friendship which got snapped when India was divided.

That was more than 60 years ago. Both countries have traversed different paths since. Still their journeys have something common, the history, the geography and their value system. They are realizing it increasingly and wanting more links, more meetings and more opportunities to give and take. Government-sponsored Track 1 meetings have been of little help because negotiators are normally the nominees of the establishment. This proves, if any proof was needed, that the pressure of ordinary people can make the difference to the formal exercise that the governments on both sides go over periodically. The dialogue among the people is still limited.

The world is replete with examples where people have forced events. Poland is thousands of miles away from Pakistan. Yet this European country has a lesson for people living in the subcontinent. The common man was only a tool in the hands of some faceless Communist party bureaucrats wanting to control him.

Suddenly, from among the people rose an ordinary worker—with the same failings as others—to ignite the desire to overcome individual differences and stand together to defeat those who furrowed separateness. This man was Lech Walesa, head of the ship workers union at Gdansk and later the first President of a free Poland. To the world he gave an idea, the idea that people who join hands for a common cause are a power to be reckoned with. They can remove any impediment, any wall and any border.

Something like that, imperceptible and yet vaguely visible, is beginning to happen between Indians and Pakistanis. Different streams of contact and understanding are flowing into each other's

Kuldip Nayar is a leading Indian journalist born in Sialkot (Pakistan).

country, despite the efforts of chauvinists, bureaucrats and intelligence agencies to impede the process. In popular parlance we are talking about people to people contact, but in reality it is moving the mounds of mistrust and bias that have accumulated over the decades. The process can be accelerated if visas are relaxed. Thousands of people of one country should meet thousands of them in the other so that misinformation disappears. Since 1965, when the two countries went to war, no newspaper and no book is officially allowed from one side to the other. Still I saw a ray of hope even in the twilight of partition.

Before I crossed into India on September 13, 1947, after travelling some 250 kilometers in a jeep from my hometown, Sialkot. I saw a column of Muslims coming from India stopping near us, outside Lahore. None spoke—neither them nor we. But we understood each other; it was a spontaneous kinship. Both had left behind home and hearth, both had seen murder and worse; both had been broken on the rack of history; both were refugees. The emotional bonds between peoples of the two countries had not died even after the holocaust when at least 1 million people died and 20 million were uprooted. After staying for some time on the outskirts of Lahore, they went their way and we ours. I told myself that someday we must create conditions where we could meet, the friends we had left behind or their children whenever we felt like. I do not like gates at the border, nor iron wires. Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who founded Pakistan, did not want that way. He said that Pakistan and India would settle down as America and Canada one day. When he came to my Law College at Lahore, less than two years before Partition, he allayed my fears over hostility between the two countries. He said: “Some nations have killed millions of each other’s and yet an enemy of today is a friend of tomorrow. That is history.”

I also heard him on the Pakistan radio a few days before Partition “You are free; you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the state... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state... Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our idea and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is a personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.”

A candlelight vigil at the Wagah border or a busload of women from Lahore to Delhi, or a lorry of passengers travelling between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar are by themselves not great events. But they signify the breaking of a crust of hostility between the two countries. A composite dialogue or confidence building measures may be overused phrases. But what they mean is that the era of hostilities is over. The era of sitting across the same table has come,

accepting the fact that we have problems to sort out. The basic thing to these problems is how to have faith and confidence in each other.

I suggest that the Punjab assemblies on both sides pass a resolution offering apologies for the killings, looting and the like during Partition. This may have a psychological effect. There are a few relentless optimists who have prepared the ground. They had to confront nearly implacable opposition, vested interests and extremism of the worst type. In Pakistan the task was still more Herculean because the openness of India's democracy did help to some extent. Pakistan believed that India was out to undo it. But India, however democratic, did not adjust how to live with an intransigent neighbor. There was so much tension that one could taste it. Even the best of friendships were under strain.

Things have changed now to a large extent. Cricket teams have done a tremendous job. Leading players are heroes on both sides. People applaud good cricket whichever the team plays. On the other hand, cassettes of Indian music and films are popular all over Pakistan [only in 2005 the ban on Indian films has been lifted after an over three decade gap with the release of the epoch-making *Mughal-e-Azam* in Pakistan theatres]. This has helped lessen bitterness.

Elected representatives are at the helm of affairs in Pakistan after the February 2008 elections. Top leader Nawaz Sharif has demanded the abolition of visas for Indians. Benazir Bhutto, whom I met in London in 2007, told me that she wanted a "border-less" subcontinent. I personally think that such praiseworthy efforts get embroiled in the preconceived notions of bureaucrats and politicians of limited vision. Some activists, already engaged in the process of people-to-people contact, know this from their experience at the grass roots. Governments in New Delhi and Islamabad have to realise that it is really the people who have the power to induce changes and if they are kept at a distance the process itself will get defeated. Politicians have certain pulls and compulsions, but the people are their masters and, if allowed, they can alter the course of history. Witness the popular revolutions in France, China and, most recently, Iran, where the tide of public opinion swept away the established order. The people in those countries realized the folly of tolerating dictation by those who did not represent the popular mood. Have Pakistan and India reached that stage? Ultimately, their understanding will count.

Kashmir is a symptom, not the disease. The disease is the bias and mistrust in each other. If you do not remove that, you will have another Kashmir after solving this one. The only way is the equation we develop between the two countries and here the role of people is the foremost. Unfortunately, both New Delhi and Islamabad have played with the idea—people's role—but never taken it to the logical end. The direction towards such an end means relaxing restrictions on cross-border movements in the real sense. There are countless statements and even measures announced, but when it

comes to implementation there is the same mind set confronting visa seekers. The travel facilities offered are irritating and humiliating, apart from being time consuming. I once traveled on the Samjhauta Express from Atari to the Pakistan border, a distance of 10 kilometers. It took more than 12 hours and the number of checks I had in the first class apartment would have been unthinkable at Berlin's Checkpoint Charlie at the height of the Cold War. The same applies when it comes to a bus which has recently connected Amritsar with Lahore. What it conveys is that both countries lack commitment and do not mean to genuinely encourage people to people contact. When it comes to doing anything concrete in this field, the agencies take over, blessed by biased bureaucrats and clueless politicians. In fact what has been achieved, despite these hurdles, is heartening.

Visas are difficult to obtain. Indians, even living in faraway Kerala, have to travel to Delhi to get a visa for Pakistan. The Pakistanis, wherever they reside, face a similar situation and have to go all the way to Islamabad where the Indian High Commission is located. Despite these hazards, people who make it to each other's countries find love and affection. The common man in the two countries is bewildered. He misses his neighbors, his friends and the spirit of accommodation. The first time, a few years after Partition when the two countries softened their border for a day or so, hundreds from one side flocked to the other. They wept and embraced each other like the long separated friends. They would not charge money for the goods bought and even daily wage earners like drivers of scooter refused to charge fare. None bothered about religion. They only knew that people from across the border had come—with whom they had lived for centuries in harmony. They wanted to convey in their own way that what happened during Partition was an aberration.

I was one of those who visited Lahore at that time. I was convinced in my belief that the people on both sides must be enabled to meet each other at their will. My greater wish was to harness the youth—their children and grandchildren. They too should also feel the same kinship, the spirit of brotherhood and be proud of ancient traditions. The language of the Punjabis is the same and our folklore relates to the same Chenab river. They sing the same Heer and enact the same Sassi-Punu episode [love legends of Punjab]. Wars deterred me and the hostility between the two countries did not give me any space. I wanted frequent contact between the people in the two countries. The information about each other was biased. Were they to see things themselves, prejudice would go. I remember, when in Lahore some years ago, Benazir Bhutto sent Khurshid Kasuri, a former Pakistan's Foreign Minister, to bring me to the place where she was sitting with opposition parties and discussing the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). She made me sit beside her and told me, we the governments will never reach anywhere. You people should continue your effort because they will bring some day

people together. A few days later, I met Nawaz Sharif, then the Chief Minister of Punjab. He repeated more or less the same thoughts and expressed the hope that the people to people initiative would succeed soon since the enmity was costing the two countries billions of rupees. That was the time when I decided to light candles at the Wagah border on the night of August 14-15 because it was the midnight when both the countries got their independence. I collected eight to ten people from Delhi and three to four from Amritsar and went right up to the gates of the border to light candles. That was some 15 years ago. Now this ceremony is regular. The government of India gives us permission to go right up to the border since the area is under curfew at that time. We light candles at 12 o'clock for India and at 12.30 for Pakistan, since they are divided by a half hour time zone.

There is now a large number of people participating in the ceremony, which we now hold about a kilometer away from the border because of lack of space. What was a limited effort is today the people's movement. For the last five years we have been inviting MNAs and their families from Pakistan and a band of singers. The function begins at eight in the evening with the best of Punjabi singers showing their skills. In fact it is considered a matter of pride to be invited to sing from that stage. We punctuate the function with a resolution from the stage, reiterating the resolve that people in India and Pakistan want unity between the two countries and the efforts to keep them apart will never succeed. Only the slogan of India-Pakistan "dosti zindabad" (long live friendship) resounds the place. A few of us get up from the venue at 15 minutes to midnight and go right up to the gates of the border to light candles. Half an hour later we repeat the process. Behind this ceremony are roughly 40 organizations of writers, academicians and singers from India participating. I wish Pakistan could have allowed some of our friends across the border to hold a similar kind of function. They tried some years ago, but the government on the one hand and the Jamaat-e-Islami on the other frowned even at the suggestion.

Such efforts can only be gestures, a sort of urging to the governments concerned, because those in Delhi and Islamabad have to appreciate the will of people on both sides to meet and fraternize. In fact I see that over the years some of the efforts have borne fruit. There is less tension in the two countries. Both are seriously trying to grapple with problems, but one warning: do not underrate the power of people. They are determined to have good relations. You can stall them, but you cannot defeat their determination to live as friendly neighbors and see that the border one day is only a line which can be crossed at any time, anywhere. It would be like going from part of the same house to another, visas would be a thing of the past. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spelled out that eventuality in the hope that "while retaining our respective identities, one can have breakfast in Amritsar, lunch in Lahore and dinner in Kabul." This has been my dream since I left Sialkot some 60 years ago and I still cling to that hope in the sea of mistrust, bias and prejudice.

European Unity and Franco-German Reconciliation

Gérard Bossuat

The following has been written by a historian trained and shaped by his French, even Parisian, academic background. These are some of his ideas regarding the beginnings of the European integration process and the Franco-German reconciliation that formed an intrinsic part of the process. This paper is based on the work of French and European historians.

The cataclysms of the first half of the 20th century have been so overwhelming that we risk missing the seed-idea that was planted in 1948—that germinal concept which would grow to form an entirely new Europe. It would be worthwhile to pause and investigate more closely this novel and compelling force which forged our present European unity in this Iron century. Though it has not lived up to all its promises, at least two remarkable facts stand out: a long-standing peace has prevailed over a unified Europe and great prosperity has followed in its wake. At the same time, as the European Union has begun expanding towards Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, it is becoming increasingly clear that this unity, though compelling, is fragile because the original motives have been partially lost. Still, the ideas planted by Monnet and Schuman on May 9, 1950 have been largely successful in bringing about a Europe-wide harmony while respecting national identities. Franco-German cooperation has played a major role in this process and continues to be its backbone, even though the sparkle of the first few days has dimmed somewhat.

The integration, a reaction against history

To the post-Liberation generation, the Franco-German wars seemed absurd. The momentous turnaround of May 9, 1950 had been

Gérard Bossuat holds the Jean Monnet chair at the University of Cergy-Pontoise (North of Paris).

prepared by several individual, personal “conversions” among the governmental elite. It took some time before the public opinion came round to accepting the new paradigm. As far as France was concerned, European unity took roots not as a result of any deep, heartfelt desire—though in the end it was finally accepted—but as a necessity based on reason and good-sense. In fact, it was the defeated enemy, the Germans and the Italians, who wanted this unity to start with. It was the Benelux countries which supported it first, followed without much ado by Great Britain. In 1946, although Churchill, a long-standing champion of European unity, had no longer any say in his country’s government, he encouraged all pro-European movements to push ahead.

The Nazi war crimes, the atrocities and the Holocaust, had evoked a sense of revulsion which could have easily led towards a federalism had it not crashed against another current which wanted the restoration of the national democratic state—and not necessarily European unity.¹ Unity was encouraged by European business and financial circles who dreamt of a grand pan-European market while others were wooed by the thought of a single regulatory authority overseeing the continent’s economy.² Ultimately, while the unity was a political, contingent act, it represented fundamental human aspirations and took sustenance from great currents of thought: Christian-democracy, socialism, liberalism. It succeeded because it was based on the universality of European cultures, on political liberty and respect for the individual, on the improvement of the quality of life.³ After its liberation in 1945, Europe was once again proving that it had not lost its values, as Paul Valéry had feared as early as 1919.⁴ This unity was also a guarantee against the return of totalitarianism as well as an assurance of improved and higher standards of living.

Still, the success of this unity was in no way guaranteed by the circumstances prevailing in post-War Europe. The conditions of the unity and the originality of the institutions created are as much a cause of this success as the widespread feeling that nationalism had outlived its purpose and was an obsolete concept. Ernest Renan, a late 19th century philosopher had said that, “nations are not eternal. They have had a beginning, they will have an end. The European Confederation will most likely replace them.”⁵ Does the concept of a pan-European federal state require the sacrifice of nationhood? “The possibility that nations cease to exist anymore as political entities is inscribed in the European project—but, without the state, what would

¹ Alan S. Milward, *The reconstruction of Western Europe*, London, Methuen, 1984.

² CHEFF, *Milieux économiques et intégration européenne au XX^e siècle*, international conference organized by E. Bussière, S. Schirman, M. Dumoulin, Paris, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France, 2002.

³ Denis de Rougemont, *28 siècles d’Europe*, Paris, Christian de Bartillat, 1990.

⁴ Paul Valéry, “La crise de l’esprit,” Première lettre, *NRF*, 1919, reprinted in: *Variétés*, Paris, Gallimard, 1957.

⁵ Ernest Renan, *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation ?*, Paris, 1882.

France, or any other nation for that matter, be?” wrote Paul Thibaud, a French intellectual, who went on to add, “perhaps the new greatness of these nations of the Old Continent is to realize that they are mortal.”⁶ Was 1950 the beginning of the end of nations?

The five explanatory factors behind the European integration

There were other factors as well which helped create and mould the union: first among them was the prevailing Cold War and, as counterpoint, the incursion of the United States with its Marshall Plan. Next was the shared willingness of the West European countries to come closer to each other, bind stronger relationships and ensure mutual security. Finally, it was the work of individuals, at decisive moments and strategic points that contributed to the success of the integration.

The Cold War

One cannot talk of European unity without referring to the Cold War. In fact, this unity, in all its forms, reinforced the Western bloc and by consequence, posed a threat to the USSR which, not surprisingly, refused to recognize the European Community till as late as 1988. When the European Council was created in May 1949, the Consultative Assembly of Strasbourg symbolically kept some seats empty for the absent delegates of the Eastern countries. The European Unity, restricted as it was to Western Europe, was very much wanted by the United States, which knew that a united Europe would afford far greater resistance to the growing threat of communism. In fact, half a Europe, even united, was weak and would not be able to dispute the American leadership. It was the Europeans themselves (Bidault, Bevin, de Gasperi) who had asked the United States for a permanent military presence in Europe, thus facilitating the acceptance of the Atlantic Alliance by the United States Congress.

Europe on its way towards unification leaned heavily towards the Atlantic—it had no international ambitions of its own, especially as the big European powers were busy extricating themselves from the freedom struggles in their colonial empires. How could a France, over its head in wars in Indochina and Algeria, hope to lead a unified Europe towards autonomy and away from American domination? As for Great Britain, it rejected the conductor’s baton in 1949 and firmly linked its lot to that of the United States.

⁶ “La nécessaire construction d’une légitimité démocratique,” *Le Monde diplomatique*, May 1996.

The Cold War had yet another consequence—it changed France’s political perspectives vis-à-vis Germany. While earlier, fear and revenge dominated, the chilly winds of the Cold War led a still wary France to accept its erstwhile enemy (at least half of it) into the Marshall Plan and the resulting Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Going further, France had also to accept the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, in May 1949) and give up its ideas of dividing the allied share of Germany into little independent states and of putting the Ruhr at the disposal of those countries which had suffered most at the hands of the Nazis.

The Cold War was a precipitating factor in European unity, but it did nothing for its autonomy. Though a united Europe was born, the force of circumstances compelled it to take shelter under Uncle Sam’s protective umbrella.

Economic and social modernization

A second, major drive for European unification was the widespread aspiration of many Europeans for modernizing the economy and the social structure. In fact, even as early as the end of the First World War, corporate bigwigs and policy shapers were decrying the erection of new barriers in central Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had shattered into several bits, each jealous of its independence. The Balkanization of Europe induced grave economic tensions. The sundering of Silesia into two and the isolating of Vienna from the rest of the erstwhile Austro-Hungarian Empire led to some resounding bankruptcies—all of which had to be somehow or the other set right by Monnet, then deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations.⁷ The absence of a common European market or of any sub-regional common market in Europe led to the growth of an economic nationalism which the Nazis exploited to the full.

European business leaders were fascinated by (and a little scared of) the American industrial juggernaut and the growth of its mass consumption market. By the time peace returned to war-torn Europe, it seemed that the era of the big economic consortiums was nigh.⁸ Convinced of this, several liberal economists such as Paul Van Zeeland began clamoring for a great European economic market—though we still do not know whether it would be in the form of a cartelized organization or the liberation of market forces within a grand customs union or within sub-regional units. What we do know is that right from the day that the Atlantic Charter was signed on August 14, 1941, the United States had insisted upon the opening up of

⁷ See articles written by Antoine Fleury, Lubor Jilek and Eric Bussière in: Gérard Bossuat and Andreas Wilkens (eds.), *Jean Monnet, l’Europe et les chemins de la paix*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999.

⁸ Eric Bussière and Michel Dumoulin (eds.), *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne en Europe occidentale au XX^e siècle*, Arras, Artois Presses Université, 1998.

European markets—a move which was resisted for a while by some chary politicians and timid businessmen.⁹ Full currency convertibility was attained only in 1958.

European integration could not afford to overlook the “open” option: a common market could only be “open” inside and would have to work hard to justify the discriminations it would have to make regarding the outside, including the United States. The United States though, was all for a united Europe because it still meant a step towards a general liberation of trade restrictions. Moreover, is it not surprising that economic projects such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and especially, the Common Market were so much more easily accepted than the political ventures like the Council of Europe and the European Defence Community (EDC)? All efforts towards a European economic integration were well received by the United States which in fact turned it into a condition of the Marshall aid programme. A child of this Marshall Plan, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation facilitated inter-European trade, without the idea of any proper integration. The desire to modernize the economy was a powerful force for the economic unification of Western Europe.¹⁰

National security

Yet another reason for having some kind of European integration was the sorry state of practically every country in blighted, post-War Europe. Governments found it well-nigh impossible to rely purely on their national resources for the needed reconstruction and modernization, to meet minimum social demands or even to guarantee national security. Only an integration, or at least a cooperation, could give them the required strength and support. The French government accepted the Marshall Plan (in 1948) and its prerequisite for European unity because it felt that the advantages of getting the aid outweighed the inconveniences of the constraint. De Gaulle had felt the same way in 1958 when he accepted the conditions which formed part of the treaties of Rome. But when, in 1965, the French economy revamped during the Fourth republic and snugly cushioned by the Common Market, the franc beginning to flex its new-found strength (thanks to Pinay and Rueff) and the state reinvigorated after the new Constitution, de Gaulle could afford to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in order to prevent, or so he claimed,

⁹ Article 4 says: “they [the USA and the UK] will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”

¹⁰ Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944-1954*, Paris, CHEFF, Imprimerie nationale, 1992, 2 vol, 1 010 p., index, thesaurus, reprint 1997.

the Commission from flouting the statutes of the Treaty.¹¹ When Great Britain finally gained admission into the Community after having been twice repulsed (in 1963 and 1967), it did so mainly to defend the interests of its businesses which found themselves drawn inexorably by the common market of the “Inner Six.” It joined the Community in order to ensure its own prosperity and, if required, to modify its workings and directives (the crisis of the British cheque). Smaller countries such as Luxembourg were happy to root for European unity because it guaranteed their identity, shielded them from the grabbing hands of their bigger neighbors and often gave them more importance than the size of their populations justified. Luxembourg also proved itself adept as intermediary between the big nations. Belgium, itself a multi-community conglomerate, strengthened its national unity within the folds of the European Union. The countries of the South (Greece, Portugal and Spain), of the North (Finland) and East (Austria) came to join the Union in order to maintain their economic security and preserve democracy.

As the 20th century wound to a close, it had become evident that, on their own, the “big” European nations were no longer the determining world powers they had been for so long. Only a joining of forces could give back to Europe some of that influence and power in the affairs of the world (as was attempted by Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou and Margaret Thatcher). Whatever the reason or path taken by each of the member states, they emerged from the union richer, stronger and more secure... at least for the short term.

The work of individuals

There still remained one other indispensable condition for unity: the will and determination of individuals—unless of course, one subscribes to the belief that history is simply the unfolding of inevitable, uncontrollable necessity.

First, let us take note of the fact that there existed in Europe a complex and rich admixture of intellectuals, of “Europeans” in every sense of the word, which included ideologists like Alexandre Marc and Hendryk Brugmans, high ranking government officials like Robert Marjolin, academics such as Michel Gaudet and Walter Hallstein, political leaders like Spinelli, Schuman, Adenauer, Spaak and Brandt... And they were not alone... The unification was also supported by industry leaders and other influential voices (Monnet)¹² besides different political sensibilities like the Christian-Democrats, the Socialists, the Centre-Right and the liberals.

¹¹ Gérard Bossuat, “Robert Marjolin dans la tourmente de la chaise vide,” colloque Marjolin, Paris, Institut de France, December 10, 2003.

¹² Gérard Bossuat and Georges Saunier (eds.), *Inventer l'Europe, Histoire nouvelle des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne*, Brussels, PIE, Peter Lang, 2003.

No doubt there were those who fiercely opposed the move (for example Michel Debré in France), but once the process had begun, this “milieu” grew to include more and more high-level functionaries of the new European institutions. The founders found themselves supported by (if they were not already the leaders of) entire networks of these “Europeans” and “Atlanticists” who worked tirelessly to influence the political powers-that-be. The two principle political persuasions in Europe, the socialists and social democrats and the Christian democrats nurtured several of these influential “Europeans,” including some of their top leaders: Guy Mollet in France, Sicco Mansholt in the Netherlands, Paul-Henri Spaak in Belgium, Konrad Adenauer in Germany. Monnet used a network of American businessmen, and later, another trans-Atlantic network of politicians, trade unionists and bankers whom he systematically organized into the Action Committee of the United States of Europe in October 1955, to weigh and consider, day by day, the unfolding of the common policies of the Commission and the various governments.¹³

Both the heroes and the anti-heroes of the unification rose from the same fertile patch. Among them one name stands out in particular: it would not be unjustified to call Jean Monnet the father of a united Europe because it was he, more than anyone else, who was responsible for laying the foundation of an integrated Europe: the (dare I say, misnamed?) Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950. No doubt there were others too, men such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi, and, during the period of the Treaty of Rome, Paul-Henri Spaak, Johan Willem Beyen, Walter Hallstein and Hans von der Groeben. Guy Mollet and Konrad Adenauer worked jointly for the Treaty of Rome. Political leaders proved indispensable for the eventual success of the Union, as is evident from the history of the various new institutions. On the other hand, they were also behind the quiet failure of the Council of Europe and the more resounding breakdowns of the European Defence Community and of the qualified majority voting of January 1966.

It is the work and will of these individuals which kept the impetus going and helped the institutions of European integration to grow even in their darkest and weakest periods. There were a number of men, working tirelessly in the shadow of the President of the Commission, whose dedication and sacrifice ensured the success of the institution. No doubt the Commission had great presidents like Walter Hallstein (1958-67) and Jacques Delors (1985-95), but one can never overlook the vital contributions of Emile Noël, executive secretary to the Commission of the European Economic Community (1958-68) and later, when the three Communities (Euratom, Coal and Steel and Common Market) were merged into one, he became their Secretary General (1968-87). It was the same with Jacques-Camille

¹³ François Duchêne, *Jean Monnet, the first international Statesman of Interdependence*, London/New York, Norton Company, 1994.

Paris, the first secretary general of the Council of Europe (1949-53). The work and reputation of European commissioners of the caliber of Robert Marjolin, Sicco Mansholt, Raymond Barre, Jean-François Deniau, Altiero Spinelli, Claude Cheysson, etc., gave a face and a body to the faceless anonymity of the bureaucracy.

The work of individuals, even those of the founders and continuators, cannot explain the integration on its own. At the same time, it is also true that without Monnet and Schuman, and the able support of Adenauer in May 1950, there would not have been a “High Authority” of the European Coal and Steel Community. The work of these individuals seems all the more important because, in contrast, public opinion was very muted. The European integration was not a result of a popular movement as had been the revolutions of 1789 and 1848.

The Schuman Plan of May 9, 1950, an accident and a symbol

On July 7, 1945, France proposed the economic and financial disarmament of Germany: steel production limited to 7 million tons and a reduction in the defeated aggressor’s capacity for scientific and technological innovation. In October 1945, de Gaulle declared that the Ruhr was France’s means towards industrial glory.¹⁴ Mendès France also said the same thing. The aim would be to “liberate, as far as possible, French industry from the competition imposed by its German counterpart and to take full advantage of its dismantling to significantly add to France’s own industrial might” (January 1946).¹⁵ In such a context, the creation of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, based on an idea by Monnet and ratified by Schuman, was nothing short of a miracle.

The Marshall Plan and the London accords of June 1, 1948, put paid to France’s hopes of a dismembered and ravished Germany. The idea of a united Europe, a sort of cure-all to save the situation, resurfaced. As early as 1945, Monnet had proposed that the coal industry in the Ruhr be centralized in the hands of a strongman.¹⁶ In 1946, he talked of handing over the economy of the new Rheno-Westphalian State to “an international organization which would be

¹⁴ *Revue de la zone française*, No. 1, Novembre 15, 1945. Quoted by Bénédicte Grange, *Emile Laffon et la ZOF en Allemagne, 1945-1947*, M.Phil Dissertation, Paris-I, 1993, René Girault and Gérard Bossuat, p. 47.

¹⁵ Archives of the French Ministry of Economy and Finance, B 43 711, CGAAA, the General Commissioner, to M. Schweitzer, Note of the CCFA, GFCC, Economic and Financial Delegation, ‘Evaluation of the German Industry’, Berlin-Frohnau, January 7, 1946.

¹⁶ Archives of Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, (AFJME) AMF 4/3/6, summary of a conversation between M. Monnet et M. Clayton, September 24, 1945.

created in the lines the American ‘authorities’ [...] or of a mixed enterprise corporation.”¹⁷ In August 1947, he talked of turning the Ruhr into a “European asset.”¹⁸ French industrialists recalled their talks with their German counterparts in Remagen in 1945: “We have need for the German industrial resources.” The French Foreign Ministry also wanted to see a “constructive European collaboration.” “France would gain an enormous moral victory which, at a single stroke, could raise it to political leadership of the continent.”¹⁹ Romain Gary, a promising young 34-year old trainee at the Ministry and a hero of the Free French, recognized the necessity of giving up some elements of sovereignty in favor of the establishment of a democratic organization in Europe.²⁰ But the public still despised Germany and wanted it to be cut down to size for good.

In fact, Monnet was waiting for the opportune time to introduce his idea of the “High Authority.”²¹ He was not alone in dreaming of a Europe-wide federation of heavy industries—Churchill himself had proposed, at the Hague Congress of May 1948, an integration and nationalization “of the heavy industries of the Ruhr, Belgium, Luxembourg and Lorraine, under international control.” He also put forward the joint development of hydro-electricity in the Alps and a close cooperation in rail and road transport.²² Lord Layton, a British Liberal and very pro-Europe, accepted the idea of joint production, especially of coal and steel, and asked for a “steel plan for Europe.”

By 1950, the French government’s constant anti-Germany recriminations had exhausted the patience of its allies. The free world had need of a strong Federal Republic of Germany, involved in defending the West—while all France wanted was German coal. The need for equal access to German coal, for all consumers, be they European or German, and the control of investments in the iron and steel industry required that a European institution be established which would look to everyone’s interests impartially. Monnet’s idea of the High Authority suited the Americans who had beseeched Robert Schuman, then French Foreign Minister, to find some way of including Germany in the defense of the West. His response was the Schuman Declaration of May 9 which opened a way for a “political” cooperation with Germany. The federal nature of the High Authority also pleased those who still hoped for a “United States of Europe.”

¹⁷ Archives of Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, (AFJME) AMF 4/3/46, Basis for Franco-American negotiations, February 15, 1946.

¹⁸ Archives of Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, (AFJME) AMF 14/1/10, August 18, 1947, JM, “Turning the German industry around.”

¹⁹ Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, YI, 1944-49, 372, RF, April 1, 1948, Roger Fabre, “Note on the economic aspects of the German question.”

²⁰ Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe 1944-60, Allemagne, 83, MAE, DE, November 30, 1948, “Prospects of a French policy towards Germany.”

²¹ Pierre Gerbet, *La Naissance du marché commun*, Bruxelles, Complexe, 1987.

²² French National Archives, private collection of Paul Reynaud, 74 AP 4, “L’Occident de l’Europe,” *Œdipe Revue hebdomadaire de l’opinion internationale*, No. 19, May 7, 1948, p. 2.

There is no doubt that the concept of federalism and the notion of unity played their role in the success of the declaration. But it was above all the result of Monnet's skill as a negotiator, the disinterest showed by Georges Bidault, the atlantist head of government, and the stance adopted by Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the FRG, who was quick to appreciate France's generous offer: peace on equal terms.

How did the Schuman Plan address the issues of the day? The text of the declaration dealt with the age-old quarrel between France and Germany and the prevailing condition of international relations. On that historic day of May 9, 1950, Schuman extended the olive branch to Germany and hoped by that to build a new, prosperous Europe for the benefit of all Europeans "without distinction, be they from the East or the West, and all lands, especially Africa [...]." The Schuman Plan opened a whole new chapter in the history of Europe. There is no doubt that his Organization for European Economic Co-operation saved the Marshall Plan by meeting one of the principle conditions set forth by the Americans for their assistance: the creation of a European union. To the Franco-German conflict, it brought an armistice with the promise of lasting peace. French officials acknowledged that Germany was indispensable for Europe and even for France. Hardly five years after the end of the Second World War, Germany was treated as an equal—but that did not prevent the others from keeping a close eye on it through the High Authority which was, in principle, free from German industrial pressure. No doubt that peace between the two countries was a prime political objective for the French and Germans, but also for the rest of Europe and obviously for the United States. The Schuman Plan was adopted not so much for its concept of the High Authority as for initiating a dialogue between the protagonists. As such, the FRG got back some of its international credibility which had been so thoroughly shattered by Hitler.

Despite the resistance of iron and steel entrepreneurs, the plan was very realistic in macro-economical terms. France imported German coke on equal terms with Germany under the supervision of the High Authority. The new French iron and steel plants (Usinor and Sollac) could now function at full capacity. Moreover, the French government and its industrialists were also happy to see that their desire for the dismantling of Germany's iron and steel cartels and trusts, which they had expressed in vain since 1945, was at last imposed upon the FRG by John MacCloy, the American High Commissioner in Germany and Monnet's personal friend. The French also saw the end of the double pricing of German coal (one domestic and the other, export). The negotiations conditioned the creation of a European Iron and Steel Community on the implementation of Laws 75 and 27 on the breaking-up of the German iron and steel cartels. The six largest German iron and steel companies were divided into 24 independent units. The United States also insisted, between September 1950 and March 1951, on the separation of steel and

coal. The largest German company now produced no more than 2.2 million tons of steel and the 12 largest iron and steel plants were authorized to control only 75 percent of their coal requirements. The German iron and steel industry now controlled only 15 percent of German coal as against the 56 percent it commanded before the War. The centralized German coal vending authority, the Deutsches Kohlen Verkauf, was dissolved in February 1951. The Schuman Plan contributed to the control of the German economy through other means. Can we now say that the Schuman Plan was history turning over a new leaf? Was it the turning point for the return of faith and confidence? Maybe. But it also forced France to accept a Germany remaining a powerful actor and therefore still very much a potential threat. The Schuman Plan was to some extent reassuring as it reigned in Germany with the power of the High Authority, but it did not normalize Franco-German relations because it tried to raise them both into that blithe realm of supra-nationality. Still, it did set the stage for some Franco-German cooperation. Italy too found that it had a voice in this rising symphony of the post-War democratic nations of Europe. It had come through honorably after its fascist adventure and debacle. The Benelux countries evidently benefited by the Franco-German accord.

France and Germany at the birth of the subsequent European Communities

Basically, there were two other attempts: the European Defence Community (EDC) which fell through in August 1954 and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) created by the treaties of Rome on March 25, 1957.

The fear of a new Wehrmacht

The creation of a “High Authority” in the more sensitive area of defense finally fell through on August 30, 1954 at the hands of the French delegates. Despite the success of the European Iron and Steel Community, it became quickly evident that it was a completely different story when it came to other domains. The failure clearly illustrates the difficulties in “forging a unity.” For the historian, the crux of the matter lies in the time factor. How could one even imagine so drastically weakening the State by depriving it control over its own defense?

In contrast to the ECSC, negotiations for the EDC had been carried out quasi-publicly and at length. The media had seized upon the shocking idea of having one of the most fundamental and sovereign rights of the nation be questioned. There was also the need of having a political authority to whom the Commissioner of the EDC

would be answerable. A plan for a European Federal Constitution was studied in 1952-53 under the direction of Henrich Von Brentano, who had been commissioned by the six member states of the ECSC.²³

The French public got into the act, and though it did not arrive at any clear decision, there is evidence to show that despite the Schuman Plan, the French were still extremely chary of the Germans. There was not enough time for people to get used to the concept of a European federal government—even in a restricted area—and especially to the idea of German rearmament, even within the framework of the EDC. For the French Christian Democrats, a German rearmament could only take place within the framework of a European federal State. According to the French socialists, Germany should never be re-armed within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because they thought that if it came to the crunch, West German divisions could refuse to fight against their East German brethren. Daniel Mayer, a French socialist leader, accused Adenauer of allowing former Nazis and SS officers to regain their influence and of gagging Socialist Christians such as Karl Arnold and Werner Hilpert. He was also very clear about his profound doubts and misgivings regarding the end of German militarism. Fifty more votes would have been needed in the National Assembly for the EDC to become reality. The failure of August 30 showed that European unity was not yet a given cultural reality and that the Franco-German reconciliation was still very fragile.

Franco-German partnership at the heart of the negotiation

On the French side, the European negotiations of 1956-57 were conducted by a small team led by Guy Mollet, the socialist President of the Council, his deputy chief of cabinet, Émile Noël, Alexandre Verret, chargé de mission to the President of the Council, Christian Pineau, the Foreign Minister, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs concerning European issues, Maurice Faure. The French delegation to Brussels was led by Robert Marjolin. It included high government officials such as Jacques Donnedieu de Vabres, Jean-François Deniau and Georges Vedel. On the German side, Adenauer had with him Von Brentano, Walter Hallstein and Von Groeben.

But there was one outstanding issue which needed to be resolved before the Franco-German negotiations could really take off: it was the tug-of-war for Sarre. Though a referendum had already “settled” the matter on October 23, 1955 by going in favor of ceding Sarre to the FRG, the two Foreign Ministers, Von Brentano and Pineau went at it again with tooth and nail on February 20 and 21,

²³ Richard T. Griffiths, *Europe's First Constitution. The European Political Community 1952-1954*, London, The Federal Trust, 2000.

1956 without coming to any agreement. In the words of a delegate, a “terrible dispute” raged between the two ministers. While the Germans were ready to recognize French economic interests in the Sarre, the French wanted the recognition of rights.²⁴ The French demanded Sarre coal for its iron and steel plants in Lorraine. The negotiations dragged on.... Guy Mollet and Konrad Adenauer met on June 5, 1956 and the German Chancellor finally conceded to the French demand. A treaty was signed at Luxembourg on October 27, 1956: the Sarre would politically revert to the FRG on January 1, 1957 but France would continue to enjoy its economic benefits for three years more. The canalization of the Moselle, which would greatly facilitate the supply of coal to the steel plants of Lorraine, would be co-financed by Germany. Thus, the way was at last cleared for the bigger treaties of the economic and atomic Communities. This affair, wrote M. Couve de Murville, the French ambassador to Germany, “opened up interesting perspectives in terms of both a Franco-German cooperation, and also for Europe as a whole.”²⁵

The French government set forth its doctrine within an interdepartmental committee, the “Verret Committee,” which met for the first time on September 4, 1956. Should the common market be placed on hold by pleading French military engagements in Algeria? Paul Ramadier was all for deferring the common market sine die, but Christian Pineau thought otherwise: “If we do not act now, we shall be led ineluctably towards autarchy and degeneracy. Without a unified Europe, our difficulties will become insurmountable. Instead of adapting our policies to suit our economic strategy, we should bring our economic policy in line with our European aspirations.”²⁶ Guy Mollet decided in favor of Europe: “We must convince ourselves that the common market is good in itself, and also for France.”

These positive attitudes and encouraging words, which (September 4) preceded the Suez crisis, did not prevent Guy Mollet and his entourage from bargaining hard to preserve French interests as it was thought that the common market could pose a danger to French employees. Their concerns were not borne lightly by the other five partners. Germany, especially, refused to entertain France if it thought to stop the integration between the first and the second stages of implementing the clauses of the treaty. On the other hand, Pineau, a former union leader, wanted to be sure that France’s partners would accept social harmonization. The five others conceded that France had major problems regarding its balance of

²⁴ *Documents diplomatiques français* (DDF), 1956, 1, No. 117, report on Franco-German conversations held in Paris (February 20-21, 1956).

²⁵ *DDF* 1956, 3, No. 59, M. Couve de Murville, Ambassador of France to the FRG to M. Pineau, MAE, Bonn, October 30, 1956.

²⁶ French National Archives, F60 SGCI, file 24, dossier 122/21, Commission interministérielle, Hôtel Matignon, September 4, 1956; see also: Eric Kocher, *Le rôle de la France dans la négociation des traités de Rome (un aspect de la relance, 1954-1957)*, M.Phil Dissertation, Paris-I, 1989, p. 115.

payments and were amenable to it maintaining, for the time being and under the supervision of the six, its import tariffs and export incentives (October 20 and 21, 1956). A unanimous decision by the Council was required to pass from the first to the second stage. But disagreements arose regarding equal pay-scales for men and women. Germany refused to recognize the International Labour Organization (ILO) in this regard.²⁷ Moreover, it also refused to ratify the 40-hour week. Pineau wanted that overtime work be paid 25 percent more than normal hours, which would increase labor cost by 1 percent per year for the 48-hour week. The meeting ended badly. The French flatly refused to entertain any compromise regarding the schedule of going from stage 1 to stage 2. It seems that Ludwig Erhard was elated on his return to Bonn. Actually, the French government had raised the stakes for reasons of internal politics.

While the situation was thus delicately poised, the Suez crisis burst upon the scene. It helped to bring France and Germany closer, at least it was so for Mollet and Adenauer. In a bid to save the Sarre Treaty, Adenauer went to Paris on November 6, 1956—a day which also happened to be crucial in the Suez affair. Marjolin and Carstens worked on a compromise for social consistency which was accepted without more ado by both the heads of government: a leveling at a high level would come about by the very process of implementing the common market and the procedures of adoption set forth by the treaty. One could talk of the French concessions because the passage to the second stage was not conditioned by the harmonization of social taxes which would result from a common policy decided at the end of the first stage. In case of failure, the Commission would authorize safeguards for the threatened branches. In return, Germany accepted the measures taken by France to protect its balance of payments with the proviso that these measures would gradually be allowed to lapse after a qualified majority vote.²⁸ These conditions were accepted by the other four partners on November 16.

The political failure of both France and Great Britain in Suez in November 1956 shook the public. The shock made many of the wavering cautious throw in their lot in favor of the common market. C. Pineau thought that “It was public opinion which rallied to the cause of the common market as a means of freeing France from the domination of the United States”²⁹ and not so much any direct action by the government. The government made full use of the Suez debacle to garner support from the people. The drying up of oil

²⁷ Hanns-Jürgen Kusters, *Fondements de la Communauté Economique Européenne*. Bruxelles, Labor/Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, 1990, p. 202.

²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 213.

²⁹ Enrico Serra (ed.), *Il rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma. La relance européenne et les traités de Rome, The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, p. 525.

supplies from the Middle East reinforced Monnet's stand on setting up a nuclear energy community.

As the Americans kept distance from their Western allies enmeshed in the Suez conflict, Guy Mollet had read out to Adenauer, on November 6, Bulganin's famous letter threatening both France and the United Nations. Adenauer expressed his grave doubts regarding the safety of Europe in the context of the American-Soviet *pax atomica*.³⁰ He also went on to add his distrust of the US policy: "This is the time that the European countries must unite. It is not a question of any 'supra-nationality'. We must unite against the United States and after the [US] elections, ask the Americans what they want. Naturally, England must be one of these European countries."³¹ "And now let us build Europe!" exhorted Pineau.³² The resulting Franco-German collaboration was a reaction to the US-USSR condominium in international affairs. The European project could become a means towards formulating a common European foreign policy, out from under the heavy shadow of the United States—as de Gaulle put it so well some three years later: a European Europe.

The Franco-German cooperation owed much to the concept of a European defense. Adenauer even accepted that France continue to pursue its military nuclear program, despite Euratom. It had many repercussions in the field of civilian nuclear power generation and the development of new weapons. On January 17, 1957, Franz Josef Strauss and Bourges Maunoury met at Colomb-Béchar to sign a protocol on new weapons. General Lavaud proposed developing an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and there was little doubt that it would not carry only conventional warheads.³³ The delivery system could be developed in France but co-financed. On November 20, 1957, Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Franz Josef Strauss announced their willingness to cooperate on the development and manufacture of delivery systems and also to embark on a "joint effort in the domain of nuclear research within the framework of the Paris accords."³⁴ On November 25, 1957, a tripartite accord was signed between the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Italy.

³⁰ Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe 1955-60, Allemagne 26, report on the conversations between G. Mollet and K. Adenauer on November 6, 1956, in the presence of Pineau, Faure, Couve de Murville, von Brentano, von Maltzan, etc. See also, Georges-Henri Soutou, "Les accords de 1957 et 1958 : vers une communauté stratégique et nucléaire entre la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie ?" in *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps*, April-June 1993, No. 31, p. 1-12.

³¹ *DDF*, 1956, 3, No. 138, minutes of the meeting between President Guy Mollet and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, November 6, 1956, p. 235.

³² Christian Pineau and Christiane Rimbaud, *Le Grand Pari, l'aventure du traité de Rome*. Paris, Fayard, 1991, p. 223.

³³ Eckart Conze, "La coopération franco-germano-italienne dans le domaine nucléaire dans les années 1957-1958, un point de vue allemand," *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, No. 4, 1992, p. 121.

³⁴ *DDF* 1957, 2, No. 359, M. Pineau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the Ambassadors of France in Bonn and Rome, Bonn, November 20, 1957.

According to the historian Georges-Henri Soutou, this accord mentions nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

In 1949, a French senate committee wrote: “West Germany also gives the impression of a considerable power whose expansion will be in directions which will turn it into a danger for France.”³⁵ In 1959, Jean François-Poncet, a future French Foreign Minister, taught at Sciences-Po: “The future of the German economy is a subject which is so close to us and affects us so directly that it is impossible for us to study it with the same impartiality as we would the Canadian or the Brazilian economies for example.”³⁶ French distrust continues and will continue for long to remain the dominating factor in the French psyche vis-à-vis Germany. Despite that, the work of some far-seeing individuals (Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Mollet), the force of circumstances (Cold War) and the economic necessities drove the French and the Germans to cooperation and the treaties of Rome. This rapprochement at the summit and the democratic unfolding of the FRG helped the French revise their opinion of Germany and made them willing to partner their former enemy in the building of a new Europe.

³⁵ Commission d’Information sur l’Allemagne, Council of the Republic, April-May 1949.

³⁶ Jean François-Poncet, *Politique économique de l’Allemagne occidentale, 1956-60*, Vol. 1 et 2, Law course, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris.

Citizen Diplomacy and Civil Society Contacts

Asma-ul-Husna Faiz

In this paper we propose to examine the role of citizen diplomacy in conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Since January 2004, the Composite Dialogue process is underway between the two countries at the official level. Along with it, we have witnessed unprecedented popular interaction between citizens of India and Pakistan. We propose to study this phenomenon in the light of growing theoretical and empirical evidence provided by conflict resolution literature. We shall look at the progress of citizen dialogues and also examine the future direction of this phenomenon.

Theorizing citizen diplomacy: conceptual and comparative perspectives

In the aftermath of Second World War, the realm of conflict resolution underwent radical transformation with the evolution of new concepts and mechanisms. We shall briefly review some of the concepts and methods evolved by theorists and practitioners of peace building. We shall define important terms and methods to be followed by an examination of practice of peace building in two conflict-torn societies. Regarding the concept of peace, we observe new meanings and interpretations provided by the theorists of conflict resolution. The common meaning of peace is considered to be the absence of violence. However, this definition has come to be challenged by new approaches, which dismiss this negative approach of the terminology of peace. Opposed to it is the notion of “positive peace” which emphasizes the removal of all forms of injustice including structural and cultural violence.¹ This implies peace as more than mere

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¹ Milton Rinehart, “Understanding the Concept of Peace: Search for Common Ground”, *Peace and Change*, Vol. 20, No. 3, July 1995, p. 385-91.

absence of violence. It envisages creation of societies free of all forms of discrimination and oppression. This focus on the attainment of comprehensive peace and transformation of societies has led to the rise of new approaches towards management and settlement of various conflicts. It is in the background of these theoretical developments that we encounter the rise of new approaches to peace building such as citizen diplomacy. The traditional approaches to conflict resolution have come under great criticism owing to their failure to eliminate the deep-rooted acrimony and hostility between the rival groups. This has divided the conflict resolution literature into two major strands of research: the structuralist and psychosocial perspectives. The former approach highlights the neglect of rights, denial of justice and political issues in the emergence of a dispute and attempts to settle a conflict by providing structural remedies. In contrast, the psychosocial paradigm focuses on building reconciliation by seeking to remove the underlying hostility and prejudice between groups and parties.² In this paper, we will focus on the psychosocial approaches to peace building by examining the role of civil society and citizen dialogues.

The citizen peace initiatives endeavor to improve the general context of relations between the two rivals while the dispute settlement process continues at the official level. It is observed that the people-oriented peace initiatives have received scant academic attention in the conflict resolution literature. Therefore, as we observe ever increasing examples of popular dialogues for peace in inter and intra-state conflicts, this phenomenon deserves academic analysis and explanation. The major objective of citizen peace activities is to minimize the impact of stereotypical enemy images between the adversaries, which only strengthen with the ripening of dispute. Therefore, citizen diplomacy emerges as a necessary complement to official dialogues in pursuit of a durable comprehensive positive peace. One of the first and most well-known proponents of citizen peace activism is the former US ambassador John McDonald. McDonald and Diamond expanded their preliminary conceptualization of Track One-Track Two diplomacy to coin a systemic approach, i.e. multi-track diplomacy.³ They argue that the ability to make useful contribution to dynamics of peace-making lie beyond the boundaries of governmental officials and processes. In their assessment, private individuals belonging to various walks of life can facilitate understanding between adversaries by bridging the perceptual divide.⁴ Thus, their conceptualization of multi-track diplomacy includes nine separate but corresponding tracks of citizen peace

² Michelle I. Gawerc, "Peace-Building: Theoretical and Concrete Perspectives," *Peace and Change*, Vol. 31, No. 4, October 2006, p. 437-38.

³ The term Track Two diplomacy was first coined by Joseph Montville to describe the informal and unofficial negotiations between ex-government representatives in an effort to settle contentious issues.

⁴ John McDonald and Louis Diamond, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. Hartford, Connecticut, Kumarian Press, 1996, p. 1-25.

building. These include business, private individuals, educational institutions, faith-based organizations (FBOs) and media. The nine tracks explained by McDonald and others can be confusing and ambiguous in conceptual terms. They seem to be over-lapping. The authors do not provide sound theoretical justification for their classification of separate peace building tracks. It is argued that this approach needs conceptual refinement. We need to come up with better classification and mode of operation of these networks.

Looking at the involvement of civil society in peace-building at various stages of conflict resolution, Gawerc argues that this process plays a critical role in the success of peace making process at different stages of the conflict. She suggests that before the onset of militarized hostilities, civil society activism can help to provide an early warning of escalating tensions. Moreover, grass-roots organizations can work to answer grievances between communities before they explode into violent conflict. Thus, conflict prevention can take place with the mobilization and active involvement of civil society.⁵ Once militarized conflict ensues between groups, civil society can perform several functions such as relief work, keeping a check on war atrocities and preparing the ground for future dialogue by establishing links with grassroots peace organizations. Similarly, she argues that after the conclusion of peace negotiations, the civil society organizations can be engaged in reconstruction work, laying the foundations of a durable peace by eradicating roots of conflict and connecting with other citizen organizations across the former conflict lines to establish a network of communications.⁶ Thus Gawerc provides a detailed map of pre- and post conflict activities of civil society organizations at the local level.

The people-to-people dialogues are increasingly gaining significance in theory and practice of peace building. They are defined as activities of ordinary citizens across the divide, with an aim to develop linkage, communication and understanding. While difficult negotiations ensue between the leaders of the communities or states at the official level, the citizen dialogues can create a sense of shared existence and a vision of co-operative future between members of the conflicting groups. Located in various domains of social life, these dialogues carry a functional and informational significance. Apart from working to enhance co-operation in a particular field, Saunders believes that people-to-people contact leads to “getting to know the other side.”⁷ This informational aspect of citizen dialogues echoes in the activities of Track Two dialogues too with the difference being the nature of participants. Since the Track Two engages former or current government officials in their private capacity, the citizen diplomacy thrives on the networking and communication of ordinary citizens. But

⁵ Michelle I. Gawerc, op. cit. [2], p. 445.

⁶ Ibid., p. 445-46.

⁷ Saunders is quoted by Gawerc. See *ibid.*, p. 446.

the single most important utility of citizen dialogues lies in generating a constituency of peace and developing a sense of commonality and humanity across the conflict divide.⁸

Looking at the working of citizen peace negotiations, the theorists of peace-building identify two major issues of “re-entry” and “transfer.” It has been argued that the citizen peace activists who are socialized by engagement with the “other” during their mobilization, face opposing pulls of influence and information once they move out of the domain of dialogues and join the mainstream. This has been described as the dilemma and challenge of re-entry and it seems to impact both ordinary citizens and regime élites. In addition, the question of transfer is also considered to be critical to the potential effectiveness of citizen peace-building. It implies the transfer of knowledge, learning and policies from networks of ordinary citizens to official policy-making circles. Thus, often citizen peace negotiations generate novel solutions to conflicts but they fail to filter them through to governmental channels. So question of transfer becomes a key factor in understanding the impact of people-to-people dialogues. Thus, citizen diplomacy, being part of a large multilevel process, often suffers from a lack of vertical linkage, i.e. connectivity between various levels and actors necessary to bring about a shift in policy agenda. Beyond this, the theorists of conflict resolution highlight several obstacles to the effective working of citizen peace dialogues. These include opposition from government or ruling élites and rightwing hawkish elements, limited resources and infrastructure, and inability to penetrate into the hard-line elements of the society.⁹

Beyond the literature on peace building and conflict resolution, there has begun academic analysis of contribution of citizen diplomacy in the negotiation literature. It is argued that while negotiations and diplomacy are a comprehensive process taking place at various levels, there has been little appreciation of the role of citizen diplomacy by theorists of international negotiation. In general, the theorists of negotiations consider diplomacy to be a series of isolated strategic events with government officials being the key actors. This view in general prevails in both game-theoretic and psychosocial analyses of diplomacy. There are few exceptions to this trend in the mainstream negotiations literature such as Putnam’s “Two-Level Games” analysis and Fearon’s conceptualization of “domestic political audience costs.”¹⁰ Hemmer et al. (henceforth Hemmer) trace the origins of the term peace-building to former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who

⁸ Michelle I. Gawerc, op. cit. [2], p. 446-47.

⁹ Ibid., p. 448-50.

¹⁰ See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 427-60. Also see, James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3, September 1994, p. 577-92.

likened it to an activity intended to increase greater confidence and understanding between peoples of different groups.¹¹ In an innovation, these authors attempt to develop a linkage between democratization and peace-building. They focus on the dual processes of citizen diplomacy and civic democratization and interaction between the two. Thus the level and trend towards democratization within a society are taken as key variables in an assessment of workings of citizen diplomacy. Hemmer points towards peace-making efforts in war-torn societies such as Bosnia and Rwanda, where post-conflict transformation not only focuses on healing the wounds but also seeks to develop a domestic democratic political order. In this context, they emphasize the significance of contribution made by international donor organizations. Thus, Hemmer, attempts to provide a new direction to peace-building and conflict resolution research by linking it with the theories of democratization and civic culture.¹² While this is a good effort to connect peace building with democratization in both theoretical and empirical terms, certain questions also arise. For instance, what are the prospects of grassroots peace initiatives in societies which are less than democratic? Also, will the dynamics of citizen diplomacy be the same in democratic and non-democratic or mixed dyads? What mechanism will cover the vertical linkage between ruling élites and citizen organizations in non-democratic regimes? These are some of the questions which can be examined in future research.

Considering the involvement of grassroots citizen groups, concept of “bottom-up” peace-building has been discussed by theorists of conflict resolution. Lederach talks about the need to engage the bottom-level, grassroots groups using civic negotiation paradigm, in an effort to free them from the cycle of violence and develop self-sustaining networks of communication at the local level between antagonistic groups. In order to prevent the efforts of ordinary people from being wasted, he emphasizes the critical role of ‘middle level’ social and political leaders who act as a bridge between the élites and grassroots organizations. Thus, these middle-level individuals are part of local environment while having links with the ruling regimes.¹³ In this paper, we will use this concept of “bottom-up” peace-building to understand the dynamics of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan.

After discussing the theoretical foundations, we will now look at the practice of “bottom-up” peace-building in two different war-ravaged societies. Orjuela analyzes the performance and challenges faced by civil society in building peace in Sri Lanka. In an ethnically charged atmosphere, where state has come to represent the

¹¹ Bruce Hemmer et al., “Putting the ‘up’ in bottom-up peace building: Broadening the Concept of Peace Negotiations,” *International Negotiation*, No. 11, 2006, p. 136.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 139-58.

¹³ John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington DC, US Institute of Peace, 1997.

aspirations of the majority Sinhalese community, the civil society struggles to maintain a neutral posture and mobilize the masses in pursuit of peace. It is suggested that the realm of civil society is dominated by the patronage of international and domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), exhibiting a “top-down approach.”¹⁴ Due to intense ethnic polarization, most of the citizen organizations are mono-ethnic as cross-communal linkages are extremely hard to establish. Since the 1990s, there have emerged numerous domestic NGOs and human rights organizations in response to the increasing violence and suppression. A landmark event in the history of peace-building in Sri Lanka was the organization of massive protests in December 1994 on the eve of international human rights day. Similarly, in February 1995, the first ever meeting of National Peace Council was held which featured the participation of hundreds of citizen peace activists from various civil society organizations. This event led to the emergence of one forum, i.e. National Peace Council which engages in conflict resolution and peace-building activities. It has been argued that the working of the Sri Lankan civil society has been influenced by the direction of official policy towards the Tamil conflict. Thus, the declaration of war by the People’s Alliance (PA) government in the mid-1990s had a submissive effect on the peace mobilization of the civil society groups. Thus, with the worsening of military conflict, the citizen peace initiatives confined themselves to organizing training workshops for peace-building. The single most important objective of Sri Lankan peace movement is considered to be preparing a constituency for peace on all sides of the conflict. Thus, as political parties engage in ethnic war-mongering, the civil society attempts to develop an attitude of vigilance and reconciliation among the ordinary citizens.¹⁵

The Sri Lankan citizen peace movement is focused on de-demonization of the ‘other’ in the face of grand ethnic polarization in the society. With the onset of militarized hostility between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), there have been massive human rights violations, incidents of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsion of peoples from various parts of the island. Thus, many regions of the country have now become ethnically homogenous with little understanding of the goals and grievances of the “other.” The Sri Lankan civil society is engaged in an effort to bring understanding and recognition of the opposite claims through its pro-peace education and activism. Thus, the citizen peace movement attempts to penetrate the prejudiced socialization of people through teaching and learning of history in the country. This has led to organization of workshops, training exercises and few joint initiatives of Tamil and Sinhalese citizen groups. Orjuela argues that the Sri Lankan civil society is attempting to bring about a change at

¹⁴ Camilla Orjuela, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society,” *The Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 40, No. 2, March 2003, p. 199.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109-202.

the local level in order to facilitate an eventual large-scale transformation of conflict. In pursuit of these goals, the citizen peace activists are seeking to develop local peace committees involving religious leaders and local élites to prevent any event from triggering a local war. They have attempted to inculcate greater respect for humanitarian laws from both sides, increasing cooperation between the Sinhalese and Tamil forces on certain issues like cease-fire and return of the dead bodies. Significantly the civil society is trying to bring about a change of perception and vision between the two sides and develop a vision of a shared prosperous future for Sri Lanka between Tamils and Sinhalese.¹⁶ Thus, one feels that the Sri Lankan civil society is seeking to change the “context” of relations between the Tamils and Sinhalese and promote understanding, compromise and reconciliation between the two sides. However, its efforts have been adversely affected by intensification of the militarized conflict at various points. The assessment of its effectiveness and performance cannot be divorced from the larger realities and policy profiles of the Tamil and Sinhalese élites.

Bosnia Herzegovina provides a good example of the significance of citizen initiatives in building a comprehensive peace in society. Bosnia still lacks a proper peace movement more than 12 years after the Dayton Accords, as political situation remains extremely fragile. Hemmer analyzes the network of NGOs which emerged in Bosnia after the signing of Dayton agreement. He argues that Dayton laid the foundations of a multi-ethnic Bosnia under international supervision with a complex federalist system and new constitution to be introduced. After the peace agreement, international community invested heavily in Bosnia as hundreds of international NGOs began their operations in the country. These organizations were working towards diverse objectives such as state reconstruction, economic growth, disarmament and de-mining, settlement of refugees and democratization. Hemmer argues that even with the heavy international investment into the future of Bosnia, things on the ground remain very fragile and tense. Deeper divisions and mistrust are still the hallmark of ethnic relations. Ethno-nationalist parties continue to dominate the political landscape. Economy is in a shambles and deep divisions exist between Serbs, Muslims and Croats about the future shape of the Bosnian nation state. The authors argue that the dozens of civil society organizations in Bosnia are still unable to develop a network of cooperation and trust amongst themselves. These initiatives do not have a plan to tackle the explosion of xenophobic nationalist sentiments. Thus, if the ethnic tensions were to explode on the surface, the Bosnian civil society will be completely unprepared to deal with the challenge. There seems to be little political engagement of civil society organizations. Some of these initiatives have begun to be politically active at the local level. Accordingly, the political role of citizen peace-building groups is

¹⁶ Camilla Orjuela, op. cit. [14], p. 202-10.

beginning to emerge in Bosnia at the local level. Discussing the reasons for the perceived underdevelopment of civil society peace builders, Hemmer argues that this relates to the extremely tense and difficult relations between ethnic groups. More time is needed to do away with the suspicion and mistrust of the past. Once that phase is over, then coalition building and networking will begin to emerge within and between communities.¹⁷ For this to happen there needs to be a national consensus on controversial issues, which is so far lacking. Thus, the citizen peace-building in Bosnia has moved at a slower rate than expected. This also stymied the growth of a coherent and stable Bosnian nation state. Therefore in this section, we have attempted to develop a conceptual and comparative perspective on peace building between warring groups at the inter and intra-state levels.

Building peace between India and Pakistan: a “bottom-up” approach

The civil society in India and Pakistan has only recently begun to come to its own and engage in peace-building activities. Since the Partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, the regional environment has been dominated by one of the most enduring rivalries of the modern times. The two countries engaged in several wars and numerous unresolved contentious disputes. In this extremely inhospitable atmosphere, the growth of networks of citizen interaction between the peoples of India and Pakistan has been extremely limited. The nature of Indo-Pakistan relations has determined the fate, direction and effectiveness of citizen linkages in the region.

Several psychological, administrative and legislative factors are deemed to be responsible for limited civil society engagements in South Asia. On the eve of independence, the leaders of India and Pakistan expressed desire to establish friendly relations between the two. At that time, several proposals were discussed to create conditions for uninhibited travel between the two countries. But these optimistic proposals were soon overtaken by the rising tide of hostility between the two sides. Thus, in the first decade after partition, the citizens of India and Pakistan were considered as illegal aliens in each other's territories.¹⁸ This unfriendly state of affairs has existed for six decades after partition. The biggest factor behind this situation is the climate of hostility, mistrust and animosity between India and Pakistan. The demonization of the “other,” with the transfer of

¹⁷ Bruce Hemmer, op. cit. [11], 153-56.

¹⁸ Navnita Chadha Behera, “Popular Interactions in South Asia: A Post-Modernist Agenda,” in Navnita Chadha Behera, Victor Gunawardena, Shahid Kardar and Raisul Awal Mahmood, *People-to-People Contact in South Asia*, Colombo, RCSS Publications, 2000, p. 38-40.

historical grievances to future generations through history books and media has been the corner stone of official policy on both sides. Beyond these psychological factors, there exist several legislative hurdles in the way of open travel between India and Pakistan. The 1974 bilateral visa agreement (as amended in 1984 and 1985) led to imposition of strict conditions for travel between the two countries. In Pakistan, issuing a visa to an Indian citizen falls under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry instead of the Foreign Ministry, as the Indian nationals are presumed to be a threat to national security. The visitors from the two sides are generally required to visit a police station upon arrival in the country. In recent years, the situation has improved in terms of relaxation of some of these conditions. However, travel usually remains enormously difficult between the two sides. In addition, there are several infrastructural issues which make the contact between citizens of India and Pakistan extremely hard. Inadequate infrastructure and poor services for travel between the two countries also add to the woes of these peoples. Air travel is an expensive as well as limited medium of travel in South Asia. With the resumption of official diplomacy between the two countries, the governments have lately eased the travel restrictions. New linkages such as by train and bus services are being operated between the two.¹⁹ This is only a recent development which needs to be adopted on a permanent basis in order to facilitate greater citizen contacts between India and Pakistan, which can subsequently engage in “bottom-up” peace-building. We can observe how several factors hindered the travel and interaction between the citizens of the two countries. These have a direct bearing on the impact of networking and communication between these citizens.

We have seen how citizen diplomacy and civil society have attempted to build a vision of cooperation, understanding and peaceful coexistence in various conflict areas across the world. In South Asia, the citizens of India and Pakistan have only recently begun to participate in activities in order to form a web of networks in the region. In this section, we have examined in general how difficult it has been for citizens of India and Pakistan to travel across the border and visit each other. It is in the background of this ground reality that we need to examine the peace building activities by the ordinary citizens and civil society to settle the Indo-Pakistan dispute. One of the most prominent examples of citizen contacts is provided by its engagement in rebuilding trust in the aftermath of attack on Indian parliament in December 2001. Events like the limited war on Kargil in 1999 and the Indo-Pakistan military stand-off of 2001-02 had serious consequences for the inter-state relations. In this atmosphere of extreme hostility and tension, it was only the civil society groups who were able to keep channels of communication open and urge the two governments to begin negotiations with each other. The efforts of

¹⁹ Shahid Kardar, “People-to-People Contact in South Asia: Scope and Constraints,” in Navnita Chadha Behera et al., *op. cit.* [18], p. 91-105.

citizen diplomats found an echo when in early 2004 the Composite Dialogue process started between the two countries. Generally the citizen's peace movement between India and Pakistan comprises of individuals from all walks of life. The peace movement enjoys representation from social and human rights activists, women's groups, journalists, lawyers, youth, writers, artists, academics, scientists and labor groups among others.²⁰ In the following pages, we will briefly discuss some of the major citizen peace initiatives between India and Pakistan, their goals, movement and performance during the last decade.

One of the pioneering peace initiatives between India and Pakistan is the India-Pakistan Friendship Society established by Kewal Singh in 1987, a former Indian foreign secretary. This was one of the first citizen dialogues between the two countries which strove to increase popular exchanges between the two peoples in order to generate more understanding for the "other" amongst the people. Prominent citizens like Khushwant Singh, Bhai Mohan Singh and Inder Kumar Gujral were its members. Another example of citizen negotiations is the South Asian Dialogue which was held in different cities of the region. These meetings were arranged to discuss issues like economic and political growth, human rights and cultural reforms.²¹ Thus, we observe that early dialogues between India and Pakistan were more on the lines of Track Two with very limited membership and outreach. The real spurt of popular participation came in the 1990s.

The largest citizen peace dialogue between India and Pakistan is the Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPPFD), established in September 1994 in Lahore by prominent citizens of the two countries. The key objectives of this dialogue are to work towards resolution of all disputes and bring an end to nuclear and conventional arms races between the two sides. On the eve of its creation, it was decided that PIPFPD will never accept foreign funding and will allow a limited number of individuals to travel across the border. Also it vowed to form linkages with other grassroots citizen organizations in the region. The PIPFPD argues in favor of peaceful resolution of all disputes between India and Pakistan. Amongst the activities of PIPFPD are developing linkages with other like-minded organizations, producing publications, organizing talks and meetings and reaching out to all sections of society on both sides to convert them to the cause of peace. PIPFPD's national chapters are further organized at the national, provincial and local levels within the two countries. Its objective is to provide an alternative vision of South Asia other than the one pursued by the two governments since Partition and convert the maximum

²⁰ Asma Faiz, *India-Pakistan Dialogue: Bringing the Society In*, Colombo, RCSS Publications, 2007, p. 121.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

number of citizens into a constituency of peace. Since its founding, PIPFPD has organized seven conventions in different cities. It has faced hostility and opposition from hawkish elements on both sides of the border whether they are in government or out of it. Even in the face of opposition, PIPFPD has continued to provide channels of communication between the two societies in order to develop an understanding of the “other.” In the wake of the attack on Indian parliament in December 2001, relations between the two countries reached an all-time low with millions of soldiers engaged in an “eyeball to eyeball” confrontation. During this time, the activities of PIPFPD were also badly affected. However it proved to be one of the few channels of communication open at the time. Since the resumption of the Composite Dialogue process, the PIPFPD has engaged Kashmiris from both sides in its activities to widen the scope of the dialogue.²² In November 2007, after the imposition of emergency in Pakistan by President Musharraf, PIPFPD actively participated in expressing the rejection of such policies. Thus, we can observe, that with over a decade of its functioning, PIPFPD has emerged as a leading forum for citizen dialogue on issues of significance between India and Pakistan.

Amongst the stream of citizen dialogues flourishing in the region, an interesting example is provided by a group of retired military personnel from the two countries. The military is commonly considered to be more hawkish and conflict-prone in its orientation. However, a number of retired distinguished army officers from the two sides have joined hands to form the India-Pakistan Soldiers Initiative for Peace (IPSI) in 2000. These retired army personnel campaign and mobilize opinion in favor of normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. Another key objective for this organization is to raise awareness and put pressure upon the two governments for giving clemency to prisoners on the two sides. IPSI began with a very small organizational strength and support base. However, it has been able to extend its outreach with its membership gradually increasing. Some authors consider IPSI to be a Track Two initiative since it involves ex-servicemen in their private capacity.²³ However, in terms of its ideology, membership and mode of behavior, IPSI provides us a fine model of a citizen peace-building organization.

The anti-nuclear groups are a critical component of citizen peace movements in South Asia. These groups especially enhanced their activities after the 1998 nuclear tests. The anti-nuclear groups are extremely critical of the policies of militarization adopted by the Indian and Pakistani governments. The conventional and missile arms race between the two countries in the 1990s led to the birth of these movements in South Asia. A conglomeration of civil society groups in Pakistan which vehemently opposed the conduction of

²² Asma Faiz, *op. cit.* [20], p. 122-26.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

nuclear tests by Pakistan is the Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC), formed in January 1999. In addition to opposition to nuclear weapons, extremism and lawlessness are also issues on which these groups engaged in activism. The PPC engages in anti-nuclear activism in partnership with its sister forum from India, i.e., Committee on Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP). The PPC strives to prepare a community of individuals opposed to nuclear weapons by publishing literature, organizing seminars and protests. Operating in an environment where security issues are given a certain amount of sanctity, the PPC and CNDP face severe criticism from domestic hawkish elements, often labeled as traitors. It has been suggested that the anti-nuclear citizen movements have to develop and mobilize a two-stage strategy. These groups first need to develop a critique of nuclear weapons so as to weaken the overwhelming support given to them in South Asia. Once this happens, only then can these groups strive to criticize the governmental policies.²⁴ This is a daunting task in pursuit of which South Asian anti-nuclear citizen initiatives are engaged in.

The participation of women in support of peace is a phenomenon visible in other parts of the world, such as Argentina, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Thailand. The peace groups feel that women's association with peace initiatives serves to enrich the peace campaign by providing an alternative discourse and a vision of the present and future. The women peace activists feel that womenfolk are especially vulnerable in the face of narrow conceptualization of religion and morality imposed by the society. The Pakistani women's peace movement came into its own in the wake of the limited war between India and Pakistan in Kargil. Following the rising hostility between the two nuclear-armed states, several feminist activist groups merged together to form Women's Initiative for Peace in South Asia (WIPSA). This group, led by Asma Jehangir and late Nirmala Deshpande, made bus trips across the border ensuing charges of treachery against them from the rightwing groups in both the countries. Beyond WIPSA, there has emerged a network of women's NGOs in India and Pakistan which connect with their counterparts across the border to establish relations of trust and confidence. The female writers of South Asia have revisited the history of Partition and conflict and provided an alternative account of the plight of ordinary people. Thus, even when the official dialogues between the two countries broke down, the women's forums provided a venue for continuation of communication and understanding between the two countries.²⁵

The writers and poets of the Indian sub-continent are also part of the citizen's peace dialogues. Through their writings and activism,

²⁴ Achin Vanaik, "Nuclear Disarmament: Building A Movement in South Asia," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 40, No. 6, 5 February, 2005.

²⁵ Asma Faiz, op. cit. [20], p. 132-36.

they have sought to undermine the hatred related to conflict and develop a sense of the shared South Asian identity and history. Starting from 1987, there have been numerous dialogues and meetings between the Indian and Pakistani writers in various cities of the two countries. In 2000, there emerged another fraternity of South Asian writers, the Foundation of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Writers and Literature (FOSWAL) which has continued the process of negotiation and dialogue even in the face of heightened tensions in the region. A prominent peace initiative of South Asian writers was held in Islamabad in 2003, known as the Pen and Peace Conference. In this gathering, well-known writers demanded the signing of a peace treaty between India and Pakistan, peaceful resolution of all outstanding disputes and giving up of rhetoric of hatred and violence by the ruling establishments. The South Asian writers espouse a culture of tolerance and understanding in the region through their writings. In addition to writers, the artists of the sub-continent have also sought to promote peace and harmony through their art. Since the 1980s, we have witnessed numerous joint performances by Indian and Pakistani artists geared towards exposing inherent inequalities within their societies and presenting a message of peace and welfare to the people. In Pakistan, several prominent artist peace dialogues have emerged during the last two decades such as Tehrik-e-Niswan and Ajoka Theatre. Thus, we observe vigorous efforts by the artists and writers of the Indian sub-continent to promote a message of peace and tolerance through their work and mobilization.²⁶

Media has played a critical role in shaping the dynamics of Indo-Pakistan rivalry. Since 2003, we witness media at the forefront of civil society's efforts to promote conflict resolution and reconciliation between the two rivals. There have been different phases of media's involvement in Indo-Pakistan relations since Partition. In the early phase of this conflict, the media organizations generally reflected the response and posture of their own governments. As a consequence, the rhetoric of hostility present between India and Pakistan also found its way in the media organization. The Pakistani media turned its attention away to the Middle East region following Pakistan's humiliating defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. This state of affairs has changed during the last decade. Especially since 2003, we have seen the rise of private media in the region as a new forum of support for the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries.²⁷ The major media-oriented citizen peace initiative, South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) was created in 2000 to enable media to play a joint role for

²⁶ See in this book the article by Shahid Nadeem and Madeeha Gauhar, "Communicating and Exchanging Peace Narratives Through Art and Culture."

²⁷ Mohammad Waseem, "Media and Peace," quoted in the SAFMA Report on the 4th South Asian Free Media Conference, see SAFMA, *Media and Reconciliation in South Asia*, Lahore, 2004, p. 23-4.

freedom and peace. During the last four years, SAFMA has organized numerous conferences in various cities. It has been able to organize the visits of Indian and Pakistani journalists across the Line of Control.

Beyond media, we observe numerous joint initiatives of Indian and Pakistani traders and businessmen such as Punjab Haryana Delhi (PHD) Chamber of Commerce. With the introduction of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), the economic cooperation in South Asia is going to increase. With growing economic interdependence in the region, it is hoped that new and more formidable constituencies of peace will be formed which will prevent the rise of any new conflict between the two countries. In addition to media, there are several NGOs, human rights groups, labor and trade union organizations which are involved in cross-border linkages. Thus, we can conclude that we are witnessing an unprecedented number of citizen exchanges in South Asian region. These interactions are serving the major purpose of breaking the stereotypical images of hostility and animosity. It is hoped that this burgeoning civil society will lead South Asia towards a comprehensive peace.

Citizen diplomacy: conceptual and empirical observations

In this section, we will discuss the future direction of citizen diplomacy in theoretical and empirical terms. Conceptually, we have analyzed the theory and practice of contemporary peace building in this paper. The single most important shortcoming of this literature is its poor conceptualization. With the passage of time, we see greater policy input into these processes, as is visible in conflict regions like Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. The international governments, donor agencies and inter-governmental organizations are investing more and more resources into building civil society institutions in conflict-ridden regions and societies. The theoreticians and academics need to study these processes at greater length. They should also develop better theoretical models to explain the contribution and effectiveness of civil society initiatives. Moreover, there should be analysis of the generalization of this research. Can the academics come up with universal theories of civil society's contribution in peace-building? So far, we observe merely case studies of this phenomenon. How can we develop models which can explain civil society's involvement in various regions and different levels of conflict? Gawerc talks about the need to examine the mutual linkage between civil society initiatives and militarized conflicts. If a conflict is at an extremely violent stage, then how can citizen interactions operate in such an environment and what can be the level of their effectiveness? In other words, we need to come up with better understanding of efficacy of

civil society at different stages of conflict. Also, what can be the structure of linkages developed between rivals as a result of the peace building efforts of civil society? We have talked about vertical and horizontal linkages between various layers of the peace building process. The theorists of international relations need to examine the sustainability of citizen peace dialogues in a vertical and horizontal mechanism?²⁸

The question of measurement of contribution of citizen diplomacy is very important. As previously noted, the bulk of conflict resolution literature is social-psychological in its orientation. How can we conduct scientific research into the dynamics of citizen-led peace building processes? What can be the method with which to quantify the impact of citizen dialogues on conflict resolution? Is it even possible to conduct scientific research into the dynamics of citizen peace building? Most of this literature is normative and prescriptive in essence. Like the conflict discourse in international relations, there should be greater academic research into the sources of success of the citizen peace movements. To date political science has yet to develop such theorization and research design. The way forward lies in opening the black box of societal peace building. An important question facing the academics of conflict resolution is the divergent impact of civil society dialogues on inter- and intra-state conflicts. During the last three decades, there has been massive growth in the number and deadly potential of intra-state conflicts. While international war has dominated the conflict literature in political science, we need to understand the application and working of civil society dialogues in both inter- and intra-state conflicts. As these processes seem to be far more effective in intra-state conflict, how can its effectiveness be increased in an international conflict? Moreover, we need to examine the linkage between democracy and citizen peace-building further. How can civil society build peace in regions and countries which are not democratic? Also, in case of an international conflict, if only one of the members of the dyad is a democracy, then how does it impact the prospects of success of successful conflict resolution by the civil society?

In empirical terms, there are several aspects of ongoing citizen dialogues which need to be discussed. Citizen diplomacy is a new phenomenon in South Asia. As discussed earlier, it is only during the last two decades that there has been the growth of civil society in the region. Therefore, the citizen peace initiatives have been operating in the region only from the late 1980s onwards. Keeping in view the magnitude of the task, limitation of resources and a relatively short life span of citizen dialogues, it can be argued that citizen diplomacy is playing a significant part in helping to usher in the age of reconciliation in South Asia. Nevertheless, these dialogues have a long way to go in order to maximize their potential and influence a

²⁸ Michelle Gawerc, op. cit. [12], p. 462-63.

grass roots change in the society. An important consideration is the potential limitation of popular grassroots diplomacy.

While we discuss the contribution of Track Three diplomacy, we realize that Track Two or Three can never replace the official dialogues. The contentious issues will always have to be settled by the governments and leaders. At present, the civil society is helping to bring about a change in attitudes towards the “other.” The positive peace as described by Galtung and Lederach has to be preceded by negative peace and dispute settlement. In the presence of contentious disputes lingering between the governments, it will be very difficult to change the underlying context and psychological perceptions. Therefore, as civil society and citizen dialogues continue to play their role in facilitating tolerance and peace in the region, there has to be a simultaneous development at the official front.

The civil society also needs to maximize its outreach by broadening its influence and bringing in hitherto isolated classes of society in its fold. Looking at the composition of citizen dialogues in South Asia, it can be suggested that these are mostly an upper or middle class phenomenon. New elements and groups need to be brought in its influence. The previously ignored sections of population such as women, youth, and lower classes need to be integrated into these dialogues. The focus of effort should also shift from cities to the countryside. South Asian youth can play a decisive part in carrying forward the message of peace, tolerance and mutual coexistence. The civil society initiatives should especially attempt to develop linkages with youth, wherein lies the biggest investment for future. Also, the official bureaucracies need to adopt an attitude of flexibility and accommodation towards civil society initiatives. In the present circumstances, there should be a partnership between official, semi-official and private dialogues. This requires a new *Weltanschauung* on the part of state élites in South Asia. The governments should learn and benefit from the experience and expertise of citizen diplomats. Involving them in the official processes will only enhance the legitimacy of the process and maximize the possibility of their success. Therefore there should be a linkage between dialogue processes at various levels. The transfer problem, as discussed earlier, needs to be settled. The successes achieved by citizen diplomats, such as coming up with innovative solutions to long-standing issues should be communicated to the decision-makers. There needs to be development of cooperation between the various levels of peace-building process. The citizen diplomats should be made a part of the official negotiations.²⁹ These are some of the theoretical and empirical suggestions for future analysis and working of citizen diplomacy.

²⁹ For general discussion see Asma Faiz, *op. cit.* [20], p. 150-5. Also see Navnita Chadha Behera et al., *op. cit.* [18], p. 57.

In this paper, we have attempted to analyze the citizen diplomacy between India and Pakistan in the light of emerging theoretical and practical evidence. It is argued that citizen diplomacy is a necessary component of conflict resolution process which aims at the establishment of positive peace in South Asia. While this is one of the most optimistic periods in the history of Indo-Pak engagements, we must not lose sight of the challenges lying ahead. The impact and efficacy of civil society initiatives needs to be analyzed and supported by the governmental élites and theoreticians and practitioners of peace building. With the increasing advancement in information technology, it is hoped that the growing networks of cooperation will only grow between the citizens of India and Pakistan and will eventually result in a prosperous conflict-free and stable South Asia.

PART 2

HISTORY AS A METAPHOR OF ESTRANGEMENT/ RAPPROCHEMENT

Post-Conflict Memory and Representation: How Trafalgar affects Franco-British Relations today

Claire Sanderson

It may seem surprising that the memory of a naval battle dating back to 1805 can be said to affect contemporary Franco-British relations. Yet the battle of Trafalgar is a relevant example of the long-term impact of post-conflict memory on two countries who have been in conflict historically (the Hundred Years' War, etc.), who have learnt to restore relations while coming into competition with each other (for example during the colonisation process in the 19th century), and who have come to fight conflicts on the same side (as they did during the First and Second World Wars). Over the centuries, France and Britain have experienced a long and complicated history of conflict and rivalry, but also of co-operation and mutual trust. Yet despite the fact that the two countries seem so close, often with similar objectives and priorities, the way conflict is represented in the collective memory of France and Britain is very different. The Battle of Trafalgar of 1805, between Britain on the one side, and France and Spain on the other, was of course a decisive naval battle in the context of the Napoleonic wars. The battle itself is not here our primary frame of study; rather, we are concerned with the weight of the long-term effect of this legendary conflict on relations between Britain and France, seen most clearly in the way the battle is remembered. This in turn affects not only the relations between the Royal Navy and La Royale, the French Navy, but stretches further to other areas of Franco-British relations to this very day.

How and why do the two countries remember this conflict so differently?¹ For the British, the Battle of Trafalgar is not considered as one of the military victories over France. It is considered as a naval victory per se, a naval victory which marked the turning point of

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¹ The first part of this paper is taken from the article by Claire Sanderson and Philippe Vial entitled "Apprendre l'un de l'autre : le bicentenaire de Trafalgar de part et d'autre de la Manche" which was published as part of the commemorations of the Battle of Trafalgar in *La Revue Maritime*, No.472, 2005, p. 100-9.

Britain's naval supremacy, a founding moment in British national and maritime identity. It is seen as a victory symbolising fundamental values and characteristics such as courage, duty, and determination. Lord Nelson himself has come to represent these values, and has stood 45 meters high on his column in Trafalgar Square in London since 1842 (the bronze bas-reliefs at the foot of the column were recast from the melted brass of the French cannons). His famous reference to his crew of co-sailors as the "band of brothers," and more particularly, the motto "England expects every man to do his duty," a slogan which would be used for recruitment campaigns in the First World War, has come to be symbolic of what the British see as part of Britishness today—a difficult concept in terms of identity, of course,² but one which remains nevertheless tied to the values associated with Nelson and the Battle of Trafalgar. Nelson's column has itself become so much associated with these values that it has become symbolic of them and of Britishness itself, to the extent that during the Second World War, when Hitler was planning to invade London, he specified that he would take down the Column and transfer it to Berlin. Nelson himself has thus come to symbolise what Trafalgar represents in terms of national identity, and indeed, in 2005, the commemorations were officially presented not as the bicentenary of the battle itself, but as the "bicentenary of the death of Lord Nelson at Trafalgar,"³ Nelson's courage and determination in the face of adversity reminiscent in the national collective memory today of that of Winston Churchill during the Second World War.⁴

On the French side, it is a different story. The battle is remembered as a terrible naval defeat, leading to the fall of Napoleon and the confirmation of British naval supremacy, not only in relation to France and in Europe, but throughout the world, a turning point from which French naval power could, and would never recover. This has been felt particularly among the French naval forces, from the battle itself to the centenary celebrations firstly in 1905 (in which French did not participate), and again as recently as 2005, when commemorations were again held in the UK, and France had to decide how to react to the British proposal to participate in the commemorative events. And so, for both sides, Trafalgar is much more than a simple battle, lost or won. In French and British collective memory, two parallel representations continue to this very day.⁵

Trafalgar was the last great naval battle between France and Britain, and myth has it that the black tie still worn by French sailors

² Immigration since the post-war years, the strengthening of regional identity which led to the devolution process in Scotland and Wales, together with the situation in Northern Ireland, have had far-reaching consequences on the nature and definition of British identity and Britishness in the United Kingdom today.

³ Taken from the home page of the official website of the celebrations, *Seabritain2005.com*.

⁴ Claire Sanderson and Philippe Vial, op. cit. [1].

⁵ Ibid.

today was first worn as a sign of mourning. It is also one of several historic defeats inflicted on the French by their British counterparts, from conflicts during the Hundred Years' War to the battle of Waterloo, the Fashoda crisis, and Mers el-Kébir. And in most of these cases, the French defeat was subsequently linked to the lack of professionalism of the commander in charge.⁶ This has in turn—during the Suez crisis, for example, as we will see—continued to have an impact on the choice of nationality of the leader of a ship where both crews are present.

In the British Navy, Trafalgar is celebrated every year on October 21, on ships, in naval departments and ports, where a ceremony is held, followed by an official dinner. Trafalgar Day parades are organized, often including the young Sea Cadets,⁷ and it is even celebrated by the navies of former dominions Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. But the memory of Trafalgar goes beyond the October 21. Symbolically, it is also identifiable through the continued use of the names of the ships involved in the battle. For example, only a year after the centenary of Trafalgar in 1906, Lord Admiral Fisher named his warship the Dreadnought, in memory of one of the British vessels at Trafalgar. The first nuclear propelled British submarine was also called the Dreadnought (probably as much in memory of Fisher's ship as the one at Trafalgar), but proof that Trafalgar was still present in British collective memory shows in the day chosen for its launch: October 21, 1960. A few years later, France would also react in a similar fashion, giving the name *Redoutable* to its own first nuclear submarine—the *Redoutable* being one of the most heroic ships of the battle on the French side, and more precisely, the ship from which the fatal bullet which killed Lord Nelson was fired.⁸

Historically, the battle of Trafalgar reinforced the importance and potential of the British Navy in the British national psyche, and the national and international consequences of this throughout the 19th century had considerable impact on the way Britain's identity affected its relations with France, especially in the European context. In the 20th century, Britain's supremacy was challenged and eventually overcome, forcing it for reasons of economy and status to move towards Europe—this “undesirable inevitability”⁹—grudgingly accepted by an island race whose history and identity has always been so closely linked to, and affected by, its geography. In both a symbolic and concrete way, the bicentenary celebrations were also an opportunity for the British to recall the importance of the naval

⁶ Claire Sanderson and Philippe Vial, op. cit. [1].

⁷ The Sea Cadets is an organization of young girls and boys created in 1914, based on the customs and traditions of the Royal Navy and dating back to the Naval Lads Brigades of the Crimean War.

⁸ Claire Sanderson and Philippe Vial, op. cit. [1].

⁹ Hugo Young, *This Blessed Plot, Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, London, Macmillan, 1999.

dimension in British defense policy, and to reflect on how Britain sees itself in the world today.

Britain organized the biggest naval revue since Queen Elizabeth's Silver Jubilee in 1977, representing over 40 different countries and hundreds of vessels. For the British, inviting the French navy to participate as guest of honor was part of the natural course of events, as much as inviting Spain. However, the French naval authorities hesitated before accepting the invitation: should they accept or refuse? And if they accepted, how should the French navy be represented? Fortunately for Franco-British relations, the final decision to participate was taken, and for the occasion, the French choice was to sail the Charles de Gaulle nuclear aircraft carrier¹⁰ up the English Channel. Of course, Britain does not own a nuclear aircraft carrier—only two ordinary aircraft carriers¹¹—and so several humorous eyebrows were raised in London (or rather, Portsmouth) at the clear message being sent from Paris. But the celebrations went well, and the results were extremely positive on both sides. At the end of the day, the two countries—particularly the two navies—had made a step forward together in the context of post-conflict memory and reconciliation.

Trafalgar thus became a motor for reflection on collective memory issues within the European context, which was to have particular resonance in the field of European defense. And these different perceptions of the same event have also been reinforced over the years, in both countries, through education, and the way history is represented in history books for young people at school. This is clearly still an issue today when we think of other conflictual situations, such as decolonisation in Africa for Britain, or the Algerian or Indo-China wars for France, for example. But how have these two different representations of Trafalgar in national memory affected Franco-British relations and how do they affect them in the present day?

First and foremost, they have affected military relations between the two countries. The perception and representation of each other's naval forces has often led to a feeling of superiority on the British side, and one of inferiority on the French side. This in turn, has had an effect on the way the British and French forces (mainly naval, but not only) interact, in both positive and negative ways. During the 1956 Suez crisis, the negative perception of the French forces on the part of the British was proved wrong following the excellent operational cooperation between the two, and this mis-

¹⁰ The Charles de Gaulle is the only nuclear aircraft carrier in the European Union (which has five ordinary aircraft carriers at its disposal). In theory permanently available, the Charles de Gaulle requires 15 months maintenance work every seven years. Current plans for a Franco-British aircraft carrier have been put on hold until 2012 at the earliest.

¹¹ HMS Illustrious and HMS Ark Royal (HMS Invincible having been withdrawn in 2005).

judgement was later admitted by the British. French ships were under British command, and although there was admittedly poor cooperation during the decision-making process at every stage of the preparations (mainly due to the British reluctance to involve or even consult their French colleagues), the British clearly underestimated the efficiency of the French forces, as was readily admitted in the aftermath of the events.¹²

A more positive example, which recalls the “band of brothers” mentality, is that of the two naval forces working together during the lead-up to the First World War, elaborating plans of cooperation in the English Channel in the event of an attack by the German navy, sometimes going further than the British government itself would have wished. Secret military talks began as early as 1905 on joint cooperation, and would be followed by precise plans to send a British expeditionary force to north-eastern France (elaborated by General Joffre in 1911). Further military and naval exchanges followed, notably in November 1912, to the extent that Admiral Fisher and his successors in the Royal Navy were to be highly criticised for the secrecy of their intentions in the event of war.¹³ The essence of the agreement was that France, whose naval vessels were fewer and less sophisticated, would concentrate the majority of its fleet in the Mediterranean, whilst Britain would move the part of its fleet already stationed in the Mediterranean northwards, to protect the French coasts. France was to deploy the bulk of its home fleet in the Western Mediterranean, and the bulk of Britain’s fleet would remain in home waters, with simply a “containing force” presence in the Mediterranean (in reality a British battle-cruiser squadron would in fact defend British interests in the Mediterranean). The agreement, which in fact left the northern and western coasts of France unprotected, in no way affected the political and naval freedom of either side and involved no obligation to enter into war.¹⁴ But as we will see, this issue would be highly problematic for Franco-British relations when the time came for it to be tested.

¹² The British Ambassador to France Sir Gladwyn Jebb praised the “great efficiency” of the French forces. See Telegram from Sir Gladwyn Jebb to Sir Frederik Hoyer Millar (Foreign Office), January 31, 1957, NA (National Archives, UK, hereafter NA)/FO371/130668. General Keightley also praised their “skill, comradeship and gallantry of the highest order.” See “General Keightley’s Dispatch” published as a supplement to the London Gazette on September 12, 1956, NA/FO371/125456.

¹³ See Claire Sanderson, “The Entente Cordiale and its aftermath: a French perspective” in James K. Hiller and Christopher J. B. English (eds.), *Newfoundland and the Entente Cordiale 1904-2004*, St. John’s, Newfoundland, Memorial University, 2007, p. 32-43.

¹⁴ E.W.R. Lumby (ed.), *Policy and Operations in the Mediterranean, 1912-14*, London, Navy Records Society, 1970, quoted by Philip M. H. Bell in his conference paper “Britain, France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, March 26, 2004, at the International Conference “Refocusing on Europe? International Relations from the Entente Cordiale to the Outbreak of the First World War, 1904-1914”, March 28-30, 2004, Europeans Studies Research Institute, University of Salford, Manchester.

Secondly, Trafalgar has affected Franco-British relations in the context of the European continent: for the British, victory at Trafalgar meant the end of a French-controlled European continent, and if not British control of the continent, at least British supremacy on the seas to protect it from further invasion. From the First World War onwards, the security of the European continent and Franco-British defense co-operation now lay at the very heart of the relation between the two countries.¹⁵ Since the symbolic signature of the Entente Cordiale in 1904, these relations have been continually affected (and sometimes conditioned) by issues relating to the defense of the European continent, and they continue to do so to this day. It was most particularly the case during the Cold War, but it is still very much the case today in the context of the European Union, and the necessity of defining, elaborating, and putting into effect a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

This has been problematic for two reasons, both related to Britain: firstly because the British remain reluctant to adopt defense strategies which threaten the role of and relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), whether this be at strategic, planning or operational level. The importance of Anglo-American relations has threatened Britain's relations both with France and with Europe in general terms (de Gaulle's two vetos of Britain's membership of the European Economic Community in 1963 and 1967, for example), and in the more specific defense context, from the Cold War years to the more recent period under Tony Blair. The second problem is that ever since the first French proposals for a European Army in 1950, Britain has been extremely reluctant to abandon the autonomy of its armed forces, air, land or sea, to European (and especially French) authority. Its refusal of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 was testament to this, and its role setting up the Western European Union following the Paris agreements of October 1954, only two months after the EDC was rejected by the French National Assembly (partly because the British had refused to participate), led to only a limited solution, despite the considerable energy spent. The British aim here was to find a similar alternative solution which would make a contribution to defending the continent (in Britain's interests also, of course), but in no way threaten the independence of their troops, which could be pulled out as and when they were needed. The British position created huge problems between the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay, whose diplomats were deeply disappointed at the British attitude and also, it has to be said, obstructionist behaviour.¹⁶ This left

¹⁵ John Keiger underlines of the "progressive militarization" of the Entente Cordiale and the fact that the defense of the European continent was now, and would remain, at the heart of Franco-British relations. John Keiger, "La genèse de l'Entente cordiale" in Jacques Viot et Gilles Radice (eds.), *L'Entente cordiale dans le siècle*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2004, p. 24.

¹⁶ Claire Sanderson, *L'Impossible Alliance, France, Grande-Bretagne et défense de l'Europe 1945-1958*, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2003, p. 337-341.

scars amongst a generation of diplomats who were to work together in the European context during the 1960s, a period during which French and British misunderstandings and disagreements took a difficult turn.

But again, both these aspects on the British side—the importance of Anglo-American relations and of British autonomy—are points which are felt more keenly at diplomatic and governmental level than between the two armed forces themselves, both historically and during the 20th century, as the extent of the naval cooperation in the lead-up to the First World War shows. At the time of writing,¹⁷ the construction of the Franco-British aircraft carrier (despite the fact that it has now been put on hold until 2012 at the earliest) remains a potent symbol for the armed forces on both sides, and for European defense cooperation in general. France and Britain do cooperate today in the defense field within the context of the European Union in collaboration with Germany and also Italy, although recent cooperation was often affected by the concern of Tony Blair to avoid adopting any position which may harm or threaten Britain's relations with NATO and the United States.¹⁸

There are two further examples which are less directly related to Trafalgar, but which are arguably important in the context of Franco-British relations in the 20th century and the themes of post-conflict memory and representation. The first point is related to a small but significant difference in the Franco-British diplomatic context which has had long-term consequences throughout the 20th century. It concerns the different interpretations of treaties signed by the two countries, and the Entente Cordiale, signed in 1904, is a poignant example. The Entente Cordiale, which settled colonial differences between France and Britain,¹⁹ followed a period of great tension between the two countries (culminating in the Fashoda incident of 1898), and was signed during a period of anxiety regarding the intentions of Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany and its extensive ship-building programme. France felt increasingly threatened by the possible proximity of so many German vessels, as did Britain, but with the added dimension of a direct threat to the supremacy of her navy which, at the time, was still the largest in the world. Although the expression "Entente Cordiale" has come to mean the maintaining of cordial and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries (and indeed the expression "Entente Cordiale"²⁰ has come to

¹⁷ June 2008.

¹⁸ See Claire Sanderson, "Le Royaume-Uni et la défense européenne aujourd'hui : enjeux, choix, réalités" in *Relations internationales*, No.125, "L'Europe et les enjeux de sécurité," Winter 2006, p. 73-81.

¹⁹ France recognized British influence in Egypt, and Britain recognized French in Morocco, notably (other areas were also involved in the agreements, for example fishing rights in Newfoundland, and border issues in Siam and Africa).

²⁰ The expression was officially coined in a speech by King Louis Philippe on November 27, 1843, but had also been used by the young Queen Victoria (crowned on June 28, 1837, anniversary of the battle of Waterloo!) in a letter to Louis Philippe

symbolise the nature of Franco-British relations per se), the term does not appear in the agreements themselves, which are concerned only with colonial issues. Mutual interest, together with a more favorable climate among public opinion on both sides of the channel,²¹ thus enabled the two countries to resolve their colonial differences.

For the British, the Entente went no further than this. But for France, it was seen as the first symbolic step towards something more far-reaching, perhaps a political alliance of mutual support in the light of what was increasingly seen as German aggression. In other words, it implied a kind of moral commitment between the two countries. This difference of interpretation was to be tested as tension with Germany intensified. When Germany invaded Belgium on August 2, 1914, no reassurance was given to France that the British Navy would defend French coasts (although this was implicit if Britain itself was to remain protected), and only in September did London sign a military alliance with its French ally. This seems all the more surprising as the Royal Navy was quite prepared for battle, as we have seen, and decisions had been taken.²² But the fact that the British did not even give verbal reassurance to the French ambassador²³ as Germany invaded Belgium again fuelled the familiar accusation of “Perfide Albion,” and recalls the notion of trust between two countries (a point raised by Martin Koopman, cf. *infra*), which would continue to be challenged and threatened in the context of Franco-British relations throughout the 20th century.

The second, and last point concerns post-conflict memory and representation in a situation when the French and the British were fighting on the same side: the First World War. The way this same conflict is remembered is different in national collective memory on the respective sides of the channel. November 11 is a holiday in France, and the war is remembered with a ceremony in Paris led by the French President, culminating in a ceremony under the Arc de Triomphe at the top of the Champs Élysées by the “Tomb of the Unknown Soldier,” where a flame burns day and night. But in Britain, remembrance of the conflict is more poignant. The First World War was very different for the British—fighting on the European continent, defending lands which were not their own, not directly threatened by

dated 17th October: “I need not tell you again how greatly we desire to see confirmed more and more this *entente cordiale* between our two countries, which exists so happily between us personally.” Victoria had visited Louis-Philippe the previous month, and was held to be the first British monarch to set foot on French soil since Henry VIII landed at Calais (at the time still a British possession) in May 1520. Louis-Philippe was to return Victoria’s visit successfully in October 1844, becoming the first French monarch to cross the channel. See Ian Dunlop, *Edward VII and the Entente Cordiale*, London, Constable, 2004, p. 11-9.

²¹ This was partly thanks to the involvement of Edward VII in Franco-British relations on the death of Queen Victoria in 1901. See Ian Dunlop, *op. cit.* [20].

²² See Claire Sanderson, *op. cit.* [13].

²³ Paul Cambon, French ambassador to London, went as far as to ask that the word “honor” should be struck from the English language, in John Keiger, *op. cit.* [15], p. 26.

armed conflict (unlike the Second World War when the German bombings brought the war much closer to home). Young soldiers, some very young, the “Lost Generation,” some of whom wrote immensely moving and evocative poetry about both the horrors of war and the love of one’s own country, have marked generations of British people ever since.²⁴ The red poppies mentioned in the poems—the only flower which survived in the Normandy fields in which they were fighting—have come to symbolise in British collective memory both the blood of war and the fragility of young life. At 11 o’clock on November 11, the whole country holds two minutes’ silence in memory of the lives lost, and wreaths of paper poppies—similar to those worn on jacket lapels all over the country in the week leading up to the war—are placed at the foot of the country’s war memorials, in every town and village. And today, this ceremony has come to embrace the memory of not only the First World War, but the Second, and other conflicts of the 20th century, including Korea, the Falklands, and Iraq. In those two minutes of silence, held by young and old, throughout the whole country, one understands more about the place of conflict and remembrance in British collective memory than in a hundred history books, important as these are, especially now that what is taught today to young people in schools—and here I refer to a wide range of historical events—is closer to the truth. This particular comment is relevant also in the French context, regarding the Algerian War, for example. But, as we are learning constantly, it is often difficult for nations to come to terms with the realities of their own history.

²⁴ The poems of Rupert Brooke, Wilfred Owen, and Siegfried Sassoon, to name but three.

Distortion and the Historiography in Pakistan

Ahmad Salim

For the last few years the researchers and the historians along with the textbook publishers have been pressured to modify textbooks to better reflect multicultural and multiethnic values. Writing textbooks that gratify everybody is probably unfeasible. Most have multiple authors and are therefore unevenly written. After reviewing many books that are among the most widely used in Pakistani schools it becomes clear that until now inadequate and inaccurate depictions of history are the norm. The books reviewed here are riddled with flaws and omissions. Maximum coverage is given to Islamic and Muslims' history with an anti-Hindu bias. The increased attention given to Islam is one change made to recent editions. A report on curricula and textbooks in Pakistan concluded that the textbooks also have a lot of stereotypes and other perspectives that "encourage prejudice, bigotry and discrimination towards fellow Pakistanis and other nations, especially against religious minorities, as well as the omission of concepts [...] that could encourage critical self awareness among students."¹ The conclusions students are most likely to draw from these narratives are those held by India's detractors; therefore, it should not be surprising if students are easily encouraged to believe the worst about India when they reach for higher level of educational activity.

Textbooks in Pakistan unfortunately remained the domain of distorted politics which have victimized the Social Studies curriculum. The story of Pakistan's past is intentionally written to be distinct from and often in direct contrast with interpretations of history found in India. It was during Bhutto's reign when the concept of an integrated Pakistan, one strong Islamic nation that could overcome separatist movements and prevent another splitting such as the creation of

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¹ See: A. H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, *The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan: Urdu, English, Social Studies and Civics*, Islamabad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2003.

Bangladesh, was introduced. Textbooks laid even greater stress on the Islamic perspective of historical events. Islamiyat was made a required subject up until class eight. The use of the phrase “the ideology of Pakistan” was inserted into Social Studies textbooks during Bhutto’s first term, and pre-Islamic South Asian history was obliterated. Despite all this, Bhutto gets no credit for Islamization, textbooks calling his efforts “too little, too late.” A focus was directed towards proving the historical differences and enmities between Muslims and Hindus and the righteousness of the Muslims as opposed to the deceit of Hindus who rarely appear in a sentence without adjectives such as politically astute, sly, or manipulative or referred under the trait of the “cunning bania.”² This hatred was further exacerbated when General Zia-ul-Haq envisioned more thoroughly a Pakistan which would finally fulfill the true Shariat-ruled mandate inherent in the creation of an Islamic republic. The continuing move towards islamization got accentuated against the ominous backdrop of nuclear testing, missile development, failed diplomacy, and sporadic tit-for-tat acrimonious exchanges between India and Pakistan.

Denial and erasure are the primary tools of historiography as it is officially practiced in Pakistan. History continues to be used as a tool of indoctrination in favor of controversial ideologies. According to A. H. Nayyar, “the insistence on the ideology of Pakistan has been an essential component of hate against India and the Hindus. For the upholders of the ‘ideology of Pakistan,’ the existence of Pakistan is defined only in relation to Hindus, and hence the Hindus have to be painted as negatively as possible. That the pathological hate against Hindus is only because of adopting the so-called ‘ideology of Pakistan’ is borne out by the fact that the pre-ideology (before the 1970s) textbooks of Pakistan did not contain this hatred. Although a lot of animosity towards Hindus might well have been expected in the newborn Pakistan because of the bloody riots of the Partition, the early textbooks in Pakistan, many written after the Partition, were free of the pathological hate that we see in textbooks today.”³

The social studies curriculum in Pakistan, as both product and propagator of the “ideology of Pakistan,” derives its legitimacy from a narrow set of directives. The textbooks authored and altered during the 11 years of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule (1977-88), are still in use in most schools. They are decidedly anti-democratic, anti-secular and inclined to rigid mode of teaching the political ideology, which is characterized by some controversial theories. The manipulation and implementation of religious terminology and symbols as political tools is repeatedly being taught to the young generation. Little wonder then, that “instead of being able to acknowledge diversity in points of

² The word *bania* refers to a sub-caste of small shopkeepers and lenders, to which Mahatma Gandhi belonged. It can be used pejoratively to signal a greedy and deceitful person.

³ A. H. Nayyar and Ahmad Salim, op. cit. [1], p. 5.

view, students are likely to look at the world in oversimplified, uncritical 'black and white' and 'us versus them' terms and to develop single dimensional, exclusivist mindsets."⁴

Though this force to islamize the external manifestations of social and political institutions was itself a reflection of a worldwide movement towards religious conservatism and fundamentalism within the islamic community, the results of Zia's indoctrination program has given rise to more conservatism. Twenty years or so ago, A. H. Nayyar and Pervez Hoodbhoy, commenting on the consequences of General Zia's efforts to islamize the educational system, rightly predicted that the full impact "will probably be felt by the turn of the century, when the present generation of school children attains maturity."⁵

Oblivious to religious sensitivities

The narrow and sectarian interpretation of Islam, downplaying the tolerant aspects of the religion and focusing on Islamic fundamentalist interpretations, inevitably questions the loyalty of minority Hindus and Christians in Pakistan.⁶ To support such prejudice, the Hindus have been accused of playing with communal feelings in various books. "Textbooks began to be filled up with religious legends of the Hindus. Similarly, rebels of the Mughal times, especially Rana Pratap, Shivaji and Guru Gobind Singh were presented as heroes, with the intention of wounding the sentiments of the Muslims and to arouse the feelings of Hindus and Sikhs against them."⁷ Then on describing the educational policies of the Indian National Congress, a textbook says: "The Congress also introduced the Wardha and Vidya Mandir education scheme in its provinces. The Wardha scheme aimed at infusing Indian nationalism in children, and the textbooks prepared under it were crammed with lessons in Hindu culture and the over-idealized exploits of heroic Hindu personalities. The Congress also introduced on October 2, 1938 the worship of Gandhi's portrait in schools on his birthday, wearing of the Gandhi cap and singing of *Vande Mataram*."⁸ On this Muslims of many areas expressed their

⁴ *The State of Education, Annual Review*, Social Policy and Development Centre, Karachi, 2002-03.

⁵ Pervez Hoodbhoy and A.H. Nayyar, "Rewriting the History of Pakistan" in Asghar Khan (ed.), *Islam, Politics, and the State*, London, Zed Books, 1985, p. 164.

⁶ Yvette Rosser, "Cognitive Dissonance in Pakistan Studies Textbooks: Educational Practices of an Islamic State," *Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law*, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 2005, p. 13

⁷ M. Aslam, Tahira Habib, *Tareekh-e-Pakistan for Ninth and Tenth Classes*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, p. 240-241.

⁸ *Vande Mataram* was composed in 1876 by Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay in a mixture of Bengali and Sanskrit. It became the national cry for freedom from British rule during the freedom movement. *Vande Mataram* was rejected as national anthem

deep displeasure. During the same period the Hindus gave a fillip to the campaign for cow protection, and this led to much armed conflicts due to the Muslims defense of their right to slaughter cow.”⁹

Justifying the two-nation theory, it is said for instance that it “means that the Indo-Pak subcontinent is populated by two nations—the Muslims and the Hindus. Although the two nations, lived together for centuries they could not learn to exist as one. In the beginning Muslim leaders put forward the demand that the Muslims of the subcontinent should have legal and constitutional protections in keeping with their separate identity. But when these protections were denied, and instead the Congress Party tried to thrust on the Muslims the culture and civilization of the Hindus (who were in numerical majority) the Muslims decided to seek a separate homeland for themselves. That is how Pakistan came into being.”¹⁰

In government textbooks, students are taught that Hindus are backwards, superstitious, they burn their widows and wives, and that Brahmins are inherently cruel, and if given a chance, would assert their power over the weak, especially Muslims, and sudras, depriving them of education by pouring molten lead in their ears.¹¹ Emphasis has been laid on the negative aspects of the Hindu society such as caste system and sati (a rite in which a widow is burnt alive with her deceased husband). Hindu women are said to have an extremely inferior status in the society. Outlining the Hindu social setup, it is stressed for instance that the law is not equal for everyone. People of superior caste could get away with the law whereas there were harsh punishments for low castes people.

In a government-approved social studies textbook being taught to students of Class IV to VI, it is said that “Temples in which Hindus worship idols are narrow and dark places. These temples are so congested that only one person can enter the temple at a time. In mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.”¹² It is poignant to mention that words like dark, ugly and short are used to describe Hindus while Muslims are presented in glowing terms. Atrocities committed by Muslim invaders are glossed over while those by Hindu and other minorities are magnified. Invasions led by Muslims are justified as having been necessary for the expansion of Islam whereas Hindu-led invasions are depicted bleakly. Textbooks glorify Mehmood Ghaznavi and Mohammad bin Qasim as “conquerors.” Their name is written with utmost reverence. In front of the name of each, an abbreviation is used that denotes,

on the grounds that Muslims felt offended by its depiction of the nation as “Mother Durga”—a Hindu goddess—but remains a national song in India.

⁹ Ikram Ali Malik, Sayed Qamar Abbas and M. Nawazish Ali Beg, *Tareekh-e-Pakistan for Ninth and Tenth Classes*, Lahore, 1993, p. 239-241.

¹⁰ Hassan Askari Rizvi, Javed Iqbal and Ghulam Abid Khan, *Pakistan Studies for Ninth and Tenth Classes*, Lahore, 1991, p. 15-17.

¹¹ *Social Studies Grade VII*, Jamshoro, Sindh Text Book Board, 1997.

¹² Amit Bhattacharya, “Creating a Pakistan of Distortion,” *The Pioneer*, New Delhi, July 13, 2003, p. 1.

“God’s blessing be upon him.” There is also a lot of venom against Sikhs. They have been described as inflicting severe atrocities on Hindus and Muslims.¹³

Hindus are also reported as having colluded with the English to suppress the Muslims. Various excerpts from the Islamic Studies textbooks also substantiate the element of religious bias. For instance, “Generally the other nations remain engaged in rubbish business during their festivals. [In their religions] there is no expression of relationship with God or His worship. Contrary to these, two religious festivals of Islam provides on the one hand opportunity to Muslims for recreation and happiness while on the other hand they provide an occasion for fellowship, help and care of the needy.”¹⁴ In contrast, “the social setup and the caste system in Hindu religion is very discriminatory, lower caste Hindu can be murdered easily while murdering a Brahmin was the biggest crime.”¹⁵ Content reflecting the religious prejudice can also be found for instance in a class 2 Urdu book which says that “Our country is Pakistan. We live in our country. Pakistan is an Islamic country. Here Muslims live. Muslims believe in the unity of Allah. They do good deeds.”¹⁶

It conveys the message that being a Pakistani is equated with being a Muslim and that only Muslims are true Pakistani citizens. Patriotism has been equated with Islamic zeal. The way it has been said clearly alienates religious minorities.

Prejudice against the Indian National Congress leadership

Pakistan Studies textbooks are a vehicle for negatively representing India, but the historical narratives also underplay the role of the nationalist Indian Muslim leadership. Names of any revolutionary leaders associated with the Indian National Congress (INC), including Muslim members, are not included in the textbooks. The INC is accused of masterminding acts of violence and aggression against Muslims and plotting to install Hindu Raj upon the end of British rule. Even Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad’s role has been obscured and textbooks on the history of the freedom struggle either totally ignore him or mention him just casually.¹⁷ Another occulted figure is Abdul

¹³ *Social Studies for Class IV*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, 2002, p. 81-82.

¹⁴ Cited in chapter 2 of Islamic Studies book for class 5 entitled “Imaniyat aur Abadat (Faith and Prayers),” p. 18.

¹⁵ *Social Studies*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, March 2002, p. 59.

¹⁶ *Meri Kitab for Class II*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, October 2001, p. 36.

¹⁷ A renowned scholar, Maulana Azad (1888-1958), is certainly the most famous Muslim political leader belonging to the Indian National Congress. He was even its president between 1940 and 1946. Committed to secularism, he opposed the

Ghaffar Khan (1890-88), a Pashtun leader and founder of the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) who through non-violent opposition came to dominate the politics of the NWFP. He refused when the INC offered him its presidency in 1931, but remained a member of the Congress Working Committee for a long time. Khan's trust on non-violent methods and on the compatibility of Islam and non-violence never waned. So strong was his kinship with Gandhi that in India he was often referred to as the "Frontier Gandhi." Abdul Ghaffar Khan vehemently opposed the Partition of India. As such, he was often seen as anti-Muslim by some and was imprisoned many times after the creation of Pakistan.

Other Muslim leaders who played an important role in freedom struggle and stood for united nationalism were Hakim Ajmal Khan (1863-1927, president of the INC in 1921), Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari (1880-1936, president of the INC in 1927)—both had a key role in establishing Jamia Millia Islamia in Delhi—and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai (1894-1954), an ally of Jawaharlal Nehru who became twice minister in Independent India. One can also mention the role of Ali Brothers—Maulana Mohammad Ali (1878-1931) and Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873-1938)—who were involved in the Khilafat movement but got afterwards disillusioned with the Congress.

The history of freedom struggle as also that of medieval period is being written today from a majoritarian perspective. The Pakistani textbooks ignore Hindu contributions to our common struggle against colonialism, and seem ashamed of the common lineage with Hindus going back to the Indus Valley civilization. Pakistani textbooks also ignore the Sufi contributions to the struggle for independence and restrict discussion of Sufism to Shah Waliullah and a few others.

The motives of the Hindu-dominated INC leadership during the freedom struggle are seen as dubious. The Khilafat and non-cooperation movements were the first popular movements that had not only spread out in all parts of the Indian sub-continent but also provided a joint platform for the Muslim and Hindu leaders. But the solidarity expressed by the Indian National Congress with the Khilafat movement was for Gandhi "a golden chance to exploit the Muslim power for his won purposes." The same author continues: "The Muslim leaders could not comprehend the conspiracy of Gandhi and followed his guidance. It affected the economy, education and social conditions of the Muslims very badly."¹⁸

The INC Congress and its Hindu leaders wanted a constitution that could help them prevail upon the Muslims. They were not willing to recognize the independent political standing of the Muslims. Neither were they inclined to protect Muslims. The period which followed the formation of Congress ministries in six states in July

demand for the creation of Pakistan and became the first Minister of Education of Independent India.

¹⁸ *Pakistan Studies for Class IX*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, 2005, p. 19-20.

1937 is described as one of untold misery for Muslims. Students are told in textbooks that “in connivance with the government, the Hindus started communal riots and caused loss of life and property. At the time of prayers the Hindus tortured the Muslims by playing bands in front of the mosques. Before the commencement of classes the students saluted the portrait of Mahatma Gandhi and Muslim students were also forced to do so.”¹⁹

There are many places and paragraphs in the social studies books where students are taught about the unjust attitude of Bharat (the sanskrit and hindi name of India) vis-à-vis the new-born state of Pakistan. Such as: “The policy of Indian National Congress created multiple problems for the government and people of Pakistan. It took every step to crush the withering economy of the new state. When the question of division of assets between the two separated countries was raised, the Hindus once again did not do justice with Muslims. The Bharat government remained reluctant to pay the share of Pakistan out of the cash balance of four billions. The share of Pakistan was 750 million rupees. Bharat in spite of world pressure, became ready to pay the amount if Pakistan would surrender Kashmir valley to Bharat. Gandhi interfered in the matter and partial payment of 200 million was released.”²⁰

The students are told that 1965 war was waged by India without any provocation. Pakistan army fought bravely and conquered a vast land of the Indians. India stands also accused of masterminding disintegration of Pakistan by instigating the Bengalis and Pakistani Hindus. India is portrayed as an enemy whose designs are nefarious and the students are strongly advised to receive military training so that they could fight it any moment.²¹

Gandhi’s image in Pakistani textbooks

The popular rendition of Gandhi is a mix of ignorance and negative stereotyping, stripped of all contradictions that constitute his person and legacy. That is true on both sides of the border especially when it comes to the cast of the lead characters of the Partition saga. Gandhi is the personification of good and Jinnah of evil in Indian nationalist historiography. In Pakistan, it is the other way around. If Gandhi, for instance, supported the Caliphate movement, it was to secure “the cooperation of the emotional Muslims for his own purpose.”²² This is typical of Hindus. “He had his own axe to grind in joining this movement. Later on, Gandhi created an atmosphere of distrust

¹⁹ *Pakistan Studies for Class IX-X*, p. 37-8.

²⁰ *Pakistan Studies*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, June 2005, p. 51.

²¹ *Social Studies for Class V*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, March 2002, p. 112.

²² *Pakistan Studies for Class XII*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, p. 19-20.

among the Muslims and dissociated himself from the movement. Gradually, the movement died down.”²³

While conversing on the subject of migration during the Khilafat movement, some interesting facts can be reviewed from the Pakistan Studies book for Class XII of the Punjab Text Book Board Lahore. It says (p. 20) that it was Gandhi who advised Muslims to leave the country and migrate to Iran, Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. The author further argues that “millions of Muslim families migrated to Afghanistan after selling their properties to the Hindus. The Afghan government refused entry to them. On their return, poverty, helplessness, shortage of food and humiliation troubled them. Now they fully realized the real face of Gandhi, but it was of little use as they were already ruined.”

Yet there are also more balanced accounts of Gandhi. For instance, about the sharing of assets of British India with Pakistan, it is acknowledged that on Gandhi’s insistence and threat of having resort to a fast-unto-death, “the Indian government gave another installment of 500 million to Pakistan. The remaining amount of 50 million has not been paid until now.”²⁴

An important book is *First Step in our History*, by Dr. Kh. A. Haye, being taught in Pakistan military academy for years. The most interesting fact with regard to the projection of Gandhi as an individual can be traced by comparing the two editions written by the same author. Whereas in the first version, published in 1959, Gandhi is described as “Mahatma Gandhi: Who died for Peace”²⁵ the second version carry the title “Mahatma Gandhi: A Famous Hindu Leader.”²⁶ For the same, referring to Gandhi’s professional accomplishment, the author says in the first edition that “Gandhi went to England to study law. He returned to India as a barrister. He started practice, but he did not make a good lawyer.” The second edition pinpoints that “he started practice, but did not make a good lawyer like the Quaid-e-Azam.”

Coming to the circumstances leading to the Gandhi-Jinnah talks of 1944, one textbook explained that “the expectations of Gandhi were not fulfilled. The Allied forces gained the ground. The desperate Gandhi changed his tactics, and turned towards the Muslim league. Gandhi-Jinnah dialogue was arranged. The former wanted to entrap the later. Gandhi was no ready to give some concessions to the Muslim league in order to start joint struggle of the two parties. The Quaid very well understood his mind he did not agree to enhance the strength of the Gandhian movement.”²⁷ The

²³ *Social Studies for Class VI*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, January 2002, p. 146.

²⁴ M. Ikram Rabbani, *Introduction to Pakistan Studies* (compulsory), for Matric and Intermediate classes, Lahore, Karwan Book House, 2007, p. 95.

²⁵ Kh. A. Haye, *First Step in Our History*, Karachi, Ferozsons, 1965, p. 207-14.

²⁶ Kh. A. Haye, *First Step in Our History*, Lahore, Ferozsons, 1990, p. 161-66.

²⁷ *Pakistan Studies, Class 12*, Lahore, Punjab Text Book Board, 2005, p. 30.

issue of Gandhi's proposal to start a joint effort has been explained in Pakistan Studies textbook in the chapter on "Creation of Pakistan" as, "Gandhi was the most influential of all Hindu leaders. Gandhi insisted that the Muslim league should join hands with the Congress unconditionally in its struggle for independence against the British and both the parties should solve internal problems through mutual consultation after independence was achieved."²⁸ No one mentions that Gandhi offered the leadership of undivided India to Jinnah if it could keep the country united or his intention to live in Pakistan after Partition.

Conclusion

Textbooks have been criticized by academics and scholars in Pakistan, for propagating jingoist and irredentist beliefs about Pakistan's history and culture and being insufficiently objective in their portrayal, particularly with regards to political Islam and the treatment of minorities in the country. Though the government of Pakistan has lately taken some steps to exclude all material that promotes prejudice against non-Muslims in pre-Partition India. The new national curriculum for Pakistan Studies for grades IX and X explains the two-nation theory and Pakistan's ideology "with specific reference to the economic and social deprivation of Muslims in India."²⁹ A good education system is one of the pillars for developing a modern state. Therefore, it should be free from religious biases, hate speech, distortion of history and ideological myths. The manner in which ideas are formed and disseminated through the educational system impacts the formation of the character of the students. What kind of mindset such books will create among the young students is not difficult to imagine. Such textbooks should therefore be replaced at the earliest by those which will bring out the strength of composite culture and similarities between the different religions.

²⁸ Abdul Qadir Khan, *Pakistan Studies for Secondary Classes*, Islamabad, National Book Foundation, 2005.

²⁹ *Daily Times*, December 7, 2006.

From Enmity to Reconciliation: The Role of Franco-German Bilateral Institutions

Martin Koopmann

During the 1990s and the first years of the new century, the Franco-German relationship has been characterized by a number of conflicts related to European issues and especially to the question of the EU-enlargement to the Eastern European states. The first event in this context has been the recognition of Croatia and Slovakia by the German government in 1991. In doing so, Germany broke with its foreign policy tradition that had been marked for decades by an integrative approach and multilateral procedures. This shift of German foreign policy, often called “normalisation” by many of the international analysts, was observed by France with some kind of leery distance. Paris criticized the German behavior in the Croatia/Slovakia-case and hold over the following years a much more reluctant position concerning the enlargement of the European Union (EU) than Germany did.

The diverging positions of France and Germany towards the process of eastern enlargement of the European Union lead to several disagreements between the two countries regarding the different steps of the rapprochement. The missing development of a convincing and coherent EU-enlargement-strategy can be traced back to the Franco-German conflict and, consequently, resulted in the discovery that, only a few days before the decisive EU summit in October 2002, the Union had no common view on the central question of how to finance the accession of the ten new member states. It was obvious that without an understanding between the two most important members of the EU, the Union was unable to find a way out of this most important strategic challenge it had been confronted with ever since.

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Sure, the strategic conflict between France and Germany had not been a crisis that put into question the special Franco-German relationship in itself. But however, it had been a serious bilateral conflict of priorities that had blocked the final steps of preparation of the biggest EU-enlargement since the beginning of European integration. And even if the bilateral differences did not lead to the failure of the enlargement project, the difficult and long-lasting problems of the famous Franco-German couple were a real challenge to the self-image of French and Germans to be the “motor” of the European integration process. Many of the observers, the politicians and diplomats in charge agreed that the differences between Paris and Bonn/Berlin in the nineties constituted the most serious bilateral crisis since the beginning of the reconciliation process—a period of at least more than 50 years.

It was perhaps even more than an image problem for the two founding members of the European Communities: The legitimacy to create compromises and to agree bilaterally on package deals as the basis for solutions to difficult problems of European integration suffered strongly from the Franco-German long-term inability to develop a kind of a common strategic dialogue on the future of the European Union. France and Germany reacted to this crisis by the most drastic measure available to them: They signed a new Franco-German Declaration modeled somehow on the Elysée Treaty of January 1963. Apart from several political announcements on a rhetorical level, the Declaration provided for new bilateral institutions: a common Council of Ministers and the General Secretaries for Franco-German relations residing in the respective Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These innovations had been preceded in 2001 by another institutional innovation, the so-called Blaesheim summits that bring together every six to eight months the French President and the German Chancellor as well as the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs on a regular but informal and confidential basis.

The developments of the last 15 years with a difficult and fast evolving political background in Europe left the impression that France and Germany, having accomplished the enormous challenge of post-war reconciliation on the one hand and—with the European Monetary Union—perhaps the last core project of the European integration à la Monnet and Schuman—on the other, were unable to find a new and convincing motive to provide their special relationship with new legitimacy. Finally, it seems that Franco-German relations today have a strong reflex to respond to fundamental political challenges of their relationship on an almost exclusively institutional level, by strengthening existing bilateral institutions or creating new ones. Against this background, a closer look on the role of institutions in the Franco-German past and the attempt to define some determining factors of their future importance seem to be suitable. Firstly, five decades of close Franco-German cooperation beginning in the 1950s were an impressive demonstration of the importance of institutions for the bilateral rapprochement and sustainable

reconciliation between the former “hereditary enemies.” And, secondly, a favorable international context and converging national interests are two important and necessary conditions for successful institutions as instruments to overcome mutual mistrust.

Institutions matter for sustainable rapprochement and even reconciliation

Franco-German post-war history is a history of institutions, affecting politics as well as social, economic or cultural issues. The basis for the long-term development of an institutional partnership between both countries was the Franco-German Friendship Treaty, the so-called Elysée Treaty of 1963, signed by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and President Charles de Gaulle. The treaty was the result of several attempts to create a kind of a union in Western Europe that would be able to stabilize the European continent on a political level (the so-called “Fouchet Plans”)¹ and to strengthen the defense capabilities of each of the participating states by establishing a common defense organization (the European Defence Community in 1954). Since both attempts failed, de Gaulle suggested a bilateral solution to his preferred German partner. So, the Elysée Treaty never had been the first choice of France and Germany to overcome their bilateral antagonism. It was a way out of the disappointment created by the failures on the European level, a second-best alternative that rapidly turned out to be one of the most effective instruments of sustainable conflict resolution on the bilateral level that ever had existed.

The Elysée Treaty provided all constitutive elements of the future institutional co-operation. It was composed of an organizational part and a program part formulating several political objectives of Franco-German cooperation. The organizational provisions, today more than 45 years old, are still the basis and the fundamental framework of the current cooperation between Paris and Berlin. The treaty established the regular meetings of the French President and the German Chancellor at least twice a year and of the Foreign Ministers at least every three months. It provided monthly meetings of the Heads of department of the two Foreign Ministries responsible for political, economic and cultural affairs as well as regular meetings every three months of the Ministers of Defense and the Education Ministers. Even if this agreement seems to be very technical and yet banal, it revealed its purposefulness when Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was replaced by the very transatlantic oriented Ludwig Erhard. To face the challenges of European integration, of European

¹ The Fouchet plans of 1961-62 had for ambition to move towards a political union through the institutionalization of a co-operation between EEC member-states on foreign affairs, defense and education.

and international security in the context of the Cold War, and—last but not least—of the “German question,” the Federal Republic of Germany needed at that time trustful relations with its two most important partners: France on the European level and the United States on the transatlantic level. Since Erhard clearly put the emphasis on the very unilateral strengthening of Germany’s relations with Washington, he would undoubtedly have neglected regular exchange with France—if the treaty’s provisions wouldn’t have obliged him to maintain the bilateral dialogue with Paris. The continued Franco-German communication under unfavorable conditions helped to avoid a complete bilateral paralysis and, beyond this, allowed for a fast and effective re-launch of Franco-German impulses in the European integration process after the end of the short three-year-interregnum of Ludwig Erhard (1963-66).

The institutional part of the Elysée Treaty was completed by programmatic provisions, relating to several policy areas. One of the most prominent and often quoted articles of the treaty is the one about foreign policy: “Both governments will consult each other before any decision in all relevant issues of foreign policy to get to aligned positions.” Critics often have stated that the gap between pretension and reality in no other paragraph of the treaty is as large as in this part about foreign policy. Sure, many French or German foreign policy decisions have been taken without preceding direct consultations on the political level. But, on the other hand, the continuously ongoing—and often informal—exchanges on the working level also took and still take place in accordance with this provision of the Elysée Treaty. Another important and publicly well-known article of the treaty is the one setting up a close and sustainable cooperation concerning education and youth: The agreement to found the “Franco-German Youth Office,” an international organization that, until now, has enabled about 8 million German and French youth to participate in nearly 300.000 exchange programs, is undoubtedly the most visible success of the Franco-German reconciliation process. Today, the Office supports more than 11.000 encounters with about 200.000 young participants. And, last but not least, the Franco-German Council on Defense and Security and the Franco-German Economic and Financial Council have been created on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty—as a direct consequence of the institutional approach of the treaty of 1963.

Discussions on the assessment of 45 years of Franco-German cooperation after the signing of the bilateral treaty often center, on the one hand, on the imbalance of the numerous existing common institutions and, on the other hand, on the weak political outcome or sometimes even on the political Franco-German absence of the European or international arena. But first, this basic assumption of “ineffectiveness” of the existing institutions and, thus, of the treaty itself is highly problematic. The overwhelming positive effect of Franco-German cooperation in the context of the European

integration process is beyond doubt, and the always interesting question if, in international politics, individual actors are of greater importance than collective or institutional ones, is a purely theoretical one.

The institutional pressure to cooperate had a long term effect in the bilateral relationship: Today exist intense personal contacts between French and German diplomats that have developed over more than 40 years. The regular exchange of diplomats includes the possible integration of German diplomats in French delegations and vice versa. An instruction in the German Foreign Ministry states that any new head of division has to go to Paris and to introduce himself to his French counterpart. Similarly to the close ties between French and German civil societies, the Franco-German diplomatic network constitutes a kind of a continuum of German foreign policy. If the motivation of the founding fathers of the Franco-German reconciliation, such as Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer and others, was to put an irrevocable end to the liability of Franco-German relations to resolve conflicts of interest by military means, one can just say that they succeeded—and that institutions were pretty much important to achieve this aim.

Necessary conditions for successful institutions: a favorable international context and converging national interests

Apart from the political will of the “founding fathers” of Franco-German reconciliation, the bilateral rapprochement process was directly linked to some conditions. If the first one—the international context—was out of reach for French and German political leaders, the second one—converging national interests of the two countries and their governments—depended directly on the views and convictions of the elected politicians.

The international context was marked by new challenges of the early post-war period. The old system with Europe as the center of power and influence in world politics had been replaced by a bipolar system with multilateral security systems and the upcoming new threat of nuclear weapons. The new security challenges on the hand were completed, at least for the European states, by a difficult economic situation after the Second World War. The reconstruction of the European economies with the long term objective of sustainable economic welfare was at the top of the governmental agendas. France and Germany both chose an integrative approach to respond to these two major challenges and were both members of the most important multilateral institutions of the West: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community. Bilateral institutions as an expression of a direct rapprochement between France and Germany were just as important as the embedding of the

reconciliation process in a multilateral framework of institutions. This means that bilateralism and multilateralism were two sides of the same coin. In the understanding of Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle, bilateralism had to be complementary to the multilateral structures: What was needed was a complementary bilateralism—and not an alternative to NATO or EU. Bilateralism had to be a constructive force and not a destructive concept.

Another, and perhaps the most important condition for the success of the Franco-German bilateralism, was the convergence of the respective national interests as they were perceived at least by the German Chancellor and the French President. With regard to their future relationship, they built their policy on the two basic concepts of control and cooperation. As to the first approach, control, mutual mistrust concerning the political objectives of each other in European and international politics was a very strong motive for close institutional ties on the bilateral level.

Two examples underline the importance of this security-oriented factor. When de Gaulle started his rapprochement policy with regard to Russia in the Sixties, the German Chancellor Erhard feared that he could neglect German interests with regard to security issues and to the transatlantic ties of Western Germany. When German foreign policy paradigms changed under Chancellor Willy Brandt and opened up to the new German Ostpolitik of détente, it was now up to the French President Georges Pompidou to fear a new German nationalism. Both, Erhard and Pompidou, used the Franco-German institutions of consultation to exercise control over the partner's ambitions vis-à-vis Russia.

In security and defense policy, Adenauer did not share the French Gaullist criticism of American leadership in NATO and tried to use Franco-German consultations as a kind of a mediation channel. Mitterrand, 20 years later, defended openly in the German parliament (1981) NATO's "double track decision" against strong criticism of the German Social Democrats—after all the governing party at that time.² In both cases, the one tried to prevent the other from shifting its policy too far in a direction that was perceived as being incompatible with its own national interests.

Control, being a very defensive motive for an effective and sustainable bilateralism, was achieved by the very constructive conviction of many of the French and German political leaders that cooperation would not only contribute to reconciliation and the development of peaceful bilateral relations but would also increase the power and the political impact of one's own country in an international system characterized by multilateral structures—as for

² In December 1979, NATO had offered the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles combined with the threat that in case of disagreement NATO would deploy more middle range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

example the European Community. This was the conviction of the very pro-European Franco-German “couples” of Adenauer/de Gaulle, Schmidt/Giscard d’Estaing or Kohl/Mitterrand; a conviction that was confirmed by the fact that there was no alternative, no other potential bilateral partner with the same political impact or of the same economic relevance. Furthermore, the Franco-German way was a very logical one, since both countries were members of the same multilateral institutions and organizations, such as the European Community, NATO or the Council of Europe. All in all, bilateral cooperation and control in the long term, being two sides of the same coin, were the most important motives for France and Germany to sign the bilateral Elysée Treaty in 1963 and to build up successively the institutional ties that characterize till this day the Franco-German relationship.

Often criticized—sometimes ineffective— all in all indispensable: the long term impact of bilateral institutions

Without the framework of a binding bilateral treaty, being the basis for common Franco-German institutions, the centrifugal forces of national interests could have developed much stronger than they did—with important negative consequences for the reconciliation process and the development of the European integration process.

Today, Franco-German relations suffer from their success: the risk of military conflicts between both countries is close to zero for a long time to come, the reconciliation process has definitely come to its end—and that is exactly the reason why relations between France and Germany have lost their initial impetus. But the serious crises the European Union had to go through during the last 10 years, marked by the biggest enlargement EU ever has realized, show that the most important success of Franco-German cooperation—the realization of the European integration process—can be put into question if France and Germany do not cooperate but compete without making use of the communication channels provided by the existing bilateral institutions.

Franco-German bilateral institutions of the post-war era had two central roles—that are still up-to-date: to get even unwilling politicians to cooperate and to socialize generations of politicians and diplomats in a Franco-German context. The network from this rapprochement over generations guarantees today the sustainability of Franco-German relations—even in a changing international context challenging the results of a successful reconciliation process.

PART 3

UNLOCKING CONFLICT NARRATIVES

The Role of Media in India-Pakistan Relations: A Reflection on Agra Summit

Nazir Hussain

“As a result of their ability to reach and influence large numbers of people, the media carries immense power in shaping course of a conflict. Although many examples of media’s negative contribution to the violent conflict exist, fair and acute journalism and media content that builds confidence and counteracts misperceptions may have a potential in both conflict prevention and transformation.”

Sandra C. Melone, Executive Director European Center for the Common Ground (ECCG)¹

Since the dawn of the information revolution, the electronic and print media has played an important role in the international affairs. Slowly and gradually from an organ of the state propaganda it has assumed the role of an image builder. The “CNN and BBC effect” created a lot of influence for the decision makers and public alike. More than often the media has influenced the policy making in several countries around the world, especially the Gulf War of 1991 described as a media war, and changed the strategic thinking of many leaders around the world.

In the backdrop of conflictual relations between India and Pakistan, having strong historical and ideological roots, media has played an important but negative role in image building of peoples and governments. It has been more than often used as a state propaganda than a news-transmitting medium. However, the forceful emergence of international satellite channels have undermined the state control media in both India and Pakistan, which has compelled

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¹ Sandra D. Melone, “Using the Media for Conflict Transformation: The Common Ground Experience,” *Berghof Handbook For Conflict Transformation*, April 2004.

the domestic media of these two countries to be more factual and analytical.

The Indo/Pakistani media had been reporting events and situations in their respective countries mostly on nationalistic and patriotic lines. But one such event, which changed the role of media from negativity to positivity was Agra Summit between President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee held in July 2001. Fortunately, the chance was provided to personally see and watch the unfolding of the Summit. Some Pakistani academics were invited by the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR), to participate in an India-Pakistan bilateral conference on “Development Perspective in the New Millennium: Forging India-Pakistan Partnership” on July 9-10, 2001 at the Maurya Sheraton hotel in New Delhi. The pre-summit atmosphere was keenly observed as the hotel housed many Pakistani guests. Later, coming back from New Delhi, the PTV invited me to anchor the live discussion programs on the Agra Summit for three days (July 14-16). Therefore, based on this experience, the study highlights the importance of media in the bilateral relations. It also analyzes the crucial role media has played during the summit, and can play in the future of India-Pakistan relations. In this regard the study offers certain recommendations on the responsibilities of the media to create goodwill and positivity between the two countries and their people.

Role of media in Indo-Pakistan relations

The proactive role of media as an actor has become a paramount reality in the contemporary international politics. Today the media has become a weapon, the observers would agree the media can contribute to peace or fuel the conflict. In the case of the subcontinent, in the last few decades the media has made a revolutionary advancement and its influence on public opinions and in shaping the priorities of the policy makers is far higher; in fact playing the role of a moderating variable. What is important to study in the Indo-Pakistani case is either the media exploring the opportunities for peace between the two adversaries or exploiting the opportunities as a shaper of regional political environment. In the words of Yashwant Sinha, India's former External Affairs Minister: “Journalists become co-conspirators in the task of living behind the baggage of hatred, suspicion and violence.”²

In the bilateral context, the role of media is multidimensional. There exist three types of communication networks (Pakistani media, Indian media and International media) which are projecting three

² O.P. Virma, “Task with Pakistan within SAARC regime,” *Deccan Herald*, January 4, 2004.

different perspectives. The international media is projecting the rivalry between two nuclear weapons holders as consequently dangerous not only for the region but also for the world and is raising the concerns of the international community to apply pressure on India and Pakistan to hold a Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) and agree to Confidence Building Measures (CBM). Secondly, both the countries are using the international media as a source of propaganda to demonize each other. In the aftermath of 9/11, Indian leaders began to propagate terrorists' threat to nuclear assets of Pakistan; additionally they succeeded in projecting the Pakistan-supported freedom struggle in Kashmir as Pakistani-backed terrorism. The third dimension is the use of media by the Establishments of both countries in communicating with each other in time of crises and project their sincerity to the world for resolving the issues. For example President Musharraf excessively used the media in the last few years for sending messages to the world and especially India on the Kashmir issue: "Pakistan would set aside its 50 years old demand to implement the Security Council Resolution that troops should be withdrawn from Kashmir and plebiscite held on the question as to whether the province should be a part of India and Pakistan."³

The objective was the persuasion of the international community that Pakistan is a mature and responsible state. Again the past is evident as what role the media played in the Kargil crisis and the 2001-02 stand-off. Finally, the independent role of media is "double edged" as it is harming as well as helping the CBMs. The captions which the media of one country display have a symbolic status for the other and eventually invite reaction. At the time of 12th SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) Summit in Islamabad in 2004, an article by Absar Alam in the Nation entitled "The Ego has landed" (Vajpayee being the "Ego") suggested that India was driving the current move toward normalization.⁴ In response to Pakistan's conciliatory gestures of normalization, the *Times of India* asserted: "Does Musharraf like the taste of his own words? Or do domestic compulsions make him eat them. Whatever, the Pakistani President has made it a habit of backtracking on his grand gestures—gives it to him, he makes them often. But then he takes them away."⁵

In view of the role played by the media at the Agra Summit, both the countries avoided the media at the 2004 SAARC Summit. Analysts view that the Agra Summit failed because of the media coverage. One Indian analyst, Smruti S. Pattanaik, noted: "If the past is any indicator, the Agra Summit failed since every thing was done under the media glare, which raised not only expectations but also

³ David Logan and Stuart Croft, "Seizing the Ripe Moment: Building Confidence and Security in South Asia," *Disarmament Forum*, No. 2, 2004.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ C. R. Jayachandren, "What makes Musharraf eats his words," *The Times of India*, December 19, 2003.

created apprehensions. To quote the former External Affairs Minister of India, “there is an assurance; there is a certain situation on the ground. And we are proceeding on the basis of the assurance and the ground situation as we see it.”⁶

Today, media power is a reality that cannot be wished away. Political leaders have by and large come to terms with the new media realities in the rough and tumble of domestic politics. It is high time that the diplomatic establishment also recognizes the new media imperatives. Working with the internet and the electronic media could generate “force multipliers” for diplomacy and working against them would only produce negative outcomes. As emphasized by Raja Mohan, then strategic editor of *The Hindu*: “Getting the foreign policy set-up to imbibe the virtues of public diplomacy must be a key element of the long overdue security sector reforms in India.”⁷

The role of Indian media in the past conflicts

The defeat of Pakistan in the 1971 India-Pakistan war led to a major upheaval in the nation’s society, armed forces and body politics.⁸ A major part of this collapse can be attributed to the closed and patriotic nature of the restricted and controlled Pakistani media. Walled up against the unpleasant truth, fed on overbearing statements of the political leadership, Pakistani society just could not accept the defeat. Likewise, when fighting first broke out in Kargil, the Indian Army responded by keeping all journalists out. The ban appeared to have been as a consequence of the 15 Corp (Indian Army Units responsible for Kashmir Sector) being as confused as anyone else about exactly what was happening in Kargil, and not wanting journalists to get hurt. On the night of June 4, the Indian Army Headquarters abruptly cancelled permits to journalists to travel. No clear reasons were given for the decision but senior army officials in New Delhi privately put forward some claims. Photographs that had appeared in some newspapers and magazines, they said, had exposed Indian gun positions. In the absence of any answers to questions, let alone lucid and fact-based answers to uncomfortable questions, journalists rely on sources who believe all is not proceeding well on the Kargil front as the Army’s official spokesperson would have them think.⁹

During the Kargil conflict, Indian media persons used satellite phones and carried cameras right up to the gun heads to their great

⁶ Smruti Pattanaik, “Indo-Pak Relations and the SAARC Summit,” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 28, No. 3, July-September 2004.

⁷ C. Raja Mohan, “Media and Foreign Policy,” *The Hindu*, New Delhi. July 23, 2001.

⁸ Media Handout, Defense Services Staff College, Wellington 1998.

⁹ *Frontline*, Vol. 16, No. 14, July 3-16, 1999.

professional advantage.¹⁰ So, the consequences of a reporter equipped with a ultra-lightweight camera, able to transmit live on to a news network from anywhere in the world, cannot be understated and has brought media to the dawn of what Nik Gowing has described as “the tyranny of real time news.” He further adds that “This is the new reality. The media beaming back, uncontrolled before even the first signals are received in national capital.”¹¹ In 1999, the STAR and ZEE channels transmitted the triumphs and tribulations of the events and tension surrounding the hijacking of IC 814 right into the homes of the people.¹² For the first time people realized that these events were not something which were being tackled by just the military or diplomats in some far-off lands but were happening right in their minds. The tremendous media pressure during the hijacking of IC 814 virtually coaxed the government into taking the diplomatic initiative and secures the release of the passengers.¹³

Role of Pakistani media

The primary electronic media vehicles before August 2002 in Pakistan were Radio Pakistan and Pakistan Television (PTV), both under the control of incumbent governments. On August 14, 2002 GEO television network started its transmission and then the Pakistani space was bombarded with a number of new private channels. The state achieves its needful objectives of building public opinion through information, publicity and propaganda. As a mass medium, radio’s role cannot also be underestimated. Pakistan has a sizeable population residing in the rural areas, out of reach of electricity and other modern amenities. Radio programs are beamed from different broadcasting stations, mostly in the national language. It covers 75 percent area and 95 percent population of the country. A growing number of FM radio stations are also broadcasting but their ranges are far less as compared to the AM radio stations. The mode of education through television differs in its manner and organization.¹⁴ Pakistan opted for television as a mass information and entertainment medium in 1964, which was much ahead of its neighbors. This early start has given television in Pakistan strong headway in terms of expertise, talent and technical competitiveness. PTV with its five production centers and 32 transmitters covers 87.07

¹⁰ Ajay K. Rai, “Military-Media Interface: Changing Paradigms New Challenges,” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIV, No. 5, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, p. 902.

¹¹ Nik. Gowing, “Conflict, Military and the Media-a new Optimism,” *The Officer*, May-June 1997.

¹² Ajay K. Rai, “Military- Media Interface: Changing Paradigms New Challenges,” *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. XXIV, No. 5, August 2000, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, p. 901.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 904.

¹⁴ Douglas V. Johnson II, “The Impact of the Media on National Security Policy Decision Making,” US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 3.

percent of the total population and an area equal to 36.36 percent of the total area of the country. The new era in this field started when private channels started their transmissions and were being broadcast through cable network.

However, if we critically analyze the role of Pakistani media in the past wars/crises vis-à-vis India, the coverage of news has been so monotonous that people started disbelieving the facts and figures given by electronic media.¹⁵ It took no initiative to draw attention and convince foreign media and countries.¹⁶

The media during Agra Summit

The present day world is hostage to information technology, where the print and electronic media play an important role in making and breaking an event. The Agra Summit between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee was rightly termed as a media summit, where about 500 media teams were present and wanted to be the first to break the news. Under these circumstances of “becoming the first,” sensationalism and irresponsibility is a natural outcome. I was lucky enough to be a witness to both Indian and Pakistani media before and during the summit and of course its aftermath, therefore a participant observer of the whole exercise. Prior to the summit I happened to be in New Delhi seeing/reading the media and meeting people, both elite and commoners.

Out of the five major news channels of India, only one was giving balanced and objective reporting. Thus the other four channels were instrumental in creating the euphoria about the forthcoming summit. Almost the same was the case of the print media. The English newspapers (not all) were more objective and responsible than the vernacular newspapers, which were playing with the sentiments of the Indian people. However, both the elite and popular perception in the Indian capital was favorable towards the summit and normalization of relations between India and Pakistan.

The pre-summit mood and projections were very positive. The *Times of India* editorially stated “Adab Araz Pervez” (Welcome Pervez) and *The Indian Express* warned that “Indo-Pak talk must not end up as talks about talks.” Even during the talks *The Hindu* reported “Hope rise for a productive summit,”¹⁷ and *The Times of India* stated “[...] the expectation is soaring [...] breakthrough is possible history is in the making [...] the Wagah wall is next to fall after the Berlin Wall.”¹⁸

¹⁵ Vijay Menon, *Role of Media in a National Crisis*, Singapore, AMIC, 1993, p. vii.

¹⁶ “The Media Invasion-Where do we stand today?” *The News*, April 9, 1997.

¹⁷ *The Hindu*, July 15, 2001.

¹⁸ *The Times of India*, July 16, 2001.

The progress of the summit, especially the “one-to-one talks” for six hours in four sessions, first without any official statements and then counter-statements by Indian and Pakistani spokespersons, created more vagueness than clarity. This resulted in creating theories and conjectures by the media in order to be the first. Likewise, President Musharraf’s image from an architect of Kargil to a flexible and accommodative person, then a relaxed human being and then a hard-liner, was all because of the media projection. President Musharraf’s meeting with the Indian media personalities being termed as a “media coup” by the Indian officials, was also as a result of the media’s eagerness to be the first.

While coming back from New Delhi, we saw a sea of media people coming from Pakistan, who had their own perception and views about the summit and normalization, which were portrayed in their writings back home. The eagerness to extract news from the Indian officials also resulted in an unfortunate but avoidable incident in New Delhi. The write-ups, reports and stories printed in the English and Urdu press showed a marked division in the perception, approach and projection of the summit. Prime Minister Vajpayee being portrayed as ill, exhausted and vulnerable presented a bleak situation of the summit. This underscores the commonality of media’s approach both in India and Pakistan. On the other side, PTV (in the absence of any private channel) alone had to counter more than five news channels of India and that too without a well-planned policy. The marathon transmission for three days was mixed with opposing views between the hawks and the doves, notwithstanding the centrality of the Kashmir issue. PTV tried to be as balanced and objective as possible, depending on the stories coming from across the border. The subsequent press conferences by the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan, and later President Musharraf’s press conference truly depicted the hardline positions of respective journalists from both sides. It also showed the vulnerability of the leaders and the people to the media.

The above account is not in any way to put the blame for the failure of the summit on the media but to provide an insight into the role of the media in meeting their professional responsibilities in an extremely competitive environment, which also led to over-role in shaping public opinion and formulation of perceptions. At the same time, it also imposes a responsibility on the media to shape the environment for better relations between the two countries.

Nobody can deny the disagreement in the context and approach of the two countries on a host of issues and problems including Kashmir but nobody can also deny the fact of the desire and willingness of the two countries and people to solve their outstanding issues and bring peace and normalcy to the region. A region which otherwise is studded with poverty and underdevelopment, requires peace and stability for growth and sustainability under the threat of globalization. The majority of the people associated with the media in both the countries is responsible and has their respective views and

perceptions, which everyone respects but nobody is bound to subscribe to these views. The media is an important medium of image formulation; therefore, this importance places the responsibility on the media to project objectivity with fairness. It was the media which raised the hopes and expectations of the people of the two countries about the summit, it was the media which portrayed the summit as a failure, despite the two leaders claiming inconclusiveness, and it is the media which initiated the blame-game.

“The breakfast media coup”

“The carnivalesque flavor to Agra came to an unceremonious end because the media failed to emphasize the process of peace.”¹⁹ After the failure of Agra Summit the question which was being asked “How it turned out to be the way it did?” “Who would have done it?” and “who has killed it,” both in India and Pakistan.²⁰ Both Indian and Pakistani nations were hoping that the meeting would usher in a new era of friendly relations between the two countries. Media emphasized the historic nature of the summit, and importantly the Indian/Pakistani icons were finally granted much deserved recognition by the other Media, also highlighting the historical role of Mahatma Gandhi and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Pakistani public was informed for the first time in their history that Mahatma Gandhi had played a positive role in the independence movement and Pakistani nation should appreciate it. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was also spared the negative imagery and quoted for his worthwhile ideas. But then suddenly everything came to a sudden halt.

All that the official spokesperson could say at the end of it all was: “I am disappointed to announce that though the commencement of a process and the beginning of a journey has taken place, the destination of an agreed joint statement has not been reached.”²¹ Briefing could not be briefer than that. And it all happened because of media only.²² Can we blame it on the stars or the media coup during the Agra Summit?

The annihilation of time and space through instantaneous transmission of images has given a power to media that it had enjoyed never before. Nobody actually saw what transpired between Lal Bahadur Shastri and Ayub Khan at Tashkent in January 1966 or between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indira Gandhi at Shimla in July 1972. But when Atal Bihari Vajpayee and General Pervez Musharraf met in Agra, umpteen number of TV cameras were taking pictures of their

¹⁹ Samina Yasmeen, “Agra Summit: Did the Media Play Spoiler at the Agra Party?” *The Indian Express*, July 25, 2001.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ “Impact of Media On India’s Diplomatic Initiatives,” *Rocw.raifoundation.org*.

²² Ibid.

famous handshake and no one has forgotten the kind of analysis that went across the TV channels to discuss their body language. It was simultaneously beamed across all over the world and, given the fact that India-Pakistan border has become a nuclear flash point endangering the whole world, the Western media was also giving it a due coverage. But what actually will go down in the history of television reporting as a watershed was Prannoy Roy managing to procure the tape of Musharraf's breakfast meeting with select editors of the Indian press for telecast on Star news. The NDTV (New Delhi Television) at that time was content provider of Rupert Murdoch's Star News. Whether the Pakistani leader transformed his informal breakfast meeting in Agra with select Indian editors into a publicity exercise or not is matter of debate. But the "breakfast media coup" seemed like a well-planned military-style operation. The select group of Indian editors had no clue that they were walking into a trap. They were given a simple three-line faxed invitation from the President of Pakistan that he wanted to have "informal" talks with them. Prannoy Roy of NDTV was also among those invited. According to a news report, half way through the meeting, Mr. Roy noticed a PTV camera recording the proceedings. About 10 minutes before the interaction ended, he sent a note through a waiter to the Pakistani officials at the head table, asking if he could get a copy. When the meeting ended at 10:50 am, Mr. Roy went to the cameraman and asked to borrow the tape and make a copy. The cameraman turned to a PTV official standing nearby, who gave the permission on condition that he would send another man with Mr. Roy to get the master tape back. Mr. Roy virtually ran the short distance from Amar Vilas to Taj Khema (both hotels), where the NDTV studio was located; all the time worried that someone might stop him. Whether this was a "stealth" gambit that the General sprang in a commando fashion or it happened without his knowledge or tacit permission is again debatable. But the momentous impact that it had on the summit is all known to us. The summit ended in a failure and Musharraf had to return empty handed.

So the event, recorded only by PTV, was not meant for immediate telecast. But Prannoy Roy sensing the opportunity persuaded Pakistani officials to lend him the only copy of the recording. The result was a media coup for Star News and something, which dominated the Agra skyline for the rest of the day. After some time the thing started to come out that when Musharraf started talking to media the Indian decided to give him a tough time and not to let him take anything back with him but that proved to be disinformation.

Was media a right entity to blame for the failure?

Putting all the blame on the media is not the right thing because the failure of the summit is quite simple, i.e. Vajpayee himself and his cabinet hard-liners (led by Advani) were operating on different lines. The hard-liners wanted to give nothing on Kashmir and even though Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh twice agreed on the Kashmir clauses of the draft joint declaration, on both the occasions he, and his Prime Minister, was vetoed by the hawks. For the Pakistani press, that is what happened at Agra.²³

For the first time since Kargil, the burden of narrow-mindedness and provocation shifted clearly to the Indian shoulders. During the summit's final hours, Pakistani newsmen in mobile contact with members of the Pakistan delegation sensed a growing feeling of anger and frustration at India's delaying tactics. Twice, it was said, Jaswant Singh had gone back on his own draft. As rumor flew thick and fast, what had already been an extraordinary summit showed every sign of turning into a screen thriller. To add to the sense of drama came word at this point that General Musharraf wanted to address Pakistani journalists but was being prevented from doing so by the Indian side. The air quickly filled with a hint of raw patriotism but the tension subsided with the news that Musharraf had left for Agra airport.

The media headlines

Some of the cuttings taken from different newspapers from India and Pakistan give a deeper understanding of Agra failure and the role of media if there is any in its failure. Journalists mentioned the nuclear dimension of the India-Pakistan rivalry only in passing. While Indian and Pakistani writers reported that the two sides came "very close to clinching an agreement" at Agra, their analyses made it clear that a two-day summit could not bridge the "chasm [...] over the key issues of Kashmir and cross-border terrorism." Editorials illustrated the parties' vastly different perceptions of those issues. The centrist *Indian Express*, for example, asserted that Pakistan would need to relinquish its "main bargaining chip" i.e., its "support to cross-border terrorism."²⁴ Conversely, Pakistan's second-largest paper, *Nawa-e-Waqt*, declared that "Pakistan should give more patronage to jihad movements," since "India will not agree to anything within the context

²³ Ayaz Amir, "What more could we have asked for?", *Dawn*, July 20, 2001.

²⁴ *Indian Express*, July 19, 2001.

of a dialogue unless it is brought under pressure through jihad and diplomatic campaign.”²⁵

The *Hindustan Times* ran “India: Life beyond Agra” by senior Congress leader and former External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh (July 19): “The General has won the media war and lost the diplomatic one. He sees life in black and white terms. No grey areas for him. You either agree with him, or you don’t. If you don’t, so much the worse for you. He failed to comprehend the depth and strength of our secular, democratic polity. He has much to learn. As for us, do we deserve this meandering feebleness [of Indian officials], this leisurely incoherence, this dissolving vision, this unforgivable diplomatic unpreparedness, this imprudent reticence, this hazy grasp of reality? No, we don’t. For heaven’s sake put up a better show at the next step of the steep Indo-Pak staircase. Keep the peace process alive and keep your powder dry, Atalji. The road to peace is narrow and slippery.”

The *Asian Age* held (July 19); “The fact remains that the two leaders might have appeared committed to the process but their colleagues had second thoughts which managed to end the two-day summit without even a written resolve to meet again. The United States has also come out in support of the summit and has taken a magnanimous view of the end result; pointing out that the meeting itself was a major beginning. The two leaders will now have to ensure that the future does not get eclipsed by the same issues that have kept the two countries apart for over 50 years.” In a column titled “Engaging Pakistan: After Agra,” strategic affairs editor C. Raja Mohan commented in *The Hindu* (July 19); “The long-term success of India’s engagement with Pakistan will depend on a four-pronged strategy [...] First, India needs to overcome the parity syndrome [...] If India can lift itself up, it can get a totally different perspective on Pakistan [...] Second, India must always retain the initiative [...] In inviting Gen. Musharraf, taking unilateral initiatives in the run up to the summit, and in handling the outcome; India has shown a different temperament today. India has finally begun to discover the value of taking unilateral steps that might help redefine the context of the ties with Pakistan [...] Third, India needs to separate its Pakistan policy from emotionalism [...] India should not expect dramatic advances in its relationship with Pakistan. Instead, it must concentrate on a process of patient engagement that would let one concrete step follow another. Finally, India needs to work with the broader global forces to transform the relations with Pakistan. India has a great advantage in letting the forces of globalization transform the economic and political context of Indo-Pakistan relations. It is in India’s strategic interest to promote regional economic integration in the subcontinent and facilitate cross-border and trans-national projects such as natural gas pipelines [...] India needs to work closely

²⁵ *Nawa-e-Waqt*, July 19, 2001.

with the major powers to prevent its neighbor from heading down the path of a failed state. India alone does not have the power to transform the internal dynamics of Pakistan. Only a cooperative endeavor between India and the major powers can produce stable arrangements that will help Pakistan overcome its current internal difficulties. A Pakistan at peace with itself and its neighbors will dramatically transform the regional situation.”

The *Pioneer*, a daily sympathetic to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), ran “Kashmir at Breakfast, Lunch and Dinner” by former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan G. Parthasarthy (July 19): “New Delhi’s approach in dealing with General Musharraf has been both mature and restrained. It is however important to ensure that restraint is not mistaken for weakness across the border. Further, the diplomatic pressure on Pakistan needs to be maintained as long as jihadi outfits operating from its territory, or from Taliban controlled Afghanistan, continue to act with impunity, whether in Kashmir, the Ferghana Valley or Chechnya. It would be naive to believe that the optimism voiced after the summit by Jaswant Singh in Agra, or by Abdul Sattar in Islamabad, is in any way going to weaken the nexus between the ISI and the jihadi outfits they support.”

The *Telegraph* ran “And so to the sticking points” by leftist columnist Achin Vanaik (July 19): “We will probably have to settle for the hope that more skilful diplomacy, a greater sense of urgency on the part of the two governments, and stronger public pressure/sentiment, can all combine to produce another modest step forward. Maintaining this momentum may then eventually lead to that self-questioning which alone can end the self-righteous hypocrisies of both governments and much of their elite backing. That alone will bring about the conditions in which a lasting, because just, peace for all, including Kashmiris, might be forged.”

In Pakistan, the center-right *Nation* editorialized (July 19); “Foreign Ministers Abdul Sattar and Jaswant Singh have done a reasonably good job of sweeping the debris of the collapsed Agra Summit under the carpet. It is reassuring to learn from the similarity of their basic messages that the Summit did not break down irrevocably, and that whatever may have transpired in Agra on Monday and on Tuesday in Islamabad and New Delhi, both countries are intent on taking a positive view of events [...] With hindsight, the Agra Summit was perhaps doomed not to produce an agreement. Two days was probably not enough to produce an agreement on Kashmir [...] There is no easy solution to the Kashmir issue, and it requires great wisdom and statesmanship on the Indian side to realize that the key is not just Kashmir, but the Kashmiri people, whose aspirations have to be satisfied. Hopefully [...] Mr. Vajpayee and his colleagues reach that realization.”

Broaching the domestic fallout, an op-ed by Syed Talat Hussain in Karachi-based, *Dawn*, asserted (July 19): “The two sides came very close to clinching an agreement but then moved apart,

going back to their traditional positions. In the midst of the vows to meet again and keep talks going lies the hard fact that Agra has little to show for itself by way of tangible foreign policy results. For the time being, attention has to be focused on the failed summit's domestic impact [...] Agra is unique in the sense that it does not have any substantive effect on General Musharraf's position at home. His domestic challenges and tasks are not any tougher or easier in the wake of the Agra summit. The opposition to his rule is not any stronger now than it was before he left for Agra [...] There is little advantage that the opposition has gained out of the Agra debacle. At home he is still the man in charge because in Agra he gained nothing and lost nothing."

An editorial in the Peshawar-based, independent, *Frontier Post* held (July 18): "President General Musharraf's departure from Agra was in sharp contrast to the manner of his arrival [...] The interaction between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee appears to have been largely positive but failed to move the process to even a minimum satisfactory conclusion. This interaction is scheduled to resume on the sidelines of the UN General Sessions Assembly in New York in September, and the invitation to Mr. Vajpayee to visit Pakistan later this year still stands [...] The situation is fraught with new risks. One such risk is that the tensions along the LoC and the freedom fighters' actions inside Indian-held Kashmir may escalate in the days ahead."

An editorial ("Bang & Whimper at Agra") in *Dawn* said on July, 18: "One only hope that the intense disappointment the two sides are now feeling will give way to some pragmatism. After all, the sentiments in favor of peace, stability and cooperation, which were expressed by the leaders of India and Pakistan during the weekend, cannot be brushed aside as mere wishful [...] This is also a time when a new pattern of global politics is emerging as China and Russia join in a friendship treaty. In this situation, it is not wise for India and Pakistan to remain locked in their decades-old confrontational posture."

Conclusion

Now what should be done? Do we require brainwashing or sermonizing? Nothing of the sort. Every powerful institution or person when placed in a position of authority, where the future and destinies of over one billion people rests on their stroke, naturally become responsible. Because their own future and place in history depends on their positive approach and they would not liked to be named as spoilers of peace in history. How many more wars do we have to create to realize the importance of peace for humanity? As wars are created in the minds before these are fought on the battlefields, there is a need and call of the time to remove hatred and misconceptions in

order to avoid any future wars, which this time may be a nuclear one. A responsible media can remove the hatred and wars from the minds.

But how could an already responsible media be more responsible? Yes, professionalism requires objectivity and a positive outlook. We can project and highlight the positive without hiding the truth. The media can become an important source of creating harmony between the people of the two countries. It can also create a conducive socio-political environment for further improvement of relations between the two countries. If hatreds are removed from minds, then wars can be substituted by negotiations and arguments in a mature and friendly manner. We think the media from both sides can do this for the well-being of not only South Asia but also for the entire humanity to make its imprint in history.

This brings us to the role of civil society for peace and stability in the region, which is a corollary of the above. A better educated and conscious populace would always place survival with better socio-economic conditions first, which can only come through the absence of wars and its preparations. Here again the role of the media is very important in creating positive images for an effective civil society, which will have its voice and role in decision-making of both these countries. When we talk of civil society, we mean one not distanced from the people's interests, national sentiments, its pride and prestige, but also a civil society which takes along all these in destroying the false images, wrong perceptions and hollow pride in order to create genuine peace and harmony between the two governments. Till the time people's stakes are not involved in creating peace and stability, the governments and bureaucracies which have thrived on conflict-mongering cannot bring about lasting peace between the two countries and cannot work for conflict resolution. Sixty years of wars and conflicts have made them lose the meanings of peace and harmony. It is the responsibility of civil society to help them realize the better fruits of peace than wars.

By peace one does not mean cowardliness and seeking refuge from realities, by peace we mean development and well-being of the people of South Asia. This is a moment of truth. Let us be very frank and candid, peace must be a strategic choice and war as an exception. Both the media and civil society are important for the future of India and Pakistan. These two institutions can form the basis of psycho-social understanding and mutual trust between the governments and peoples of the two countries. Some people who would be knowledgeable and better informed, may disagree on the course of action to pursue and may not become instrumental in taking the right decisions, but can definitely create an environment to help prevent their respective governments taking wrong decisions.

Communicating and Exchanging Peace Narratives through Art and Culture

Shahid Nadeem and Madeeha Gauhar

This paper is an attempt to share the experience of Ajoka Theatre's challenging but exciting years of performing and touring for peace in Pakistan and India. Ajoka was set up in 1984 during the oppressive rule of General Zia-ul-Haq but both of the authors were involved with theatre for social change much before that. While Ajoka Theatre and other similar groups faced harassment and restrictions in the 1980s, they persevered and survived until the political conditions changed. The theatre movement had a secular and progressive character and was deeply committed to peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan. We will also refer to like-minded Indian groups who were willing to reach out to Pakistani colleagues to build bridges.

In the first section of the paper, we shall discuss the impact of the Partition of India in 1947 which turned communal hatred, historical distortion and stereotyping on religious grounds into an ideology, and created tensions and disputes which led to two full-scale wars. Pakistan unnecessarily surrendered a large part of united India's rich cultural heritage and was obliged to create a non-India Pakistan Ideology. Pakistan began looking west in order to find a cultural identity different from India but the natural cultural bonds could never be broken by government policy or propaganda and indoctrination in schools. The "Islamic Ideology" of Pakistan operated in all walks of life during the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. The arrival of free and vibrant media and new technology which enabled free communication between countries loosened the grip of state ideologies and gave a boost to cultural interaction in the 2000s.

In the second section of the paper, we will trace the "theatre for peace movement" from its inception in the mid-1980s. We will then focus on the post-2000 period when due to domestic economic and political compulsions and international pressure, the two countries

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embarked on a sustained process of rapprochement. We will show how the cultural groups, who had been struggling to reach out to their colleagues across the border, jumped at the opportunity and fully exploited the relaxed policies of the two governments. The cross-border exchanges grew at a dramatic speed. We will narrate the Ajoka story in some detail, recounting our interaction and collaboration with the like-minded Indian groups over two decades. We will share the experiences of performing in India and hosting Indian groups in Pakistan, especially since 2001 and also briefly touch upon the themes of some of the plays. In the third section, we will link Ajoka's peace initiatives with the efforts made by other cultural groups in both countries and the impact of such exchanges on the peace process, including film-makers, singers, artists, writers and students. We will urge that these initiatives were the only civil society initiatives, and the two governments only facilitated by relaxing the visa restrictions. Because of this widespread cultural interaction, a momentum has been created which the governments can not reverse. We will list the achievements of this cooperation and also make a mention of some hurdles we have encountered. We will conclude by pointing towards the challenges ahead.

Heritage divided

The year 1947 has been a reference point for the people of South Asia, evoking simultaneously the jubilation and pride at the achievement of freedom from colonial rule and pain and horror at the unimaginable bloodshed which accompanied Partition. While in India Partition was mourned as an act of tearing apart of Mother India, in Pakistan it marked the birth of a new state for Muslims of India created in the face of opposition from both the British and the Hindus. The ideologues of the new State of Pakistan had to develop an ideology and rationale for the Muslim-majority state carved out of united India. During the Pakistan movement, the contours of the new country could only be vaguely defined as a land for Muslims where they could practice their religion and preserve their cultural and religious identity, which was distinctly different from and irreconcilable with the Hindu-majority India. Pakistan had to be a land with a culture, language and history of its own, having no commonality with India. Henceforth, all evidence of shared culture, art, values and heritage had to be deliberately suppressed even at the cost of denying obvious historical and social realities. Pakistan, in fact, was painted as "non-India."

This irrational, even pathological denial of the common linguistic, cultural and historical affinities caused serious problems in the development of a Pakistani cultural identity and the self-perception of the people. Not only did they have to surrender the art forms and cultural heritage which they shared with India, they were also required to abandon their own language and ethnic identity in

favor of a united Pakistani identity. They were supposed to be “not Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis, Pashtuns, Bengalis, but Pakistanis with one language and one religion.”

Partition also led to an almost total exodus of Hindu and Sikh artists and intellectuals from West Pakistan. This was particularly devastating for Punjab and the cultural capital of northwest India, Lahore. Before Partition, Lahore was a famous center of theatre, film, music and other performing arts and Hindu and Sikh artists played a prominent role in the cultural life of the city. After 1947, they were forced to migrate, leaving behind a huge cultural void which was never filled.

The Establishment, eagerly supported by the conservative media and rightwing political parties, did not stop at drawing a clear line between us and them. It went on to demonize the other as the scheming and greedy Hindus and the violent and foolish Sikhs. The textbooks drew pictures of Indians who had always been plotting against Muslims to avenge the thousand years of subjugation. Newspaper articles and editorials lashed at the Indian (read Hindu) atrocities against Indian Muslims and Muslims of Occupied Kashmir. Politicians waved their patriotic fists and vowed to hoist the Pakistani flag on the Red Fort.

The two wars and the near-war situations and complete and prolonged closure of borders reinforced this “demonization” process. Amritsar appeared to be further than planet Mars and Sikhs were greater strangers than aliens. Apart from All India Radio music programs and later, Doordarshan dramas and Bollywood movies, there was hardly any cultural contact between the people of the two countries. On the other hand, the only window of Pakistani cultural activity for the people of India was the popularity of Pakistan Television (PTV) dramas in the border areas where PTV signals could reach.

It can be claimed that despite all efforts, the cultural bonds between the people of the two countries, especially the artists and intellectuals, remained strong, though not publicly admitted. Pakistani writers found ways of obtaining the works of Indian Urdu and Punjabi writers. Bollywood movies were available for the Pakistani public and artists. Music could cross borders without much trouble. The 1971 break-up of Pakistan was a devastating blow for the two-nation theory. It had a demoralizing effect on the anti-India lobby in the new Pakistan. The growing influence of leftwing politics and the progressive policies of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government also strengthened the secular lobby, which challenged the domination of the religion-based Indo-phobic patriotism. That was also the time when the post-Partition generation, which did not have the traumatic baggage of the Partition, had taken charge. There was a willingness to re-establish contact with the enemy across the border. Even when democracy in Pakistan received a serious set-back in 1977 and a fundamentalist military ruler took over, this process continued.

Shatrugan Sinha's visit to meet Zia-ul-Haq and his family [S. Sinha was then a top male Bollywood film star who later joined the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and even became a Cabinet minister in Vajpayee's government] was the most publicized event in the early 1980s, while informal cultural and social contacts kept on growing quietly.

However during the Zia era, a parallel process was initiated at the time of the Afghan war against the Soviets. Pakistan began establishing strong links with Western Muslim neighbors for defense and economic reasons. But it also had an ideological motive i.e. to strengthen the bonds of the Ummah, the Islamic community. That was the time when the Islamic cultural identity of Pakistan was aggressively asserted with the help of the military ruler.

The media explosion in the 1990s gave a big boost to cross-border cultural contacts, without crossing the borders. VCRs and the Internet had already led to a huge video shop industry, mostly thriving on Bollywood. Now Indian channels became accessible to Pakistani viewers all over the country and the Pakistani audience got hooked to Indian movies and the never-ending Indian TV soaps. Pakistani private channels also came on board, though their access to Indian channels remained limited. Pakistani singers and pop music bands made some inroads in India. Governments on both sides did not support such exchanges but due to popular enthusiasm for such exchanges they did not actively resist it. Now that the people could watch each other's dramas and films and enjoy live music performances from across the borders, the process of de-demonization began.

The advent of the 21st century brought the two nuclear powers to an eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation. However, the prospect of another devastating war caused alarm within the region as well as the world. That was the beginning of a slow but consistent process of rapprochement. Civil society groups, intellectuals, artists and certain business lobbies paved the way for the process of peace-building. The Islamabad Declaration of 2004 was a watershed in this regard. The composite dialogue in the past four years may not have led to the resolution of main conflicts, but it gave a boost to the people-to-people contact and created a momentum for peace which at present looks irreversible. The most dramatic has been the proliferation of cultural, commercial and academic contacts between the Punjabis of East and West Punjab. The sight of Sukhbir Singh or Hans Raj Hans singing to ecstatic crowds in Lahore, exchange visits of students from Lahore and Amritsar, cross-border participation in cricket matches and dramatic growth in the sizes of jathas and zaireens crossing borders for pilgrimage were impossible to conceive even a few years ago. 2007 marked the 60th anniversary of independence and the 150th anniversary of the 1857 War of Independence. It was surprising to note that unlike the 50th anniversary in 1997, the focus on both sides seemed to be on Partition, its causes and consequences rather than the success of

anti-colonial struggle and independence. On both sides, seminars were held books were published and plays were performed on issues relating to Partition. The 1857 commemoration also focused on the non-communal nature of the uprising.

The enthusiastic participation of artists in cultural festivals held in Pakistan such as Ajoka's Panjpaani Indo-Pak Theatre Festival and Rafi Peer Performing Arts Festivals and similar festivals across the border (Manch Rangmanch's Theatre Festival and Punarjyot's Sanjh Festival) and the emotional response from the audience removed any doubts about the public support for the peace process.

The most recent phenomenon has been the growing cooperation in the show business. It started with very successful and financially attractive tours of pop singers from both sides (more so from the Pakistani side) and exchanges between theatre groups. There were charity fund-raisers and fashion shows where stars from both sides participated. The media boom contributed a great deal. The private TV and FM radio channels, not bound by the government policies or priorities, focused on art and culture of the other side and debated issues of common interest. Cooperation in the field of film is most significant because of the power and popularity of cinema in the region. Co-productions, screening of films from across the border, and actors acting in films from the other side heralded the beginning of a new era of cultural cooperation.

The Ajoka story

When the Lahore-Delhi bus service started in 2001, a 20-member strong Ajoka team was on it, with a project to perform its play ("Aik Thee Naani") in Delhi. This was a happy new phase in Ajoka Theatre's determined and consistent interaction with the Indian theatre community and struggle for the cause of peace. They sang peace songs while the bus crossed the Wagha border, while the Pakistan Rangers and Indian Border Security Force personnel looked on with unease.

Ajoka was formed in 1984 in Lahore when General Zia-ul-Haq's military regime was at its oppressive peak. The anti-India Pakistan Ideology was a key factor of the government policy and was being fully backed by the state-owned PTV and the right-wing print media. It was no coincidence that Ajoka's first play was "Jaloos," written by Indian socialist playwright/director Badal Sircar. The radical political message of the play, conveyed through an innovative form, caused a stir in the culturally-starved city of Lahore. Ajoka's objectives from the very beginning included promotion of peace between India and Pakistan and working for a democratic and secular Pakistan. The independent print media, especially the English papers, gave very positive reviews and announced the arrival of "alternative" theatre in Pakistan. In the beginning Ajoka's plays were held in a

house lawn as no theatre hall owner was willing to provide the venue for plays which were critical of the military regime and which raised issues such as fundamentalism and war-mongering. The intelligence agencies did register their presence at the performances (though they were not advertised in the press and were by invitation only) and the founders of the group were harassed and victimized. Later, Ajoka was able to find a safe haven in the Goethe Institute, Lahore where it built a mud open-air stage and performed its plays for the next 13 years.

Although Ajoka's founders already had personal contacts with Indian theatre activists. Ajoka's first contact with its Indian counterparts began in 1988 when a civil society organization ASR held a theatre workshop which included Indian theatre personalities including Badal Sircar, Safdar Hashmi, Rathi Bartholomew, Maya Rao and Anuradha Bhasin. The Pakistani participants included Ajoka and Punjab Lok Rehas. Indian guests included eminent and experienced theatre people with a rich experience of experimental, folk, community, dance and street theatre. Discussions and theatre exercises with them gave invaluable insight to the Pakistani theatre activists who till then had very little exposure to theatre outside Pakistan. This workshop also established contacts and friendships that continued in the coming years and resulted in several collaborative projects. Rathi Bartholomew returned a few months later to direct a play for Ajoka (Shahid Nadeem's "Jhalli Kithay Javay") which was later performed not only in Pakistan but also India, Bangladesh and Nepal. Anuradha Bhasin also worked with Ajoka and a Nepali group to produce a collaborative play "The Sixth River" for the PP21 event in Bangkok. The play was written in several South Asian languages and its theme was the devastation and suffering caused by communal hatred and wars.

The tragic and brutal murder of Safdar Hashmi in 1989, only a few months after the Lahore workshop, was a great shock for his Pakistani theatre friends. When Safdar's theatre group Jan Natya Manch and his theatre colleagues organized a festival to pay tribute to Safdar, Ajoka made a surprise and remarkable appearance in Delhi to perform its play on bonded labor "Itt" at Delhi's Mandi House. Next day, a four-column photograph of the performance was on the front page of *The Times of India*, announcing the beginning of Pak-India theatre collaboration to the utter shock of the authorities from both sides. Ajoka members had obtained visas on individual basis. "Itt" was a great hit as several performances were organized at campuses and factories. The group received encouragement from the Indian Bonded Labor Front which were actively engaged in securing rights for the bonded labor of India. The latter were the victims of a potential and legal system not very different from Pakistan.

In the same year, Ajoka and some other theatre people were able to attend a unique theater festival celebrating the birth centenary of Pandit Nehru. Various landmark theatre productions by the greatest Indian playwrights and directors were specially revived and a Pakistani delegation had the opportunity to see the best of Indian

theatre for two weeks. This experience had a lasting impact on Pakistani theatre groups.

A milestone in this regard was the production of Ajoka's famous play "Aik Thee Naani" (A Granny for All Seasons), which was based on the life and acting careers of two amazing sisters, Uzra Butt and Zohra Segal. Uzra and Zohra belonged to an aristocratic Muslim family of Uttar Pradesh in India and had chosen careers in performing arts in the 1930s. They had toured the world with the Uday Shankar Ballet Company and were members of the Communist Party-affiliated Indian Peoples Theatre Association. In the 1940s, they joined the famous Prithvi Theatre in Bombay. Uzra was the leading lady of the film and theatre legend Prithviraj Kapoor and Zohra was the vamp and dance director. After Partition, Uzra migrated to Pakistan with her husband Hameed Butt, while Zohra decided to stay on in India and pursue her career in acting and dancing. There was no use for Uzra's acting talent in the non-Indian Islamic Republic of Pakistan and she started living the life of an ordinary housewife. Zohra achieved fame in India and UK where she acted for theatre and TV. Uzra would have disappeared into obscurity had Ajoka not accidentally "re-discovered" her. She acted in Ajoka's adaptation of Brecht's *The Caucasian Chalk Circle* in 1985 and there was no looking back. "Aik Thee Naani" was conceived when we met the two sisters in London in 1988. They promised to act in the semi-autobiographical play. The story was so powerful and dramatic that writing the play was no problem. The problem was getting an Indian actress to come and perform in Pakistan. Her being a Muslim did help a little but the rules were very rigid. No Indian was to be allowed on Pakistani stage. Finally, Zohra was able to visit Lahore and "Aik Thee Naani" was premiered in 1993 at the Kinnaird College, as the Lahore Arts Council was not available. This event led to just sharing of the same stage by the two actor sisters after a gap of nearly 40 years. Also it was the feeling of sharing common culture and history which had been denied for nearly half a century. When the sisters got a prolonged standing ovation at the end of the performances, no one over the age of 50 had dry eyes. The play was regarded as anti-Pakistani by the agencies and rightwing media. By showing the suffering caused by the separation of sisters, it highlighted the separation of families and shared culture caused by the Partition. It also very effectively brought out the common cultural heritage between the two countries and ridiculed the deliberate distortions of history made by the custodians of Pakistan Ideology. The play also raised the issue of double standards in the Pakistani society where people were happy to privately appreciate music and dance but did not let their daughters touch a harmonium or ghungroo. The play raised questions about Pakistan's cultural heritage and boldly challenged Pakistani establishment's concocted cultural identity.

The play was later performed in Delhi in 1999 where it was a rousing success and an emotional unblocking experience for many pre-Partition people in the audience who had been separated from

family and friends. The most moving and poignant was the performance at the Prithvi Theatre in 2005, the venue where the two sisters had shared the stage with leading Indian actors for many years.

Ajoka's acclaimed play "Bulha" is another play which had an extraordinary impact on the promotion of goodwill between the two countries, especially between the two parts of the divided Punjab. The play is based on the life and works of the great Punjabi mystic poet of 18th century Bulleh Shah who is well-known for his uninhibited criticism of the ritualistic side of Islam, and for his message for peace and love for all. The script was not cleared by the censor committee of Lahore Arts Council and had to be staged at the old Goethe Institute which had now become a "retail outlet." The premier performance in April 2001 was attended by Punjabis from India, Canada and UK who were in Lahore to attend the World Punjabi Conference. At the end of the play, they stormed the stage and there were prolonged emotional scenes of warm embraces with tearful eyes. We had not realized the power of Bulleh Shah and theatre until then. But little did we know that the great Sufi had just started casting his magic spell. In 2003, with the Indo-Pak rapprochement slowly moving into action and the Wagha border gates grudgingly opening, Ajoka was allowed to tour Indian Punjab with "Bulha." It was the first-time ever that a Pakistani theatre group was allowed to tour Indian Punjab. Equally significant was the fact that the group crossed Wagha border on foot for the first time. They were received by their Indian hosts with bhangra and bouquets and an excited team of Indian TV and print journalists. The tour included six major cities of the Indian state of Punjab including Amritsar, Jalandhar, Patiala, Ludhiana and Chandigarh. The response of the people was staggering both in terms of numbers and the emotional charge. We played to packed houses everywhere but it was not the halls which were packed. There were many more who could not get in because there was not even standing room. But they refused to go. In some cases, the organizers had to arrange for simultaneous screening outside. There were many who travelled with the group and watched the play again and again. Everywhere there were emotional scenes, old men and women crying and remembering the Muslim friends who had crossed over to Pakistani Punjab and their native villages and towns which they had to leave in 1947. One old man brought his sick grandchild and insisted that "Bulha" should blow his blessing at him. When the actor playing Bulha tried to explain that he was just playing the role of Bulha, the old man insisted and said "No, you are Bulleh Shah's reincarnation (avatar). If you bless my grandchild, he will be alright." It was the first time that the Punjabis on both sides of the border were able to enjoy and appreciate their common cultural, literary and spiritual heritage together. It was a revelation for many members of the Ajoka team to see how popular a Muslim Sufi was among the Sikh and Hindu Punjabis. They were also very much moved by the warm hospitality showered on them everywhere. Bulha was later invited to Delhi by the government-run

Indian Council for Cultural Relations and once again the largest hall of Delhi (Kamani Auditorium) proved to be inadequate for all three days. The presence of the Indian Foreign Minister and Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman along with Pakistani High Commissioner in the hall was also significant. Another breakthrough was Bulha's performance in Jammu in 2006, the first Pakistani cultural group to perform in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Once again Bulha took the city by storm.

Yet another significant production was Ajoka's play for children "Border Border." Chandigarh's Besten Foundation and Ajoka Children's Theatre agreed to do a joint production for children. Shahid Nadeem, who was in California at the time, wrote the play in the Persian (Shahmukhi) script and emailed it to Ajoka in Lahore. The script was unreadable for the Indian Punjabi children who use the Gurmukhi script of Punjab. Shahid transferred the script to Roman script on his computer and emailed it for the Besten School children. The two sides met in Chandigarh and premiered the play in Chandigarh, with the Governor of Punjab as Chief Guest. Later when the play was revived by the Springdale School and Ajoka Children's Theatre in 2005, the Islamabad performance was attended by the Pakistani Minister for Culture and the Indian High Commissioner. Although the play was for children, it was very critical of the lukewarm and ambivalent peace policies of the two governments. The children of Lahore and Amritsar who participated in the project became best friends and they have since participated in other Indo-Pak theatre ventures.

There have been other plays and collaborations which have had significant impact on creating goodwill and strengthening bonds between the artists of India and Pakistan. "Kala Meda Bhes" was performed at the Nandikar Theatre Festival in Calcutta in late 1997. Although the play was in Punjabi, the Calcutta audience had no problem in appreciating the play which addressed the theme of religious and class exploitation of the common people. The play was also performed in Delhi and a show was arranged on the request of the Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral, a Punjabi refugee from Jhelum in Pakistan. Mr Gujral was deeply moved and came to the stage and gave his affectionate fatherly hug to Madeeha Gauhar, the director of the play. The hug by the male PM of an enemy country became an issue for a little-known patriotic group who sued her for damages. But things had changed and the matter did not attract attention except by one or two super-patriotic papers.

Soon the return visits began thanks to a change of heart in the visa policy of the Pakistani High Commission. In 2004, Ajoka held the first Indo-Pak Theatre Festival, which is now known as Panjpaani Festival. Leading Indian theatre groups, mostly from Punjab, participated and the Lahore audience had the first opportunity to see high quality theatre from India in a language and cultural milieu they shared. All festivals so far have been hugely successful among the

people of Lahore. The attitude of the governments on both sides has however remained ambivalent and unpredictable.

Communication through theatre has been no problem as the plays brought to Pakistan have been either in Punjabi or Hindi. The difference in the script caused some hindrance in the published plays or written exchanges. In the mid-1990s, we received a book in Gurmukhi. We were surprised why this was sent to us. Then a letter slipped out of the book. It was from Dr Arvinder Kaur of Khalsa College Amritsar and was addressed to Shahid Nadeem. Then we discovered that it was a transliteration of Shahid's collection of Punjabi play, "Khasman Khanian." Arvinder had apologised that she had published the book without permission but explained that there was a dearth of original Punjabi plays and theatre groups and colleges were keen to do Ajoka plays. Later, we discovered that some of our plays had reached Indian Punjab theatre groups and schools/colleges, and were being performed quite widely. In fact there have been more performances of several Ajoka plays in Indian Punjab than in Pakistan. One can only surmise that these performances running into thousands, have carried the message of peace and goodwill where they have been performed.

The Panjpaani Indo-Pak Theatre Festival has been yet another successful initiative for bringing artists and the public closer at cultural and artistic levels. The first festival was held in March 2004 and the theme of the festival was Zanani (woman). Leading theatre groups from both countries participated in this landmark event. It was the first Indo-Pak public cultural event, spread over eight days. 22 plays were performed by 18 groups, over 150 Indian artists participated in the festival. Plays were performed in the two Lahore Arts Council halls and the open air space. Every day both halls were jam-packed with an audience most generous with applause. This was the first time that Indian artists performed plays for a full week in front of 700-plus audience in Hall No I and 450-plus Hall II. The standing ovation clearly demonstrated that the Pakistani people were ready for peace and to rebuild cultural bonds with the people of India. The mood of friendship and warmth was not restricted to the theatre halls. Wherever the Indian artists went, they were received with the same warmth and affection. They literally danced on the streets of the Old Anarkali food street and were joined by the people. Lahore, which was regarded as the bastion of anti-Indianism and which had born the brunt of Indian attacks in 1965 and 1971, seemed to have exorcised the demon.

During 2007, the 60th anniversary of the Partition was marked by various cultural initiatives. Ajoka performed Saadat Hassan Manto's "Toba Tek Singh" at a special event in Delhi where peace activist from the Indian film industry also presented poetry and performances on the theme. Later, Ajoka members joined young artists from Indian Punjab at a three-week long theatre workshop organized by the national School of Drama, which concluded with a remarkable production: "Yatra 1947." This workshop focused on

theme of Partition and personal testimonies and memories of the workshop participants. The result was a somewhat disturbing but immensely moving revisiting of Partition. The most striking aspect of the project was the deep involvement of the young Punjabi artists in the exploration of the Partition in terms of suffering, separation and dehumanization. Those who followed the project noticed how the participants learned and how they grew and matured during the process.

Artists lead the way

The Ajoka experience of peace initiatives in the past 10 years or so has been most rewarding and satisfying. It is one theatre group based in one city, and it dared to challenge the establishment-imposed ideology and national security mindset during 1980-90s, when talking of peace with India was tantamount to treason. It bypassed and overran the hurdles created by the two governments in times of great border tension and near-war situations. It traveled by train, by bus, on foot, sometimes via Dubai, Kathmandu or Dhaka, but it kept visiting India and inviting Indian theatre people to Pakistan and keep the peace torch burning at all costs. In the earlier phase, “agencies” would visit Ajoka office after every visit to India or visit of Indian guests to Pakistan. But over a period, authorities on both sides came to realise that Ajoka meant business i.e. doing theatre for peace and it had no hidden agenda. “Agencies” however had their reservations and still have. The most recent example of this ingrained distrust of all those who want to cross the borders is that of the fifth Panjpaani Festival in May 2008. First it was the Pakistani authorities who sat on the visa clearance case for many months and then in their wisdom decided to give visa clearance to half of the Indian team. The festival had to be postponed twice to convince the Pakistani Interior Ministry that a play is performed by the full cast and certain members of the cast cannot be made to disappear. Finally the visas were granted and the festival dates were announced and all preparations made. Then came the bombshell. This time the Indian Interior Ministry suddenly refused to grant permission to cross the Wagha Border on foot, something which the Indian artists from Punjab had been doing all the time. There was no time to change the mode of travel and find seats on a bus on the due date. Hence the Indian plays in the festival had to be cancelled. This unfortunate situation happened although, unlike in the past, the High Commissions on both sides had shown a remarkably friendly attitude.

While Ajoka was building lasting friendships, entertaining the audience, so much else was happening which facilitated the people-to-people peace process. The pop bands were crossing borders to perform before ecstatic audiences. Folk and Sufi singers were winning accolades. Writers and painters were attending conferences, literary moots, art exhibitions. Pilgrims were visiting shrines, senior

citizens were visiting their ancestral villages and towns. The TV and film interaction had a massive impact too. Hence Ajoka was not operating in a vacuum and the dramatic results of its incursions into India and vice versa would not have been possible without the broad and firm push towards friendship and bridge-building. Theatre performances were a liberating experience for the artists involved and a collective unblocking experience for the audiences. The cultural soldiers not only transcended the borders, they also transcended half a century of conflicts, ideology, prejudice and distortions.

The exchange and interaction between theatre groups, including performances, tours, workshops, seminars and personal friendships had the following impact: (i) de-demonization of the other through theatre performances, TV programs and music concerts. (ii) Realization that the two peoples shared much more than what the ideologues would recognize. (iii) They were able to find mutually acceptable descriptions of controversial and sensitive issues such as the responsibilities for the 1947 communal carnage, the 1971 war and liberation of Bangladesh.

Understandably, this peace journey was not without hurdles. The two countries had fought two full-scale wars and had come to near-war situations several times. The links between people of the two countries had remained severed for many decades. Also the political and cultural developments in the two countries had taken place at a different pace and in some cases in different directions. Hence it was not easy to have full agreement on all matters. Religious and cultural sensitivities were also a minefield. There were situations where these sensitivities sometimes came in the way. One controversy which did not go away was the “Banda Singh issue.” Banda Singh Bairagi was a bairagi sadhu in the times of Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb and Sikh Guru Gobind Singh, who became Guru Gobind’s disciple and as ruthless Sikh general Banda Singh Bahadur led the Sikh fight against the Moghuls. He is remembered in Muslim history as the butcher of Muslims of the area. Bulleh Shah also lived in Punjab in the same period but there is no evidence that they ever met. In “Bulha,” Shahid Nadeem made them meet and debate their response to the atrocities by the Moghul rulers. Banda Singh in the play emerges as a martyr, alter-ego of Bulleh Shah. He had legitimate grievances against the Delhi Throne but his methods of revenge were excessive. We expected some reaction in Pakistan for the positive portrayal of Banda who is regarded as arch villain by Pakistani historians, but there were no negative reactions. However during the 2004 tour of Indian Punjab, there were some muted comments about Banda Singh which were reported in the press (*The Indian Express*). By the time we got to Patiala, this had become a major issue. The organizers of the tour were forced to request Ajoka to take out the Banda Singh character from the play. We refused first but to prevent damage to the mood of goodwill, we finally relented. The objection we were told was at the very portrayal of Banda Singh on stage as he has a very high status in Sikh history. The objectors were also

unhappy at the fiery character of Banda Singh. Some of the people who had been travelling with Ajoka from town to town, noticed the absence of Banda Singh scene and the matter got to the press. There was such a backlash from the media and the intellectuals that the newspaper had to print a retraction. Banda also aroused some heckling in Jammu in 2005 but it could not cause any disruption.

Jammu because of its particular political history has been ultra-sensitive on issues relating to the city's image. In 2007, Ajoka was invited to perform its play "Dukh Darya" in Jammu. It was a play particularly relevant to the city as it was based on a true story partly based in Jammu. The story revolved around a woman from Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir who jumped into River Tavi to finish her life but was washed away on the Indian side and held for illegal border crossing. She was raped and later gave birth to a daughter. The dilemma in the story was where did the mother and daughter belong? Only a few days before the performance in Jammu, the invitation was called off because of opposition from some pressure groups who thought the rape by a Jammu prison warden would bring a bad name to the authorities. We had already reached Amritsar on our way to Jammu. However the media and cultural circles condemned the campaign. We were invited again in March 2008 but the program was cancelled once again due to threats. Recently at a meeting in Jammu University, Madeeha once again raised the matter and insisted that the story of the Kashmiri woman has to be told. The media, the University administration and city intellectuals very strongly supported her case.

The unpredictable and blow hot-blow cold attitude of authorities has been a major irritant. It is not easy to judge whether governments are holding back on the people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges or are in a facilitating mood. Suddenly the visa policy would be hardened and relaxed again without any explanation. The policy varies from person to person and group to group. They would deny visas to a small cultural delegation and next day a much larger group would be granted visas. The role of intelligence agencies (who have no expertise or opportunity to vet the applicants) in clearing visa applications from the other country, is weird. The High Commissions should be in a much better position to scrutinize visa applicants from a security point of view. Sometimes the criterion for accepting or refusing applications is laughable. They ask for a reduction in number of the group and sometimes bargain on the size in a petty way.

We have also encountered another "interesting" difference of perspective which sometimes led to criticism. While the Indian artists, like most Indians, express sorrow at the Partition of India and the forced separation of the people who want to live together as friends, they can also get emotional and demand the "lines" to be erased and reunite India and its people. On the other hand, most of their Pakistani colleagues, though feeling equally strongly at the divisions and hatred cultivated by the political vested interests and the

governments oppose the reversal of this process. However both sides have been learning to respect each other's sensitivities and circumstances and the problem is getting 'resolved' gradually.

It must be mentioned that during this steady growth of cultural exchanges, the cultural groups have come into regular contact with High Commissions and relevant ministries, even with the border forces. We have noticed a positive change in their attitude as well. They do not look at you with suspicion. The border personnel even give a smile when no one is looking. The High Commission officials are much more relaxed and helpful and the Interior Ministries at least answer your calls and even apologise for the delays and refusals. Some of them have attended our plays on the themes of Indo-Pak friendship and seem to have enjoyed the shows. They sometimes have spotted their own characters being satirized and laughed. The Governor of Punjab has been happy to inaugurate the Panjpaani festival and enjoyed the performances of Indian and Pakistani groups. In case the subject was too radical, he only requested the press not to take his photograph! The Pakistani media have also become more friendly. The Urdu press which was generally critical of Indo-Pak bonhomie and jumped at every chance of sensationalizing pro-India stance of Ajoka or other organizers of Indo-Pak cultural events, is now not hostile, if not very supportive. The Pakistani private TV channels and FM radio channels have been favoring Indo-Pak exchanges and have spread this message very widely. On the other side, though the Indian media has been very positive and generous with their coverage of Ajoka tours, there has been a tendency among the conservative (mostly non-English) papers to angle the stories in such a way that they reinforce the stereotypical picture of Pakistan. However these have been minor hiccups in a generally supportive and friendly press on both sides. The electronic media coverage of the cultural exchanges had huge impact on public awareness of the exchanges and has had a very positive impact in creating a conducive ground for strengthening people-to-people and government-to-government relations.

The cultural interaction and exchanges between artists and intellectuals of the two countries have created a momentum which appears to be irreversible. It has added to the growing public pressure on the governments not to back down and keep moving forward. At least it is no longer possible for the policy-makers to cite public reaction as a reason for not pursuing the policy of peace and reconciliation. Unlike in the early years after Partition (upto late 1980s), it is not the government which is taking the initiative or dictating terms of discourse, it is the society, the artists, the sportsmen, the businessmen, the youth who are leading the way.

Conclusion

Artistic and cultural interaction and exchanges have had a significant impact on the pace and direction of Indo-Pak rapprochement. Looked at with suspicion and hostility by the governments in post-1971 years, the governments relented a little, only to retreat into fortress-like mentality, but since 2001 the reconciliation process has been irreversible. It can be safely claimed that at least over the last decade or so, the society has taken a lead towards peace and friendship, leaving no other option for the two governments. It is also evident that the cultural stakeholders have played a prominent, even leading role in creating a momentum for goodwill among the people. Theatre exchanges, cooperation between film makers and actors, tours by pop and classical music groups and regular contacts between the media people have moved on. They have deprived the stereotypical portrayal of the other side and fear-mongering by the extremist political groups keeping the conflicts alive.

During the process of theatre exchanges, the following developments have taken place:

- Theatre groups have developed regular and mutually beneficial relationships with each other strengthened by participation in theatre festivals, collaborative productions and tours, using the scripts of each other for production and holding training workshops.
- The popular response on both sides has enabled thousands of people to watch plays from the other side, empathize with the social problems of the others and enjoy the shared culture. The media coverage of these events and interviews and write-ups has spread the message to millions of viewers and readers across the subcontinent.
- The Punjab-to-Punjab cultural contacts have seen a dramatic growth. Punjabis on both sides have celebrated their common cultural heritage which had been denied to them because of the prolonged closure of borders between the two Punjab. Plays in the same language, paying tributes to common heroes and exchanges between writers, intellectuals, artists and scholars have multiplied. The results can be seen through translations/transliteration, inclusion of writings in teaching courses on the other side, frequent seminars, a growing number of pilgrimages and collaborations between businessmen, professionals and media people.

- The attitude of authorities dealing with visas and security have shown marked improvement, even though the mindset of the intelligence agencies needs much improvement.
- The issues raised in the plays and stories include the common heritage, history and culture, while looking at the controversial and sensitive issues such as Partition, religion and terrorism from a secular and humane perspective, leading the way to a rational debate and peaceful resolution.

The main problems or hurdles faced by artists in their effort to interact with their counterparts are as follows:

- Visa problems: In spite of frequent pronouncements by both governments and joint declarations after bilateral talks, the visa policy and procedures are still designed to discourage and control people-to-people contacts and exchanges between stakeholders. The veto power exercised by the intelligence agencies in the process of visa clearance for groups applying to attend conferences, festivals, events must be removed and any such vetting, if needed, should be done by the two High Commissions.
- There is a need to sensitize media on both sides on how to contribute to the peace process by sensitive and objective reporting and avoid reinforcing stereotypes and playing to extremists galleries.
- The process of understanding and shared view of history is still fragile. Conflicting viewpoints can cause frictions. It is important for both sides to be sensitive when commenting on issues facing the counterpart or the historical reality of Partition. There should be mutual respect for each other's political and emotional sensitivities.

It should also be noted that the upbeat mood for peace and cooperation is dependent on concrete and substantial improvement in the bilateral relations at the state level and peace dividends reaching the stake-holders and people at large.

The challenges ahead are the following:

- The cultural protocol, which has apparently been signed, needs to put into action in a sincere and prompt manner. It should not suffer the fate of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) charter/agreements.

- The Jihadi factor may still spoil the atmosphere of friendship and cooperation. If the Pakistan government is seen to be weakening in its resolve to crush jihadi incursion across the border and if the Indian government comes under attack for being soft on terrorism, the extremists on both sides can snatch the initiative again.
- The media's growth in reach and power has added to the responsibility of the owners and media professionals. It remains to be seen if the media stays on course as a peace promoting player and does not succumb to panic and pander in the aftermath of breakdown of dialogue between the two governments or a major terror attack.
- The opening up of film cooperation opens up enormous possibilities. However it has to be admitted that in this field India is a much bigger player than Pakistan and the cooperation may be uneven and hence frustrating for Pakistanis unless some formulae are found which can give the weaker industry a head start.

Finally, it can be concluded that the gains of non-governmental cultural cooperation between India and Pakistan are substantial and are expected to keep growing and expanding unless there is a monumental blunder or grave security disaster. Ajoka and its partners in theatre for peace movement are however determined to defend the gains of the past and proceed ahead with great zeal and speed. We must keep praying and playing for peace.

PART 4

OVERCOMING THE TRUST DEFICIT: OTHER PARADIGMS IN RECONCILIATION

From Hatred to Friendly Cooperation: Poland and Germany after the Second World War

Klaus Ziemer

From the beginning of the German aggression against Poland in 1939, until the end of the Second World War some 6 million of Polish citizens (from among 35 million in 1939) were killed, among them some 3 million Jews. The Germans erected almost all extermination camps in which Jews from all over occupied Europe were killed, on Polish territory, Auschwitz-Birkenau being the best known. From the very beginning of the war, German occupiers systematically killed members of the Polish intelligentsia. Polish society reacted by setting up resistance movements, the most powerful of which (the *armia krajowa* [home army]) was directed by the Polish government in exile in London. During the Warsaw uprising of this army from August to October 1944, some 180.000 Polish civilians were killed.

After Germany's unconditional surrender, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain decided in the Potsdam agreements of August 1945 to shift Poland westwards. The Soviet Union received the territories which it had been agreed upon in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939. As a result, Poland lost its Eastern territories, including cities like Vilno and Lvov which were of pivotal importance for Polish national self-consciousness. More than 1 million Poles had to leave their homelands in the East or went westward, because they did not want to live under Soviet rule or among Ukrainians who had conducted massacres against the Poles in 1943/44 in Volhynia.

Most of the Poles from the East went to the territories which Germany had to cede from its former Eastern provinces (east of the rivers Oder and Neisse), representing about one-fourth of the German territory of 1937 and where, in 1939, some 8 million people lived. These Germans had to leave their homelands and to settle

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down—together with another 4 million ethnic Germans from East, Central, and South East Europe—in devastated Germany.

It is not difficult to understand that under such circumstances, the relations between Poles and Germans were extremely poisoned at the end of the 1940s. They were aggravated by the fact that with the beginning of the Cold War, Germany was divided and East Germany (the “German Democratic Republic”) became together with Poland a part of the Eastern bloc, West Germany a part of the Western alliance. How was it possible that starting from a situation characterized by extreme political antagonism and hatred, two generations later, Poles and Germans have resolved almost all the problems stemming from the past, are partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and practicing good neighborly relations?

In order to answer this question we have to analyze two levels of relations. On the one hand, there are relations between the states, government institutions and, as far as communist countries are concerned, institutions of the Communist Party. On the other hand, there exist a significant interaction between the two societies (“trans-national” relations). Communist governments tended to control not only the relations at the Party and state levels, but also the relations between both societies. As we will see, one societal actor, the churches, played a decisive role, although hindered by communist authorities. After the collapse of the communist regimes, these obstacles have disappeared. The Polish-German treaty on good neighborhood and friendly co-operation of June 1991, set the framework for a broadly based cooperation between both civil societies.

Hereafter is a brief outline of the most important events in Polish-German relations since the end of the Second World War and then an analysis of the necessary conditions for rapprochement and the practical results.

A brief summary of Polish-German relations since the end of the 1940s

After 1949 Polish-German relations became complicated insofar as with the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) two German states existed. The leadership of the GDR wanted to be regarded as a partner having equal rights among the Soviet satellites and therefore recognized the new German-Polish border in 1950 which immediately caused protests from the West German side. Communist Poland established diplomatic relations with the GDR and for decades to come made a distinction between the “good Germans” in the GDR and the “revanchists” and “revisionists” in the FRG. Appeals by the

communist leadership to the horrible experience of German occupation during the Second World War and the alleged “German danger” originating from West Germany were the tightest tie connecting Polish society with the disliked communist leaders.

Between West Germany and Poland there were no diplomatic relations, and almost no official contact. One has to wait the mid-1950s to see several hundreds of thousands ethnic Germans, who were until then living in Poland, being allowed to leave for West or East Germany. Apart from that there was little contact between West Germany and Poland. During the early years following the war, the (West) German public discourse carried the conviction that the victims had been the millions of Germans forced to leave their homelands after the end of the war (and the civilian victims of bombardments). Almost no one spoke about crimes committed by Germans during the war in Poland and other countries in East and South East Europe. This changed only slowly after the 1958 trials conducted against perpetrators of war crimes, and more especially during the first half of the 1960s (Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt).

A breakthrough in the public discourse about Germany’s relationship with its Eastern neighbors in general, and Poland in particular, was reached with the publication by the Protestant Church of a memorandum on the relationship between the Germans and their eastern neighbors in autumn 1965. For the first time after the Second World War not only German arguments were outlined, but also those of the other side. On the one hand, the sufferings of the German expellees and their achievements in building up post war Germany were underscored. But on the other hand the authors of the memorandum stressed the right of the Polish population living in former German territories to be there and acknowledged the “right to Heimat (homeland)” also to those Poles who had been born in former German territories. The memorandum initiated an unprecedented fierce debate in German society on the relations with its eastern neighbors, about guilt during the Second World War and the consequences Germany had to bear for that. The debate deeply split not only the Protestant Church, but German society in general. Nevertheless, in the long run it paved the way for German society to accept the *ostpolitik* (policy towards the Eastern neighbors) of the social-liberal coalition led by Willy Brandt from 1969. As a consequence, in 1970, the borderlines in Europe existing as a result of the Second World War, and especially the actual German-Polish border, were acknowledged.

In Polish society a similar breaking point in the attitudes towards Germany was the letter sent by the Polish catholic bishops to their German colleagues towards the end of the Second Vatican Council in November 1965. The Catholic Church was, and is regarded, as the moral authority of Polish society and during communist rule was seen as the actual representative of the Polish nation. The bishops’ letter contained an interpretation of a thousand years of Polish-German relations that completely differed from the

statements the Communist Party had given (“a thousand years of struggle”). And it culminated in the words: “We forgive and we ask for forgiveness.” The publication of this letter was a shock for the Polish society which was completely unprepared for such a message. The half-hearted response by the German bishops, who wanted to avoid a clear declaration concerning Poland’s western border, encouraged the communist authorities in Poland to attack the bishops as not loyal towards their country. Large parts of Polish society, unprepared as they were for such a step, could not understand the bishops’ action. In the long run, however, this letter of the Polish bishops proved to be the decisive step for initiating the readiness of Polish society for Polish-German reconciliation. Against it was, of course, the communist leadership which exploited anti-German sentiments in the Polish society in order to strengthen their fragile legitimacy. But as a consequence of the bishops’ letter, in the second half of the 1960s, catholic intellectuals began to establish a dialogue with German catholic pioneers especially from the Pax Christi organization, but also from the Protestant Church. On the Polish side, this dialogue was often hampered by state authorities, denying, for instance, Polish intellectuals a passport.

Nevertheless, this dialogue turned out extremely helpful for both sides. The Germans learnt what the experience of the Second World War—especially the little known Warsaw uprising of 1944—meant for the Polish society. The Poles for the first time heard about a resistance movement against the Nazi regime in Germany. This dialogue was led among tiny, but strategically important élites. Among the Polish participants, there were prominent politicians after 1989 such as the first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Foreign Minister Władysław Bartoszewski, and others.

When after 1969 the *ostpolitik* was implemented, it met with several misunderstandings on both sides. Whereas German politicians had expected German-Polish relations to be “normalized” after the ratification of the treaty and the exchange of ambassadors in 1972, the Polish leadership considered these steps only as the “beginning of normalization.” The Polish side was interested in regulating open questions following the Second World War (indemnification for Polish victims of German occupation, problems of pension insurance funds etc.) and in getting West German technology and credits. The German government was concerned about the right of members of the German minority in Poland to leave Poland for Germany. A breakthrough was reached in bilateral negotiations during the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in Helsinki in 1975: hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans could leave Poland in the years to come. Poland received a compensation for its pension insurance funds of 1,3 billion deutschmarks and a cheap credit of 1 billion deutschmarks (together more than 1 billion euros). West Germany quickly became the second economic partner of Poland (after the Soviet Union).

When the independent trade union “Solidarity” (Solidarnosc) sprang up in Poland in 1980, and still more when martial law was introduced in December 1981 and “Solidarity” was repressed, a wave of sympathy for Poland embraced (West) German society. Hundreds of private van transports with food went to Poland and millions of packets were sent to a society which was facing a severe crisis of supply. These gestures of solidarity and concrete help for the first time since the Second World War changed the image of the Germans in a large part of Polish society.

The second German state, communist East Germany, in the first years after its constitution regarded Poland as an example to be followed, for instance in reconstructing a destroyed country. Since the liberalization of communist rule in Poland in 1956, the leadership of the GDR considered Poland to be a danger. In the long run, the existence of a second German state could be justified only by differences in the political and socio-economic order. Any deviant from the Soviet model was viewed as dangerous not only for communist rule, but for the very existence of the GDR. From 1956 East German communists behaved like controllers in ideology vis-à-vis their Polish comrades.

The possibility to travel without visas between Poland and the GDR, introduced in 1972, was to give East Germans a kind of surrogate for travels to the West which were forbidden. Millions of Poles and East Germans made use of this chance to travel. They behaved, however, not only as tourists, but also as consumers who bought goods in the neighboring country which were scarce or more expensive at home. In communist planned economies, such additional consumers were not foreseen, also several goods became scarce especially in the border region of East Germany and caused less feelings of friendship than of animosity towards the neighbor.

When “Solidarity” was allowed legal existence in Poland, the GDR leadership was shocked and after a couple of weeks unilaterally finished visa-free travelling between both countries. In order to avoid a sparking off of the ideas of “Solidarity” in their country, East German communists in the 1980s successfully propagated anti-Polish stereotypes and—much less successfully—tried to induce Polish leadership to reinforce the party’s control over politics and society in Poland.

In 1989, the victory of “Solidarity” in Poland initiated the collapse of the communist regimes in East Central Europe and contributed to the fall of the Berlin wall and German reunification in 1990. The “Two-plus-Four” negotiations (of the two German states and the four allies of the Second World War) in Summer 1990 set the international framework for German unification, substituting the peace conference which had been announced in Potsdam in 1945 but never took place. Still in 1990, the German Parliament recognized the post-war border between Germany and Poland as definite. In June 1991, a German-Polish treaty on good neighborly relations and friendly co-

operation was signed which paved the way for a growing network of relations on a multitude of levels between the civil societies. Already in 1990 German and Polish political élites spoke of a Polish-German “community of values and interests.” The common strategic aim was the full integration of Poland into the political, economic, and military co-operation structures of the West. This aim was reached especially with Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999 and to the European Union in 2004. No other state contributed more to Poland’s Western integration than Germany, and this not only for reasons of “historical justice,” but also in its own interest. When Poland joined Western institutions, Germany which hitherto had been situated at the Eastern border of the Western community, became more “centrally” located in Europe. The fact that a politically and socio-economically strong Poland can stabilize the situation in East Central Europe today and is in Germany’s vital interest, illustrates the fundamental change in Germany’s attitude towards Poland. This is especially evident when we look back to the first half of the 20th century when many German politicians denied the Poles even the right to a state of their own.

Necessary conditions for rapprochement between states and societies

After the dramatic events of the Second World War, the immense suffering for millions of people and the growing political antagonism between East and West during the Cold War, it was not astonishing that contacts between Poland and West Germany were reduced to a minimum. Poland’s government considered the recognition of the new Western border as its main aim, which was strictly refused by West German government and society. So when East and West Germany joined antagonistic military alliances, the Polish strategic border shifted from the new Polish Western border to the border between East and West Germany. The division of Germany became part of Polish state doctrine. For West Germany the top priority goal was German unification. As the “key to resolving the German question” was seen in Moscow and not in Warsaw, Poland was rather neglected by West German politics in the 1950s and the 1960s.

‘Visions’

When the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961 postponed German unity indefinitely, a new philosophy or “vision” seemed necessary to overcome the impasse. The close assistant of West Berlin’s Lord mayor Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr, in a famous speech at an academy in Bavaria in 1963 coined the term of “change by rapprochement” (*Wandel durch Annäherung*). It meant that in order to change the present situation, one has to accept the actual reality. From this starting point one may reach pragmatic agreements with the other side which may gradually change the situation into the desired

direction. The political or even military adversary was to become a “partner in security” jointly responsible for maintaining peace in Europe and helping to gradually establish a *détente*.

This “vision” of a shift from a confrontation fraught with danger to a pragmatic approach was at the beginning of German *ostpolitik* implemented from 1969 onwards by the social-liberal coalition formed by Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walter Scheel. For the first time after the war, political leaders from West Germany had intensive exchange of views with top politicians of the Soviet Union and then also of Poland.

The feeling of responsibility for “overcoming the past” and getting out of a blind alley and the vision of a “different future” based upon Christian values was also at the beginning of a greater involvement in Polish-German matters by one of the most influential actors of civil society, the churches. The above mentioned memorandum of the Protestant church of October 1965 on Germany’s relations with its Eastern neighbors tore apart and divided not only the Protestant community, but all politically conscious people in the German society. The authors’ intention, based on religious conviction, was to establish a sincere balance of recent history between Germans and their Eastern neighbors, to draw a realistic picture of the actual situation on both sides and to propose an adequate reasoning for the future which was hardly acceptable for hard-liners on both sides. But it was thought-provoking for a certain open-minded “milieu” in their own society and at least to intellectuals with free access to information in Poland.

In a similar vein, the letter of the Polish catholic bishops to their German colleagues at the end of the Vatican council held in Rome in November 1965 was to set up a new basis for the relations between both societies on the basis of Christian forgiveness and thus enable a different, better future. Beside that “vision” stemming from genuine Christian mission it had several political implications. In the context of communist Poland, it was directed against the Communist Party’s exploitation of unilaterally interpreted history for political reasons and implicitly questioned the monopoly on foreign policy that the Communist Party claimed for itself. It therefore met with fierce attacks by the Communist Party and its government. But this message and its intention were hardly understandable for a completely unprepared society so that communist propaganda for a short time could bank on a certain alienation of part of catholic believers from their bishops. It was made easier by the fact that the German bishops proved to be unable to answer to the letter of their Polish colleagues at a similarly high level and avoided taking a stance on the German-Polish border. But the Polish bishops’ letter on the one hand and the unsatisfying answer of the German bishops on the other caused a “bottom up” initiative by German Catholics who, in 1968, published a memorandum as a “real reply” to the Polish bishops. One of the signatories of this memorandum was the young professor of theology Joseph Ratzinger, the present Pope

Benedict XVI. Today the letter of the Polish bishops is regarded to be the turning point in Polish-German relations after the war.

Leadership

Apart from “visions,” another structural prerequisite necessary for reconciliation between societies is “leadership.” Lily Gardner Feldman in this context refers to the importance of the personal relationship between Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle for German-French reconciliation, or Adenauer and Ben Gurion in the case of German-Israeli reconciliation, and quotes Helmut Schmidt who relates that “the formal, impersonal diplomacy of communism made it difficult to develop friendly relations between German and Polish leaders.”¹ Brandt tried to see behind the façade of communist leaders like Wladyslaw Gomulka and Józef Cyrankiewicz, scrutinizing the “person and the human face.” Schmidt himself developed a close relationship with the Polish leader of the 1970s, Edward Gierek, which enabled the political breakthrough in Helsinki mentioned above. He kept a personal relationship with Gierek after the latter’s political fall in 1980 and until Gierek’s death in 2001.

For domestic tactical reasons, Helmut Kohl, in the months preceding German unification, protracted the recognition of the Polish-German border as long as possible and quite evidently could not develop close personal ties with the first non-communist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. But once unification was reached, Kohl became the personification of Germany’s intention to help Poland in joining Western co-operation structures and at times was more popular in Poland than in Germany. Kohl’s leadership and the credibility of his policy towards Poland very much helped to overcome fears and reservations concerning Germany in Poland.

In this respect Gerhard Schröder as a Chancellor has also contributed to Polish-German understanding. It was his government which put on the political agenda the painful question of (at least symbolic) compensation for forced labor during German occupation and found a generally acceptable resolution. He had a critical role in the success of the negotiations on Polish accession to the European Union. But in the memory of the Poles he will remain as the Chancellor who helped to prepare in 2005 a commercial treaty on a pipeline from Russia to Germany carrying Siberian natural gas under the Baltic Sea and bypassing Poland. A couple of months later, after his electoral defeat, he became a leading member of the Russian concern Gazprom. Poles are resenting Russian activities in energy policy, also Schröder, who on international conflicts often expressed

¹ Lily Gardner Feldman, “German-Polish Reconciliation: How Similar, How Different?” Essay based on a lecture given February 25, 2008, at the German Historical Institute Warsaw. The ideas presented there are drawn from her book *From Enmity to Amity* (to appear).

himself clearly on the Russian side, is assessed in Poland unequivocally.

Chancellor Angela Merkel has in Poland a big bonus of being a former East German so that she knows what Poles have experienced after the Second World War. She lent a hand to Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz to achieve success during the EU summit of 2006 in London and has personal relations of many years with new Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Her incomparably tougher position towards Russia than Schröder's and her endeavor to build up close relations with the United States also assured her sympathy in Poland among the society as well as among the political élite.

Among Polish politicians, President Lech Walesa was fiercely criticized by veterans for inviting German President Roman Herzog on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising, but the success of Herzog's speech confirmed the rightness of his decision (see below). President Aleksander Kwasniewski tried together with his German counterpart Johannes Rau to defuse, in 2003, the conflict over the interpretation of history (concerning the planned "center against expulsions," see below), with limited success, however.

In Germany, the highest esteem among Polish public personalities goes to Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, born in 1922. He was one of the first prisoners at Auschwitz concentration camp in 1940, was released in 1941 due to actions undertaken by the Polish Red Cross, then provided assistance to Polish Jews and fought during the Warsaw uprising. Immediately after the war, he joined the opposition to the communists, was arrested and spent six years in Stalinist prisons in Poland, worked as a catholic journalist and lecturer and was one of the first Polish intellectuals to begin dialogue with German colleagues. Arrested again following the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981, he became after his release a guest professor at several Bavarian universities. After 1989, he returned to Poland, became Ambassador to Austria (1990-95), Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1995 and again in 2000-01. This unique biography and his active contribution to better Polish-German relations gave him a moral authority in German eyes. After the elections of 2007, he became Secretary of State for International Relations in the Prime Minister's office and essentially contributed to the improvement of Polish-German relations which had cooled between 2005 and 2007.

Symbols

Symbolism significantly matters in the process of reconciliation. When Willy Brandt gave a stamp of approval to the Polish Western border in 1970, he also paid a visit to the monument for the Warsaw ghetto. When he knelt down (spontaneously, as he wrote in his memoirs), he did something that aroused violent discussions in Germany. Conservative circles vehemently criticized that he had not been entitled to do so in the name of the Federal Republic. On the contrary,

supporters of the social-liberal government hailed his gesture which could have been done only by a man who during the Second World War had fought (in exile) against the Nazi regime. In Poland, the communist government was taken aback by Brandt's genuflection. The censor banned photographs of the event which became known to a larger public only later. Today, Brandt's gesture marks the symbolic step of German apologizing for what had been done during German occupation in Poland. Since the 30th anniversary of this event, at the other end of the square hosting the memorial to the Warsaw ghetto, there is a small corner called Willy Brandt square with a small monument commemorating his deed.

To mark the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising of 1944, Lech Walesa invited German President Roman Herzog and Russian President Boris Yeltsin (the Red Army had already occupied the smaller part of Warsaw situated on the right side of the Vistula river and passively observed how German troops were defeating the Poles and devastating Warsaw). Yeltsin sent a third-level official, but Herzog delivered a short, well composed speech at the end of which he apologized for all that Germans had done to Poles during the war and asked the Polish nation for forgiveness.

In April 1995, in a speech delivered during a joint session of both Houses of the German Parliament to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, called Herzog's speech "the real and long expected answer to the message of the Polish bishops of 1965." Having evoked the suffering of millions of Poles during the war, he declared: "We moan the individual fate and the suffering of innocent Germans who were affected by the consequences of war and lost their homelands." With these two speeches, symbolic reconciliation on the state level was completed. It was now up to the civil societies to "ratify" this reconciliation in everyday life.

Coming to terms with history

A necessary prerequisite to reach understanding or even reconciliation between societies in conflict is an honest approach to history, especially concerning the "dark chapters" in their bilateral relations. In the case of Germany and Poland, since the second half of the 19th century, historians and other scientists such as archaeologists, cultural anthropologists and others tried to "prove" that disputed territories had historically belonged to their own community and thus wanted to underscore political claims. After the Second World War this pattern continued. It was further "enriched" by the fact that the communist government in Poland, well aware of its weak support among the society, drew on anti-German feelings and fear of German revenge. Until the signing of the Warsaw treaty of 1970, it reminded West Germany's not acknowledging the Polish Western border and after the ratification of that treaty it quoted

organizations of deportees which went on opposing the delimitation of the border.

In 1972, as a result of an initiative of the German and Polish UNESCO-commissions, a German-Polish commission on history and geography textbooks was established and is still operational today. During the first years of its existence, the work of this commission was laborious. Not only because of “inherited” controversies, but also because of the taboos the Poles had to heed regarding the role of the Soviet Union in contemporary Polish-German relations (e.g. the agreement between Hitler and Stalin in 1939) and the foundations of communist rule in Poland.

After the end of communist rule in Poland in 1989, the negative political environment has ceased to play a role in the work of the commission which could therefore performed exclusively on scientific and not political criteria. Much common research has been done since then, enhanced also by the German Historical Institute in Warsaw, founded in 1993, and its counterpart, the Polish Centre for Historical Studies in Berlin, founded in 2005. Polish and German historians do not have problems in analyzing difficult times (for instance the decade between 1939 and 1949) according to common criteria and coming to common results. An example was an exhibition on war crimes committed by the German army during the aggression against Poland in September and October 1939. On the 65th anniversary of the launch of the invasion on September 1, 2004, an exhibition was jointly organized by the German Historical Institute in Warsaw and the Polish Institute of National Remembrance and opened by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw Royal Castle. It has been shown in several Polish towns, and an almost identical German version has met with great interest in many towns in Germany, starting with Berlin.

Whereas German and Polish historians do not face difficulties in finding common ground, the memory of Polish and German societies is strikingly different. These memories are influenced less by academic publications than by oral family tradition. The divergence has been exploited on both sides by politicians during the last few years. The president of the German federation of deportees (from East Central, East and South-East Europe after the Second World War), Erika Steinbach, has been since 2000 promoting the idea of establishing in Berlin a center against expulsion in Berlin. This idea provoked a storm of indignation in Poland and initiated a heated debate which was ignored or not understood in Germany, but was politically exploited by national-conservative and national-clerical circles in Poland. Only when the new Tusk government declared this question to be a German domestic issue not impinging directly on Polish-German relations, even if the Poles have to remain watchful, it lose momentum. “History policy” will certainly play a role in 2009 when the 70th anniversary of the beginning of the Second World War, the 60th anniversary of the Federal Republic and the 20th

anniversary of the fall of communism in Poland and the subsequent fall of the Berlin wall will all be commemorated.

Nevertheless, there are encouraging examples of how history is not a factor of division but one of unity. German historian Gregor Thum wrote a voluminous book on how the capital of Silesia changed from German "Breslau" to Polish "Wroclaw" in the years immediately after the Second World War. It is dealing with one of the most sensitive items in German-Polish relations. Thum did not conceal problems connected with the forced emigration of the German population and the settlement of Poles in an almost completely destroyed city, but addressed all questions with a high degree of empathy. He got many awards for his book not only in Germany, but also in Poland. The city administration of Wroclaw even organized promotional activities for the book.

In former East Germany, communists had not come to terms with German history between 1933 and 1945, that is with national-socialist rule in general and with German-Polish relations from 1939 to 1945 in particular. The German occupation in Poland was interpreted in ideological terms. In this perspective, Poland had been a victim not of the Germans, but of monopoly capitalism. The GDR, of which several leaders had been prisoners of Nazi concentration camps, declared itself from the outset "antifascist." Coming to terms with the Nazi heritage was to be a matter of concern for West Germany, not for the GDR. The fact that there was no broader discussion on the role of East German population during Nazi rule contributed to a latent distrust of Polish society and even of their communist leadership towards the East Germans.

Another important sphere for coming to grips with the past is criminal law. A credible break with the past is reached when political and state-supported crimes of the previous regime are judged. In the Federal Republic it was only from the end of the 1950s that the problem of crimes committed on a mass scale in German-occupied Europe was recognized and a central investigation institution was set up. But until the end of the 1960s, in many cases, judges trained in Nazi times, refused to recognize witnesses from Poland under various pretexts. With a generational change among judges and a different political climate after the implementation of Brandt's *ostpolitik*, documents and witnesses from Poland were considered properly, but in many cases the perpetrators could not be prosecuted because they had either died or were in poor physical condition.

In communist Poland, Polish-German relations between 1939 and 1945 were clear-cut: the Germans were perpetrators and the Poles victims. After 1989, Polish prosecuting authorities also started investigating Poles who after the war had committed crimes against Germans only because they were Germans, but the prosecutors had the same problem of time-lag as their German colleagues in the previous years. More important is that Polish historiography now dealt with problems of revenge against Germans after the war. At the sites

where several thousand Germans died in camps of forced labor, common Polish-German monuments of commemoration were erected.

A third aspect of coming to terms with the past concerns the rehabilitation and material compensation for victims. From the beginning of the 1950s, West Germany had paid billions of deutschmarks to victims of Nazi rule in Israel and Western states, but refused to take into account communist countries (where the majority of these people were living). It was argued that one could not be sure that financial compensation would really reach the persons for whom it was intended. Exceptions were made for specific groups like victims of pseudo-medical experiments. The problem of forced labor which had concerned millions of young people from Eastern Europe was tackled only by the “red-green” government led by Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005). In August 2000 a fund was established into which the Federal Government and a group of German firms, which had employed forced laborers during the war, paid 10 billions of deutschmarks each (equal to a total of some 10 billion euros). Nearly 1.7 million persons, among them some 0.5 million Poles, received sums between 2,550 and 7,700 euros, which could be only a symbolic contribution. But more important than financial compensation was for these persons sincere interest in their fate shown by ordinary people. They had already been invited to Germany since the 1980s by local initiatives who traced the fate of forced laborers who had been working in their community during the war. They were glad that people wanted to listen to their narration, asking questions and invited them to school classes.

Continuity of institutional co-operation

The fundamental political change in Europe after 1989/90 has deeply affected Polish-German relations. This is true for the relations between the states, but also for the attitude both societies have towards each other. One example, seldom noticed by the public, is a military co-operation that started in the early 1990s and has been helpful when Poland had to adapt its military structures to the requirements of NATO. Several hundred Polish officers have been trained at German military academies, there are regular seminars for officers from both countries (in Poland and in Germany). Near the German border, a common Polish-German-Danish task force is stationed which in 2007 led the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops in Afghanistan. When in 2008 on the celebration day of the Polish army, a unit of the Bundeswehr took part in a troop parade in Warsaw (together with units from France, Slovakia and Ukraine), this was not even commented by Polish media.

In 1990, the abolition of visas between Germany and Poland considerably facilitated mutual contacts. When Poland joined the European Union in 2004, customs controls were abolished. Even

passport controls were cancelled when Poland became a member of the Schengen agreement in December 2007. These measures favored further contacts between Poles and Germans. Both societies got to know the partner closer and to appreciate him. The government agreement on good neighborhood and friendly relations of 1991 set an excellent framework for establishing a dense network of relationships between the civil societies. Economic exchange between Poland and Germany is one of the most dynamic fields in bilateral relations and constitutes a solid material foundation for the future. Poland is exporting about one quarter to one third of its goods and services to Germany. For Germany, commerce with Poland means only some 3 per cent of its foreign trade, but it has been growing every year. Keeping in mind that the Netherlands with about 40 per cent of the Polish population is the third or fourth largest trade partner for Germany, one can imagine which potential of further expansion of Polish-German trade is hidden in these economic relations.

There exists an official partnership between more than 600 Polish and German twin-towns. These relations are very vivid and bring “ordinary people” together, not only the élite. The German-Polish office for youth exchange, formed in 1993 according to the pattern of the successful German-French institution, organizes meetings of some 170,000 young Poles and Germans every year. There is a close co-operation between German and Polish universities and scientific organizations. Some 1500 German students are studying in Poland, some 15,000 Polish students in Germany. The examples of institutionalized contact and co-operation could be continued.

Results

Considering the present state of Polish-German relations one cannot but be astonished at the fundamental change which has occurred in these relations during the last 20 years. Partnership has expanded on a multitude of levels. But most remarkable is the change in the attitudes of both societies towards each other. When Germany was reunited in 1990, no other nation in Europe had greater fears of future Germany than Poland. Still the Polish government supported the unification because Poland wanted to become a part of the West, and the GDR had transformed from being a “shield against possible West German aggression” into a barricade separating Poland from the West. Germany proved to be a reliable partner who supported Poland’s ambitions of joining NATO and EU. Already in the mid-1990s, opinion polls showed that Germany was for the majority of the Poles the preferred partner in political and economic cooperations.

On the other side, opinion polls in Germany showed a rather negative image of Poland and the Poles in which traditional

stereotypes like “Polish backwardness” were linked with new ones like “Poles as car thieves.” This image is however changing. Since Poland has joined the European Union, Germans have been looking to their Eastern neighbor with new curiosity. Poland is still probably Germany’s most unknown neighbor, and much of the country’s negative image can be explained with the low level of knowledge about it. This knowledge is growing, and so is sympathy towards Poles, especially through the widespread personal contacts, but also through travelling to Poland which is so close to Germany and much less known there than Spain, for instance, which is many hundred kilometers away from the German border. Even when the Polish government happened to be rather critical of Germany, sympathy for the German society increased. Sociologists explained this with the high frequency of every-day contacts which formed a picture of Germany that was different from actual governmental discourse. A positive attitude towards Germany and to Polish-German cooperation is especially strong in the territories near the Polish-German border and among young and well-educated people.

The cooling in official Polish-German relations during the two years of the PiS (Law and Justice)-led government in Poland, and especially of the government of Jaroslaw Kaczynski from July 2006 until November 2007, highlighted the importance of established institutional relations between the two societies. Contacts between the governments were reduced, but they continued on many other levels thanks to the many existing bilateral agreements between civil society actors. But implementation should not be found missing. The funding of the program of youth exchange, which is one of the highlights of German-Polish co-operation, was partly questioned in 2006 and 2007 by the responsible Polish Ministry led by a politician of the national-clerical party.

When at the beginning of the 1990s, Polish and German élite were speaking of a “community of values and interests” many people wondered if this was a community without thorough grounding in society. Today we notice that this grounding has developed considerably and has gained great importance in Polish-German relations. In the long run, good transnational relations cannot substitute good relations between the governments. But as the experience of the “critical” years (2005-07) has proven, good relations between both societies may help to bridge them in times of crises.

Probably only few people would have predicted two generations ago that the relations between Polish and German societies would be so positive. The determining factors which enabled such an evolution in the relationship have been explained above. If this German-Polish experience can be transferred to other societies in conflict depends on the factors causing problems between them that must be analyzed first. However the German-Polish example shows how decisive civil society actors, like religious communities, can be under certain circumstances and how their own sense of responsibility vis-à-vis the society at large can play a positive role in

conflict resolution. The example of the year 1965 shows that it is not absolutely necessary for an organization to act in a democratically constituted community. Important are leaders able to instill a “vision” for societies in conflict and committed to implement this “vision” even under adverse political conditions.

Reawakening of Sino-Japanese War Memories

Hugues Tertrais

In 2005, demonstrators took to the streets of the main cities of China to protest against both the new Japanese history textbook and the Japanese Prime Minister's visits—then Junichiro Koizumi—to the Yasukuni Shrine. Two years later, in 2007, numerous conferences were organized in France, China and Japan to commemorate the massacre of Nanking (Nanjing), committed in December 1937, at the beginning of the Japanese occupation of China.¹ But the facts involved are already 60 and 70 years old. How was such a mobilisation still possible?

We have to understand what these two “places of remembrance” are: the Yasukuni Shrine and the city of Nanking. The first was established in Tokyo in the second year of the Meiji era (1869) by the will of the new Emperor Mutsuhito (the Meiji emperor),² and named Yasukuni Shrine 10 years later. It is dedicated to the spirits of soldiers—called “divinities”—who died fighting for the country and the Emperor of Japan.³ More than 2 million men and women whose lives were dedicated to the service of Imperial Japan since the 1850s are enshrined there. But the main source of contention is that 14 convicted Class-A war criminals (“crimes against peace”) have been among them since 1978.

The Nanking Massacre is different story, but closely linked with the first. Nanking, then the capital of the Republic of China,⁴ was the scene of mass atrocities and war crimes committed by the Japanese military, after the city fell to the Imperial Japanese Army on

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¹ Notably “1937-2007, Nankin.” IRICE Workshop organized at the University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne on December 14, 2007.

² In 1868, Mutsuhito set up a new leadership, moved from Kyoto to a new capital, Edo, renamed Tokyo, and launched important reforms in order to modernize Japan.

³ The two first main wars of the new period—and victories—were against China (1894-95) and Russia (1904-05).

⁴ Since Chiang Kai Shek reunified China and proclaimed the new Republic in 1928.

13 December 1937.⁵ How long did the massacre last? That is not clearly defined, although the violence continued until early February 1938, six weeks later. The extent of the atrocities is still debated, but a large number of women and children were raped or killed. What is certain is that the Sino-Japanese war was the main confrontation in East Asia—between two Asian nations in modern history. Furthermore, the Sino-Japanese hostility is one of the few adverse relations in the region where the risk of war is still serious.

The background

With the benefit of hindsight, we have a better understanding of events. The main background is the long-lasting centrality of China in Asia. For many centuries indeed, the Chinese (Han) culture dominated the Far East from Japan in the North to Vietnam in the South. But the more recent time shows the Japanese take-off and its attempt to dominate Asia during the Second World War. What happened between these two images?

For the most part, the transition arises from the reactions to the encounter with the Western Powers in the 19th century, which roughly appeared in the area during the 1840s, both in China (the British) and in Japan (the Americans).⁶ In both countries, there was a debate about the correct response to Western incursions. The first was to confront the threat, even from a disadvantageous position, and to try to maintain the traditions—that was the Qing dynasty's attitude in China. The second was to go with the West and undertake a process of modernization, by making the necessary reforms—that was the Japanese decision and soon the Meiji period began. In fact, so complete was Japanese adoption of modernization that the new Japan participated in the “break up” of China alongside the Western Powers. As a result, the following period became a time of confrontation between the two countries.

Thanks to a first war against China, won in 1895, Japan annexed the Island of Formosa (Taiwan) and started the building of its maritime empire. In 1900, Tokyo joined the Western Powers in the repression of the anti-foreign, anti-Christian Boxer uprising. At the beginning of the 1930s, Tokyo took over the so-called Manchukuo and at the end of the decade invaded and occupied the Chinese mainland, thanks to the “Marco Polo bridge incident” of July 1937. As we know, the Asian part of the Second World War, including the occupation of China, was ended by the Japanese defeat in August 1945. Then began the post-war period.

⁵ After the battle for the control of Shanghai, Nanking was abandoned by the Republic's military chiefs and fell without fighting.

⁶ Nanking (Nanjing) Treaty with China in 1842, Kanagawa Treaty with Japan in 1854.

The agenda of the post-conflict period

1945-1951: no peace process

When Tokyo announced its capitulation after the two atomic bombings,⁷ the USA dominated the whole situation in the Far East. On the Japanese side, the American occupation authority had first to decide what to do with Emperor Hirohito,⁸ to examine what level of responsibility he took in the war decisions, and consequently whether he should be tried for war crimes.⁹ As we know, Truman and McArthur resolved that Hirohito would not be prosecuted in the Tokyo Trial (the International Military Tribunal for the Far East), making the military occupation of Japan significantly easier. Instead of the Emperor, a few but important political and military Japanese rulers were condemned. Some of them, first of all General Hideki Tojo, the former Prime Minister and army chief, were sentenced to death and hanged on 28 December 1948.¹⁰ However, in the wake of the atomic bombings, Japan appeared as a victim more than as an aggressor and the United States made their military occupation of Japan as soft as possible—that lasted until the San Francisco conference of September 1951.

On the Chinese side, the Japanese military units remained where they were for a while. The winner was the Republic of China, led by Chiang Kai-shek and its Nationalist Party (Guomindang), itself backed by the United States. But the Chinese communist Party was co-winner and had no intention of coming into line. As a result, internal tensions replaced Sino-Japanese antagonism as the main source of conflict in China. Furthermore, the Resistance years had made the Communist Party stronger, whereas the Guomindang, in charge before the war, was held responsible for the war. The country fell into a civil war in 1947 ultimately won by the Communist Party which proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. As a result, China and Japan entered the Cold War on opposite sides, with China aligned to the Communist bloc, and Japan in the American camp.

⁷ Hiroshima and Nagasaki, August 6 and 9, 1945.

⁸ Hirohito rose to the throne on December 25, 1926, and his imperial reign was called *Showa* (radiant peace).

⁹ The exact role of Emperor Hirohito in war decisions remains an important historiography question. See Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, New York, Perennial, HarperColins Publishers, 2000, and Peter Wetzler, *Hirohito and War, Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Pre-war Japan*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1998.

¹⁰ Prime Minister from October 1941 to July 1944, General Tojo Hideki was the leader of the "Party of the War" against the United States.

1951-1971: sharing hostility

By the early 1950s, Japan and China started a new page of their own history marked by estrangement. Japan recovered its national independence by the Peace Treaty of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, including a second treaty about security, which strongly linked the new Japan to the USA. Japan rather quickly rebuilt an industrial economy, thanks to new political rulers backed by the US and a new constitution—but with the same Head of State, Emperor Hirohito. At the end of the 1960s, a French book could be entitled *Japan: The Third Big Power*.¹¹ Indeed, Japanese goods were already sold all around the world.

Red China became a close ally of the Soviet Union during the same period, although this alliance did not last. A treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance was signed by Stalin and Mao on February 14, 1950 but by the early 1960s competition rather than co-operation dominated the relationship between the two communist countries. Soon after, the Cultural Revolution engulfed China. From the American point of view, the PRC remained the main enemy in the Asia-Pacific area. For instance, from 1965 onwards, the war in Vietnam was fought with the conviction that the United States were facing both North-Vietnam and People's China.

1971-1979: renewed diplomatic and economic relations

In the early 1970s a new situation arose in the Asia-Pacific arena, largely a consequence of more cordial relations between China and the United States, initiated by Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing of July 1971. The President's security adviser organized the first official visit to China by an American head of state. During the same year, the United States returned to Japan the Okinawa island which had been annexed in 1945 and maintained as a strategic military base close to the Chinese coastline. Finally, the Beijing regime recovered the China seat at the United Nations on October 25, 1971.

The turning point in the relations between China and Japan came a few months after the Nixon-Mao summit of February 1972. The Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, went to China in September 1972 where, besides establishing diplomatic relations, he stated that the People's Republic government was the unique and legal government of China instead of Taiwan. During the 1970s, economic ties grew between the two neighboring countries, China was keen on getting access to Japanese technology and investments whereas Japan imported Chinese oil. Mao died in September 1976. Less than two years later, a peace and friendship treaty was signed

¹¹ Robert Guillain, *Japon Troisième Grand*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1969.

by the Fukuda government on August 12, 1978.¹² A few weeks later, the ashes of the former rulers hung after the Tokyo Trial in 1948 were transferred to the national Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. Was the war definitively over?

1980-1995: looking back on their common history

Almost at the same time, the Chinese leadership decided to reform the Chinese economy.¹³ But the Chinese strategic switch to a more open economic policy went hand in hand with a political and historical adjustment. Economically, the new Chinese way brought the country closer to the capitalist world, notably Japan, through the Special Economic Zones on the coastline. Far from the Maoist standard “learn to forget,” a new attention was given to past events, especially to the Nanking massacre which had sunk into oblivion. The local authorities (city of Nanjing, provincial government of Jiangsu and the communist party) decided in 1983 to build a memorial, a museum dedicated to the victims of the massacre which quickly became emblematic. That also meant new fields and debates for historians, who came together around a new journal created in 1991 and called “Research on the Resistance War against Japan” (*KangRi zhangzheng yanjiu*).¹⁴

The historical debate was also very lively in Japan with an obvious political dimension. The teaching of national history had been thoroughly reformed during the post-war period, but the question still remained on how to teach Sino-Japanese relations and the Pacific War. The debate was rendered more sensitive by the rise of Japanese patriotism. Most of the textbooks were fairly objective, especially in the 1970s with mentions of the massacre of Nanking. But the right-wing politicians, especially those from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), applied pressure to favor a more nationalist conception of history. The LDP set up a “Study Commission on History” in 1993.¹⁵

But the reading of history had already acquired a regional dimension when in 1982 the PRC and Korea (the two Koreas), both victims of Japanese domination, expressed their concern over the

¹² Diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington were normalized four months later, on December 16, 1978.

¹³ The opening up policy by the Deng Xiaoping was decided by the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978 (Third Plenum of the XIth Central Committee).

¹⁴ *Wushi nian lai de Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu* (50 Years of Research on Contemporary China), Shanghai shudian chubanshe. Quoted by Françoise Kreissler, “Le Mémorial de Nankin. Lectures et relectures de l’histoire”, in *Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps*, No. 88 (“Ordre et désordre asiatiques”), Nanterre, BDIC, October-December 2007.

¹⁵ The idea was to redefine the conception of the past and the teaching of history. 105 PLD elected members participated in the meetings. Arnaud Nanta, “Le débat sur l’enseignement de l’histoire au Japon,” in *Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps*, op. cit. [14].

process of writing new history textbooks in Japan. The 40th commemoration of the Japanese defeat, on August 15, 1985, became particularly sensitive. On the same day, in Tokyo, the Japanese Prime Minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, paid a visit to the Yasakuni shrine—sparking off an outcry in China and Korea—and in Nanking, the memorial hall was inaugurated.

Since 1995: the rivalry reactivated

The 50th anniversary of the Japanese defeat was more fervently commemorated in China and Korea. The Far Eastern Economic Review published in Hong Kong an issue entitled “Forbidden but not forgotten,” with on the cover a 1937 photo showing a burned baby crying alone in a bombed and abandoned station. Regarding the writing of history, Japan tilted towards the conservative view. The official report of the “Study Commission on History” recommended in 1995 to reassess the whole of modern history, the Tokyo Trial and even the Nanking massacre. A new national movement decided to promote a more Japanese vision and created in 1997 the society for the writing of a new textbook, which was officially approved in the early 2000s, although no school use it and it has very little impact on the teaching of history.¹⁶

On the part of China, a successful book was published in 1997 for the 60th anniversary of the Nanking massacre by the Sino-American Iris Chang: *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of the Second World War*.¹⁷ However, two years later, the journal *Research on the Resistance War against Japan* reviewed 50 years of historical research in China, without any special chapter about the Nanking massacre.¹⁸ That did not prevent the 2005 demonstrations in China against the Japanese history textbooks. In Nanking, a new memorial hall dedicated to the victims of the Japanese invaders was open in December 2007. Iris Chang herself suggested that the rape of Nanking could be compared to the Jewish Holocaust.

The issues at stake

First, is there any opportunity to write a joint history of Eastern Asia? One already exists, written by a small group of Japanese, Korean and Chinese historians.¹⁹ This book is officially approved in Korea, where

¹⁶ Arnaud Nanta, “Le débat sur l’enseignement de l’histoire au Japon,” op. cit. [15].

¹⁷ Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, London, Penguin Books, 1998.

¹⁸ *Wushi nian lai de Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiu* (50 years of Research on Contemporary China), op. cit. [14].

¹⁹ Alain Delissen, “Carrefour historique, carrefours historiographiques : les nouveaux passé de la Corée du Sud,” in *Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps*, No. 88, op. cit. [14].

it is consequently usable in schools; it is also available in Japanese bookstores, but doesn't circulate in China. Indeed, such textbooks are not easy to write together. For example, who exactly are the victims, in Hiroshima or in Nanking? The Asian nations have yet to build a common memory.

This problem is especially important if we think in terms of regional integration. Is there any opportunity to organize something like an Asian Union? Since the 1990s and the end of the bipolar world, Eastern Asia is one—or the only—strong economic area in the world without a process of regionalism. There is an economic integration, with a lot of outsourcing and relocation of industries mainly inside China, but we do not see any firm willingness to set up regional institutions even proposals have been made. The closest regional organization (ASEAN²⁰) is located in South-East Asia.

A comparison with European Union suggests that this was made possible thanks to a genuine reconciliation between France and Germany (a symbol of which was the 1984 picture showing Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand hand in hand at Verdun, the most dramatically famous battlefield of the First World War). In the Far East, there were apologies but there was no genuine reconciliation. The situation seems to be different since the balance of power is shaky between Japan and China, especially because of the fast emergence of China as a global powerhouse whereas Japan seems to economically stagnate. The two nations are both candidates for regional leadership. They are competitors and China does not seem in a hurry to build any kind of Asian Union as the smaller Asian countries are and maybe Japan itself. China is large and populated enough to have little interest in regional integration. Furthermore, there is a strategic aspect to the competition between China and Japan: Beijing does not agree with the idea that Japan could be a member of UN Security Council. Also the past can be used at any given time for political and diplomatic purposes.

²⁰ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded by the Bangkok Declaration of August 8, 1967 and signed by five nations: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Since the 1990s enlargement which incorporated Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999), there are 10 member countries.

The My Lai Massacre and its Memory: the Long Path toward Reconciliation between Vietnam and the USA

Pierre Journoud

During the morning of March 16, 1968, several hundred Vietnamese civilians—probably more than 500 if we include the victims from the hamlets of both My Lai and My Khe, two neighbouring hamlets of Son My village¹—were killed in cold blood, most of them by U.S. soldiers from the 11th Brigade's Charlie Company. Commander of the spearhead First Platoon, Lieutenant William Calley ordered his men to fire on a group of civilians and fired round himself in the crowd. Other atrocities were committed in the village: rape, torture, mutilations, etc. These horrible facts were not made known to the public until the end of 1969. As the legal scholar Douglas Linder wrote, “two tragedies took place in 1968 in Viet Nam. One was the massacre [...] in My Lai on the morning of March 16. The other was the cover-up of that massacre.”² We need to understand, first, why the governments of both the United States and its ally, the Republic of South Vietnam; and after 1975, the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), obviously for different reasons, tried to suppress public knowledge of the massacre, and consequently, ignore, cast a blind eye, on the suffering of the survivors, sacrificing the traumatic memory of victims to State interests.

However, since the 1990s, the United States and the SRV have been engaged in a process of rapprochement, if not reconciliation, driven by important political motivations, powerful economic and commercial interests and a common need to

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¹ The Vietnamese memorial at the site lists 504 names, with ages ranging from 1 to 22 years; the official US estimate is 347 deaths.

² Doug Linder, “An Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial”, 1999 (on line on Doug Linder's website dedicated to the My Lai courts-martial: http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/MyL_intro.html).

counterbalance the renewal of China's power. This process has been facilitated, if not initiated, by the will of the SRV to come out of its isolation, thanks to the adoption of the *Dôi moi* policy of economic liberalization in 1986³ and the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989. Simultaneously, the sentiment of victory over communism, felt par American leaders and reflected in public opinion, after the disintegration of USSR and the end of the Cold War, and reinforced following the lightning victory in the Gulf War of 1991, appeased—without definitively exorcising, as was declared by the first President Bush at the time—the “Vietnam Syndrome.”⁴ This renewal of American self-confidence facilitated the building of a new relationship with Vietnam. The intensification of official and informal exchanges between both countries have led to the lifting of the trade embargo in 1994, and the formal diplomatic recognition of the SRV by the Clinton administration in 1995, just 20 years after the fall of Saigon. Despite cyclic resurgence of the tensions and the ambiguities, which have characterized the Vietnamese and U.S. visions of the postcolonial world since the beginning of the first Indochina War,⁵ the two governments have steadily and significantly improved their relationship.

With a few exceptions, Washington and Hanoi have explicitly rejected the weight of the “ghosts of war,” trying to “transcend the past without forgetting,” as an easier way to keep this traumatic past at bay. While still a painful and potentially divisive memory within both nations, considered separately, the memory of My Lai and other less well-known and publicized massacres has never played a significant role in the developing diplomatic and political relationship between the United States and the SRV. Thus, the role of civil society, and especially that of American non-governmental organizations (NGOs), has been instrumental, as a substitute for official institutions, not only in the recognition of the physical and moral damage inflicted upon the Vietnamese people, but also in beginning to pay the material and symbolic compensation that these tragedies so eloquently and painfully call for.

³ The *Dôi moi* (or renewal) policy was aimed first at changing the rules of economic activity. Since the 1990s, it has also been associated with political, institutional and legal change, in order to separate the Party from the State: Matthieu Salomon, “Les arcanes de la ‘démocratie socialiste’ vietnamienne” [The mysteries of Vietnamese “socialist democracy”], *Les études du CERI*, No. 104, May 2004, www.ceri-sciences-po.org/publica/etude/etude104.pdf.

⁴ As Geoff Simons wrote, “the deep national trauma that helped to define the Vietnam Syndrome arose not only through unprecedented military defeat, but also because the unambiguous rout had occurred within a particular context. A national people had refused to submit, despite a genocidal onslaught [...] perpetrated by a racist gun-happy nation born through the mass murder of indigenous people and still obsessed with ‘frontier values.’” Geoff Simons, *Vietnam Syndrome. Impact on US Foreign Policy*, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998, p. xviii.

⁵ Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America. The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*, Chapel Hill/London, The University of North Carolina Press, 2000, p. 188.

Hiding the truth: a conditioned reflex

The cover-up of the massacre in the USA

(March 1968-September 1969)

Immediately after the massacre took place, higher-ranking officers of the units involved decided to maintain secrecy. Officially, My Lai was a military victory that had resulted in the deaths of 128 enemy combatants. However, Ronald Ridenhour, a soldier of the 11th Brigade, who had not been at My Lai, but heard soldiers talking about what they had done that day, and become convinced that his comrades had participated in a mass murder, wrote to congressmen and to dozens of top officials—including President Nixon, the Pentagon, the State Department—to share the result of his personal investigation. The letter was ignored, except by Congressman Morris Udall of Arizona.⁶ The Pentagon then decided to conduct more serious inquiries into both the massacres and the subsequent cover-up. One of the most devastating of these inquiries was the “Peers investigation.” A veteran of the Second World War, the Korean conflict and the Vietnam War, General Peers and his team gathered considerable evidence on the mass crime. It proved that US soldiers from two companies—and not only one—raped and killed hundreds of civilians in not just one but three hamlets that infamous day (My Lai, Binh Tay and My Khe). Worse still, it revealed that the orders “to leave nothing alive” came from senior officers, that the massacre had been planned and coordinated at Task Force level by Lieutenant-Colonel Frank Barker.⁷ Because its findings were so disastrous for the U.S. Military, the 400 hours of tape were classified.

The massacre occurred, of course, during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson, but by the time that pressure mounted to investigate what, in terms of the Nuremberg precedent would at the minimum be a War Crime, if not a Crime Against Humanity, Richard Nixon had assumed the Presidency, and the responsibility fell on his shoulders. His advisors were divided, because they feared the potential negative

⁶ David Anderson (ed.), “Ron Ridenhour’s Letter of March 29, 1969,” in *Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre*, appendix A, Lawrence, KS, University of Kansas Press, 1998, p. 201.

⁷ The recordings of the US Army’s internal inquiry into the massacre were forgotten for nearly 40 years until they were tracked down in the U.S. National Archives (NARA) by the British journalist Celina Dunlop. She eventually succeeded to get—for the first time—the declassification of 48 hours of recordings: Celina Dunlop, “The Forgotten Tapes, My Lai: Legacy of a massacre,” *Global Research*, March 16, 2008, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=DUN20080316&articleId=8361>. Some very interesting extracts of these recordings can be downloaded on the BBC website, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/documentaries/2008/04/080327_my lai_partone.shtml. See as well the account of General Peers: W. Pears, *The My Lai Inquiry*, New York, WW Norton and Company, 1979.

impact on public opinion, if knowledge of what had transpired on that terrible March day became widespread. They were also worried about an adverse effect on the peace negotiations (which had started in Paris in May 1968). Nixon and Kissinger had precisely defined a strategy of ending the war by negotiating while simultaneously maintaining a position of force on both the military front in Vietnam, and the political front at home.⁸

Hence, Nixon decided in August 1969 to let the Army handle the matter through its established court-martial procedures. On September 6, 1969, Lieutenant William Calley, the leader of the First Platoon, which conducted a significant part of the killing, was charged with the murder of 109 “Oriental human beings.”⁹

From massive revelation in the media to denial of justice (November 1969-1974)

It was only in November 1969 that the media revealed the grisly details of the My Lai tragedy, and the Army’s efforts to cover up the truth. Seymour Hersh’s articles in the *New York Times* and other periodicals,¹⁰ and Ronald’s Haeberle’s photos in *Life* magazine played a decisive role. Doubt and denial were no longer possible. In a telephone conversation declassified in 2004, a distressed Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger: “There are so many kids just lying there; these pictures are authentic.” Both men talked about a “game plan” to confront the “terrible mess” caused by the scandal, “sweep under the rug” the atrocity photographs, and blame a “low-level officer [Calley], who must have been insane”...¹¹ Laird also personally warned President Nixon—who, at a press conference in December, would reduce the massacre to an “isolated incident”—that My Lai “could prove acutely

⁸ Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 10, 1969, quoted by Jeffrey Kimball at the Paris conference on the end of the Vietnam War (1968-1975), May 13-14, 2008.

⁹ For a short biography of Calley, see: Mark Gado, “Into the Dark: The My Lai Massacre” (on line on http://www.crimelibrary.com/notorious_murders/mass/lai/index_1.html). For a detailed history of his court-martial: Michal Belknap, *The Vietnam War on Trial: The My Lai Massacre and Court-Martial of Lieutenant Calley*, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2002.

¹⁰ Hersh had been a police reporter in Chicago. When he uncovered the story of My Lai, he went first to the news magazines *Life* and *Look* and they were not interested. So he first gave the story to Dispatch News Service, a recently established competitor to the Associated Press. The story ran on November 13, 1969. Seymour Hersh later received the Pulitzer Prize and quickly came one of America’s most respected and effective investigative journalists. He published the complete results of his inquiry in *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath*, New York: Random House, 1970.

¹¹ Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, November 21, 1969, *The Kissinger Telcons*, National Security Archive, “Electronic Briefing Book” No. 123, edited by Thomas Blanton and Dr. William Burr, May, 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/index.htm>.

embarrassing to the United States,” affect the Paris peace talks and “provide grist for the mills of antiwar activists.”¹²

But the news impact on American opinion—already strongly divided over the Vietnam War—was surprisingly ambivalent. On the one hand, it encouraged the antiwar movement, which reached its peak in the fall of 1969 before declining steadily,¹³ to oppose a war that turned out to be not only a misguided policy and a tragic mistake, but also an unjust and immoral aggression against a small nation. It also increased the number of conscientious objectors, and aggravated the so-called “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” suffered by veterans, sometimes denounced by demonstrators as “baby-killers”...¹⁴ On the other hand, many people reacted with disbelief, denial and evasive sentiments. Lieutenant Calley—the only one who would eventually be convicted, in September 1970, of premeditated murder for ordering the shootings, and sentenced to life imprisonment—benefited from unexpected public support.¹⁵ An April 1971 poll shows that 78 percent of those polled disagreed with the decision of the military court, which found Calley guilty and gave him a life sentence; 56 percent disapproved of this verdict because they thought that many others besides Calley shared the responsibility for what happened. Thus, 51 percent thought that Nixon should free Calley and 28 percent reduce his sentence.¹⁶

As Elizabeth Hillman writes, “no one was happy with the results of the Calley court-martial,” even if the latest was necessary. But “the military justice system could not deal with the consequences of military service gone so horrifyingly wrong any better than commanding officers could solve the political, social, and cultural dilemmas that made it impossible for American troops to win the

¹² Thom Shanker and David Stout, “Vietnam Archive Casts a Shadow Across Decades,” *The New York Times*, May 23, 2008, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807E5DD113EF934A25752C1A9639C8B63>.

¹³ Melvin Small, Johnson, *Nixon and the Doves*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1988, p. 193.

¹⁴ Commonly abbreviated in the American press as “PTSD,” which requires a very careful medical diagnosis, since it could result in the recognition of and compensation for the long-term consequences of military service. It is important to note that antiwar activists used terms like “baby killers” much more frequently against political and military leaders and not to categorize common soldiers, enlisted men. On the cultural and psychological impact of the Vietnam War in USA and especially on American veterans, see: Andrew Martin, *Receptions of War. Vietnam in American Culture*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993; Fred Turner, *Echoes of combat. The Vietnam War in American Memory*, New York, Doubleday, 1996.

¹⁵ Melvin Laird, “Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2005, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20051101faessay84604/melvin-r-laird/iraq-learning-the-lessons-of-vietnam.html>.

¹⁶ Telephone surveys conducted in April 1971 by Opinion Research Corporation for President Nixon and The Gallup Organization, <http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/SurveyResul>.

Vietnam War.”¹⁷ Thus, it is not surprising that some veterans tried to fill the gap themselves between the reality of war in Vietnam and its perception in the USA. In April 1971, antiwar veteran John F. Kerry began to testify to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that war crimes were not isolated incidents but “crimes committed with the full awareness of officers at all levels of command,” which resulted of American tragic military policies in Vietnam, such as the “glorification of body counts”; the creation of “free fire zones” in which U.S. forces were permitted to “kill anything that moves”; the burning, napalming and bombing of Vietnamese villages...¹⁸ His testimony was a résumé of American soldiers’ direct accounts of war crimes presented weeks earlier by Vietnam Veterans Against the War in Detroit. Called the “Winter Soldier Investigation,” these hearings were a direct consequence of the revelation of the My Lai massacre, and were a valiant if unsuccessful effort to convince the American people that U.S. war crimes did not begin nor stop in My Lai.¹⁹

But Kerry was not yet Congressman and far from becoming a Presidential candidate: he was not heeded; some even said that he was lying. Just three days after the court-martial verdict, Nixon had already made the controversial decision to order Calley released from prison, and let him spend the next years under house arrest at Fort Benning, in Georgia, with organizations such as the American Legion raising funds for his defense. But not only was his sentence reduced to 10 years but, later, in 1974, Calley was paroled after completing just one-third of his sentence. Some denounced Nixon’s gesture as a “whitewash,” a bumbled attempt to pacify memories across the political spectrum. One may conclude, objectively, that the decision to judge only Calley, instead of many other who shared responsibility, including those far higher in rank, and then to reduce Calley’s sentence, was nothing else than a denial of Justice, in direct violation of the responsibility principles issued for the first time by the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals (no one may be excused from responsibility for war crimes because he was “following orders”). At a University of North California conference entitled “Vietnam Reconsidered,” General Peers frankly admitted that he had not been pleased with the result of his inquiry: “I don’t think we as a nation... and I, as an individual... feel that is justice.”²⁰ Were the survivors, and relatives of victims, better treated in reunited and independent Vietnam?

¹⁷ Elizabeth Hillman, *Defending America. Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006.

¹⁸ The Vietnam Veterans against the War Statements by John Kerry read to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations April 23, 1971 (on line on the Sixties Project’s website: www2.iath.virginia.edu).

¹⁹ Jan Barry, “John Kerry and War crimes in Vietnam,” February 29, 2004, *Vvaw.org*.

²⁰ Lt. Gen. William Peers, April 8, 1984 (on line on the Vietnam Virtual Archives’ website, Douglas Pike collection, <http://www.virtualarchive.vietnam.ttu.edu/starweb/virtual/vva/servlet.starweb#>).

The unexpected censorship in Socialist Vietnam after 1975

Surprisingly, after the victory of April 1975 and the unification of the country, Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi did not seize the opportunity to transform the massacre into what could have been a powerful tool of anti-U.S. propaganda, as they had done since the beginning of the war, often with great success in influencing world opinion. For example, Western observers were invited to make the difficult and arduous journey to Hanoi to document the massive bombing of North Vietnam, and attention was called to the terrible destruction of life and property caused by the indiscriminate use of defoliants in South Vietnam.²¹ Of course, in 1969-70, while the war was still raging and the on and off Paris talks in Paris often at standstill, North-Vietnamese propaganda used the revelations in the American press to convince the world that the My Lai massacre was only one among many others similar tragedies, and that the U.S. Army was not the only one to blame. For that purpose, it made reference to the Waffen-SS exaction during the Second World War. Specifically in reference to the murder of 642 inhabitants of the French Oradour-sur-Glane village, on June 10, 1944, by the first battalion of the Panzer division Das Reich, the Nhan Dan editorialist wrote: "It is not a Vietnamese Oradour, but hundred of Vietnamese Oradour which have taken place."²² In early December 1969, the French magazine *L'Express* ran as a headline "Oradour-sur-Vietnam" and described America as "overcome by nausea [...] since it learnt, about ten days ago, that it has become, in Vietnam, the equal as the French in Indochina, in Madagascar, in Algeria. And [the equal] as the German in Oradour, if not on the Eastern front, where the extermination was systematic."²³

Of course, there were so many fierce battles and so many Vietnamese civilian victims before, during, and after the My Lai massacre until 1973, even around My Lai and Ha My, that the massacre itself was not such big news in Vietnam. But, after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the Vietnamese government did not allow massacre survivors (who, after being displaced, had decided to

²¹ One of the most famous initiatives was the two sessions of the so-called Tribunal Russell headed by Jean-Paul Sartre in 1967 and 1968. The results of the inquiries conducted by special teams in Vietnam were presented during international conferences (organized as symbolic tribunals) and then published in two volumes: see for example Jean-Paul Sartre (ed.), *Tribunal Russell II. Le Jugement final*, Paris, Gallimard, 1968.

²² "L'affaire du massacre de Song-My," *Le Monde*, November 27, 1969.

²³ Jacques Boetsch, "Oradour-sur-Vietnam," *L'Express*, December 1, 1969. On the Oradour massacre and its controversial judgment by the Bordeaux military tribunal in 1953: Jean-Jacques Fouché, *Oradour. La politique et la justice*, Saint-Paul, Editions Lucien Souny, 2004). There are also quite many studies and publications, now, on French exaction in colonial empire and colonial wars. See, for instance: Raphaëlle Branche, *La Torture et l'armée française pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-1962*, Paris, Gallimard, 2001.

return to their villages in 1975-76) to publicly commemorate the tragic deaths, in their own way, despite the importance of proper treatment of the dead in Vietnamese culture.²⁴ One possible explanation is that the new leaders of a united Vietnam may have been afraid of the possible instrumentalization by their adversaries of the massacres in which it had directly or indirectly been involved. During the Tet offensive, in particular, several hundred—or maybe more than 2,000—South Vietnamese civilians and a few foreign nationals were massacred in Hue. However, although Vietnamese Communists have generally been considered as primarily responsible for killing in Hue, responsibilities have never been officially established, and the number of victims has been the subject of ongoing controversy.²⁵

Thanks to historical, sociological and anthropological research, it is now possible to understand better the attitudes of the Vietnamese government and people. The silence of the SRV leaders seems to have been justified by their almost obsessional concern for the necessity to build a national and heroic memory of their War of Independence. From 1948 to 1964, the Vietnamese leaders of Democratic Republic of Vietnam tried to promote a new political and productivist élite by establishing a “New Hero” worship, based on a subtle mixture between Vietnamese traditional celebration of mythical heroes of ancient victories and the internationalist heroic figure theorized by Soviet ideologues in the 1930s and later adopted by the Chinese Communists. The role of this campaign was crucial in the (re)building of a national memory in the northern half of the country after 1954,²⁶ and even more so after 1975. While fighting against every form of superstition on the familial and village levels, especially the traditional worship of the dead, the government’s first priority was to forge a new collective memory by building huge monuments and vast cemeteries, and organize massive national commemorations.²⁷

As the anthropologist Heonik Kwon has pointed out, “the post-war state hierarchy of Vietnam promoted the worship of the heroic

²⁴ On the traditional commemoration in Vietnam, see: Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “Weddings and Funerals in Contemporary Vietnam,” in Nguyen Van Huy and Laurel Kendall (eds.), *Vietnam: Journeys of Body, Mind, and Spirit*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p. 186.

²⁵ Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong Strategy of Terror*, Saigon: US Mission, 1970; Gareth Porter, “The 1968 ‘Hue massacre’,” *Indochina Chronicle*, Vol. 33, June 24, 1974 (article on line on: www.chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/porterhue1.html). For Stanley Karnow, communist soldiers were supposed to arrest—and not assassinate—American and foreigners (except the French thanks to de Gaulle’s critics of the U.S. policy in Vietnam) but some of them could have exceeded these instructions. Karnow adds that South-Vietnamese secret agents had also certainly infiltrated Hue, during the intense combats in the wake of the Tet Offensive, in order to assassinate those who had collaborated with the communists. An important number of bodies could have been thrown “in the common graves, with the victims of the Vietcong” (Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam. A History*, New York, Viking Press, 1983, p. 325.

²⁶ Benoît de Tréglodé, *Héros et révolution au Viêt Nam* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001).

²⁷ Hue-Tam Ho Tai (ed.), *The Country of Memory. Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001.

war dead to a civic religion and, in doing so, demoted the traditional culture of death commemoration.²⁸ [...] Neither the dominant traditional culture nor hegemonic revolutionary policies welcomed the memory of village victims of mass war death.” They could not be honored as casualties of war in the heroic sense, since they were considered to be victims of “unjust death.”²⁹ They could not be celebrated as heroes of glorious battles since they only brought suffering... Moreover, they were lost, buried anonymously, perhaps in a mass grave, without the possibility of family members celebrating their lives, their memories, their place in the social and familial hierarchy. Emphasizing the importance of the continuity of family, the Vietnamese system of values could not accept such a negative outcome as the termination of a family, conveyed by mass civilian war death. Thus, official governmental attention has been focused on the bodies of fallen revolutionary soldiers, and properly honoring the memory of their heroic dead in liberating the homeland, not on the bodies of non-combatant village women and children, long-neglected.

Those innocent civilians martyred by “B” and “C” Company’s soldiers had to wait for one generation before becoming the subjects of new respect, devotion, and when possible proper burial. In the meantime, the My Lai massacre had become the paradigm for American violence in Vietnam.

The return of the repressed

USA: My Lai, paradigm of American violence during the Vietnam War

On March 16, 1998, 30 years to the day after the My Lai massacre, 10 years after Clemson University professor David Egan and his wife had began a letter-writing campaign in 1988 for that very purpose, two veterans were awarded the Soldier’s Medal—the highest honor for bravery not involving direct conflict with the enemy. Helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson (then 24 years-old), and door gunner Lawrence Colburn landed their helicopter between American soldiers and a group of civilians to prevent their murder, and saved several

²⁸ Heonik Kwon, *After the Massacre. Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006, p. 2. On the Vietnamese state capacity to exercise complete control over the commemorative project, see: Hue-Tam Ho Tai, “Monumental Ambiguity: the State Commemoration of Ho Chi Minh,” in K. W Taylor and J. K. Whitmore (eds.), *Essays into Vietnamese Past*, Ithaca, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1995, p. 273 ff.

²⁹ Heonik Kwon, op. cit. [28], p. 137; “Anatomy of US and South Korean Massacres in the Vietnamese Year of the Monkey, 1968,” Japan Focus, *Japanfocus.org*.

Vietnamese civilians from the carnage.³⁰ In his speech, Army Major General Michael Ackerman, himself a Vietnam War veteran and in 1998 the most decorated active-duty “Signal officer,” acknowledged that the My Lai massacre was “one of the most shameful chapters in the army’s history.”³¹

This public admission of US moral, if not specifically criminal, responsibility for the civilian deaths at My Lai was of course late—30 years after the tragic event—and partial, because it took place in Washington D.C. and it was limited to the Army: nothing was said about a broader, national responsibility for the tragedy. Nothing was said about the terrible pressures, including death threats, that Thompson has had to endure in the Army, as soon as his action in My Lai was known...³² However, the symbolic turning point of this ceremony was important: the carefully polished image of Lieutenant Calley, the “old hero,” whom conservative Americans had even managed to transform into a victim who had merely done his job and paid for the crimes of others, was irrevocably tarnished; Hugh Thompson, the “new hero,” was celebrated for having respected the rules of war and saving Vietnamese people.

By that time, the history of war crimes in Vietnam had again become a “scientific” (in a sense of being susceptible to careful scholarly and much more precise documentation) and international issue. The public began to learn that My Lai was only one of the many premeditated and related crimes committed by the U.S. and America’s allied troops during the War—“only one part of the gigantic human tragedy.”³³ As one of the largest massacres committed by American or its allied forces, My Lai had become the paradigm for massive and indiscriminate American violence in Vietnam. However, this progress, as reflected in scholarly inquiry, largely among the intellectual classes, has not yet had a significant impact upon popular opinion, and even less upon the authorities.³⁴ Beyond My Lai, there is no widespread recognition among Americans and their leaders that

³⁰ A third one (crew chief Glenn Andreotta) died a few days later: “Heroes of My Lai honoured,” BBC News, Saturday, March 7, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/03/98/mylai/62924.stm. Thompson accepted the Soldier’s Medal only after being given the guarantee that it would be presented in public, at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial wall, and that his crew would be awarded the same medal: John Zutz, “My Lai”, *The Vietnam Veterans Against the War*, Spring 1998 (on line on the VVAW site: <http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=244>). See also Thompson’s biography: Trent Angers, *The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story*, Lafayette, LA, Acadian House, 1999.

³¹ The speech is on line on the 174th Assault Helicopter Company’s website: “Presents the Soldier’s Medal to Hugh Thompson and Larry Colburn”, www.174ahc.org/mylai-01.htm.

³² Mike Boehm, “Honours For My Lai Hero Came Much Too Late”, *The Capital Times*, January 12, 2006, www.wnjp.org/node/1886; Trent Angers, op. cit. [30].

³³ Heonik Kwon, op. cit. [28], p. 143-44.

³⁴ Kendrick Oliver, *The My Lai massacre in American history and memory*, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press, 2006.

their country, while in principle at least a democracy, had deliberately adopted a strategy of targeting civilians in Vietnam, a strategy which, despite going against established, universally accepted principles of international law, has all too often been practiced by democracies in the 20th century to achieve a quicker victory, especially in desperate circumstances.³⁵ In Vietnam indeed, the American high command quickly faced the same dilemma as the French before in Indochina (and then in Algeria): how to deal with an enemy who very often could not be seen? How to deal with villagers who were suspected to support more or less actively the enemy? How to fight a revolutionary war? Frustrated by the Vietnamese revolutionary and total warfare, US Army came to the conclusion that, as General Westmoreland wrote in his memoirs, “the only way to establish control among the people was to remove the people and destroy the village.”³⁶ But, in many places, and especially in Central Vietnam’s Quang Ngai province, people were not removed before their villages were destroyed... Thus, many villages were bombed, burned, bulldozed or buried—in a word, totally destroyed... “We had to destroy Ben Tre [province capital in the Mekong delta] in order to save it” became one of the most famous statements of the Vietnam War.³⁷

It is beyond the limits of this paper to explain the roots of this “hyper-violence”: it may be linked to complex factors, such as the ignorance and dehumanisation of the enemy by massive propaganda; the American military strategy, tactics and training; the very nature of mass death in a colonial war, the peculiar dynamics of a war where the control of territory shifted significantly, often from day to night; the global bipolar geopolitical structure of the Cold War area; etc. Nevertheless, after Seymour Hersh exposed the 1968 My Lai massacre and subsequent to the preliminary investigations initiated by chief of staff general Westmoreland, a Pentagon task force known as the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group was formed to monitor war crimes investigations and give the highest political and military authorities early warning about potentially damaging revelations. Members of this group compiled a collection of 9,000 pages of classified documents, which confirmed that atrocities committed by U.S. forces during the Vietnam war were more extensive than had been officially acknowledged (more than 320 substantiated atrocities by U.S. forces and 500 unconfirmed allegations were chronicled). In

³⁵ Alexander Downes, *Targeting civilians in war*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008. There is still a controversy on the possible link between My Lai and the CIA Phoenix program (aimed at “neutralizing the Vietcong infrastructure”—kill, capture or make defect, in other words), as Douglas Valentine has claimed (H-Diplo’s debates in September 1998).

³⁶ General Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1976.

³⁷ Michael Miller, a former captain of the US Army Corps of Engineers who witnessed the briefing, attributed the quotation to major Borris, an S-3 officer, in his answer to a war correspondent who was covering the Tet Offensive, in February 1968: Michael Miller, “Saving Ben Tre...” October 25, 2006 (on line on www.nhe.net/BenTreVietnam/).

2002, freelance journalist Nick Turse managed to copy one third of these previously unknown documents after they were briefly declassified in 1994. But it was not revealed to the public until 2006.³⁸

For a long time, Vietnamese civilian victims or survivors of war crimes have been denied the attention they both hope for and deserve. Fortuitously for them, the political economy of memory has dramatically improved in Vietnam since the end of the 1980s.

Vietnam: the process of “privatization,” perhaps even “pacification”³⁹ of memory

Thanks to the liberalization process generated by the *Dôi moi* policy in Vietnam—especially in the economic and social fields, and the disintegration of the Cold War global structure, State control over memory of war has become a little less strong. This evolution has opened “a space for revisiting the past,” as wrote Hue-Tam Ho Tai,⁴⁰ and favored the growing popularity of ancestral rituals. The people of My Lai have been able to move old bones (which had been quickly buried near the sea or near the distant bamboo forest—a source of great shame and pain for the survivors) to new places around the village, and renovate the places of death. The reburial of mortal remains, even then they are mixed and kinship cannot be definitively identified, meet the needs of a proper incorporation of these identities into the ancestral ritual domain. Families have tried to console the spirits of the victims of tragic death by restoring ancestral shrines and establishing new private cemeteries. They have tried to appease “hungry ghosts” or “hungry souls” of those they consider victims of “bad deaths”—those who died in a violent manner—, because their souls were and still are supposed to be able to make the passage to the otherworld. Thus if nothing is done on their behalf, these transient identities are doomed to roam the earth.⁴¹

Like the “heroic mothers,” unhappy to be celebrated and even sanctified for their patriotic virtues, who claimed the bodies of their MIA (missing-in-action) sons, survivors of mass civilian massacres have tried to recover their own memory.⁴²

³⁸ <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-vietnam20aug20-sg,0,7940522.story> gallery.

³⁹ Misused during the Indochina war years, referring to presumed control over contested regions, after brutal resettlement of much of the peasant population, the word “pacification” here is used in its traditional meaning, simply understood as “making peace.”

⁴⁰ Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit. [27], p. 3.

⁴¹ Shaun Kingsley Malarney, “The Fatherland Remembers Your Sacrifice’. Commemorating War Dead in North Vietnam,” in Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit. [27], p. 60.

⁴² This painful quest has been the main subject of Boris Lojkin’s French documentary *Les Ames errantes* (January 2007).

Many families are now holding memorial ceremonies for the victims instead of attending official ceremonies around the memorials, even if both take place on the same day. They burn incense and money; they recite incantations of invitation for all anonymous spirits, including those of their lost spouses, children, or siblings.⁴³ But they do it in private. For example, in December 2000, the Memorial for 135 victims of Ha My⁴⁴ was opened in the middle of a rice paddy, which was one of the sites of mass killing. Its large dimensions and the banality of the official governmental reconciliation message were criticized not only by veterans of the war and survivors of other massacres, whose family deaths have not been commemorated with such a permanent memorial, but also by survivors or relatives of the victims, who preferred instead to honor the deceased privately.⁴⁵

Like a handful of Vietnamese revisionist writers (Bao Ninh, Duong Thu Huong, etc.) or filmmakers (Tran Vu, Nguyen Huu Luyen, etc.),⁴⁶ they seem to be engaged, by the practice of kinship memory, in resistance to the official linear narrative of national heroism, a resistance that Milan Kundera has so eloquently described in *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*.⁴⁷ But, for Heonik Kwon, these practices must be interpreted not as a real political challenge to the government, but rather as a rather quiet, careful, understated, yet “powerful alternative to the politics of heroic national memory.”⁴⁸ And Karil Kucera has shown that the villagers of the small hamlet of My Lai, anxious to protect the memory of the massacre and to avoid the rehearsal of such a tragedy, welcomed any communal attempt to appease the dead in My Lai and educate strangers or young people.⁴⁹

Moreover, divergences between official and private memories in Vietnam, as well as between American and Vietnamese painful memories of the war, have gradually been overcome through transnational and private efforts, by individuals working in solidarity, confident in the ability of human community to move beyond fruitless oppositions.

⁴³ On money-burning and other Vietnamese funeral rites: Kwon, “The dollarization of Vietnamese ghost money,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, No. 13, 2007, p. 73-90, www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Dollarization_Ghost_Money.pdf; *Ghosts of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, chapter 7.

⁴⁴ Site of a massacre by ROK (Republic of Korea) troops fighting alongside American units.

⁴⁵ Heonik Kwon, op. cit. [28], p. 138-52.

⁴⁶ Mark Bradley, “Contests of Memory. Remembering and Forgetting War in the Contemporary Vietnamese Cinema”, in Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit. [27], p. 196 ff.

⁴⁷ “The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting”: quoted in: Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. xv.

⁴⁸ Heonik Kwon, *Ghosts of War*, op. cit. [43], p. 161.

⁴⁹ Karil Kucera, “Remembering the Unforgettable: The Memorial at My Lai,” Winter 2006 (on line on: www.isp.msu.edu/studiesonasia/s3_v4_n1/s3v4n1_Kucera.pdf).

Overcoming the distrust: the role of civil society in individual reconciliation, as a substitute for official United States reparations

The American government has chosen to evade its own responsibilities, in terms of both moral and financial reparations. Even the post-war POW/MIA issue has long been used as a “pretext for the United States to break its pledge for reconstruction aid to Hanoi, made in Article 21 of the Paris Agreement and spelled out in the President’s February 1, 1973, secret letter to Hanoi Prime Minister Pham Van Dong.”⁵⁰ Only at the end of the 1990s did the POW/MIA issue become a source of collaborative body-finding missions in Vietnam.⁵¹ But, in March 11, 2000, before his official visit in Hanoi, Defense secretary William Cohen clearly stated that he had no intention of offering U.S. apologies for the war crimes committed by American soldiers during the Vietnam War.⁵²

Contrary to the formal relations between the governments of Vietnam and the United States, which have been extensively studied, the role of civil society does not seem to have attracted careful attention from scholars. And yet several U.S.-based non-governmental organizations have provided humanitarian and medical assistance to the inhabitants of the My Lai area and the survivors of the massacre in particular. One may cite particularly the work done by the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) and especially the American Friends Service Committee. Founded in 1917 by American members of the Society of Friends to provide conscientious objectors with an opportunity to aid civilian war victims in Europe, this autonomous committee has worked in many parts of the world. In 1966, it began to help war-injured Vietnamese civilians in the south of Vietnam and provide medical supplies for civilians in the north, besides playing an important, if often discreet and quiet, leadership role in the actual antiwar movement during the Vietnam years. During the spring of 1972, the camp where the survivors had been relocated after the My Lai massacre was largely destroyed by South Vietnamese Army artillery and aerial bombardment. South-Vietnamese propaganda officially attributed the destruction to “Vietcong terrorists.” But Martin Teitel, who was working at that time for the American Friends Service Committee, testified to the Congressional Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected

⁵⁰ H. Bruce Franklin, “M.I.A.: The Last Chapter?” in Robert Slabey (ed.), *The United States and Viet Nam from War to Peace*, Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1996, p. 79. See also: Cecile Monetrey-Monchaud, *American-Vietnamese Relations in the Wake of War: Diplomacy After the Capture of Saigon, 1975-1979*, Jefferson, NC, McFarland, 2006.

⁵¹ Heonik Kwon, *Ghosts of War*, op. cit. [43], p. 49.

⁵² “Transcript: Defense Secretary Cohen Hong Kong Press Briefing,” USIS Washington Files, March 13, 2000, www.fas.org/news/china/2000/000311-prc-us-usia1.htm.

with Refugees and Escapees and then revealed the true responsibilities to the *New York Times*.⁵³

Since the beginning of the 1990s, more and more American veterans have gone back to Vietnam, this time to build, or rebuild.⁵⁴ By discovering the Vietnamese people and their way of life, they began to ask themselves about origins of America's war in Vietnam, and the root causes of tragedies like My Lai; and they decided to sponsor and sometimes themselves embark upon humanitarian projects. Among such individuals was Mike Boehm whose first trip with other American veterans took place in 1992, for the purpose of working with the Vietnamese people to build a ten-room medical clinic in the south of Vietnam. After a very emotional stop in My Lai, Mike Boehm, who served in Vietnam in 1968-69 and was ever since obsessed by the death of so many Vietnamese civilians, decided to fully devote his energies to aiding the poor people of Vietnam. He found in the newly formed Madison Indochina Support Group (Quakers, 1993), a way to make a personal contribution.⁵⁵ One of their first projects was to establish a loan fund for the poor women in My Lai, mostly massacre widows, at the request of the Women's Union of Vietnam. Several hundred women could borrow money through the My Lai Fund and, thanks to the decision by the Women's Union to diversify, develop different activities, such as processing cassava flour, making fish nets, raising shrimp, pigs, cows, planting and selling flowers. The profits from these activities offered women a much better life and made a significant contribution to poverty reduction programs in Quang Ngai province.⁵⁶

Year after year, the loan fund for My Lai was expanded, new loan funds were created in neighboring villages in Quang Ngai, a Peace Park and new classrooms for the My Lai school were built. Moreover, art exchanges were initiated in 1996, and then developed, between the children of My Lai and the children of Madison, Wisconsin. As Mike Boehm recalled, it had not been an easy task: "I hadn't realized how traumatized people in this country still were from that war. I became reacquainted with the trauma that vets were dealing with and discovered for the first time that peace activists also had their own trauma to cope with. So it took time, years in fact, for people here to begin to cautiously accept these projects."⁵⁷ Many misunderstandings came from divergent interpretations of vocabulary. For example, the NGOs (non-profit, humanitarian associations) meant anti-governmental for Vietnamese officials. Even the noun "peace"

⁵³ Martin Teitel, "Again, the Suffering of Mylai," *The New York Times*, June 7, 1972.

⁵⁴ Among many references on that subject: Mark Lander, "Back to Vietnam, This Time to Build," *The New York Times*, September 13, 1998.

⁵⁵ This group was disbanded in 1996 but the Madison Friends took over fiscal responsibility for the projects in Vietnam, including My Lai.

⁵⁶ Mike Boehm, "Going back," *Winds of Peace. Newsletter for Madison Friend's Projects in Vietnam*, No. 1, October 1999, 1, MyLaipeacepark.org.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 9, May 2002, 1.

and the adjective “peaceful” was subject to suspicion because of the “peaceful evolution” program, which after 1975 was interpreted as a conspiracy promoted by conservative elements in the U.S. government as an attempt to overthrow the new government of a united Vietnam by “peaceful” (political, economic, cultural, etc.) means rather than by war.⁵⁸

At the 30th anniversary of the massacre at My Lai, on March 16, 1998, Hugh Thompson and Larry Colburn, two of the three members of the helicopter crew, met with people they had rescued during the massacre. This very poignant and unique reunion brought media attention from all around the world.⁵⁹ A documentary film sponsored by the Vietnamese government was then made by Tran Van Thuy, who had won many national and international awards for his previous documentaries. His title—The Sound of the Violin in My Lai—was inspired by the violin that veteran Mike Boehm agreed to play for Tran Van Thuy in My Lai, as he had done during his first stop in 1992, with a song originally depicting the sufferings of American women, whose husbands had been drafted into the Union and Confederate armies during the American Civil War (1861-1865). The documentary was premiered to an audience of more than 300 Vietnamese, Americans and other foreigners, among them high ranking Vietnamese officials as well as then US Ambassador Pete Peterson who declared: “This [purpose of this film] is not [just] to reopen minds. This film will serve the cause of mankind for many generations.”⁶⁰

Pete Peterson was not an Ambassador like others. Himself a veteran of the Vietnam War, he was a U.S. Air Force Pilot. In September 1966, his plane was shot down over Hanoi and he spent six years and-a-half in North Vietnam as a prisoner. After his liberation in March 1973, he progressively realized that, if he did not find a way to come to grips with his past, with his memories of war and imprisonment, he would remain a prisoner for the rest of his life. Therefore, he decided to engage himself on the path of reconciliation with his former enemies and started to learn everything he could on Vietnam and the Vietnamese people. He returned to Hanoi, in 1997, as the first U.S. ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. He soon realized the importance of peace and prosperity, not only for the Vietnamese people but also for the stability of the region, and then for U.S. interest. He worked hard to strengthen the economic links between the two countries—which he considered the only way to build a new relationship with Vietnam—and left Vietnam in 2001, one

⁵⁸ On the “peaceful evolution” concept: Tadashi Mio, “Vietnam after the 7th Party Congress”, *Vietnam Generation Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 3-4, November 1992, www2.iath.virginia.edu.

⁵⁹ Mike Boehm, op. cit. [56], p. 1.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* The Sound of the Violin in My Lai was the winner of the “Best Short Film” award at the 1999 Asia-pacific Film Festival held in Bangkok.

year after the first official visit of a U.S. President in Vietnam since 1975.⁶¹

Neither Pete Peterson nor any U.S. official has ever been in My Lai and both U.S. and Vietnamese governments have chosen to downplay the anniversaries. The U.S. government is not ready to recognize the immense, almost unimaginable suffering of the Vietnamese people (more than 3 million dead), which is an absolute necessity for the process of a genuine sharing of memories to evolve. But the efforts of private individuals, active in social, humanitarian and religious associations, from both Vietnam and U.S.A., and those of many American veterans, like Mike Boehm for the inhabitants of the My Lai area, George Mizo or Samuel Jones for the victims of Agent orange, while they are not formally recognized, may be understood to come within the scope of an official process of rapprochement between states. Against conservative lobbies, especially the strong POW/MIA movement (and myth), a few Senators, themselves veterans of the war like Democrat John Kerry and Republican John McCain, used their prestigious status to help the Bush and Clinton administrations to initiate a formal diplomatic process of recognition with Vietnam.⁶²

Henceforth, thanks to these converging efforts and, maybe above all, thanks to the Vietnamese people's ability to keep a strong sense of humanity and hospitality despite the terrible sufferings they have endured and still endure, official diplomacy and private initiatives have contributed towards the pacification of memory and a new interpretation of the past by former enemies. May the famous cinematographer Oliver Stone, with his forthcoming film on My Lai,⁶³ succeed in serving this same great cause as did his Vietnamese colleague Tran Van Thuy 10 years ago. May Oliver Stone make in his turn a further significant contribution in closing that apparently impermeable gap between the tragedy of war and its enduring and distorted perception in political and public memory, both Vietnamese and American—two nations “tied in blood” as well as in troubled memory. The Iraq war and its trail of tragic exaction, at Guantanamo, Abu Graib, Haditha and elsewhere⁶⁴ indubitably show that neither the American government nor American society are yet released from the ghosts of the Vietnam war, which retain a strong power to haunt. But,

⁶¹ Author's interview with Pete Peterson, April 13, 2001, U.S. Embassy in Hanoi.

⁶² Paul Lyons, “Clinton, Vietnam, and the Sixties”, in Robert Slabey, op. cit. [50], p. 74.

⁶³ Pinkville, with Bruce Willis in the role of General Peers, which is scheduled for its premiere and public screening in the end of 2008.

⁶⁴ There are many articles on this subject. For a comparative approach with the Vietnam War, on torture and especially abuses at Abu Grahib jail in 2004, see: Alfred W. McCoy, “Torture in the Crucible of Counterinsurgency,” in Lloyd Gardner and Marilyn Young (eds.), *Iraq and the lessons of Vietnam*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 2007, p. 230 ff; on the Haditha killing in November 2005: Kurt Nimmo, “Haditha and My Lai: Same Killer Dynamic,” March 23, 2006 (on line on: <http://www.propagandamatrix.com/articles/march2006/230306Haditha.htm>); Jonathan Beale, “Losing faith in the war in Iraq”, BBC News, December 21, 2006.

as Mike Boehm insisted at the ceremony organized in My Lai for the 40th anniversary of the massacre, in the presence not only of survivors of this “orgy of killing” but also of a delegation of atomic bombing survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, “if hope can rise from the ashes of My Lai, it can rise from anywhere.”⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Quoted by Ben Stocking, “40 years after massacre, My Lai survivors gather to pray for victims,” *The Associated Press*, March 16, 2008. See also “Vietnamese people remember My Lai massacre,” March 17, 2008, *Nowpublic.com*. Hoping that it would improve their standard of living, inhabitants of My Lai (including the My Lai museum director, one of only five survivors of the massacre) and communists Party officials have welcomed tourism projects, such as hotels, restaurants, golf or villas, near the site of the massacre: James Pringle, “Meanwhile: On the back 9 at My Lai,” *International Herald Tribune*, February 2, 2005.

Overcoming 60 Years of Strategic Hostility: Challenges Before the Subcontinent's Peace Movement

Praful Bidwai

South Asia today stands at a historic crossroads. Countries in the region have witnessed momentous changes in the recent past, which favor both internal democratisation and mutual reconciliation between one another. If these trends are strengthened, South Asia could achieve a breakthrough and chart a new course to peace, cooperation and prosperity. But there is no assurance that these positive trends will be sustained. Counter-trends are at work and there could well be a slippage into domestic strife and crises and a return to a state of mutual rivalry. Hopefully, this will not happen and a positive course will prevail.

The region's small but growing peace movement has a vital stake in such an outcome. But contributing to its realisation poses a huge, manifold and formidable challenge. The challenge is particularly acute for the India-Pakistan peace movement. It has to confront six decades of strategic rivalry marked by an intermittent hot-cold war, which has taken on an ominous dimension with the overt crossing of the nuclear weapons threshold by both India and Pakistan 10 years ago.

A critical review of nuclearized India-Pakistan relations

This calls for a critical review of and serious reflection on the state of India-Pakistan relations since the Pokharan-II and Chagai nuclear blasts on May 1998. The five Indian tests of May 11 and 13 conducted by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee came as a surprise even to most

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domestic supporters of the Bomb. Very few of them had advocated testing. But as soon as it happened, a majority of these so-called strategic experts concocted all kinds of justifications for the Bomb, mostly related to “security.” Many of them cited threats from Pakistan, although some of them had lobbied against all nuclear restraint proposals emanating from Pakistan since the 1980s. They now began to crave for a tit-for-tat response from Pakistan as if that would show India was not totally isolated. When the Pakistan excuse did not work, they changed their tune and pointed fingers at China. But they could not explain why India could live with China’s Bomb for a quarter-century without having one of its own.

The Vajpayee government’s real reasons for crossing the threshold had less to do with security and threats to it than with a search for global “prestige” and power and the BJP’s militant Hindu-chauvinist and revanchist ideology. It took the decision to test in complete secrecy, with no discussion in any cabinet committee, and without even the pretence of a “strategic defense review,” which it had promised.

The tests did not advance a national-consensual program, but a sectarian, hawkish agenda, which reflected a peculiar Hindutva obsession with mass-destruction weapons. That obsession is traceable all the way to 1964, when the Jana Sangh, the BJP’s predecessor, became the sole political party to demand that India build nuclear weapons—just when it was crusading for global nuclear disarmament.

The Pokharan-II blasts polarized political opinion in India. The Left parties criticized them as a reversal of India’s long-standing policy and demanded that India must under no circumstances induct nuclear weapons. The Sangh Parivar associated with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went into raptures. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) even demanded that India must be officially declared a Hindu state!

The Congress was divided. Some of its leaders congratulated India’s scientists for this “achievement.” Sonia Gandhi said that “real strength lies in restraint, not in the display of ‘Shakti’.” A fortnight later, Manmohan Singh, then Congress party leader in the Rajya Sabha, made what was probably his most eloquent and impassioned speech against the blasts.

Completely absent from this discourse was the vitally important moral dimension of the nuclear issue. The moral question was taken up passionately by the peace movement which soon gathered among scientists, writers, scholars, artistes, environmentalists and social activists in both India and Pakistan.

The peace movement powerfully challenged the political and security assumptions of the dominant discourse, including nuclear deterrence. It also developed a comprehensive critique of nuclear weapons based on considerations of peace, sustainable security and rejection of jingoism and national chauvinism. It highlighted the

specific dangers of nuclearization in one of the most tension-ridden, volatile and disaster-prone regions of the world.

In Pakistan, peace activists valiantly demanded after May 11 that Islamabad should not conduct retaliatory tests of its own. But that was not to be. Pakistan detonated a series of six nuclear bombs on May 28 and 30—to “get even” with the five Indian tests earlier that month and the first explosion conducted in 1974! Unlike in India, the emphasis in the rationale cited for the tests was not so much prestige as security and strategic symmetry—which the peace movement seriously questioned.

The movement acquired an organized expression in Pakistan in February 1999, when the Pakistan Peace Coalition was formed by a large number of civil society groups at a convention in Karachi, also attended by peace activists from India.

In India, over 200 people’s movement groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), scientists’ associations, artists’ networks and other citizens’ bodies got together in Delhi in November 2000 to form the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP). The peace movement’s views had a resonance with the underprivileged masses who, opinion polls show, oppose the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons, do not invest them with prestige, and accord priority to bread-and-butter issues in contrast to armaments, in particular weapons of mass destruction.

The crossing of the nuclear threshold by India and Pakistan thus witnessed a clear split between the policy-shaping elite led by cynical strategic experts, and the poor and disadvantaged majority, who want state funds to be spent on healthcare, education, food security and employment generation, not the military.

Ten years on, the India-Pakistan nuclear balance sheet looks extremely negative, indeed ugly. Both countries experienced turbulence, instability and heightened tension in their relations until an uncertain and shaky peace process got under way in 2004.

Most forecasts made by the Bomb’s apologists have turned out false. They confidently predicted that nuclear weapons would give both India and Pakistan greater security, and even impart stability and maturity to their mutual relations.

Nuclear weapons, they said, would also help limit conventional military spending while effectively pre-empting conventional war. (Doesn’t deterrence theory say that nuclear weapons-states—NWSs—do not go to war with each other?) Most important, the two countries’ new nuclear status would enhance their global prestige and expand their room for independent manoeuvre in world affairs.

In reality, nuclearization has made South Asia manifestly more volatile and insecure. Although the India-Pakistan peace process has reduced tensions to some extent since 2004, millions of Indians and Pakistanis remain within the range of missiles of different descriptions but capable of carrying nuclear weapons which concentrate

devastating destructive power against which armies, governments and citizens are defenseless.

The presumption that nuclear weapons give security is based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. But deterrence—which India for 50 years rightly described as “morally repugnant,” strategically unworkable, and a recipe for an arms race—is a deeply flawed doctrine. As game theory analysis and experience with military standoffs (e.g. the Cuban missile crisis of 1962) show, it is hard to predict how an adversary may behave following a rational calculus—although there is no guarantee that he will behave rationally.

Thomas Schelling, who won the economics Nobel in 2005, has shown that “a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation.” But certain, devastating retaliation is at the very core of deterrence—and India’s (and Pakistan’s) nuclear doctrines.

We now know that the probability of a nuclear exchange during the Cuban crisis was far higher than then understood. And yet, key players from the same side like Kennedy and McNamara had widely divergent perceptions of the effectiveness of their own strategic moves.

Within a year of the nuclear tests, a military conflict broke out between India and Pakistan at Kargil, along the Line of Control in the contested state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani army and paramilitary troops, disguised as civilians, conducted an intrusion into Indian territory, leading to skirmishes, retaliation and escalation of fighting.

Kargil was the world’s greatest-ever conflict between two nuclear weapons-states (NWSs), and offers an even more powerful refutation of deterrence theory than did the limited Sino-Soviet clashes of the 1970s over the Ussuri river.

Kargil was a mid-sized war involving 40,000 troops and top-of-the-line armaments. Pakistan’s generals embarked on that misadventure in the belief that nuclear weapons would shield them against Indian retaliation. India mobilized troops and prepared for a large-scale retaliatory attack.

During those seven weeks, India and Pakistan exchanged nuclear threats no fewer than 13 times even as 2,500 soldiers were killed. According to former senior White House adviser Bruce Riedel, U.S. intelligence had gathered “disturbing information about Pakistan preparing its nuclear arsenal” without even the knowledge of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. It is inconceivable India did not make contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons as the two “were heading for a deadly descent into full-scale conflict, with a danger of nuclear cataclysm.”

Kargil might have had a far worse outcome had Sharif not asked for U.S. mediation, which led to Pakistan's unconditional withdrawal, but also to a huge escalation of tension between Sharif and Musharraf—and eventually, an army coup in October 1999, from whose debilitating effects on the process of democratization in Pakistan has not yet fully recovered.

Kargil set an extremely dangerous precedent in terms of the potential for escalation of an India-Pakistan conventional conflict to the nuclear level. This again became evident after a December 2001 terrorist attack on India's Parliament House building. India and Pakistan eyeballed each other with 1 million troops for a long 10 months, and India contemplated a "limited" strike across the Line of Control.

Pakistan made credible threats to the effect that this would lead to full-scale war, and warned of its further escalation to the nuclear level. The two states twice came close to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe in early and mid-2002, as they readied nuclear weapons for use according to unimpeachable reports—a prospect almost to frightening even to imagine, but one that cannot be firmly ruled out given the history of mutual strategic hostility and miscalculation. Once conflicts begin, they acquire their own momentum, and the logic of retaliation and counter-retaliation prevails over normal, rational judgment.

Similarly, apologists of the Bomb have been shown to be totally wrong on the supposedly moderating effect of nuclear weapons on conventional armaments acquisition. This had proved a complete delusion during the Cold War, which witnessed both a nuclear and a conventional arms race between the two great blocs. In fact, the two races fed on each other.

A dubious sense of achievement

This is equally true of India and Pakistan, which have raised their conventional military spending by leaps and bounds even as they stockpile bomb fuel and test-fly new missiles. India's military spending has tripled since 1998 in absolute dollars, and Pakistan's has more than doubled. And it is still early days for their nuclear programs.

Nor have nuclear weapons bestowed global prestige on India or Pakistan. India's global profile has certainly risen in recent years. But that is the effect of India's successful practice of democracy in a highly diverse and plural society, and more recently, its growing economic power, besides a hangover from the past, when India was a force of moderation and reform of the global system.

If nuclear weapons enhance a nation's prestige, one would have seen proof this in Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. But nuclear Pakistan was considered a "failing state" until late 2001. North Korea

commands nothing remotely approaching prestige. And Iran is under enormous pressure to show greater transparency and restraint in its nuclear activities.

The peace movement has proved right on most counts, although it must be conceded that some of its representatives overestimated the degree and duration of India's isolation, and underestimated the rapidity with which the U.S. would move to embrace this "emerging power," not least to contain China.

Similarly, Pakistan's status changed dramatically after the September 11, 2001 Twin Towers attacks on the United States. The U.S. again befriended Pakistan, which had until then been considered an irresponsible state, even a pariah—not least because of the shady activities of the A. Q. Khan network.

Not just the moral, but also the political-strategic, arguments of the peace movement stand fully validated today. The core "guns-vs-butter" moral argument has lost none of its force despite India's high GDP growth, which has not significantly reduced poverty, hunger and mass deprivation. Spending 3-3.5 percent of GDP on the military, while remaining at the Afghanistan level of public health spending (1 percent), continues to be obscenely immoral.

Ten years after the India-Pakistan nuclear blasts, three distinct trends are discernible. First, the elite-mass divide on the nuclear weapons issue has sharpened, in keeping with the general experience of the poor with increasingly predatory and dispossessing growth under neo-liberal globalization.

Second, the political party-level polarization on the issue has decreased, especially in India. In 1998, the Left parties condemned the nuclear tests and demanded that India and Pakistan roll back their nuclear weapons programs. But they are no longer vocal in demanding a rollback of India's nuclearization and her return to the global disarmament agenda.

A major reason for this is the Indian debate over the controversial United States-India nuclear cooperation deal, which has generally been couched in nuclear-nationalist terms or within the framework of resistance to neo-colonial hegemony, rather than in terms of the need for nuclear disarmament. Indeed, because the Left has gravitated to such a nationalist position, differences between its critique of the deal and the BJP's arguments against it have greatly narrowed.

Third, both India and Pakistan have set their face against the agendas of nuclear restraint, arms reduction and disarmament. India's topmost priority has been to push through the nuclear deal with the U.S. and thereby secure legitimacy for India's mass-destruction weapons. Behaving like a "responsible" member of the nuclear club means not rocking the boat, but going along with Washington's plans for upgrading its nuclear weapons, finding new uses for them, launching the unilateral Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI) to intercept “suspect” shipments, and proceeding with ballistic missile defense (BMD).

As if in recompense for this, some Indian strategists offer a “moderate-sounding” agenda, in contrast to the maximalist one of testing another H-Bomb and greatly expanding India’s nuclear-missile program.

This includes sticking to “minimum” deterrence and no-first-use, limiting India’s capability to threaten some of China’s “key industrial and population centers,” negotiating nuclear confidence-building measures with Pakistan, and at maximum, joining the appeal for a nuclear weapons-free world by George P. Shultz, Henry A. Kissinger, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn published by the *Wall Street Journal* online on January 15, 2008. Apart from the problems with this appeal—including its vagueness, lack of a time-frame, silence on PSI and BMD—this claim of “moderation” is misleading. Possessing nuclear weapons is itself against moderation: all NWSs have the will and readiness to kill thousands of non-combatant civilians—an act of extreme terrorism if there ever was one.

As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, now a nuclear hawk and ardent proponent of the agenda of getting India’s nuclear weapons “normalized” and legitimized, said 10 years ago, history shows that even when NWSs “said they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, their opponents never took that seriously.”

This deceptive agenda does not involve stepping back from the nuclear abyss, only not jumping headlong into it. It does not meet the urgent need to grasp the nuclear nettle by energetically promoting regional nuclear restraint and global nuclear elimination.

A good way of doing so would be update the thoughtful 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Plan for global nuclear disarmament, presented to the Special Session of the UN General Assembly. But doing this will also demand certain unilateral gestures by India—like offering to suspend missile test-flights or fissile production—while convening an international conference on disarmament jointly with other initiatives like the Mayors for Peace campaign, the “2020 Vision campaign,” Abolition-2000, and advocating a Nuclear Weapons (elimination) Convention.

The Indian government is unlikely to muster the will to do any of this on its own. The Pakistan government would be even less inclined to take the initiative—given its generally reactive policy on matters nuclear, and the lukewarm, even hostile, response it has drawn from India whenever it has made nuclear restraint proposals, including a few after the 1998 tests.

That devolves a special responsibility on the peace movement, which must educate the public, politicians and policymakers on the indefensible nature of nuclear weapons, the fallacy of relying on nuclear deterrence for security, and the

imperative of both regional and global nuclear restraint and disarmament.

A particularly useful device through which such an education campaign might be launched is the demand for a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia, along the lines of similar zones in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa. Working for a South Asian NWFZ would mean taking several regional measures of nuclear restraint first, including a freeze on fissile material production and missile test-flights, and an agreement to keep nuclear warheads at a safe distance away from their delivery vehicles.

A comprehensive agenda for reconciliation needed

However, it will not be enough for the peace movement to confine itself to the nuclear disarmament issue. It must address a comprehensive agenda for India-Pakistan reconciliation and peace, which includes the roots of mutual suspicion and hostility between India and Pakistan, the stereotypes that are systematically promoted in both societies about each other through textbooks, films and other forms of popular culture, the mutually reinforcing nature of Hindu communalism and Islamic extremism, and the interplay between religious and social prejudices, state policies and security postures.

Unless the peace movement boldly and honestly confronts the root-causes of the state of hot-cold war between India and Pakistan that has lasted six decades, and offers an alternative perspective based on the values of pluralism, diversity and secularism, it will fail to make a convincing case which appeals to peace-minded citizens in the two countries.

Some of the dissection of the pathologies that mark India-Pakistan relations will not be pleasant. But there is no alternative to undertaking this exercise in the interests of an honest acceptance of differences, rather than a denial of them. Only thus can Indians and Pakistanis develop genuine respect for differences, and begin the process of reconciliation while affirming the multicultural, multilingual, multi-religious nature of the common entity, South Asia, to which they both belong.

The peace movement, working with civil society organizations and the progressive intelligentsia, must develop alternative perspectives on the conduct of bilateral and regional relations in the subcontinent. These must include demilitarization of India-Pakistan relations, opening up of borders through a genuinely liberal visa regime, cooperative projects in science and technology, energy, the environment, industry and trade.

I have argued for many years that India should unilaterally open itself up to unrestricted, license-free imports of goods and services from Pakistan. This will create not just tremendous goodwill, but a real breakthrough, in mutual relations. India need not fear that its economy will be hurt by such imports. The economy is large and competitive enough not to be adversely affected.

The peace and civil society movements in India and Pakistan have shown far greater imagination and initiative than governments and state officials. They have contributed many more new ideas than have government agencies, bureaucrats and diplomats. But their voices are not heard in official or semi-official bilateral and multilateral forums like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

This must change. These movements should seek entry into the official dialogue process, and demand a platform through which they can make their contribution to promoting mutual understanding, reconciliation and peace.

However, there is no reason why the focus of the peace movement and civil society organizations should remain limited to state-level interaction. They must intervene directly in the media, cultural events and organizations, and in academic forums. Initiatives like the South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA) have had a reasonable amount of success—for instance, in pressing regional governments to issue special visas to journalists.

These must be replicated in other professions and activities. Such initiatives are worthy even if they do not deliver immediate results. India-Pakistan reconciliation is going to be a long drawn-out process. But strengthening it and energizing it brooks no delay.