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**The European Union's Development Aid: from  
Development to Security, the Example of the  
European Development Fund**

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**Thierry Vircoulon  
Dominique Lecompte**

*November 2014*

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ISBN: 978-2-36567-334-1  
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IFRI  
27, RUE DE LA PROCESSION  
75740 PARIS CEDEX 15 – FRANCE  
Tel: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00  
Fax: +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60  
Email: [ifri@ifri.org](mailto:ifri@ifri.org)

IFRI-BRUXELLES  
RUE MARIE-THÉRÈSE, 21  
1000 – BRUSSELS – BELGIUM  
Tel: +32 (0)2 238 51 10  
Fax: +32 (0)2 238 51 15  
Email: [info.bruxelles@ifri.org](mailto:info.bruxelles@ifri.org)

Website: [ifri.org](http://ifri.org)

# Summary

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## Introduction

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In the course of its institutional development and the expansion of its activities, the European Union (EU) has tended to pile up rather than to rationalize its policies, creating a financial tool per objective. As a result, the European funds have become a labyrinth, for which management costs are high. The external activities of the EU do not escape this trend, because their multiple objectives defined by the former EU's High Representative for foreign affairs, Catherine Ashton, as "promoting our own values and fundamental interest such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law, but also... as contributing to the struggle against poverty, to peace-keeping and the resolution of conflicts in the world"<sup>1</sup> are based on 9 or 10 different instruments, some of them described as "geographical" and others as "thematic": the Financing Instrument for Development Cooperation (DCI), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), etc. (Appendix 1). The fields and geographical areas of intervention of these tools overlap and account for a total of 96.2 thousand million euros for the period 2014-2020<sup>2</sup>, making the EU the main provider of development aid. The European Development Fund is the oldest of these instruments, dating back to well before the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which saw

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Thierry Vircoulon is an associate researcher of Ifri's Sub-Saharan Africa Programme. A graduate of France's École nationale d'administration (college for senior civil servants) with a post-graduate qualification in political sciences from the Sorbonne, he has worked for the French Foreign Office and the European Commission in Africa, mainly in South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Dominique Lecompte is Dr. of geography and independent consultant. He has worked for 40 years in the development field on projects for the World Bank, the United Nations, for French co-operation initiatives and for 18 years in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific on European Commission programmes as advisor for the services of the National Authorising Officer of the EDF covering 8 ACP countries.

<sup>1</sup> Available on:

[www.touteleurope.eu/fr/actions/relations-exterieures/politique-de-voisinage/actualite/actualites-vue-detaillee/afficher/fiche/5600/t/44267/from/2387/br](http://www.touteleurope.eu/fr/actions/relations-exterieures/politique-de-voisinage/actualite/actualites-vue-detaillee/afficher/fiche/5600/t/44267/from/2387/br)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

the beginning of the EU's foreign policy. Its objective - investment for development - and its geographical scope for intervention - post-colonial - were initially clearly defined but it has had over time to adapt itself to the consolidation of the EU's activities in foreign affairs and to the proliferation of its objectives. Broken down into a series of different instruments, the EDF currently appears as a multi-layered organization, resulting from the build-up of intervention methods which have appeared over the years<sup>3</sup>. Apart from the complexity of its present functions, the evolution of the EDF reflects the evolution of European aid, which was initially an investment for infrastructure and is becoming more and more an investment for security. Following Maastricht Treaty, the structuring of a European co-operative diplomacy politicized development aid and is developing a security orientation, without it being clear whether the ultimate aim is to improve the security for the European citizens or for developing countries citizens. The object of this article is not to judge this evolution but to be aware of it when analyzing the main development fund of the EU (the EDF) and one of its offshoots (the Peace Facility for Africa) and then to shed light on the difficulties and doubts that this evolution generates within the framework of the relations between the EU and the developing countries.

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<sup>3</sup> During the 50 years of its existence, STABEX (Stabilizing System Revenue Export) and SYSMIN (System Development Mineral Potential) are virtually the only organizations which have ceased to be part of the system of European development aid.



## Origins: the colonial heritage

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The origins of the EDF can be traced back to the very birth of the European Union. The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 by the six founder States of what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) anticipated<sup>4</sup> that the “*member states would agree to associate with the Community the non-European countries and territories which have special relationships with Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands*” and that these same Member States would “*contribute to investments required for the progressive development of those countries and territories*”<sup>5</sup>. Appendix IV of the Treaty drew up a list of 25 colonial territories or protectorates involved in that association. A financial instrument, the first EDF, which was funded directly by the member States and was not part of the European budget, was set up to achieve the goals outlined in Article 32 of the Treaty in the spirit of the equipment funds of the member States, in particular France’s Fund for Investment and Economic and Social Development (FIDES) or Belgium’s Fund for Indigenous Welfare (FBEI)<sup>6</sup>. This “colonial caprice”<sup>7</sup>, as considered by certain people at the time, was to have a long future, because, as early as 1963 in the wake of independence achieved by former French and Belgian colonies, the first Yaoundé Convention was signed with the first 18 EAMA (Associated African and Malagasy States). So the machine was set in motion and it was envisaged that it would continue without interruption. The joining of the EEC by the United Kingdom and then Spain and Portugal brought with it an expansion of the group of States which had been former colonies, now that there were new EU members<sup>8</sup>. The developing

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<sup>4</sup> Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome.

<sup>5</sup> Article 132 of the Treaty of Rome.

<sup>6</sup> For a historical review of the EDF and the Directorate General for Development Co-operation (DGDC) called upon to implement it, read: Véronique Dimier’s “Institutionnalisation et bureaucratisation de la Commission européenne: l’exemple de la DG développement”, in *Politique européenne*, No. 11, 2003/3, pp. 99-121 and Raymond-Marin Lemesle, “La Convention de Lomé: principaux objectifs et exemples d’actions 1975-1995”, C.H.E.A.M., Paris, 1995, 193 p.

<sup>7</sup> Véronique Dimier, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>8</sup> Apart from the former overseas territories of the EU Member States, the ACP group has extended to include neighbouring countries and others for a variety of reasons,

countries were provided with a political structure according to the Georgetown Accord on June 6, 1975, when the ACP group of States was created (African, Caribbean and Pacific). An original political edifice consisting of equal structures (ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors, ACP-EU Council of Ministers, ACP-EU Joint Assembly etc.) was set up and allowed to organize negotiations and dialogue between the two groups of States: on the one hand, the EEC due to become the 28-member EU and, on the other, the ACP group which today includes 79 countries. The EDF presently constitutes the main foreign-policy instrument of the EU (approximately 35% of the funds allocated for its external activities) with almost 34.3 thousand million euros set aside for it for the period 2014-2020.

The first original feature of the EDF is that it does not, constitute an “instrument” of the EEC budget per se. Being linked with the Treaty of Rome since its very conception, it has been supported by “a contract based on international public law and lasting several years, negotiated between two groups of States”<sup>9</sup> – the European countries on the one hand and the ACP group on the other (Appendix 2): the Yaoundé Conventions I and II (1963-1975); the Lomé Convention (revised four times between 1975 and 2000) and finally the Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000 (revised twice since its signature). As far as funds provided directly by the EU member States<sup>10</sup> are concerned, it is not financially speaking part of the EU budget and is thus not legally bound by the general rules voted by the EU Parliament for the other instruments<sup>11</sup>.

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which had never been colonies (Liberia, Ethiopia) or had been colonies a very long time ago (Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba) and Pacific territories, which had been trust territories of the United States, Australia and New Zealand and East Timor as well. As a consequence of their colonial origins, 25 Countries and Overseas Territories (OCT) not yet independent and scattered from the Arctic to the Antarctic (12 territories linked to the United Kingdom, 6 to France, 2 to the Netherlands and 1 to Denmark) also benefit from a marginal amount of the EDF resources.

<sup>9</sup> Claude Cheysson, former Development Commissioner at the time the Lomé Convention was signed in his preface to Raymond-Marin Lemesle, *op cit*.

<sup>10</sup> The EDF has always been funded by direct contributions from each of the EU Member States in keeping with distribution grids which every time are the subject of closely argued discussions. As regards the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, four States – Germany (20%), France (19%), the United Kingdom (15%) and Italy (13%) – contributed more than two thirds of the resources for the Fund. Read: Ulrike Kilne, Niels Keijzen, Jesque van Seters, Sheriff Andrew, “More or Less? A Financial Analysis of the Proposed 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund”, European Centre for Development Policy Management) (Brussels Maastricht), *Briefing Note* No. 29, March 2012, 31 p.

<sup>11</sup> Depending on an international accord, the EFD, unlike other instruments linked to the EU budget, comes under an internal accord which requires unanimity and is not just a ruling which can be adopted by a qualified majority. It does not require

The second original feature of the EDF, linked specifically to the fact that it has always been the result of bilateral agreements between two groups of States, “the spirit of Lomé, based on a “partnership between equals”, is that it instituted from the very beginning a system of joint management of the Fund’s resources. From the outset, a distinction was established between the fields which were clearly the sole responsibility of the ACP States<sup>12</sup> – the definition of their objectives and priorities, the selection of projects, the signing of deals and management based on contracts – and what was a matter for joint responsibility between the ACP State and the European Commission<sup>13</sup> – the elaboration of a National Indicative Programme, examination of the projects and, what was by no means the least important question for the Commission, work to “ensure the equality of conditions for participation in inviting tenders and in concluding deals”. The Cotonou Agreement adopted this structure because its Appendix IV often adopts word for word the clauses which already figured in the Lomé Convention. This declared wish of the beneficiary States to manage the EDF was reflected in their joint implementation of the projects and programmes. As far as the ACP States were concerned, the National Authorising Officer of the EDF, nominated by public authorities and whose prerogatives were defined in Article 35 of Appendix IV of the Cotonou Agreement<sup>14</sup>, was responsible for projects and programmes to be considered for financing, the tendering process, evaluations, allocation proposals, settling payments and everything related to the supervision of the work (planning, modifications, enforcement of penalties, etc.).

The Commission, for its part, has a representative on the ground in the ACP State<sup>15</sup>, whose prerogatives are in reality exactly

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approval of the Parliament. See: ECDPM, “*Differentiation in ACP-EU co-operation. Implication of the EU’s Agenda for change for the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF and beyond*”, Discussion paper No. 134, October 2012, p.10.

<sup>12</sup> Article 222.2, “to define the objectives and priorities, on which the indicative programmes are based... to choose projects and programmes... to prepare and present dossiers for the projects and programmes... to prepare, negotiate and conclude deals... to implement and manage the projects and programmes.”

<sup>13</sup> Article 222.3, “the main trends of the co-operation... the indicative programmes... the preparation of projects and programmes...”.

<sup>14</sup> Article 35 of Appendix IV of the Cotonou Agreement is an almost word for word repetition of Article 313 in successive Lomé Conventions.

<sup>15</sup> Out of the 139 EU delegations in various parts of the world, only about fifty are established in an ACP state. Some of them cover several countries, in particular with regard to Small Island States (for example, the delegation in Fiji represented the EU in all the micro-States in the Pacific, the one in Barbados is responsible for the Lesser Antilles and the one in Mauritius for the Comoros Islands and the Seychelles, and so on).

the same as those of the National Authorising Officer<sup>16</sup>, because he has to participate and offer assistance to the latter as far as the preparation of the projects and programmes is concerned, approve requests for the allocation of contracts and ensure that the financial implementation of all these activities is above board<sup>17</sup>. From 2005 and the famous “Paris Declaration”, the donors committed themselves to “respecting the predominant role of the partner countries and helping them to reinforce their capacity for performing that role”<sup>18</sup> and to “basing the whole of their support – country strategies, dialogue on policies to follow and programmes of co-operation for development – on the national development strategies devised by the partner countries and on periodic reports on how the implementation of these strategies was advancing”<sup>19</sup>. As the EDF had been functioning according to these principles since its inception, the Cotonou Agreement could to some extent be regarded as a “proto-Paris Declaration”<sup>20</sup>.

EDF’s third distinctive feature is its predictability. From Great Britain’s joining of the EEC and Lomé Convention’s signing in 1975<sup>21</sup>, the sharing out of the budgetary allocations between the various beneficiary countries was in keeping with objective and well-known criteria, making the EDF aid programmable and predictable. This

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<sup>16</sup> Article 36 of Appendix IV of the Cotonou Agreement is a word for word repetition of Article 317 in the Lomé Conventions prior to their revision in 2005. It was then revised and reduced – without there being any repercussions regarding the extent of its powers within the context of the financial control of the EDF, which was being brought ever more closely into line with that for all foreign aid coming from the EU.

<sup>17</sup> Read the article by Véronique Dimier, “Préfets d’Europe: le rôle des délégations de la Commission dans les ACP (1964-2004)” in *Revue française d’administration publique*, Paris, No. 111, 2004/3, pp. 433-445. This article retraces the history of the EU representatives from the simple “technical inspectors of the EDF” working under contract in the 1960s and 1970s to the “delegation chiefs” enjoying diplomatic status in the Lomé IV Convention, not forgetting the interim titles “inspector delegate” or simply “delegate”. The new description of the representative’s powers as defined in the Cotonou Agreement revised in Luxembourg reflects the evolution from what had been an essentially technical role of a representative of the EC/EU for the application of EDF resources to the role of a diplomat representing the EU in all its dimensions in the ACP state.

<sup>18</sup> High-level Forum in Paris, February 28-March 2, 2005. *Déclaration de Paris sur l’efficacité de l’aide au développement*, Point 15.

<sup>19</sup> *Idem*, Point 16.

<sup>20</sup> It was not, however, until the revision of the Agreement in 2010, in Ouagadougou, that an explicit reference to the Paris Declaration appeared for the first time in the text.

<sup>21</sup> Véronique Dimier, “Institutionnalisation et bureaucratisation de la Commission européenne: l’exemple de la DG développement”, in *Politique européenne*, No. 11, 2003/3, pp. 99-121 and her presentation entitled “Waterloo re-run” showing what the entry of the United Kingdom into the CE had meant for the old-guard French colonial administrators in charge of the EDF.

found expression in the Lomé Accord in the reference to a “right to aid”: each country would receive at the beginning of a five-year plan, corresponding to that of the EDF<sup>22</sup>, an inviolable allocation. Since then the system has become more sophisticated: allocations can now be adjusted up or down, depending upon the performance of the country concerned and national and regional programmes only have to include a limited number of “focal sectors”, so as to avoid wasting of funds or too wide a spread<sup>23</sup>. Unlike the development banks which generally finance projects one by one, or other European instruments of foreign policy which often use the “first in, first out” system, the EDF continued to be based on five-year programmes with a known financial allocation.

The last specific characteristic of the EDF up until the 1990s was its using of investment funds’ model created after the Second World War. For years, it basically permitted the granting of infrastructure projects to the ACP countries, for the implementation of which they did not have the necessary technical and financial capacity. Thousands of kilometers of roads, tracks, dams, etc., have made it possible to “equip” the ACP countries to the delight of European companies providing public buildings and works. The “enterprise culture” of the EDF was essentially a culture of engineers, since the “technical inspector of the EDF” was in close contact with his colleagues in the administration and companies linked to the public works domain or to the surveillance paid for by the Fund, essentially preoccupied with the physical completion of works at all costs, while financial formalities and procedures often took second place.

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<sup>22</sup> Since the first EDF which covered the period 1959-1964, there had been a further eleven, each one lasting exactly five years until the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF (1995-2000). The situation has become more complicated since then: the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF covered the period 2000-2007 and the 10<sup>th</sup> covered the period 2008-2013.

<sup>23</sup> This was the expression of a laudable wish to channel funds to projects, which enjoyed maximum “added value” and European expertise, and to encourage better link-ins with what the member States were already doing in the ACP country. In fact, however, the frequent selection of “focal sectors” as vast as the “fight against poverty” or “governance” still makes it possible to set up programmes with the most wide-ranging of targets.



## The 1990s: the politicization of European development aid

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Until the 1990s, in the Cold War context, it was generally believed that “*whether aid was effective or not was not really important, for example, if it [was supporting] friendly regimes*”<sup>24</sup>. At the beginning of the 1990s, when western donors no longer needed to use aid as a political tool in the Cold War context and France suddenly started promoting the merits of democracy in French-speaking Africa, donors started introducing political conditions into their programmes.

In the case of the EDF, this paradigm shift for aid was firstly reflected in the Lomé Convention IV (1990), where a timid remark appeared for the first time, pointing out that “*development policy and co-operation are closely linked with respect for fundamental human rights and liberties*”<sup>25</sup>, which was followed by a list of the economic, social and cultural rights in question. Moreover, the contracting parties were reaffirming their obligations to combat and eliminate all forms of discrimination “*based on ethnicity, origin, race, nationality, colour, sex, language or religion*”<sup>26</sup>...”. But such statements were nothing more than simple declarations of good intentions. After the Treaty of Maastricht and the establishment of foreign policy as one of the Union’s policies, Lomé IV bis in 1995 points out that “*in the support for development strategies of the ACP countries, account will be taken of both the objectives and priorities of the co-operation policy of the Community and the development priorities of the ACP States*”<sup>27</sup>. Its effect is also to be felt in the transition of the Commission’s role from that of non-active partner, content with finance programmes presented to it by the APC countries, to that of a player expecting to engage in a political dialogue with those countries

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<sup>24</sup> Jean-Michel Severino, “La résurrection de l’aide”, in *OCDE, Coopération pour le développement 2011*, OECD Editions, Paris, 2012, pp. 137-150.

<sup>25</sup> Article 5.1.

<sup>26</sup> Article 5.2.

<sup>27</sup> Article 4.

and making its support to a certain extent dependent on respect being shown for the Community's own objectives and priorities. The Cotonou Agreement signed in 2000 fits that picture. In the course of the various revisions introduced at five-year intervals, we find a Prévert-style inventory of preoccupations: references to the World Trade Organization, the International Labour Organization, to the Accord on Intellectual Property Rights in relation to trade, to the Convention on Biological Diversity, to the International Criminal Court, etc. Article 86 of the Cotonou Agreement institutes for the first time in 2000 a "*procedure for consultation and appropriate measures in relation to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law*" applicable when one of the parties believes that "*the other is not fulfilling its obligation based on respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law*"<sup>28</sup>, a procedure which can result in the suspension of co-operation with the State in question. It goes without saying that this procedure has so far always been brought into play on the initiative of the European partner and against an ACP partner<sup>29</sup>. Article 96 clearly establishes European development aid as an instrument of EU foreign policy. As a result of the reservations, which numerous ACP States have in relation to that evolution, the practice of political dialogue provided for in the Cotonou Agreement varies considerably among the ACP States: it ranges from non-existence to a regular and frequent dialogue between EU representatives and ministers in the concerned.

This increased importance of political criteria in ACP-EU co-operation has been reinforced still further because of the appearance of a new form of aid at the same time – namely, budgetary support, which appeared in the wake of structural adjustment programmes. After acknowledging that "*the ACP States and the Community are of the opinion that the situation with regard to ACP States' external debt has become a critical problem for development*"<sup>30</sup>, the decision was taken to encourage "*the accelerated use of the resources of the*

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<sup>28</sup> Article 96.2a.

<sup>29</sup> Article 96 is generally applied when coups d'état take place (Ivory Coast in 2001, the Central African Republic in 2003, Mauritania in 2006, etc.) and European aid is only suspended as a last resort or when the partner State fails. For a detailed analysis of the application of Article 96, see Liisa Laakso, Timo Kivimäki and Maria Seppänen, "Evaluation of Coordination and Coherence in the Application of the Article 96 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement", in *Studies in European Development Co-operation Evaluation*, No. 6, April 2007. As early as 1993, for instance, seven countries were affected by measures to suspend aid adopted by the Community and certain countries were to experience after that very long periods during which aid was suspended (Congo-Zaire, Haiti, Malawi, Somalia, Liberia...).

<sup>30</sup> Lomé Convention IV, Article 239.

previous indicative programmes, which have not yet been used, through the instruments for rapid disbursement provided for in the Convention so as to help alleviate the burden of debt<sup>31</sup>. This new orientation with regard to the application of EDF resources was not conspicuous: the system built up by Lomé was based on the financing of investment as the motor behind growth and on a range of commercial preferences, which were the antithesis of the liberal ideas underpinning the adjustment policies pursued by the Bretton Woods institutions<sup>32</sup>. The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of these institutions were based at the time on a logic of development through increased competitiveness, which implied that producers had to adapt their prices in accordance with relative ones. This system ran counter to the mechanisms for modifying fluctuations in prices traditionally used by the EDF, which no longer regarded public investment as the driving force behind growth, although it constituted the “core principle” of the EDF and, based as it was on donations, placed a question mark over the ability of these institutions to supply credit. After a timid start, because the part of the EDF funds set aside for structural adjustment did not exceed 10% of the total for either the 7<sup>th</sup> or the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF, budget support had quickly to become the main means of application with 30% of the financing from the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF and then 48% of it from the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. Numerous factors came together to bring about this slide from a traditional aid project to budget support. Budgetary aid can be put in place more rapidly and less onerously than an aid project (it requires less staff) and above all it has become, according to the European Court of Auditors, “the first aid modality”<sup>33</sup> established through dialogue between donors and recipient countries.

The governments of the ACP partners immediately declared themselves in favour of this new form of aid, seeing in it – perhaps naïvely – a means of avoiding the pernicky follow-through to which the services of the Commission subject the use of funds allocated to projects. This, however, turned out to be a short-sighted strategy. Indeed, budgetary aid is much easier to adjust to fluctuations in the “political dialogue” than aid-projects based on contracts with public entities which, once signed, are suspended with difficulty. Therefore this aid modality allows the European partner to be, when it wants to,

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<sup>31</sup> Lomé Convention IV, Article 240.

<sup>32</sup> See: Jean Coussy, “L’appui de l’Union européenne aux ajustements structurels” in *Cahiers du GEMDEV*, No. 25, 1997, pp. 195-211.

<sup>33</sup> European Court of Auditors, “La gestion, par la Commission, de l’appui budgétaire général dans les pays ACP, ainsi que dans les pays d’Amérique Latine et d’Asie”, *Special Report* No. 11, 2010, p. 77.

much more in charge with regard to the release of funds according to political criteria, over which he has a virtually discretionary power.

## At the Dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: 'securitizing' European development aid

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After having been politicized during the 1990s, European aid has firmly entered the domain of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Far from this being a break, this evolution is rather a logical continuation. The development of lawless zones and failed States (Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo) are perceived and experienced as generating security problems in Europe<sup>34</sup>, while a new paradigm was linking development and security, and September 11, 2001 was having a major psychological impact on the western powers. These political, security and conceptual shifts were translated into increased importance of the security question on the European agenda (illustrated by the European Security Strategy of 2013) and the proliferation of EU police and military missions<sup>35</sup>. This general trend has also affected European aid, which has been supplied with *ad hoc* new instruments that are supposed to be responding to these new security priorities.

As in the previous case, the Cotonou Agreement has incorporated Europe's preoccupations with security. The original text, from 2000 onwards, included references to child soldiers, to the struggle against organized crime, drugs and the proliferation of light weapons – issues which were already a source of concern to Europe then. The first revision of 2005 added the fight against terrorism and arms of mass destruction – a direct consequence of September 11<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> The appearance of a new drug route between South America and Europe *via* West Africa has contributed a good deal to this vision of the situation.

<sup>35</sup> In the last ten years the EU has deployed several military and police missions in Africa. Certain of these were more or less permanent (like those charged with reforming the security sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Guinea-Bissau or missions for military training operations such as those in Uganda and Mali) while others involved military intervention as such (Artémis and EUFOR in the DRC in 2003 and 2006, EUFOR in Chad and in the Central African Republic between 2007 and 2009) or longer term (the Atalanta naval operation which aims at rendering secure the waters off Somalia and which began in 2008 and is still in force).

and the war in Iraq. The third revision in 2010 extended the field of problems to be confronted so as to include human trafficking and piracy<sup>36</sup> – a direct consequence of the lack of security affecting one of the busiest maritime routes in the world in the waters off Somalia. The growing importance of security issues is reflected in the European agenda in Africa, particularly with regard to the strategic partnership between the EU and Africa. Peace and security number among the priorities for that partnership: the two signatories take it upon themselves to act in unison to institute peace and security in Africa; but also to work together on problems of international security such as the trafficking of small weapons and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction<sup>37</sup>. In addition, in view of its drive to achieve coherence and clarity, the EU is from now on drawing up regional strategies, which set forth its policy for certain specific zones and are based on an integrated approach to security and development<sup>38</sup>.

Finance-wise, this approach has resulted once again in the creation of a new instrument, the Facility for Peace. Its creation followed on from a renewed commitment on the part of Africa in the form of a continent-wide organization (the African Union or AU) so as to strive to ensure peace on the continent. At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the desire on the part of certain African leaders to consolidate their political position and to have better control of their future coincided with the desire to disengage Africa from the Western nations after the end of the Cold War and the American and Belgian misadventures in Somalia and Rwanda<sup>39</sup>. This convergence of political agendas led to the idea of the Africanization of conflict management, for which the slogan was “African solutions for African problems”. The transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the AU was accompanied with new emphasis on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the continent itself and by the continent. The objective was to substitute African interventions for peace for Western ones and with the Facility for Peace, the EU became the first donor for the Africanization of the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Created in response to a request formulated by the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003, the

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<sup>36</sup> Article II.1.

<sup>37</sup> Articles 10 and 13 of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, 2007.

<sup>38</sup> The EU thus drew up a strategy for development and security in the Sahel region and a strategic framework for the Horn of Africa in 2011.

<sup>39</sup> The failure of the “Restore Hope” operation in Somalia in 1993 and the execution of ten Belgian soldiers participating in the UN operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994.

Facility for Peace was initially allocated 250 million euros for a period of three years. This budgetary allocation was provided at the time of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. Since its creation in 2003 the Peace Facility has always been extended, had its budget increased (within the framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF it has been given a budgetary allocation of 600 million) and its field of activity expanded.

The Facility for Peace finances the capacity of the African Union and regional African organizations to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the continent. Initially it was used to finance operations to maintain peace but the scope of its activity was rapidly expanded. The AU mission in Darfur (AU Mission in Sudan or AMIS) was the first mission to receive financial support in the name of the Facility for Peace in June 2004, which totaled 12 million euros. From now on, the Facility for Peace not only finances peace operations but also all APSAs (African Peace and Security Architecture), namely mediation efforts and the institutional infrastructure dedicated to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. On the other hand expenditure on military equipment or, to be more precise, weapons, is excluded. In 2007, the AU and the EU decided to widen the scope of the Facility for Peace, so as to cover the prevention of crises and post-conflict stabilization and to accelerate decision-making and co-ordination. This implies support for structures and initiatives for the prevention and resolution of crises, that is to say the Council for Peace and Security, the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. In keeping with the priorities of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, the funds from the Facility for Peace for Africa have been allocated as follows:

1) A total of 100 million has been allocated for reinforcement of capacities. The EU support is aimed at reinforcing the capacity and effective functioning of the various components of the APSA and at reinforcing political dialogue. To this end, the Facility for Peace has been used to improve institutional communication between the AU and other organizations – both material communication (equipment) and human communication (the financing at this point of four officers for liaison between regional organizations of the AU). At the present time 40 million euros are earmarked for tasks included in the programme for making the APSA more operational: a new draft for this is now being drawn up for the period 2014-2017.

2) With its total allocation of 600 million euros, the financing of these operations to support peace represent the main expenditure of the Facility for Peace for Africa.

3) A total of 15 million has been allocated for the financing of warning systems, for preparatory phases of operations in support of peace and preliminary stages of mediation processes, when funds are requested urgently.

As regards the results achieved, the Facility for Peace has made it possible to finance an institutional capacity for management of conflicts for the African Union; a range of regional African organizations<sup>40</sup> and five peace-keeping operations since its creation: AMIS (the AU mission to the Sudan between 2004 and 2007), AMISEC to the Comoros Islands (a limited AU operation to ensure security at the 2006 elections with the help of the South African army), MICOPAX in the Central African Republic (a mission of the Economic Community of Central African States, which began in 2008 and is still continuing), AMISOM in Somalia (an AU mission which started in 2007 and is still continuing), the Regional Task Force of the AU against the LRA (another mission directed by the AU, which began in 2011 and is still continuing). Among all these missions, AMISOM is the most costly, because it is also the largest: from the time of its creation in 2007, till 2012, it has received 600 million euros of European aid and it involves 6,000 men<sup>41</sup>. A sixth mission is going to be financed by the Facility for Peace. Indeed the EU has decided to put aside a total of 50 million to support the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)<sup>42</sup>.

Setting the Facility for Peace in motion has to pass through an obligatory process: acceptance by the AU, which is the central pivot of the architecture for peace and security on the continent. As a general rule the AU submits a request for a financial allocation to the EU and, when it is a matter of financing an operation to maintain peace, approval – even if only tacit and informal – is also required from the United Nations. So, the transformation of the CEEAC mission in Central Africa (MICOPAX) into an AU mission (MISCA –

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<sup>40</sup> In this case the organizations in question are the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

<sup>41</sup> European Commission, *"The EU renewed its commitment to foster peace and security in Somalia"*, February 21, 2012. The level of fatalities in that operation is also particularly high (around 3,000 between 2007 and 2013), because it is more of a support mission than a combat mission. "Somalia: Amisom has lost 3,000 soldiers in six years", *RFI*, May 10, 2013.

International Support Mission to the Central African Republic) involved negotiations between the two organizations and also a new concept of operations devised by the AU, which at the same time sent a request for finance to Brussels<sup>43</sup>. If this request was accepted, the Facility for Peace would finance a seventh African mission this year. The AU control over the Facility for Peace is, however, informally contested by regional organizations, which would like to obtain direct funding for the Facility for Peace<sup>44</sup>.

Yet the financing of efforts by African organizations to maintain peace and security does not translate into very satisfactory results. The mission plan making APSA operational, which has been drawn up, makes it possible to measure the gap between the declared objectives and the objectives achieved. The African regional organizations have not demonstrated their effectiveness in implementing their mandate for peace and security and they can be divided into three categories in this respect: those which have not made any progress in putting their plans for operations into practice and have not used any credit (as, for example, the CEN-SAD and the Arab Maghreb Union), those which have begun to do so and are in a position to present a coherent assessment of their activities (like the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) and those which have begun to put their plans into practice and are not in a position to submit a coherent assessment of their activities (the Southern African Development Community, the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States). The quality of the financial management of the funds allocated is also a subject of concern for the EU, particularly in relation to the ECCAS and the ECOWAS. As for the Standby Force, it has still not materialized. Key element in the African Peace and Security Architecture, the Standby Force is supposed to be the force for maintaining peace in Africa and to be formed by a contribution from five regional organizations (the Arab Maghreb Union, the ECCAS, the ECOWAS, the SADC and

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<sup>42</sup> European Commission: "L'UE accélère son soutien à la résolution de la crise au Mali", Brussels, January 17, 2013.

<sup>43</sup> This mission will have to protect civilians and restore security, contribute to the stabilization of the country and to the restoration of central authority, to the reform of the security sector and to the creation of the necessary conditions for the provision of humanitarian aid.

<sup>44</sup> An evolution of this kind is not impossible, particularly since the signing of an accord on direct financing between the EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the peace mission in Mali. In order to maintain the appearance of AU political control, this accord was ratified by that organization.

EASFCOM<sup>45</sup>). After finally recognizing its inability to meet that objective, the AU has substituted for it a capacity for rapid deployment which would be a smaller version of the Standby Force<sup>46</sup>. While a capacity for military planning has been established at the level of the AU, that is far from being the case with regard to the five regional organizations involved, and the capacity for rapid deployment is perhaps still a virtual force. In 2013, the failure of the ECOWAS to deploy a force at the time of the crisis in Mali and that of the SADC to deploy one at the time of the M23 crisis in the Congolese Kivu regions demonstrated in practice the failure of efforts to put together standby forces. Faced by the virtual character of certain undertakings of the APSA, a return to realism proved essential and safety measures have now been embarked upon by the EU: the introduction of an upper limit for the support budget of the APSA, reorientation of the programme so as to reinforce capacities and assessment, particularly by involving the Delegations which are in daily contact with the beneficiary organizations. It is clear that the management capacity of the African organizations has been overestimated and the actual political obstacles standing in the way of the grand design for Africanization of the management, prevention and resolution of conflicts have been seriously underestimated.

Moreover several differences have emerged with regard to the idea of peacekeeping between the EU and the African partners in the APSA. The latter have a predominantly military view of the mission and pay insufficient attention to its civilian dimension, while the EU approaches peacekeeping more from a “civil affairs” perspective. This has led to attempts to reorganize the preparation of stand-by forces with emphasis on the development and integration of the civilian component in the brigade allegedly on standby. What is more, the proliferation of AU missions goes hand in hand with a dilution of the initial peacekeeping objective: while some missions correspond to the classic idea of “peacekeeping” or “peacebuilding”, others like the Regional Task Force called upon to fight against the LRA are atypical, both as regards their essence and their form. In addition,

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<sup>45</sup>This Force has to be made up of a brigade of 5,000 men from each regional organization and to have a civilian and a police component. This was made clear in a communication from Jean-Baptiste Natama, Director of the presidential office of the African Union Commission in Paris in June, 2013.

<sup>46</sup> *Rapport de la présidente de la Commission sur l'opérationnalisation de la capacité de déploiement rapide de la Force africaine en attente et la mise en place d'une capacité africaine de réponse immédiate aux crises*, African Union, 6<sup>th</sup> regular meeting of the Special Committee for Defence, Safety and Security, April 29-30<sup>th</sup>, 2013.

they tend to resemble combat missions. This has led some people to wonder whether there has been too much of a preoccupation with security in the Facility for Peace, in particular, and in EU policy in Africa in general. As perfectly justified, the Facility for Peace has also been criticized for spending funds on security, which had been earmarked for development, because it is financed by the EDF.

In relation to the Facility for Peace, preoccupations with security have gradually spread to the whole system of EDF programming, whether it be a question of National Indicative Programmes or Regional ones. At the present time more than 10% of the total projected allocations for the six Regional Indicative Programmes (that is to say more than 225 million euros) is earmarked for projects in the security domain, some of which are directly linked to activities of a purely military nature (Appendix 3). Projects in the security domain are also being financed within the framework of the National Indicative Programmes of numerous countries and sometimes, even budgetary support programmes include indicators relating to security<sup>47</sup>. The inclusion of security problems (drug-trafficking, human trafficking, money-laundering, etc.) in European aid to the ACP States illustrates and reinforces at the same time the increased politicization of the dialogue between the EU and its partners, particularly because these projects are often planned in conjunction with EU interventions of a more strictly military nature financed by other instruments of the Commission or the Council<sup>48</sup>. The mechanism for 'steering' aid in the ACP States is adapting to this new situation, as can be seen from the sociological evolution of the Delegation heads: the engineers who traditionally occupied almost all the posts after the era of the "EDF controllers" are progressively being replaced by diplomats of the European External Action Service or the member States<sup>49</sup>, clearly illustrating the predominance of the political approach, centred more and more on questions of security.

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<sup>47</sup> In the case of the recent programme for budgetary support for Cape Verde, 8 of the 39 performance indicators were linked to the security domain covering activities as varied as the Coast Guard, the organization charged with the fight against money-laundering and the prison system.

<sup>48</sup> The Council of the EU finances European military operations using the expedient of an *ad hoc* fund, Athena.

<sup>49</sup> When the 15 Heads of Delegations were replaced in the spring of 2012, most of them were from outside the ACP: only two of the nominated ambassadors were not diplomats from the European External Action Service or the member States, (cf. Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, "Rotation 2012 de la diplomatie européenne, 17 nommés", in *Brussels 2*, May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2012, available on: < [www.bruxelles2.eu/tag/seae/page/5](http://www.bruxelles2.eu/tag/seae/page/5) >.



## Conclusion

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Fifty-five years after its creation, the EDF – Europe's oldest instrument for external action – has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for adapting to changes in its international environment and objectives, not just Europe's but also those of its ACP partners. Born as an investment fund in a framework of post-colonial cronyism between certain Member States and their exclusively African partners, it adapted to successive enlargements of Europe and to the integration of new beneficiaries into the Lomé system. It made it possible to support efforts of adjustment on the part of the ACP economies in the context of the debt crisis of the 1990s and it managed to survive the disappearance of commercial preferences which had constituted one of the pillars of successive Lomé Conventions. The EDF had gradually been politicized, including as objectives the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and it was being used more and more as one of the instruments for keeping the peace and resolving conflicts, particularly in Africa. Despite it being subdivided into multiple 'sub-funds', what has remained specific to the EDF ever since the 1950s is the geographical range of its activity, virtually confined to countries which were linked in the past to Europe by colonial ties.

Yet it has to be acknowledged that the current evolution brings problems with it, first and foremost problems in terms of 'ownership'. If we compare the current situation with the original spirit of the Lomé Conventions and then the Cotonou Agreement, which introduced – long before Paris and Accra – a mechanism for dialogue and co-management of aid based on projects, which really had been defined on a joint basis, it is undeniable that there has been a shift away from all of that. The objectives introduced in the last twenty years in successive conventions correspond more and more to the preoccupations of the European participant, to which the ACP partner often only gives lip service. The increasing complexity of the procedures involved in European aid and the transfer of tasks to the recipient country have in some cases led to the opposite of what was aspired to, namely to the reduction of the administrative capacity of the ACP countries (the exodus of administrative elites or failure to bring in new ones). Paradoxically, while donors have been starting to

discuss notions of ownership and alignment, the ACP partners have experienced a degree of disappointment as they have been gaining more and more the impression that they are being side-lined from decision-making. This sense of marginalization in connection with programming and the utilization of the Fund's resources is becoming more and more of an issue among those in responsible posts in the ACP countries and might even delegitimize European aid. In this respect it is symptomatic to note that the ACP States feel that they are more spectators than participants at debates connected with the Agenda for change, which stimulate the services of the EC<sup>50</sup>.

Another problem is connected with the politicization of the EDF, illustrated by the objective "to promote our own values and fundamental interests" as expressed by the former EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs. We might well ask ourselves to what extent the EDF really is the instrument best suited for doing this, beyond the pathos which permeates the texts of the conventions, accords and other strategies and agendas of the EU. The particular feature of the EDF is indeed the fact that technically speaking it is a bilateral donor but, while behaving in reality like a multilateral donor, the member States have constantly to be agreeing on the largest common denominator between their positions on one point or another. Then again, as regards the group of ACP countries, the 79 countries come from cultures and historical traditions which are extremely varied. Agreeing in those conditions on what the common values and fundamental interests might be and promoting them among such different States is to some extent an impossible task. On the other hand, it is important to remember that the frequent inability to define a course of joint action, as member states' diplomatic strategies have their own particular interests for specific geographic zones and different political sensibilities, can often result in collective weakness and so oblige Europe and consequently the EDF, to intervene in a situation of subsidiarity, in comparison with the World Bank and the IMF, when it comes to budgetary support, and in comparison with the UN when it comes to the Facility for Peace, thus avoiding the need to define a discourse and values appropriate for the EU.

As for the security objective set out by the former High Representative for Foreign Affairs, that is to say "the preservation of

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<sup>50</sup> European Centre for Development Policy Management, *Differentiation in ACP-EU co-operation. Implication of the EU's agenda for change for the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF and*

peace and the resolution of conflicts in the world”, the assessment of what contribution the EDF has been able to make in this respect is limited. Conceived in order to finance a policy (the Africanization of the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts), which reflects European interests and norms, the Facility for Peace corresponds to a political desire which is real but paradoxical: the desire to disengage not merely from Africa itself but from African conflicts. The EU, however, cannot decide to turn away completely from Africa’s security problems because of the proximity of the two continents, the immigration issue and the security interests of certain European countries in Africa. These interests have recently been illustrated by French military intervention to stop the jihadists’ advance in Mali, at the very moment when all European diplomats were talking about nothing but the Africanization of conflict management.

The Facility for Peace also embodies an extremely important European norm: regionalism. When financing an architecture for peace and security in the continent, which is based on a network of regional organizations, this Facility specifically promotes a regionalist approach to security which reflects both the history and the philosophy of the EU, having itself initially been conceived as a rampart and an economic association directed against the Eastern bloc. The intrinsic weaknesses of these regional organizations limit the impact of the sums injected both into the Facility itself and into the resources from the Fund coming from the Regional and National Indicative Programmes. The use of EDF resources, when it is pursuing a global approach linked with other EU interventions like the PESD missions (European Security and Defence) can, on the other hand, have a stabilizing effect on certain countries in a state of profound crisis. The inclusion of performance criteria linked to the security sector within the framework of budgetary support programmes ought in return to be the object of more intensive consideration: the indicators used within the framework of those programmes do not always make it possible to foresee the true impact on security or on the fight against international or organized crime. Ideas shared by budgetary aid officials and specialists in security issues would make it possible to avoid being led astray and to find more effective incentives, particularly if it is borne in mind that, as sectors concerned with sovereignty, defence and security are

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*beyond, op. cit.*

those which so far have been the most impervious to change governance reform and greater transparency and which have affected almost all other domains of public expenditure.

The linkage between the EDF – a geographical instrument which has historically been dedicated to financing public investments, mainly in infrastructure (a sector which is in essence one that can be planned and programmed), for which implementation is based on negotiation regarding long-term programmes – and the other financial instruments used by the EU in its foreign affairs policy, notably the thematic tools that often deal with the same problems (governance, security, etc.) and often proceed by inviting tenders. Given its nature and its mechanisms for identifying and implementing programmes and for the management of funds, the EDF is probably not the most appropriate tool to provide support for crisis management in a context where the situations can change overnight.

In view of this, the preparation of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF, which – with a total slightly larger than that of the 10<sup>th</sup> – is due to finance EU-ACP co-operation over the period 2014-2020, gives us little reason to expect significant changes. The alarming prospect of the EDF being absorbed into the EU budget – which, for years, many of those working in the Commission or the European Parliament have been hoping to see – is without doubt going to raise its ugly head, but without any prospect of becoming a reality. The particular problems linked to security and objectives specific to the Facility for Peace are just as unlikely to appear in the “Agenda for Change”<sup>51</sup> except perhaps as timid references to the development-security link and to fragile situations – perhaps ten lines in a 12-page document. The plea from the organizations of civil society to separate the question of governance from geo-strategic interests and to introduce more flexible procedures for payments in crisis situations<sup>52</sup> appears from this point of view to have little chance of encountering any friendly ears among the services of the Commission, even if the argument

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<sup>51</sup> European Commission, *Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Committee and the Committee of the Regions regarding the increasing impact of the EU Development Policy: an Agenda for change*, Brussels, October 2011, 12 pp.

<sup>52</sup> See, for example, the information submitted by the Cotonou working group, CONCORD (European Confederation of NGOs for emergency situations and development) on the occasion of the 25<sup>th</sup> ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly in June 2013, available on:

<http://www.coordinationsud.org/plaidoyer/europe/fonds-europeen-de-developpement>

concerning “differentiation” of aid depending upon needs, capacities, performance and impact could, in theory, encourage such change.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1

### Main financial instruments of European foreign action

Name and acronym of the instrument	Amount of the funding 2014-2020 (billion of euros)	Beneficiaries	Elements financed
<b>Instruments for pre-accession and neighbourhood</b>			
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance	14,11	6 countries from Western Balkans and Turkey	Support transition in these States before their accession to the EU
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)	18,182	17 countries in the EU periphery: Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, Russia, Caucasus, Middle-East	Cross-border cooperation with the States geographically close to the EU but with no will to be integrated
<b>Instrument for cooperation and development aid</b>			
European Development Fund	34,276	78 ACP countries	Development aid based on Cotonou Accord
Development Cooperation Instrument I (DCI I)		Latin America, Central Asia, Middle-East, South-Africa	Development aid for States and regions
Development Cooperation Instrument II (DCI II)		18 ACP countries	Aid for the restructuration of sugar production
Development		All third parties	Human and social

Cooperation Instrument III (DCI III)		(except industrialized and pre-accession ones)	development, environment, non-State actors, food security, migration and asylum
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), total	23,295		
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	1,587	All third countries	Democracy (elections surveillance), good governance, human rights, fundamental freedoms
Instrument for Stability (IFS)	2,829	All third countries (except industrialized)	Response to crises and border and trans-regional problems
Nuclear Security Instrument (NSI)	0,631	All third countries (except industrialized)	Nuclear security and protection against radiations
Partnership Instrument (PI)	1,0	Industrialized and emerging countries	Cooperation and exchanges in support to public diplomacy, regulatory convergence and promotion of exchange
Instrument for Greenland	0,219	Greenland	

Source : European Commission financial framework 2014-2020

## Appendix 2

### EDF succession

EDF	Period	Number of European States contributing to the fund	Number of associated States 1) 2)	Juridical Basis
1 <sup>st</sup> EDF	1959-1963	6	30 associated territories	Treaty of Rome
2 <sup>nd</sup> EDF	1964-1970	6	17 EAMA	Yaoundé Convention I
3 <sup>rd</sup> EDF	1970-1975	6	20 EAMA	Yaoundé Convention II
4 <sup>th</sup> EDF	1975-1980	9	46 ACP States	Lomé Convention I
5 <sup>th</sup> EDF	1980-1985	10	59 ACP States	Lomé Convention II
6 <sup>th</sup> EDF	1985-1990	12	66 ACP States	Lomé Convention III
7 <sup>th</sup> EDF	1990-1995	15	70 ACP States	Lomé Convention IV
8 <sup>th</sup> EDF	1995-2000	15	70 ACP States	Lomé Convention IV bis
9 <sup>th</sup> EDF	2000-2007	25	77 ACP States	Cotonou Accord
10 <sup>th</sup> EDF	2008-2013	27	79 ACP States	Revision of Cotonou Accord in Mauritius
11 <sup>th</sup> EDF	2014-2020	28	79 ACP States	Revision of Cotonou Accord in Ouagadougou

1 It must be underlined that some States integrate the ACP group while some accords and conventions are ongoing and some ACP States are not signatory to certain conventions (cases of Cuba and Somalia) or do not benefit from the EDF (case of South Africa).

2 Beyond independent States, the EDF has always financed projects in territories related to Member States; their list has constantly evolved, in particular due to the accession to independence for some of them which have become ACP States and the integration of others to the status of "Ultra-peripheral Regions" (UPR, case of the French overseas departments).

## Appendix 3

### Amount of indicative contributions to security-related sectors in the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) 10th EDF

ACP Region	Amount (million of euros)		% of PIR
	Total RIP	Security	
ECOWAS	597	119	39,9
Central Africa	165	15	9,1
Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean	645	64	9,9
SADCC	116	17,4	15,0
Caribbean	165	9,9	6,0
Pacific	95	0	0,0
Total	1 783	225,3	12,6

Source : documents from Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) 10th EDF