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FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT FRENCH PRESIDENT

Edited by Thomas GOMART and Marc HECKER

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Introduction

Thomas Gomart

In a democracy, the link between domestic and foreign policy is always a sensitive one because the two move at different speeds. In France, the Fifth Republic created an institutional framework that gives the President the central role in devising and conducting foreign policy. As foundations of **the President's legitimacy, direct election by universal suffrage, nuclear weapons and the power of appointment as part of his or her "domaine réservé"** give the President an unusually free hand compared to other democratic governments. Undoubtedly, this allows for a certain degree of power to affect lasting change and confront crises. Yet, it can also be a significant drawback when the newly elected President has no definite vision or serious training in international affairs. Foreign policy is the area in which inconsistency, ideology and ignorance are punished dearly. If they need convincing, the candidates would do well to reread the works of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1917-1994).¹

In time, it may be understood that the continuity of de Gaulle and Mitterrand and the consensus that had prevailed since 1958 – over strategic independence within an alliance system, the European project founded on Franco-German reconciliation, and diplomatic multilateralism **based on France's permanent membership in the UN Security Council** – was broken in 2002. Historians will decide. The symptoms of this rupture were twofold: the presence of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the second round of **the French Presidential election, and Jacques Chirac's re-election** for a five-year term in the Élysée (2002-**2007**). **Chirac's time in office was defined by** opposition to the British and American intervention in Iraq (2003) and **France's rejection of the treaty establishing a European constitution** (2005). The terms of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) and François Hollande (2012-2017) have been marked, *inter alia*, by the financial crisis (2008) and terrorist attacks (2015-2016).

1. J.-B. Duroselle, *Politique extérieure de la France : la décadence* (1932-1939), Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1979 ; *Politique extérieure de la France : l'abîme* (1939-1945), Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1986.

Any full term in office must be preceded by an electoral process, and we are currently feeling its effect on the rhythm of French domestic policy. The current campaign has created an unprecedented situation fuelled by revelations and a total absence of restraint, but it has not truly taken account of the disruptions of the last year: Brexit, the attempted coup in Turkey, the election of Donald Trump, the recapturing of Aleppo by Bashar al-Assad, **Xi Jinping's declarations about "economic globalization"**, or the behavior of North Korea. The debate, or rather its absence, can be looked at in two ways.

First, the lack of any serious discussion about the future direction of French foreign policy is symptomatic of our difficulty in accepting and explaining the current reconfiguration of globalization, which is being driven mainly by a new solution to the distribution of power between countries and by the growing pace of the digital transition around the world. France is not an island that can cut itself off from the world and break with its secular history, so the lack of any real method to explain how the international system works is striking. Somewhere, between pipe dreams and nightmares, there is space for sober reasoning to describe and manage the strategic, political, economic and cultural inter-dependencies that France both shapes, and is shaped by.

Second, the absence of meaningful responses to the expectations, demands and challenges of our allies, partners and enemies shows that France is in political retreat and is incapable of coming up with a convincing narrative, due to a lack of credibility. Although it is true that elections are won on domestic issues, it is nevertheless impossible to imagine the future of the country without closely examining its international commitments. Between intellectual parochialism and bombastic universalism, there should exist a space in which one can talk with at least a modicum of seriousness about the European project, beginning with the premise that France is an international player. Unfortunately, this has not proved possible in the current campaign.

Bringing together 15 brief analyses, this combined report is part of an Ifri project to contribute to the presidential debate. Earlier in the process, a high-level working group, made up of political figures and researchers, was set up in 2016: its work gave rise to *Notre intérêt national*², a publication whose aims were both conceptual and practical. Later, Ifri launched a series of debates on these questions and posted videos and info-graphics on social media. On the one hand, therefore, this study is about preparing the

2. T. de Montbrial and T. Gomart (eds.), *Notre intérêt national. Quelle politique étrangère pour la France ?*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2017.

candidates and their teams for the foreign policy challenges that lie ahead. On the other, it is about producing analyses that allow readers to refine their judgments about these same challenges. It is unusual for a French election to provoke such interest abroad and that is why this study is available in both French³ and English. Its goal is not to analyze the programs of the various candidates (presented with the help of info-graphics on various themes⁴) but to identify the most important foreign policy issues and to explain the options that the eighth President of the Fifth Republic will face on the morning of May 8, 2017, whoever that might be.

3. T. Gomart and M. Hecker (eds.), “L’agenda diplomatique du nouveau président”, *Études de l’Ifri*, Ifri, April 2017.

4. The editors would like to thank Dimitri Von Büren for creating the info-graphics detailing the programs of the candidates.

A Foreign Policy Hampered by Sovereign Debt

Michel Pébereau and Frédéric Monlouis-Félicité

As French citizens go to the polls, the alarming state of our public finances is almost absent from the Presidential debate. It is critical, however, that we show ourselves capable of balancing the books over the long term.

Our budget deficit remains above 3% of GDP. The French economy grew by a mere 1.1% in 2016 and, with growth expected to reach 1.4% in 2017⁵, it is still growing more slowly than the Eurozone average. The High Council of Public Finance judges that the deficit reductions forecast by the government for 2017 are “unlikely” to occur. At a European level, the **Commission emphasizes that France’s high level of public debt, combined** with low growth, could in the future create significant risks for public finances. It is likely that France will be the only EU country apart from Greece to run a so-called “excessive deficit” in 2017⁶.

The state budget is running a deficit for the 43rd consecutive year and receipts cover only 80% of expenditure. Public authorities (the central government, social security and local authorities), meanwhile, have been in overall deficit since 1981. This constant disparity between revenue and expenditure has led the state to accumulate more than €2,160 billion in debt by the end of 2016, or more than €32,000 per inhabitant. Debt only accounted for 20% of GDP in 1980, but by 2010, both France and **Germany’s sovereign debt levels had risen to 80% of GDP. However,** whereas our neighbor managed to reduce its debt burden to 72% of GDP by 2015 thanks to budget surpluses, ours has grown to 96% due to budget deficits.

These deficits stem from the systematic use of public spending as the answer to all our problems. In 2015, public spending in France surpassed 57% of GDP, a level exceeded in the OECD only by Finland. Public spending only accounts for 44% of GDP in Germany and an average of 45%

5. G. Duval and P. Lafont, *Rapport annuel sur l'état de la France en 2017*, Bruxelles, European Commission, February 22, 2017.

6. *Ibid.*

in the four comparable European countries. The French “lead” in public spending as a percentage of GDP has increased from 8.5% in 2010 to 11.5% in 2014.

To keep pace with this rise in public spending, we have increased our tax and social security levies to 45% of GDP in 2016, the highest level in Europe and seven percentage points higher than the European average. These exceptionally high taxes make our companies less competitive and penalize employment, making the country less attractive for investment. Public consent for taxation is reaching its limits. Yet budget deficits persist. Indeed, they have reached such levels that the net surplus provided by “private domestic savings” (households and companies) is no longer sufficient to cover them. France is the only country in the Eurozone with a current account deficit that consistently runs a trade deficit. Collectively, we spend more than we produce!

We therefore need to look again at public spending across the board, reducing it but also making it more effective. Only then can we bring down the deficit and debt levels; only then, too, can we reduce taxes and social security deductions, a vital precondition for restoring our competitiveness and foreign trade balance. This will give us the means to improve our growth potential and guarantee social cohesion. We ought to set ourselves the goal of reducing public spending towards the European average of 50% of GDP.

The persistent, unbalanced nature of our public finances also has **consequences for France’s influence** on the world stage:

- ***Imbalanced public finances are a real source of worry for our European partners.*** Since 1997, France has only rarely adhered to its deficit-reduction plans (in 1998-2000, 2010-2011 and 2014-2015). We seem incapable of complying with the terms of treaties that we ourselves have signed, such as the 3% deficit enshrined in the Pact for Stability and Growth and the Golden Rule on structural balances. This affects our credibility and, hence, our influence.
- ***Our debt makes us very vulnerable to a rise in interest rates.*** Thanks to the monetary policy of the European Central Bank, its interest charges have fallen (€40 billion), while the volume of credit has exploded. If interest rates were to return to their 2005 level, the cost would double over the medium term and could become unsustainable. That said, interest rates depend on the confidence of investors because debt must be constantly refinanced. If we want our interest rates to remain roughly similar to those of Germany, we must reassure investors by showing them that we have the will and the ability to

reduce our budget deficits, and our debt. There is little room for error. **Given France's economic, financial and political weight, any major destabilization of the French sovereign debt market could provoke a crisis in the Eurozone.**

- *The drift in our public spending is being aggravated by operating expenses and transfer payments.* This deprives the state of room for maneuver when it comes to investment spending and preparing for the future. The state is being impoverished. Its balance sheet shows a net negative position which keeps getting worse. This deterioration also limits the extent to which the state can increase spending. At a time when military operations are multiplying and the fight against terrorism is proving to be a long-term endeavor, **France's sovereignty** and vital interests are at stake and so too, therefore, is its influence in an unstable world that is defined more than ever by the balance of power. Only ruthless cuts to public spending will be capable of releasing the resources that are needed to rise to this challenge, as well as to reduce taxes and bring down the deficit.

France no longer has a choice. At stake is not only France's credibility on the world stage and in the eyes of its European partners, but also the confidence of investors, which is crucial **to refinancing France's** debt. We must bring down the deficit. This requires structural reforms as well as cuts and changes to public spending, in the interest of growth and social cohesion.

Management of Sovereign Debt



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ Withdraw from the stability pact and from European laws limiting deficits
- ▶ Organize a European conference on sovereign debt
- ▶ Propose an alliance of Southern European countries to end austerity
- ▶ Carry out a citizens' audit of our sovereign debt to determine which parts are illegitimate and to prepare a negotiated restructuring
- ▶ Make the ECB purchase France's sovereign debt
- ▶ Bring down tax evasion and tax fraud



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Write off the debt accumulated since 2008 by the most indebted EU countries
- ▶ Pool European debt
- ▶ Facilitate the direct financing of state debt by the ECB
- ▶ Deduct spending on defense and on housing migrants from budget deficit calculations
- ▶ Fight tax evasion by increasing the powers of the Inspectorate of Finances
- ▶ Impose a moratorium on the European budget stability pact
- ▶ Propose European tax harmonization
- ▶ Support the creation of a new “Economy and Society” branch of the National Council of Universities to challenge the economic consensus
- ▶ Favor social/mutual enterprises (increase their share of GDP from 10% in 2017 to 20% by 2025)



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Aim for a long-term reduction in public spending (€60 billion per year) by 2022
- ▶ Hold the budget deficit at below 3% of GDP for the whole of the term
- ▶ Reduce public spending to 52% of GDP by 2022 (57% now)
- ▶ Social sphere: save €25 billion per year by the end of the term
 - Slow down the rise in spending on medical insurance (-€15 billion/year)
 - Reduce unemployment to 7% (-€10 billion in unemployment benefits)
- ▶ State spending: save €25 billion by the end of the term (-50,000 jobs in the public sector and automation)
- ▶ Local governments: save €10 billion per year by the end of the term (reduce their spending, provide state support for the environmental and digital transition)
- ▶ Keep the legal retirement age at 62
- ▶ Work: reinstate personal tax exemptions for extra hours



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ Reform the state and reduce public spending by €100 billion over the course of five years
- ▶ Reduce public spending to 50% of GDP by 2022 (57% at present)
- ▶ Limit the annual increase in healthcare spending to 1.7%-1.8% of GDP (€20 billion in savings over 5 years)
- ▶ Clarify the powers of regional authorities. Reduce the increase in receipts by €2-3 billion per year (€10-15 billion in savings over five years)
- ▶ Increase the age at which you can receive a full pension to 65
- ▶ Work: increase the work week to 39 hours in the public sector
- ▶ Reform unemployment benefit to incentivize work and virtue
- ▶ Launch a general review of norms and constraints, involving Parliament and civil society



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ Save €58 billion in public spending between now and 2022
- ▶ Reduce public spending to 53.4% of GDP by 2022
- ▶ Reduce sovereign debt to 89% of GDP (97% in 2017)
- ▶ Achieve a growth rate of 2.5% of GDP by 2022 (1.4% in 2017)
- ▶ Reduce budget expenditures and revenues of local governments
- ▶ Return to a retirement age of 60 as long as you have contributed for 40 years
- ▶ Work: give personal tax exemptions for extra hours
- ▶ Make savings on:
 - The management of social security
 - Social security fraud and tax evasion
 - Institutional reform
 - Reducing immigration

Trade Policy: Beyond Posturing, How to Defend French Interests?

Sébastien Jean

Trade policy occupies a paradoxical place in this year's French Presidential campaign, the most forthright statements and a large part of the debate focusing on a return to protectionism. Yet we should bear in mind that trade policy has been an exclusive authority of the European Union (EU) since January 1, 1970, in line with the principle of the free movement of goods within the EU. French protectionism would only be a practical possibility, therefore, if France left the EU. But that would be a different world from the one we now live in and that would involve dismantling the European architecture. To do so would be very dangerous and would have immense consequences across the board. Aside from legal and institutional considerations, we should stress that customs barriers would impoverish the French economy. These barriers represent a tax on consumption and would weigh heavily on the purchasing power of households, particularly the poorest, while taxes on imported parts and components would greatly hinder the competitiveness of French companies. In effect, global value chains have become absolutely essential to performance in the most sophisticated types of manufacturing, such as aeronautical engineering, transportation equipment and electronics. Not to mention the retaliations that such a policy would inevitably attract.

It is far more realistic and constructive therefore to ask what challenges **the EU's common trade policy faces and how the next French President might** influence it positively. And the challenges are many, partly because of the paradoxical environment in which the EU is operating: European trade policy has rarely been so active but its political legitimacy has never been so often challenged. The European Commission is currently conducting more than twenty separate negotiations to set up or modernize trade agreements, including with top-ranked partners with which it was not linked until now, such as the United States, Japan, India, Mercosur and, for investment only, China. Yet, even ratifying an agreement with a partner as obviously natural as

Canada is turning out to be **difficult**. A gulf has opened up between the EU's ambitions and its capabilities, at least from a political point of view.

The EU also has to deal with a particularly turbulent international **environment**. **President Donald Trump's aggressive protectionism threatens** to destabilize not only a key trade relationship for the EU but also the multilateral system upon which our trade is structured. With Russia, the trade relationship plays second fiddle to the political conflict over Ukraine and the sanctions which flow from it. With respect to China, the conclusion of the interim period following its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), at the end of 2016, casts doubt on its status under European trade law and **lends urgency to the reform of Europe's trade defense instruments, which is still being discussed**.

With this in mind, the priority will be to ensure that international tensions do not degenerate into escalating protectionism, which could potentially be very costly for the French economy. To achieve this, suitable responses must be found to American policies, which are, as yet, unpredictable. Political relationships will play a key role in this but so too will the ability of Europeans to make concerted use of their trade defense **instruments and the WTO's dispute settlement system**. **Beyond this, the challenge will be to rebuild the political legitimacy of European trade policy**.

To do this, the EU must develop a clear idea of its objectives, tools and agenda. Creating a climate that is favorable to economic growth and innovation remains a crucial goal, but it is also necessary to respond to the worries that have been widely expressed about the social, environmental and fiscal consequences of trade flows. This raises the question of whether the format of negotiations should be changed to enhance their legitimacy, and whether non-commercial aspects of the deals (social, environmental and tax provisions) should be treated in a different way. Equally, it will be important to establish a framework in which the EU can have a trade relationship with China that is both conciliatory and fair. Another objective might be how to guarantee effective reciprocity, for example regarding access to public procurement.

Finally, some thorny issues will have to be addressed, starting with the trade relationship with the United Kingdom after Brexit, the European proposal for a Multilateral Investment Court and changes to our legal and commercial system in response to the development of the digital economy and the crucial importance of the sharing of data. While the positions of different Member States over trade policy have traditionally been rather entrenched, the unsettled nature of the last few years has greatly changed the field of play. The next Presidential term is unlikely to be calm and it will not be enough to rely on past behavior when formulating new appropriate responses.

Trade Policy



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ In a spirit of solidarity, institute protectionism to produce in France
- ▶ Adopt anti-dumping measures in strategic industries
- ▶ Integrate respect for the fundamental rules of the International Labor Organization in trade agreements
- ▶ Withdraw from the World Trade Organization and strengthen the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
- ▶ Refuse any backsliding in European law when it comes to social and ecological questions
- ▶ Reject free trade agreements (TTIP, CETA, TISA)
- ▶ Formulate an alternative trade policy based on cooperation and inspired by the Havana Charter
- ▶ Increase customs duties for countries with limited social protections
- ▶ Impose commercial reprisals on tax havens
- ▶ Make it a condition of selling foreign goods in France that the manufacturers respect social and environmental norms
- ▶ Privilege social/mutual enterprises



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Present a new treaty on democratizing economic governance in the Eurozone
- ▶ Immediate suspension of CETA (free trade agreement with Canada)
- ▶ Prevent TTIP and TISA from seeing the light of day
- ▶ Create a new model of international cooperation that respects democratic sovereignty and social and environmental progress
- ▶ Amend the EU directive on “posted workers”
- ▶ EU tax harmonization
- ▶ Establish equitable partnerships, principally with African countries



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Reduce the corporate tax rate from 33.5% to 25% by the end of the term
- ▶ Ensure that economic actors are given stability and transparency in tax matters
- ▶ Defend French and European industrial interests within globalization
- ▶ Create a “European commercial prosecutor” to check that the commitments made by our partners are being honored
- ▶ Establish a mechanism for monitoring foreign investment in Europe
- ▶ Include a tax cooperation section and binding social and environmental clauses in the EU’s trade agreements
- ▶ Defend the strengthening of anti-dumping instruments
- ▶ Defend a “Buy European Act”
- ▶ Support SMEs and help them develop
- ▶ Promote a common European trade policy
- ▶ Limit the length of time that a “posted worker” can spend in France to one year
- ▶ Relaunch the Franco-German engine of economic development
- ▶ Make the Common Agricultural Policy more protective and reactive
- ▶ Strengthen France and Europe’s commercial relations with China
- ▶ Tighten our economic links with Australia and the Pacific nations, Canada and Latin America



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ Reduce corporation taxes from 33.5% to 25% by the end of the term
- ▶ Defend companies, the real drivers of economic growth
- ▶ Reject agreements that are not in the interests of Europeans
- ▶ Attract financing and the best talent to SMEs
- ▶ Ease the burden of red tape that weighs on SMEs
- ▶ Release innovation and reindustrialize France
- ▶ Capture international markets
- ▶ Bring stability to our tax system in order to provide economic actors with clarity
- ▶ Oppose American extra-territorial laws with French courts and a with common European response
- ▶ Renegotiate the directive on “posted workers”
- ▶ Make Europe the world leader in innovation and attractiveness
- ▶ Make Bpifrance the national vehicle for financing foreign clients
- ▶ Rationalize the arrangements for supporting outward-facing entrepreneurs
- ▶ Strengthen economic cooperation with Latin America and Asia
- ▶ Russia: engage in discussions aimed at lifting sanctions



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ Privilege the real economy over speculative finance
- ▶ Put in place a plan for reindustrializing France
- ▶ Recover France’s monetary sovereignty by returning to the franc
- ▶ Reject free trade agreements
- ▶ Outlaw the import and sale of foreign products that fail to comply with the norms imposed on French producers
- ▶ Establish a real economic patriotism by freeing France from European constraints
- ▶ Reserve public tenders for French companies if the difference in price is reasonable
- ▶ Stop enforcing the directive on “posted workers”, which is creating unfair and unacceptable competition
- ▶ Institute an additional tax on hiring foreign workers
- ▶ Monitor foreign investments that could harm France’s national interests
- ▶ Create a state secretariat dedicated to economic changes
- ▶ Transform the Common Agricultural Policy (EU) into a French Agricultural Policy
- ▶ Once more authorize the direct financing of the Treasury by the Banque de France
- ▶ Value France’s maritime dimension

Energy and Climate: The Challenges of the Transition

Marie-Claire Aoun

Dealing with the issue of climate change has been a priority for President François Hollande. The historic agreement adopted by 195 countries in Paris in December 2015 to limit global warming to less than 2°C was undoubtedly a victory for French diplomacy. To support global efforts to combat climate change, France has sought to set an example domestically by passing an ambitious energy transition law in July 2015. To begin with, France has a very low carbon footprint compared to other OECD countries due to its reliance on nuclear power (which accounted for 76% of electricity generated in 2016). Nevertheless, the country has set itself the task of speeding up its transition to a low-carbon economy, with the aim of reducing its emissions of greenhouse gases by 40% by 2030 (based on 1990 levels), and its energy consumption by 50% by 2050 (based on 2012 levels). It also intends to increase the share of final energy consumption that is **derived from renewable sources to 35% by 2030 and to reduce nuclear's share of electricity production to 50% by 2025**. The Energy Transition for Green Growth Act (LJECV) covers a number of sectors, such as construction, transport, waste management and the “circular economy”, introduces a carbon tax and sets up a new governance framework at both national and local levels to drive the transition forward.

Despite this well-developed institutional edifice, however, Paris must now confront multiple challenges if it is to implement its plans, such as the uncertainty over the cost and financing of the transition. The Multi-Year Energy Plan, which serves as the main roadmap, shows how the consumption of coal, oil and gas is meant to decline between now and 2023, and sets out objectives for renewable electricity networks. **Nevertheless, the goal of cutting nuclear's contribution by a third by 2025**, originating from a political pact between the Greens and the Socialist Party during the 2012 election campaign, was not clarified by the present government. Decisions about closing certain reactors and extending the lives of others beyond 40 years will therefore have to be taken after 2018, taking into account the consumption and export of electricity,

the development of renewable energy sources, security of supply and the decisions of the Nuclear Safety Authority. Yet the decommissioning of nuclear power stations must be meticulously planned and thought about in advance, particularly since EDF is committed to investing €4.2 billion each year through 2025 in its “Grand carénage” program to safely extend the life of its nuclear facilities. The main challenge facing the next administration will **thus be to clarify France’s long-term energy policy** in order to attract the capital needed to make the transition, which combines energy efficiency, large-scale exploitation of renewables and safe use of the **country’s nuclear reactors**.

The next President will also have to decide how much to support French energy companies that operate abroad, particularly those in the **nuclear industry, which has spearheaded France’s external energy policy** for many decades. He or she will also have to formulate a strategy for encouraging French energy companies in the development of new technologies in a changing global landscape, particularly with the increasing power of Chinese companies. Having been strengthened by the success of COP21, France is well placed to take a different path towards a cleaner future, using a combination of renewable energy and nuclear power to produce electricity. Moreover, in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty in which the price of energy is very unpredictable, the amount of support that the French diplomacy gives to oil and gas companies will be a key factor in determining their international influence.

Faced with the febrile state of European politics at present, influencing **the EU’s common energy policy will be another challenge**. France will have to cope with a dysfunctional European electricity market and a fractured Energy Union striving to find a better balance between the goals of security of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. In this context, carbon pricing will be a crucial tool for financing the energy transition by providing an incentive for investment in a low-carbon future.

Lastly, France has stoutly defended climate activism on the international stage in recent years by launching the International Solar Alliance with India, arguing for an end to state subsidies for the export of coal-fired power stations by OECD countries in 2015, and by supporting African initiatives on renewable energy and access to energy. Given the potential weakening of the global action to combat climate change with **Donald Trump’s arrival in the White House**, the impetus provided by the French government will therefore be more important than ever in bringing the Paris Agreement to fruition.

The Energy Transition



Jean-Luc Mélenchon
"La France insoumise"



Benoît Hamon
"Parti socialiste"



Emmanuel Macron
"En Marche"



François Fillon
"Les Républicains"



Marine Le Pen
"Front National"

Energy transition, investment and finance, industry

- ▶ Aim for 100% renewable energy by 2050
- ▶ Put in place a complete exit from nuclear: immediately close the Fessenheim nuclear power plant and abandon the "Grand Carénage" program, which aims to extend the life of nuclear power plants beyond 40 years
- ▶ Abandon the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) program in Flamanville and the programs for deep geological storage of nuclear waste
- ▶ Publish information on the deep storage of nuclear waste over the last 60 years and inform the public about the dangers to health
- ▶ Support research and innovation in the cleanest energies
- ▶ Renationalize EDF and Engie (ex-GDF) to create a public energy sector

- ▶ Objective of 50% of renewable energy in the electricity mix by 2025 and 100% by 2050
- ▶ Ditch nuclear power within a generation (25 years)
- ▶ An investment plan of €1,000 billion focused on environmental transition in the most disadvantaged parts of Europe
- ▶ Massive investment in energy renovations for buildings
- ▶ Bring finance to bear on the environmental transition to find the €60 billion needed
- ▶ Launch a wide plan for using energy efficiently and sparingly
- ▶ Launch a five-year plan of €100 billion for thermal renovation
- ▶ Restore the state's strategic vision by making EDF a pillar of the energy transition

- ▶ Reduce our dependence on nuclear energy and reduce the share of nuclear in the electricity mix to 50% by 2025
- ▶ Take strategic decisions on nuclear power once the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) has reported, in 2018, on extending the life of nuclear power plants beyond 40 years
- ▶ Close the Fessenheim nuclear power plant at the same time as the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) in Flamanville is commissioned
- ▶ Double France's wind and solar capacity by 2022 by encouraging private investment to free up €30 billion
- ▶ Focus research on the storage of electricity and smart grids
- ▶ Increase the carbon tax to €100 per ton of CO₂ by 2030

- ▶ Extend the life of France's nuclear power plants from forty to sixty years on the condition that the ASN approves the decision on a case-by-case basis
- ▶ Stop the closure of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant
- ▶ Create favorable conditions for the development of French renewable energy industries
- ▶ Better exploit the natural renewable resources, which exist within France
- ▶ Speed up R&D on techniques for carbon capture and storage
- ▶ Finish restructuring the nuclear industry
- ▶ Manage EDF as a fully-functioning company in line with the state's shareholder strategy, without day-to-day interference by ministries

- ▶ Modernize the French nuclear industry and make it more secure
- ▶ Reject the closure of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant
- ▶ Support a French hydrogen industry in order to reduce our dependence on oil
- ▶ An immediate moratorium on wind power
- ▶ Massively develop French renewable energy industries
- ▶ Immediately reduce regulated tariffs on gas and electricity by 5%
- ▶ Move forward with the "Grand Carénage" program and maintain state control over EDF

Fossil fuels

- ▶ Outlaw the exploitation of shale oil and gas, and of coalbed methane

- ▶ A controlled move away from diesel for new cars by 2025

- ▶ End France's use of fossil fuels: close the remaining coal fired power stations in the next five years and outlaw the exploitation of shale gas

- ▶ Eliminate fossil fuels from electricity production
- ▶ Increase the share of electric-powered vehicles and reduce that of petrol

- ▶ Outlaw the exploitation of shale gas so long as satisfactory standards vis-à-vis the environment, security and health have not been met

European policy

- ▶ Revisit the liberalisation of the electricity market and repeal the NOME law (New Organization of the Market for Electricity)

- ▶ Implement the energy union in Europe
- ▶ Create an investment union in Europe to finance infrastructure and projects that are favorable to renewable energy

- ▶ Create a single energy market in Europe and fix floor carbon prices in EU countries

- ▶ Put in place a real European energy policy
- ▶ Improve the way the European carbon market functions and guarantee a floor price for carbon of €30/ton

- ▶ Pull back from European rules on liberalizing electricity markets

Terrorism: Five Challenges for the Next President

Marc Hecker

Among Western countries, France is a prime target for radical Islamic terrorism. It is blamed, in turn, for its colonial past, its secularism, its culture and its military interventions in the Muslim world. French society is also perceived to be particularly divided and vulnerable. Daesh does not **hide its intention to destroy France's national cohesion by aggravating** tensions between Muslims and the rest of the population. This baleful strategy is particularly dangerous at a time when France is going to the polls: a terrorist attack could influence the ballot and spring the trap of uncontrolled escalation. After the election in May, the next President will have to confront five main threats.

The most obvious one concerns Syria and Iraq, where numerous terrorist attacks have been planned, including those of November 13, 2015. Seven hundred French adults and 450 children are still in these countries, while 250 have already returned. The question of how to treat returnees, who do not all present the same degree of danger, is particularly difficult and has evolved over the course of the last three years. The tendency towards litigation, placing them in provisional detention, and the increasing severity of punishment, is clear. Women and teenagers who return from Syria and Iraq are increasingly treated with suspicion. Dozens of trials will be held in the next few years and already overcrowded prisons will have to accommodate many radicalized inmates. The next President **should boost the Justice Ministry's budget, increase the number of specialized magistrates, start building new prisons and, despite its yet-unproven results, persist with a policy of counter-radicalization.**

The second threat relates to the reactivation of old networks. The war in Syria did not expose France to jihadist networks for the first time: French nationals had already taken part in other conflicts – Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq – though in far fewer numbers. As the cases of Cherif Kouachi and Larossi Abballa have shown, people who were jailed years ago are capable of committing crimes again. Over the next five years, 80% of those currently detained for terrorist offences will be released.

These individuals must be placed under surveillance, but it is not clear whether there are enough intelligence officers to perform this task, despite the increases announced since 2014.

Threat number three concerns people who radicalize in France and may try to perpetrate an attack without any previous training abroad. These people can be recruited in person, **“remote-controlled” by jihadists** operating abroad or simply be influenced by propaganda circulating on the internet. Since 2015, the government has compiled a national database on radicalized individuals which, according to various sources, now run to between 12,000 and 16,000 entries: these people are not all equally dangerous and any responses must be calibrated accordingly. The principle of detecting threats early could end up backfiring. The more the authorities seek to intervene early, the more the database will grow, overloading the relevant departments and increasing the risk that errors will be made. Mistakes, moreover, are not only a problem from an ethical or legal standpoint: they are also a strategic problem because they can be exploited by our adversaries to radicalize more individuals.

The fourth threat relates to what the security services call “oblique strikes”. This expression denotes the ability of foreign nationals to carry out attacks within France. To prevent this from happening, the European Union (EU) must step up its control over its external borders, while flows of people between EU member states must be monitored more closely. Moreover, certain member states must invest more in their own security, which is a prerequisite for effective cooperation.

The four threats identified so far relate to jihadism, whether it emanates from Daesh, Al Qaeda or some other group that might emerge. But the focus on jihadism should not blind us to other potential dangers. The threat of terrorism from the extreme right deserves special attention. The case of Anders Breivik comes to mind, but also that of Alexandre Bissonnette, the student charged with shooting Muslims in a mosque in Quebec in January 2017. Tension is running so high in France nowadays that a terrorist attack of this nature could set off chain reactions that are difficult to predict in advance.

In conclusion, the threat of terrorism will remain very high in the years to come. The new French President must not make a mistake in diagnosing the problem or in finding a proportionate response. France is not immune to an anaphylactic shock.

Terrorism and Domestic Security



Jean-Luc Mélenchon
"La France insoumise"



Benoît Hamon
"Parti socialiste"



Emmanuel Macron
"En Marche"



François Fillon
"Les Républicains"



Marine Le Pen
"Front National"

| | Jean-Luc Mélenchon "La France insoumise" | Benoît Hamon "Parti socialiste" | Emmanuel Macron "En Marche" | François Fillon "Les Républicains" | Marine Le Pen "Front National" |
|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| Security and defense forces | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase the number of police officers and gendarmes ▶ Restore neighborhood policing ▶ Double the number of scientific and technical police (CSI and forensics) ▶ Provide the authorities with sufficient technical means and equipment ▶ End Operation Sentinelle in stages. Hand over security of public places to the police | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase funding for the police: replace all police officers who retire and create 1,000 posts per year ▶ Establish neighborhood policing ▶ Introduce a bonus for law-enforcement officers working in very difficult areas ▶ Review Operation Sentinelle according to the evolution of the terrorist threat | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Recruit an extra 10,000 police officers and gendarmes over the next five years ▶ Establish a police force for "everyday security" ▶ Progressively scale-down Operation Sentinelle according to the evolution of the terrorist threat | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Create a larger Interior Ministry bringing together all agencies concerned with security: the police, gendarmerie, prison administration, customs ▶ Recruit 10,000 additional law-enforcement agents ▶ Arm the municipal police ▶ Progressively reconfigure Operation Sentinelle | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Massively upscale the law enforcement agencies: 15,000 more police officers and gendarmes, modernization of equipment ▶ Put in place a plan to disarm troublesome suburbs and for the state to regain control over lawless areas ▶ Maintain Operation Sentinelle as long as necessary |
| Legislative and judicial questions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase funding for anti-terrorist courts ▶ Stop sending all criminals to prison, make greater use of alternative punishments ▶ Recruit 2,000 prison officers to escort detainees ▶ Review existing security and anti-terrorist laws ▶ Allow the state of emergency to end, at the initiative of Parliament | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Extending the state of emergency is not justified | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase prison capacity by 15,000 additional places ▶ Create small, closed-off centers dedicated to those who have been radicalized ▶ Reorganize Islam in France to combat radical narratives ▶ Maintain the state of emergency as long as necessary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase prison capacity by 16,000 additional places ▶ Lower the age of criminal responsibility to 16 years ▶ Allow police chiefs (prefects) to close off sites of religious worship of which the activity seriously endangers public order | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Create an additional 40,000 prison places in five years ▶ Introduce real, non-commutable, life sentences for the most serious crimes ▶ Restore the sentence of "national unworthiness" ▶ Intercept and dismantle any organization linked to Islamic fundamentalists. Deport all foreigners with a link to Islamic fundamentalism |
| Intelligence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reinforce territorial and human intelligence ▶ Support initiatives that encourage friends/family members to raise the alarm and programs responsible for suspected persons | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen intelligence, notably by placing a national coordinator under the authority of the Prime Minister ▶ Increase funding for territorial intelligence | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Improve our intelligence at the overseas, European, national and territorial levels ▶ Improve information and intelligence sharing between judicial bodies and intelligence agencies ▶ Create a special anti-Daesh intelligence cell consisting of 50-100 agents attached to the President | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reform the way intelligence is organized as a matter of urgency ▶ Step up the use of data files and biometric data, as well as exchanges of information with other European countries, while still preserving civil liberties | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Improve Intelligence and set up a dedicated agency for combatting terrorism attached directly to the Prime Minister |
| Borders and Schengen area | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen cooperation so as to better monitor our borders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen the defense of Schengen borders by coastguards and a greater use of Frontex ▶ Deny reentry to France of any national who has gone to fight among terrorists abroad | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Protect the borders of France by withdrawing from the Schengen area |
| Cyberspace and media | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Expand the fight against jihadist propaganda on the internet | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Wage an information war against jihadists | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Surveillance of social networks for terrorism and radicalization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen the fight against cyberjihadism |
| Foreign policy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reject the logic of a clash of civilizations and a "domestic war", withdraw from destabilizing wars and hypocritical alliances with the oil monarchies of the Gulf | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strike the terrorists directly in their hideouts ▶ Prevent jihadists from extending their influence in countries like Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey and certain African countries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ France must reestablish itself in the Syrian crisis ▶ Engage in a frank dialogue with Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the support for Islamic fundamentalism | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Open a dialogue with the Syrian state, an objective ally against Islamic fundamentalism |

Defense: The Moment of Truth

Corentin Brustlein

For many years, France's position on security and defense has been exposed to severe pressure. This pressure comes partly from external factors related to the transformation of the strategic environment since 2011, and partly from internal factors. Over the last twenty years, the French defense apparatus has passed through phases of growing tension between the escalating demands placed on the military and barely adequate levels of funding. This precarious balance, though it has not significantly hampered the military effectiveness of the French armed forces, has nevertheless undermined their foundations by making them less flexible and by slowing down the replacement and maintenance of equipment that has been worn out in operations. The most obvious consequence of this growing tension is simple: if the financial resources devoted to defense **are not increased significantly, France's military model** of strategic autonomy will soon be at risk, at the very time when the international environment serves to show, once again, why it is needed and relevant.

The environment in which France operates has changed radically in recent years. The threats it faces have grown more menacing and more diverse: they cover the whole spectrum of conflict, from terrorism to coercive strategies relying on advanced, conventional and nuclear capabilities; the theatres in which these threats are acted out have grown in number and variety, from the Levant to the Sahel, as well as France itself and Eastern Europe; they have proved capable of striking at the very heart of the French nation and of destabilizing allied or aligned regimes.

At the same time, France's most important military partners have reminded us, through their political posturing, of the fragility of strategic cooperation. **The United Kingdom's exit from the European Union risks enfeebling one of Europe's two main military powers and the only other** European NATO member that possesses nuclear weapons. On the other side of the Atlantic, the election of Donald Trump raises serious questions about the endurance and credibility of the security guarantees given by Washington and shines a cold light on the military capability areas in which France and Europe are dependent on the United States. In contrast,

the resurgence in military power of other partners, such as Germany, if it were to be confirmed over the long term and be accompanied by greater strategic commitment, could bring new hope, though it would not compensate for the risk that stability in Europe will be weakened.

The uncertainty about how our partners will position themselves in the future should induce us to commit once again to the goal of strategic autonomy, which served as the bedrock of French defense policy under the Fifth Republic. **Strategic autonomy lays at the root of France's nuclear posture** and its choice to maintain first-rate conventional forces, whose readiness, versatility and ability to conduct entry operations have been demonstrated on many occasions in the last ten years, in Libya, Mali and the Levant. In reality, however, these demonstrations of force hide growing weaknesses stemming from the chronic under-funding of the French military model. While military operations have become more frequent, varied and demanding, a lack of funds has resulted in cuts to personnel and to land, air and sea platforms, and slowed down procurement, including the renewal of very old equipment (for example, tanker aircraft, troop transport vehicles, etc).

The increase in funding initiated timidly by the government after the terrorist attacks of 2015 is real enough, but fragile. Catastrophe has been averted, thanks to the revision of the Military Programming Law (LPM) for 2014-2019, passed in the summer of 2015, and the extra defense spending released since then – which exceeds even the levels planned by the LPM. The bulk of the investment planned, however, has been pushed back to 2018-2019, which places a colossal burden on the next government. With equipment readiness rates that are seldom satisfactory, a quota of training days never fulfilled and a mountain of equipment (€35 billion of required investments to come, according to some estimates) waiting to be procured but whose funding has been constantly postponed, the situation remains critical.

The next five year term will therefore be the moment of truth for French defense. The accumulated problems passed down by previous administrations are so great that it is now impossible to keep the same level of ambition as today without increasing the defense budget strongly and rapidly. The first step would be at the very least to fully implement the revised version of the LPM, which provides for an increase of more than €2 billion in defense spending for 2018-2019, excluding pensions. The demands involved in modernizing **France's conventional and nuclear forces** over the next presidential term are so great that any further postponement **would inflict great damage on both, and in so doing, reduce France's freedom of maneuver and the credibility of its foreign policy.**

The near unanimity shown by the main presidential candidates about the need to devote 2% of GDP to defense (instead of the current 1.78%) therefore tends to distract from what is really at stake over the next five years: the need for spending on the military budget to rise by one to two billion euros in each year of the next Presidency.

Defense

| |  Jean-Luc Mélenchon “La France insoumise” |  Benoît Hamon “Parti socialiste” |  Emmanuel Macron “En Marche” |  François Fillon “Les Républicains” |  Marine Le Pen “Front National” |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|---|--|---|
| Defense budget | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase the defense budget to at least 2% of GDP by 2022 ▶ Prepare a new military programming law (LPM) beginning in the autumn of 2017 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Progressively increase the defense budget to €50 billion, pensions excluded, by 2025 (2% of GDP) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase the defense budget to 2% of GDP by the end of the next LPM (2023-2024?) ▶ Prepare a new military programming law (LPM) to be adopted in the first six months of 2018 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase the defense budget to 2% of GDP by 2018 and towards 3% by 2022 ▶ Write a spending floor of 2% of GDP into the constitution |
| Nuclear deterrence | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Ensure and maintain the two legs of the nuclear deterrent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Ensure and maintain the two legs of the nuclear deterrent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Ensure and maintain the two legs of the nuclear deterrent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Ensure and maintain the two legs of the nuclear deterrent |
| The defense industry | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Stop the privatization of defense industries and missions and strengthen the role of the state ▶ Give priority to French weapons and military equipment when equipping the armed forces | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase R&D spending to €1 billion per year ▶ Better integrate environmental constraints into arms and equipment programs ▶ Focus investments on “disruptive technologies” | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase R&D spending to €1 billion per year | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen the French and European Industrial and Technological Defense Base (BITD) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Rebuild France’s Industrial and Technological Defence Base (BITD) in order to guarantee strategic autonomy |
| Personnel and capabilities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase the size of the armed forces | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Ensure and maintain the ability to project forces ▶ Strengthen the training and readiness of the armed forces ▶ Maintain the current number of military manpower ▶ Strengthen non-military tools in the framework of a comprehensive approach to conflict resolution | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Keep the operational ground force at the current level of 77,000 soldiers ▶ Increase the size of the National Guard to 80,000 volunteers by 2020 ▶ Recapitalize conventional equipment and improve its readiness ▶ Improve reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering platforms (drones and satellites) ▶ Support the development of cyberdefense capabilities | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Keep the operational ground force at the current level of 77,000 soldiers ▶ Step up the training of military personnel and the operational readiness of equipment ▶ Prepare for battle in the digital domain ▶ Improve capabilities for intelligence collection abroad and strengthen coordination between different intelligence services ▶ Strengthen surveillance of France’s maritime zone | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase manpower by 50,000 men ▶ Modernize equipment and increase the number of major platforms (aircraft, ships, armored vehicles, etc.) |
| Operation Sentinelle | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Gradually stop Operation Sentinelle | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reassess Operation Sentinelle according to the evolution of the terrorist threat | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Progressively wind down Operation Sentinelle, according to the evolving terrorist threat | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Progressively reconfigure Operation Sentinelle | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Continue Operation Sentinelle for as long as necessary |
| Military service and reserves | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Create a mandatory civic service, that could take the form of a military service ▶ Create a national guard under civilian command | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Improve the recruitment, training, management and status of reservists | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Establish a universal, mandatory military service of one month | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Significantly increase the size of the reserve force | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Progressively re-establish a mandatory military service of at least three months |
| NATO and European defense | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Withdraw from NATO ▶ Withdraw from European defense integration, seen as too “Atlanticist” | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Favor the European Union over NATO on common defense policy ▶ Propose a “Defense Union” with main European partners and reinforce cooperation in key areas (R&D, logistics, joint military staff, etc.) ▶ Deduct defense spending from EU deficit calculations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Develop European defense by instituting a European Security Council, European headquarters and by activating the EU battlegroups ▶ Support the creation of a European defense investment fund | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Maintain close cooperation with the United Kingdom and create new mechanisms to share the cost of France’s foreign operations with European partners | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command structure ▶ Stop reinforcing European defense and favor strategic autonomy |
| Other | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Make any military intervention dependent on a UN mandate | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Facilitate the reconversion of military personnel back into civilian life ▶ Improve social aid for military personnel, veterans and their families | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Facilitate the reconversion of military personnel back into civilian life | |

Mastering the Digital Domain: A Condition of Strategic Autonomy

Julien Nocetti

The suspicions that Russia interfered in the US presidential election using cyber and information tools, the hacking of companies such as Dyn and Yahoo, and the global cyberweapons race all reflect a volatile international environment that has been profoundly disrupted by the spread of digital technologies around the globe.

Confronting multifaceted conflicts in cyberspace

More than ever before, the strategic autonomy of states depends on the extent to which they can master the digital domain. The frequency and scale of attacks which they face are growing. Although the cyberthreat is at present largely confined to commercial espionage, political warfare and organized crime, the greatest danger emanates from states which have no qualms in mobilizing their large offensive capabilities in order to destabilize and destroy, while hiding behind uncertainty about where the attacks are coming from.

During the presidency of François Hollande, the French authorities remained coy about the proliferation and seriousness of cyberthreats. It was only in January 2017 that the Minister of Defense, Jean-Yves Le Drian, described the scale of the cyberattacks suffered by the army, and the true **nature of the threats facing France's vital infrastructure, energy grids and telecommunications**, in particular. The sophistication of the attack against TV5 Monde in 2015 was a reminder that there is a pressing need to **increase the resilience of France's digital environment**.

These cyberthreats are amplified by the use of the “information weapon” for strategic ends, a practice to which Russia is particularly prone. We can respond in two ways to attempts to influence public opinion and the views of decision-makers. First, we could adopt a comprehensive

approach that would be capable of identifying the links between hackers, media outlets, companies and state bodies, as well as their *modus operandi* and their degree of overlap with the influencing strategies of different states. Second, we could put in place the mechanisms needed to respond, because the three existing bodies that are responsible for cyber matters do not belong at present to the same chain of command.

Shaping the rules of the game

This new type of proliferation, which is as much about the methods employed as it is about the transformation of the digital domain into a theatre of global confrontation, requires new rules to be developed. And yet, faced with the dispersed nature of the threat, the dynamism of the attacks and the extreme difficulty of correctly attributing them, regulating conflicts in cyberspace has so far proven elusive. The impossibility of knowing who your enemy is with any degree of certainty makes it difficult to invoke the principle of legitimate defense, while also complicating the idea of deterrence. Consequently, escalation becomes a very risky enterprise.

In its attempts to define what constitutes acceptable behavior in cyberspace, France should continue to defend multilateralism, while at the same time prioritizing the Euro-Atlantic “theatre”. In Europe, talks with Germany and the United Kingdom should remain paramount in this area and the talks with Germany, in particular, could explore the possibility of Europe becoming independent in terms of cybersecurity. But in the Trump administration, which has yet to give any clear signals about the importance of cyber in its foreign policy, Paris could find an obstacle to continuing with current avenues of cooperation.

Governance and the control of data

The confrontation between geo-economics and geopolitics has so far hindered any international regulation of the internet beyond the merely technical realm. Since the Snowden affair, Paris has based its position on a critique of the influence that the US tech giants wield in negotiating forums. France could now link up with countries like Germany, India and Brazil in seeking to define a middle way between those who support the consensus and are aligned with Washington, and the proponents of a Westphalian philosophy who demand that states be given pre-eminence over other actors (industrial, civil society) and insist on inter-governmental cooperation to debate the governance of the internet (China and Russia, for example).

Sensitive subjects such as data localization, taxation of the digital economy and respect for competition have been broached by several candidates. Without going so far as to assign an ambassador to “GAFA” – Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon – as Denmark has done, Paris could strengthen its language around the protection of data. The Privacy Shield, an agreement which regulates the protection of personal data transferred from the European Union to the United States, could then be defended in the event that it is denounced by Washington.

Lastly, Paris must embrace the “fourth technological revolution” and avoid being misled by the hype around “French Tech”. Convergence of the information economy, robotics, the internet of things and artificial intelligence will have a greater disruptive effect on the international environment. The main challenge is therefore about what conditions are required to develop an **ecosystem that will be crucial to France’s economic** modernization and also, therefore, to its international position.

Cybersecurity and Digital Technology



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ Re-establish public control of technology linked to the digital domain
- ▶ Guarantee the neutrality of the internet and combat online profiling
- ▶ Systemize the posting of public data online
- ▶ Oppose the logic of privatization of services linked to the digital domain
- ▶ Protect personal data against commercial exploitation



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Increase the authority and capabilities of the National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI)
- ▶ Prepare a new generation of engineers specialized in analyzing and preventing cyberattacks
- ▶ Independently produce technology for securing the state's IT systems
- ▶ Secure our electronic communication networks
- ▶ Combat tax optimization, such as that practiced by GAFA (Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple)
- ▶ Amend our tax regime and constitutional rules to take account of GAFA



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Make cyberdefense and cybersecurity a higher priority
- ▶ Improve France's cyber-intelligence capabilities
- ▶ Renegotiate the “Privacy Shield” with the United States to guarantee that Europeans' personal data is protected
- ▶ Make the use of private data by digital actors transparent
- ▶ Work to create a digital common market in Europe
- ▶ Guide the growth of tech start-ups in Europe
- ▶ Propose the creation of a European Agency for digital confidence
- ▶ Fight at the European level for a tax on revenues made in our countries from the delivery of electronic services



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ Speed up the state's digital transformation in the interest of citizens and businesses
- ▶ Devote sufficient human and technological resources to prepare France for battle in the digital sphere
- ▶ Establish genuine European digital sovereignty
- ▶ With Germany, meet the ambition of creating industrial and sector-specific digital platforms that are Europe-wide
- ▶ Make Europe a centre of innovation in artificial intelligence and blockchain databases
- ▶ Guarantee the cybersecurity of citizens, companies and institutions
- ▶ Impose and defend our values and laws regarding public freedoms and the management of private data
- ▶ Limit the effects of tax optimization by digital giants through the negotiation of a European plan for fiscal harmonization



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ Establish a constitutionally-binding charter that includes the protection of personal data of the French people
- ▶ Require that this data is stored on servers located in France
- ▶ Guarantee digital freedoms by including them in the fundamental freedoms protected by the constitution

The Reframing of the Migration Challenge

Christophe Bertossi and Matthieu Tardis

Immigration and border control have been central topics to electoral debates in France since the late 1980s. Heavily politicised, they have been framed in many different forms over the years, from issues regarding the access to citizenship to discussions around “regularisation”, or the **opposition between “chosen” vs. “suffered” immigration**, not to mention the controversies concerning the Roma people in more recent times.

Since the summer of 2015, the challenge of migration has formed part of a wider crisis that has strained the cohesion of the European Union (EU), caused by a lack of consensus and solidarity among member states when it comes to accepting migrants who have arrived *via* Greece and Italy.

A new narrative

This wider context explains why the debate is now centred on a new category, the refugee. This category has eclipsed older issues, such as the relationship between familial and professional immigration, or an amnesty for irregular immigrants.

This new context also governed how the question of the Calais migrants was framed when the government dismantled the “jungle” in 2016. The people who lived there had long been described in terms of irregular immigration and transit to Great Britain. But once the public reasoning was framed around the issue of asylum, many of these same people ended up being recognized as in need of the sort of international protection accorded to refugees.

Nonetheless, by focusing on the figure of the refugee, the debate has come to be organised around a distinction between “**genuine**” and “fake” refugees. Yet this distinction does not mean much in practice, because it does not account for the complexities of the situation on the ground.

The European dimension

To a large extent, the future of the EU is at stake in this reframing of the migration issue. While the current tensions between member states stemmed from their inability to anticipate the situation in Syria and in countries like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, they also show, above all, that the stances adopted by different European countries are incompatible. Many governments, with **Hungary's** Viktor Orban as their flag bearer, believe that those who have entered Europe since 2015 are, for the most part, “economic migrants” who pose a threat to the cohesion and security of European nations. One of the biggest challenges ahead will be to overcome these divisions. This can be achieved in three ways.

Crafting a new long-term strategy that is coherent and global

The negotiations that are beginning on the reform of the Common European Asylum System could, in theory, represent an opportunity, but the proposals that have been submitted so far do not appear to recognise it as such. Consensus is in short supply, with members states having agreed only on the short-term fix of “off-shoring” **the EU's border controls. Yet even here, ambiguity hangs over the agreements struck with third parties, such as Turkey, and how these will affect the EU's foreign policy. Over the long term, these “partnership” agreements have never proved effective in resolving the migration issue in such a way as to address its many different dimensions, such as sovereignty, border control, respect for fundamental rights, the obligations of international protection, and economic development. Crafting a more coherent and long term strategy is therefore urgent.**

Preparing for a new influx, similar to that of 2015

Since September 2015, the EU has buckled down on the task of responding to the humanitarian emergency on its territory and of laying the foundations for a new Common European Asylum System. Yet the measures and mechanisms required to improve asylum policies have been known about for a long time. Indeed, they were set out by the Tampere European Council in 1999: harmonising national systems, European solidarity and the enlargement of legal routes for entering Europe. The problem is that individual states have not committed to these measures. National concerns have taken precedence and generated friction, including between Germany and France, which approach the subject from very different angles. With this in mind, we need to acknowledge the true scale of the problem: the European process itself is failing and the refugee question is merely an alibi.

Overcoming the identity question

In view of its history and the values it proclaims, France is in a good position to drive this agenda forward. Current circumstances could help in this respect. France has not been affected by the increase in the number of refugees to the same extent as other countries. Yet, the framing of immigration as a threat to national identity is an obstacle to any possible progress in this area. The 2017 Presidential election campaign and the many uncertainties surrounding it have politicised the debate on immigration, as the Right and the Centre-Right and Socialist Presidential primaries have shown. It is the *Front National*, however, which has set the tone on immigration since the mid-1980s. What is new is the resonance that these identity-centred approaches to the “**migration** challenge” have found abroad, from Brexit to the Netherlands, where Geert Wilders has exploited this theme to dominate the electoral campaign even if he lost the election, to the election of Donald Trump in the United States.

The Migration Challenge



Jean-Luc Mélenchon
"La France insoumise"



Benoît Hamon
"Parti socialiste"



Emmanuel Macron
"En Marche"



François Fillon
"Les Républicains"



Marine Le Pen
"Front National"

| | Jean-Luc Mélenchon "La France insoumise" | Benoît Hamon "Parti socialiste" | Emmanuel Macron "En Marche" | François Fillon "Les Républicains" | Marine Le Pen "Front National" |
|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| Immigration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Regularize undocumented workers ▶ Respect the human dignity of migrants, their fundamental right to a family life and support unaccompanied minors ▶ Stop placing children in immigration detention centers, even if they are accompanied by their parents | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Accept 25% more foreign students and support scientific and university asylum in France for researchers and students who are in danger ▶ Experiment with new forms of movement allowing for more fluid back-and-forth travel for migrant workers ▶ Propose Francophone visas for students, researchers, heads of companies and artists | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Increase the number of visas delivered to talented individuals and develop circular visas for professionals ▶ Simplify procedures for accessing the job market for students with a master's degree | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Introduce a quotas system into the constitution on the basis of France's reception and the ability of applicants to integrate ▶ Toughen the requirements for family reunification ▶ Renegotiate European directives and negotiate reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights ▶ Withdraw state medical care for irregular migrants (except for minors, urgent care, infectious diseases) ▶ Repeal the "Valls circular" on exceptional admissions to residency | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reduce net legal immigration to 10,000 people per year ▶ Prevent foreigners who are present in France illegally from being regularized and naturalized ▶ Make expelling them simpler and more automatic ▶ End the automatic presumption that families must be reunited |
| Asylum | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Build reception centers that live up to international standards and centers to accommodate asylum applicants for as long as their applications are being processed ▶ Reaffirm and invigorate the right to asylum on French territory, receive refugees who claim asylum thanks to an Agency dedicated | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Introduce a humanitarian visa for receiving refugees ▶ Amend the Dublin Regulation in line with welcoming values and solidarity between EU Member States | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ The asylum procedure (Ofpra + appeal) should not exceed 6 months ▶ Decentralize the Ofpra reception centers and the National Court for the Right of Asylum in reception centers | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Process asylum applications in 4 months (Ofpra + appeal) ▶ Detain asylum applicants who pose a risk of absconding ▶ Deport failed applicants as a matter of priority and bring the period of detention, including of families, to 6 months ▶ Thorough reform of litigation by foreigners | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Do not grant the right of asylum until after requests have been filed in French embassies and consulates in the countries of origin or bordering countries |
| Integration, access to citizenship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Recognize that foreign residents living in a regular situation have the right to vote in local elections ▶ Make it easier for foreign nationals who are in France legally to access French citizenship ▶ Make it easier to get the ten year residence permit as the card of reference ▶ Develop classes to teach people to read and write, and provide French language lessons for those who do not speak French | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Hold a referendum on the right of third country nationals from outside the EU to vote in local elections, which is already the case for European nationals | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Propose higher level of language training (level B1) as a condition for granting a long term residence permit ▶ Focus on the values of the French Republic, a knowledge of French public services and the world of work ▶ Put in place local integration program and additional activity on the part of communes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Roll back recent legislative reforms that have made access to French citizenship almost automatic ▶ Reserve French citizenship for foreigners who are well integrated ▶ Make the payment of family and housing benefits conditional on two years of continuous residence ▶ Increase administrative fees, taxes for residence permit and fees for awarding French citizenship | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Stop people from automatically becoming French nationals through marriage ▶ Dispense with <i>jus soli</i> and dual nationality outside Europe |
| Borders, Europe and beyond | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Manage migration on an international level (a global migration organization and an annual international conference under the aegis of the UN) ▶ Prevent migrants from having to flee their countries (use diplomacy to bring an end to wars, dispense with unequal trade deals and take action against climate deregulation) ▶ Increase the number of civilian rescue vessels in the Mediterranean ▶ Reform EU policy on controlling its external borders ▶ Reject the EU-Turkey deal | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Work towards assisting inter-regional migration in parts of the world that are fragile or in flux | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen the European border police (5,000 officers) ▶ Sign agreements with home and transit countries ▶ Support these countries to develop, to install check points, to fight traffickers and to return migrants who are not authorized to enter the EU | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reform the Schengen treaty and strengthen targeted control at the EU's borders | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Restore national borders and withdraw from the Schengen area ▶ Recruit 6,000 customs agents over the course of the term |

The Franco-American Relationship at the Heart of Transatlantic Relations

Laurence Nardon

The election of Donald Trump as US President has ushered in a period of uncertainty in Franco-American relations. As if to symbolize this, the outgoing US ambassador to France, Obama-appointee Jane Hartley, departed on January 17, 2017, leaving the US embassy in Paris without an ambassador until further notice.

The new US President does not seem to have any particular interest in our country: no branch of the Trump Organization operates in France, nor does it possess property here. The first French “heavyweight” to meet President Trump was Bernard Arnault, the CEO of LVMH, on January 9, 2017. And on the rare occasion that Trump does mention France, it is to point out the errors which, according to him, led to the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016: strict limits on the right to bear arms preventing citizens from defending themselves, massive immigration of **Muslims who are “by nature” favorable to Islamic terrorism...**

Paris has always thought of itself as a non-aligned ally of Washington. François Hollande was speaking in that tradition when he criticized the isolationist attitude of the new White House. Will this position change over the next five years and what options does France have in the face of the new **President’s** negative attitude towards Europe?

The stakes

Strictly bilateral issues lose significance when set alongside what is at stake between Europe and the US. As a matter of fact, key intelligence cooperation between France and the US, as well as military contacts within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and as part of the international coalition in Syria and Iraq, will not be affected much by the change of leaders.

European-American relations, however, have been disturbed by comments Donald Trump made: **he has gone so far as to call NATO's role** into question, while his adviser, Steven Bannon, seems determined to do his best to weaken the European Union (EU). The assurances on the EU given in Brussels on February 20, by Vice President Mike Pence and on NATO by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis on February 15, struck a different tone and reassured Europeans – but for how long?

The Trump administration also remains hostile to the idea of new trade agreements. The negotiations between the EU and the United States over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have no chance of progressing on his watch. There are also grounds for concern about the lawsuits filed by US courts against French (and other) companies and banks which deal in dollars with countries against whom the US Congress has imposed sanctions, such as Iran and Russia.

On all these issues, it seems obvious that a common European approach would lend France the heft it needs to defend its positions.

The options for the new French administration

The next French President should of course try to establish cordial relations with the Trump administration. To achieve this, being firm across the whole range of different policy areas would seem to be the best approach. As Hillary Clinton said in one of her campaign videos, dominant personalities only understand the language of power and interpret any other language as a sign of weakness. It would be pointless, then, to hurry off to Washington to swear allegiance as the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, did on January 28.

The (at least temporary) retreat by the US from the international stage gives France an opportunity to burnish its image and play a bigger role in the world. While the United States and the United Kingdom, with its recent vote to leave the EU, are turning their backs on the values of openness which have epitomized the Western project since 1945, France could come to represent a centre of reason and moral values in the world. With this in mind, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council serves as a powerful and practical instrument.

The Anglo-Saxon withdrawal is also an invitation to Europe to see itself as an autonomous continent. Though it might be difficult to think ambitiously about the EU when there is so much rabid Euroscepticism, France could conceivably work with Germany to generate new momentum

for the continent. One possible direction would be to focus on policies that could be implemented in precisely defined areas such as energy, defense, the environment, and/or management of the digital economy.

It is worth remembering, finally, that the last three American Presidents – Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama – ignored Europe during their first terms before rediscovering it during their second terms. They ended up realizing that their true allies are in Europe. Donald Trump could follow the same path. All the more reason for the next resident of the Élysée to endeavor to win the respect of his or her American counterpart from the outset.

The United States



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

▶ Reject TTIP

▶ Leave NATO, which only serves to rally European countries behind the United States

▶ Support the Chinese proposal for a common global currency to liberate the world economy from the domination of the dollar



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

▶ Reject TTIP



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

▶ France’s closeness to the United States is an opportunity

▶ Encourage the United States to remain committed to the Paris Agreement

▶ Create a European defense headquarters that coordinates with national and NATO command centers

▶ Renegotiate the “Privacy Shield” with the United States as part of protecting data on the internet



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

▶ Reject TTIP

▶ France will be a loyal and independent ally to the United States

▶ Judge the new US administration by its actions and establish a critically-minded dialogue with it



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

▶ Reject TTIP

▶ Withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command structures so that France is not dragged into wars that are not her own

France's Russia Policy: Between Bilateral Relations and Alliances

Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean

The “Russian question” has moved to centre stage once more since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Having dogged the US elections, it is now a topic of division in the French electoral debate. The next President will inherit a bilateral relationship that has been damaged by the sanctions **linked to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine**, the termination of contracts for the *Mistral* amphibious assault ships, the **cancellation of Vladimir Putin's visit to Paris in October 2016**, and Franco-Russian disagreements over Syria at the UN Security Council.

Many bilateral forums have been mothballed or are taking place only intermittently: the Franco-Russian Council for Economic, Financial, Industrial and Commercial Cooperation (CEFIC), for instance, met for the first time in two years in January 2016. The debate over what policy to adopt towards Russia is highly polarized, with critics of the Kremlin demanding a continued hard line on a country that has violated international law, while **Putin's supporters** have passed symbolic resolutions in Parliament calling for sanctions to be softened. After the elections, these groups will mobilize with renewed vigor to try to influence **France's “Russia policy”**.

In terms of economic exchanges between the two countries, trade contracted by 35% between 2014 and 2015, mainly because of the fall in the price of oil, the weakening of the ruble and the diminished purchasing power of the Russian population. Nevertheless, France remains second only to Germany in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in Russia and, in spite of sanctions, no French company appears to have left the country. French businesses, having been encouraged by successive governments since the early 2000s to establish themselves in Russia, feel that they have been taken hostage by political decisions and are lobbying for sanctions to be lifted.

In reality, the significance of Franco-Russian relations goes far beyond their bilateral relationship to directly affect matters of crucial importance to Paris, such as European security, the situation in Syria and Iraq and the future of its alliances with the EU, NATO and its close links with Germany.

In the political domain, the resolution of the crisis in Ukraine and the future of the Minsk agreements will continue to be the key point. Not being the architect of the Minsk agreements, nor being deeply involved in them personally, as was François Hollande, the next President might not regard them as set in stone. Some modulation of their schedule (security guarantees first or a special status for Donbas) might then be conceivable in order to facilitate implementation, particularly by Kiev. The future of the Minsk agreements will be a litmus test, as much for the solidity of the **Franco-German relationship and the two countries' ability to handle crises** in Europe as for the Trump administration and its true intentions regarding European security.

The war in Syria will remain the most sensitive subject over which Paris and Moscow have been directly opposed at the UN Security Council. At the end of February, Moscow exerted its veto for the seventh time over a Western UN resolution on Syria: several of these resolutions were initiated by Paris. The next French administration will have to answer two questions on this matter: first, what approach to take towards the Astana negotiation process initiated by Russia, Iran and Turkey, and, second, what kind of interaction to maintain with Russia regarding counter-terrorism?

For Paris, the choice is now between maintaining the current line, which combines firmness and dialogue, and rapprochement with Moscow, which would entail softening or even lifting the sanctions. Yet, if economic relations are partly shaped at a bilateral level, the same cannot be said for strategic relations. For decades, France has anchored its foreign policy in NATO, the EU and strong cooperation with Germany. Whether to prioritize Franco-Russian relations at the expense of existing alliances is now a central question for French foreign policy. This choice would seem, at first glance, to rule out the option of what might be a French-driven renewing of the pan-European framework. The problem is that France, like its European partners, is caught for the moment between two strategic unknowns: **Vladimir Putin's Russia and Donald Trump's United States**. If the next French President chooses to cozy up to Russia at the expense of **France's existing alliances, he or she would clearly have as great an appetite for risk as Putin**. A realignment of this magnitude would weaken, or even destroy, the Western bloc and would therefore mark a sharp break with the heritage of General de Gaulle.

Russia



Jean-Luc Mélenchon
“La France insoumise”



Benoît Hamon
“Parti socialiste”



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron
“En Marche”



François Fillon
“Les Républicains”



Marine Le Pen
“Front National”

- ▶ Organise a security conference involving all countries from the Atlantic to the Urals
- ▶ Re-open the discussion of borders arising from the former Soviet Union, particularly between Russia and Ukraine
- ▶ Construct a new “alter-globalist” alliance with the BRICS and join their development bank

- ▶ Russia’s annexation of Crimea is not acceptable
- ▶ Treat Russia’s “aggressive imperialism” with firmness
- ▶ By annexing Crimea and actively supporting Ukrainian separatist movements, Russia has violated all the treaties it has signed

- ▶ Initiate an “independent”, “ongoing” and “sovereign” dialogue with Russia “at a European level”
- ▶ “Normalise relations” and “arrange a de-escalation of sanctions”
- ▶ Russia is the partner with whom we must discuss the Syrian question
- ▶ This dialogue “in no way detracts from our commitment to human rights”
- ▶ Do not abandon the NATO-Russia dialogue

- ▶ Re-establish dialogue and a relationship of trust with Russia, which should become a major partner once more
- ▶ With our European partners and respecting the Minsk accords, initiate discussions with the aim of lifting the sanctions against Russia
- ▶ Organise a conference on the new security situation in Europe
- ▶ Fight against the Islamic State: “We have abandoned the field to Russia and Iran, while we could have fought alongside these nations”

- ▶ Russia’s annexation of Crimea is not illegal, Crimea should be recognised as part of the Russian Federation
- ▶ Normalise relations between France and Russia, including by lifting sanctions, which are “unfair and ineffective”
- ▶ Russia is a “key ally” against Islamic fundamentalism

France in the Middle East: Engagement as Duty?

Dorothee Schmid

By necessity, the Middle East looms large in the programs of the political parties. French military engagement in Syria and Iraq, the threat of terrorism and rising tension in France in reaction to identity-based politics (ethnic and religious), whether real or imagined: all of these are preoccupying French public opinion. François Hollande has had to deal with these three pressing challenges, despite being unprepared, and the French electorate expects the next President to formulate a consistent response.

Yet, French strategic planning has never had to be constructed on such shaky ground – the Middle East is in the grip of major upheavals that have caught our diplomatic service by surprise. France is now in retreat across the region. After September 11, 2001, Paris had no option but to react to the choices made by the US administration. It parted company with the US over Iraq in 2003, rejected (along with Berlin and Moscow) the large-scale remodeling of the region favored by US neo-conservatives, but subsequently realigned itself with Washington as Iraq and Afghanistan became a shared burden.

The year 2011 marked a turning point. Having been hesitant at first over the Arab Spring, France then tried to latch onto the coattails of history by launching a military operation in Libya, its implicit aim being to affect regime change. It then courted the disillusionment of analysts (uncertainty over Tunisia) by helping strongmen return to power (support for President **Sissi in Egypt**), **supporting potentially fragile regimes (from Sarkozy's flirting with Qatar to the renewal of friendship with Saudi Arabia under François Hollande)** and looking on, powerless, as old conflicts drifted on (Israel/Palestine) and new wars flared up in Yemen and Syria. The never-ending Algerian transition and unprecedented bilateral tensions with Morocco **have curtailed France's zone of influence in the Maghreb. Against** this rather gloomy backdrop, only the *détente* with Iran seems, belatedly, to have opened up a window of promise.

But the return of Iran also symbolizes how the hierarchy of powers has changed. The problems France has experienced in imposing its point of view in the region, or even playing a useful role, are indicative of the complexity of the issues at stake. These, in turn, have invited greater competition between different actors. The biggest challenge is the erosion of the legitimacy of Middle Eastern states, be they failed, contested or locked down pitilessly once again. The belated emergence of civil societies and the entrenchment of transnational armed groups, such as Hezbollah, Daesh and separatist Kurds in Turkey and Syria, which call into question the borders drawn up in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, mean that betting on stability in the medium term would be rash indeed. Changes in the economic fundamentals, including the fall in the price of oil, the destruction wrought by conflict and the cost of refugees, reduce the scope of French economic diplomacy. A concerted European response to the unprecedented migrant flows is frustrated by internal political trends: the rise of anti-immigrant sentiment, the questioning of French-style secularism and the image of France that the latter conveys to Muslims societies.

Moreover, the indecision of the United States has left the French disorientated. The rise of German diplomacy in what France had always considered its backyard has caught Paris by surprise: Berlin, which refused to take part in the military operation in Libya, is also showing itself to be more adept than France at taking the pulse of Arab societies, thanks notably to the fieldwork conducted by its political foundations. The reflexes inherited from the “French Arab policy” undertaken by General de Gaulle and personalized by his successors have weighed the country down with historical baggage. In the imagination of French diplomats, history imposes on our country a responsibility to North Africa and the Middle East, at the same time as guaranteeing automatic benefits for France. France has still not fully come to terms with its colonial past, with the result that its Middle Eastern policy constantly oscillates between the desire for power and proclamations of solidarity with our “Arab friends”, but also with Israelis and Turks in an attempted Mediterranean synthesis (**Sarkozy’s** Union for the Mediterranean) and Iranians (where our centuries-old voyage in the East ends).

France believes, therefore, that its presence is constantly required in the region, yet it struggles to find a place for itself there. Syria is a textbook example, from the premature closure of the French embassy in Damascus to the ardent condemnation of Bashar al-Assad by the French Foreign Ministry, before a U-turn was executed by the Presidential candidates, all of whom (with the exception of the Socialist candidate) favor a resumption

of dialogue with the Syrian President, who is tenaciously supported by Russia. Between the war against Daesh, the impossibility of peace in Syria and Iraq and the deterioration of the situation in Libya, the fundamental question now is what role the military can play in our regional policy. The economic implications of large arms contracts help to turn the debate into a sacred cow. Yet the question of alliances and whom to support will be absolutely essential: on which Arab leaders should we place our bets and what sort of alliance – Western, or enlarged to include Russia – can we count on in order to fight effectively? This question is all the more crucial because the potential harm caused at home by our policies abroad is now higher than ever before.

France's next steps in diplomacy must take into account the sensitivity of public opinion, which has been polarized by the question of terrorism and the debate about refugees. An examination of the French conscience has started and the outcome will probably be a reassessment of our ambitions abroad.

Middle East / Turkey / The Mediterranean



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ Establish a global coalition under a UN mandate to eradicate Daesh and restore peace and stability to Syria and Iraq
- ▶ Guarantee the integrity of the Syrian state and its borders
- ▶ Organize free and plural elections in Syria, under the aegis of the UN and without foreign interference
- ▶ Organize an international conference in Paris on Syrian reconstruction and the return of refugees
- ▶ Withdraw from hypocritical alliances with the oil-monarchies of the Gulf
- ▶ Promote a fair and lasting peace between Israel and Palestine
- ▶ Recognize the state of Palestine
- ▶ Support a two-state solution that allows for peaceful coexistence by fully implementing the UN's resolutions
- ▶ Reject the EU-Turkey agreement on refugees
- ▶ Create a Mediterranean TV channel in multiple languages that broadcasts to the both shores
- ▶ Organize a professional education network in the Mediterranean region
- ▶ Increase the number of civil rescue ships in the Mediterranean Sea



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Defend an alternative vision for Syria
- ▶ Recognize the state of Palestine alongside the state of Israel
- ▶ Favor the peaceful and secure coexistence of these two states
- ▶ Support the development of Mediterranean countries
- ▶ Introduce a humanitarian visa for refugees



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Help to resolve the Syrian crisis
- ▶ Stand by our EU commitments to offer a home to those fleeing the war in Syria
- ▶ Dialogue with Gulf countries will be constant but demanding
- ▶ The state of Palestine is legitimate
- ▶ Research the conditions for creating a fair and long-lasting peace between Israel and Palestine
- ▶ The door will not be closed on Turkey
- ▶ The Maghreb is among our most important partners
- ▶ Europe should give itself whatever means necessary to bring stability to Libya and to stamp out the human trafficking that is creating such unbearable scenes in the Mediterranean
- ▶ Pursue and opening towards Iran
- ▶ Remain engaged in Lebanon



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ France should engage once more in the Syrian crisis
- ▶ Develop contact with regional actors combating the terrorist threat
- ▶ Engage in a frank dialogue with Saudi Arabia and Qatar about support to Islamic fundamentalism
- ▶ There is no place for Turkey in the EU. France must formulate a new type of partnership with this country
- ▶ Strengthen France's unique links with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, Egypt and Lebanon
- ▶ Uphold the security and independence of Lebanon
- ▶ Iran is a major regional power but it must respect the nuclear deal and play its part in stabilizing the region



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ Open up a dialogue with the Syrian state, which is a key ally in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism

Asia: In Pursuit of a Diversified Approach

**Alice Ekman, Françoise Nicolas,
Céline Pajon and John Seaman**

From the point of view of French foreign policy, Asia represents many things: it is a vital region from an economic standpoint, accounting for 15% of France's foreign trade, a key region in combating climate change, a mosaic of different political systems where France's cherished values (particularly democracy and human rights) are more or less neglected, and a part of the world where security concerns take on systemic importance. Given all its different dimensions, defining a policy for Asia is by no means easy. Moreover, the attention that is rightly paid to the rise of China and its growing activism should not lead us to ignore the rest of Asia: instead, France should be active in many different directions.

In the economic sphere, the route has already been sketched out. Through the European Union (EU), France has entered into a series of free trade agreements with Asian partners. The task now is, first, to make sure that the existing agreements with South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam are implemented and, second, to negotiate new deals with other key regional economies, to include Japan, other Southeast Asian countries, and even India. The scope of any potential deal with China is likely to be modest for the moment, with negotiations revolving around a bilateral investment treaty. Difficulties have arisen here over the need to maintain open markets and to defend the principle of reciprocity – as reflected in considerations on whether or not to grant Market Economy Status to China.

Economics aside, in recent years France has sought to diversify and deepen its strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region by forging strong bonds with countries that share similar values and interests. Paris has therefore negotiated a special partnership with Tokyo, involving a formal dialogue aimed at greatly reinforcing foreign policy and defense cooperation between the two countries. France has also become a closer partner to India and Australia, as shown by the sale of 36 *Rafale* jets to the former and 12 submarines to the latter. Paris could now encourage its strategic partners in the region (Japan, Australia and India) to forge

greater synergies, at the same time as it deepens its bilateral ties with partners such as South Korea and a number of Southeast Asian countries.

Beyond this multi-vector engagement, the challenge for France also lies in establishing **itself as a regional actor within Asia's multilateral institutions**. Being a staunch advocate of the principle of freedom of navigation, France is resolute in its efforts to protect sea lanes in and between the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, which are home to 1.6 million French citizens and where **the country manages the world's second largest Exclusive Economic Zone**. This is no small task: multilateral cooperation mechanisms are becoming more complex and China is seeking to design a new security architecture for the region. Moreover, instability in the Asia-Pacific region and the significant sources of tension there, including the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula, India-Pakistan relations, and the South and East China Seas, mean that any French strategy must consider the possibility of conflict and escalation.

Guaranteeing the security of French interests, and in particular of French nationals, is a priority in certain Asian countries where the internal situation has deteriorated, such as the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar. The fight against terrorism remains a major preoccupation in South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan), as well as in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines). Terrorism is one area in which France could work more closely with many countries in the region. Equally, the question of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control has become more urgent in recent years as **North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile program has progressed**.

Lastly, even though China ought not to be the sole focus of France's Asia policy, it nonetheless remains a crucial partner. Yet the rise of China is generating new challenges that could strain bilateral relations. First of all, the French Foreign Ministry must think more strategically about how it can **respond to the implementation of China's New Silk Road project, which** has so far been advertised as a geo-economic tool, but which could later be used to exert geostrategic influence. In addition, protecting French interests and nationals within China is more difficult now because of the increasingly hard line adopted by the Chinese regime under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who will be in power for (at least) the next five years. Market access in Chinese is also limited and the state continues to play a large role in the Chinese economy, while the vast anti-corruption campaign waged since 2012 is acting as a brake on various projects and making it more difficult to access information and communicate with local partners and **Party members. China's new law on NGOs also places further hurdles in**

the path of foreign non-profit organizations and casts doubt on the legitimacy of their presence in China.

More broadly, relations with China should also be seen in the context of the growing rivalry between Beijing and Washington. In view of this adversarial relationship, France has a more important role than ever to play in maintaining regional stability. And yet, while France tends to punch above its weight in many respects, its strength and importance in the region are limited. Beyond defending its own national interests, Paris must also continue to play a leading role in shaping a coherent European policy in Asia.

Asia



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ Support the Chinese attempt to create a common global currency in order to liberate the world economy from the domination of the dollar
- ▶ Join the BRICS development bank and construct a new “alter-globalist” alliance with these countries
- ▶ Strengthen cooperation with China
- ▶ South China Sea: conflicts over sovereignty should be discussed and settled at the UN



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Oppose China’s push for Market Economy Status
- ▶ Nurture or strengthen fruitful partnerships in Asia
- ▶ South China Sea: the international community must remain vigilant vis-à-vis free movement and the security of shipping



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ France and Europe must strengthen and balance their security, commercial and environmental relations with China
- ▶ Launch a global initiative alongside our European partners to negotiate a cross-cutting agreement with China
- ▶ Work more with other Asian countries, particularly India, which is our foremost strategic partner in Asia
- ▶ Work with China to step up action against climate change
- ▶ South China Sea: develop a Europe-wide policy to guarantee our presence in the region



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ Deepen cooperation with Asian powers while respecting our economic interests
- ▶ Work closely with China on the great challenges of our time: climate change, the fight against terrorism, the regulation of trade. Establish a strategic partnership with Beijing
- ▶ South China Sea: France must monitor the situation closely and be ready to deploy ships and aircraft



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ South Sea of China: France’s role is to make sure that dialogue continues between the regional powers and to prevent a military escalation between China and the United States

France's Africa Policy Challenged by the Diversity of the Continent

Alain Antil

Presence in Africa is a key component of French power, or at least influence, and has always been a priority of French foreign policy. If it is to remain so, France must adapt to the profound changes taking place on the continent and to the processes that are shaping it.

Security

France has conducted approximately fifty military operations on the African continent since its former colonies declared independence. After the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, Paris no longer wished to play the part of “gendarme of Africa”, and chose to construct its policy towards the continent around three principles: intervening only with sound international mandates, pushing the European Union (EU) to commit itself more and, finally, helping to improve the state of African armies and build an African security architecture. These policies have been implemented over the last twenty years at the same time as French defense budgets has been cut, resulting in fewer French soldiers being stationed in Africa.

The first objective has been achieved but the second has only partially been attained: although some European countries do now take part in peacekeeping operations in Africa, their involvement is both unusual and superficial. The third goal is a long way from being achieved and as a result, France is obliged to intervene regularly because it is the only power that is capable of doing so, at least in the early stages of a conflict. It is **in this light that France's interventions in Mali (Serval) and the Central African Republic (Sangaris) should be interpreted.** Judging by the current fragile state of the Sahel-Sahara strip, disengagement is not an option, as any political upheavals there could have a direct impact on the Maghreb and the Mediterranean basin. As such, Operation Barkhane, which involves 3,500 troops, is key to stabilizing the Sahel-Sahara strip.

Economic diplomacy

France is still one of the largest investors in Africa and one of the **continent's most important commercial partners, but its market share is** being squeezed by the emergence of both African and non-African competitors. Though large French companies are well equipped to hold their own or even gain substantial shares in new markets, small and medium sized enterprises have far fewer tools to employ and receive less support. African markets are growing and French industry has the potential to satisfy them (for example through building and public works, water grids, transport, etc.). Beside, the contribution that France makes to African security provides useful support to its economic diplomacy. Yet there are too many different initiatives and structures designed to protect French interests, some of which are in competition with one another. This surfeit of instruments makes French economic diplomacy less effective as a whole. For instance, the failure of the “Energies for Africa” initiative illustrates this uncoordinated approach.

The French-speaking world

Despite being the natural leader of the French-speaking world (*la Francophonie*), France often appears to be sidelined in Francophone institutions and does not seem to have made language a central element of its foreign policy. Related to the speaking of French, however, there is a zone of influence related to law, trade, international organizations and even the dissemination of cultural works. Furthermore, in view of the demographic changes that are taking place in French-speaking African countries, the French language could gain hundreds of millions more French speakers over the course of the twenty-first century. For the moment, this opportunity is purely theoretical because, if France does not do more to reengage in cooperation (sending teachers, supporting educational institutions, etc.), the expansion of the French language will not take place. The French-speaking world could also be used as a lever to promote democracy and good governance, both of which are easier to promote in this way than *via* government-to-government exchanges in which each and every recommendation can be denounced as an assault on **a nation's sovereignty. France's longstanding support for authoritarian regimes, whether for economic reasons or security considerations, has tarnished its image among the young people of these countries: these youths might become tomorrow's elites and turn their backs on any “special relationship” with Paris.**

Aid for development and good governance

Africa has a young population that is struggling to gain access to labor markets that are incapable of absorbing so many new entrants. These young people bring great potential: by trying to fashion a place for themselves in African societies, they are creating social movements to **demand not only that people's political rights are respected**, but that their economic rights are too. At the same time, these young people could provoke tensions if jobs are not created on a massive scale. French cooperation and development aid confer influence (soft power), but they should take greater account of these twin challenges (creating jobs and **respecting citizens' rights**). **That applies also to the need to pay more attention to the disappearance in certain countries of the aid money that they receive.**

Africa



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ Abandon *la Françafrique*: respect the independence of African countries and the sovereignty of their peoples by refraining from meddling in elections and reprimanding corrupt leaders
- ▶ Reorganize Francophone institutions by re-centering them on defense, the influence of the French language and its common use
- ▶ Develop common curriculums and diplomas between French-speaking countries
- ▶ Strengthen French-speaking audio-visual media (RFI, France 24 and TV5 Monde)



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Establish equitable partnerships with African countries
- ▶ Increase French development aid towards 0.7% of GDP. France will support future transitions with our partners in Africa, the Mediterranean and the Sahel



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Propose a grand partnership with Africa
- ▶ Credibly reaffirm, as our European partners have done, our goal of devoting 0.7% of GDP to aid (mainly directed towards African countries)
- ▶ Revitalize the promotion of *la Francophonie* by developing language cooperation and support to French lycées abroad
- ▶ Promote *la Francophonie* in Africa to fight against religious radicalism
- ▶ Step up action on climate change in cooperation with Africa



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ Extend our operations in the Sahel while also intensifying our training of, and support to African armies
- ▶ Develop a dispassionate and trusted relationship with our French-speaking partners in the first instance, but also our English- and Portuguese-speaking partners
- ▶ Make French-speaking not only a vehicle for culture but also for sharing common values



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ Implement a genuine policy of co-development with African countries based, first and foremost, on aid to develop primary education, improve farming systems and strengthen defense and security tools
- ▶ Strengthen links between people who share the French language

Four Ways to Recapture the Initiative on the EU

Vivien Pertusot

2017 is a crucial year for the European Union (EU), with elections in the Netherlands, France, Germany and perhaps Italy. Negotiations over Brexit have officially begun, in what amounts to a historic break with the past. Torn by internal contradictions, the EU just celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which provoked a surge of diplomatic activity in an **effort to shore up the EU's cohesion**, though the outcomes have been limited. The next French President will assume office at a time of crisis, **with France's partners entertaining profound doubts about how serious the country's engagement in Europe really is**. The EU, however, has been at the very heart of French foreign policy since 1957.

As a founder of the EU and a first-rate power, France carries weight in European debates: its partners welcome its contributions but are critical of its tendency to oscillate between arrogance and detachment. Since the EU enlargement of the 2000s, Paris has struggled to formulate an overall European policy. Its “No” to the referendum on the constitutional treaty in 2005 led to a rupture, of which the effects are still being felt. The economic **crisis that began in 2008 has sapped Paris's strength and limited its ability** to take the initiative.

It would be wrong, however, to say that France has remained idle. It has been active on all European questions, be they the European Stability Mechanism, the banking union, the fight against terrorism or defense. Yet France has seemingly acted in response to short-term imperatives rather than following a long-term strategy.

With a diminishing weight in the world, the EU is now at a crossroads. Debate in France, meanwhile, focuses primarily on the limitations of the European project. Saying that Europe should do less or act differently does not amount to a comprehensive vision. In addition, it is pointless to advocate the adoption of policies that are already underway or to call for **tweaks to unpopular policies, particularly if they are not to France's liking**. Clearly, we will have to deal with the issues of migration, European defense, “posted workers” and even European investment. These issues are

already on the agenda. But doing so eludes the response to the fundamental questions facing the EU: should the Eurozone be given new fiscal, social, budgetary or institutional tools? How to manage the relations between the common market and, more generally, policies across the 27 member states, and a more integrated Eurozone? How to restore **Europeans' confidence in the European project? Which problems should the EU tackle and which ones is it not (or no longer) suited to deal with?**

This year presents an opportunity for the new President to open up a far-reaching debate on the future of the EU, a debate that could be intensified after the German election. We need only the will and the strength to set the ball rolling. Four avenues could then be explored simultaneously.

The first relates specifically to France and its ability to restore its political and economic credibility by implementing a program of structural reforms that **would be welcomed by France's partners because the overall stability of the EU partly depends on them. France's credibility has been** damaged so severely that structural reforms are now an essential precondition for any attempt to reshape European policies on budgetary supervision and the respect, or creation, of rules.

Second, these reforms would allow Germany and France to have more of a dialogue of equals. Paris and Berlin do consult with one another daily, but the vitality and scope of the European project depends, to a large degree, on understanding and agreement between the two great European powers about the order of priorities, as well as about their ability to set the direction. Currently, France and Germany do not see eye to eye because of the economic asymmetry between the two countries, which has only grown over the last decade.

Third, France must open up to deeper cooperation with other European partners. It cannot rely only on traditional partners such as Spain and Italy and shows too little interest in countries in Northern and Eastern Europe. We are now seeing the beginnings of closer cooperation between Paris and The Hague, which disagree with each other on many EU matters. But France must go further. The Czech Republic hopes to develop a stronger relationship with France and it is up to Paris to seize the initiative. Besides, discussions about tax harmonization cannot take place without consulting those countries that oppose the move, such as Ireland. Without wider support, even Franco-German consensus is not enough to relaunch the EU.

Finally, the next President ought to initiate a great debate about **Europe in France. It is not only the European Commission's responsibility** to do so. We need such a debate to restore enthusiasm for the EU in France and to set long-term goals for the development of the European project. That is why the next President must also be informative and explain the nature of the interdependencies that France simultaneously shapes, and is shaped by. To do so, he or she must think on the right scale—that scale is Europe.

The European Union



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ Withdraw from the Stability Pact and from European laws limiting deficits
- ▶ Stop applying the EU directive on “posted workers” in France
- ▶ Reject the backsliding of European law on social and environmental questions
- ▶ Reject the free-trade agreements (TTIP, CETA, TISA)
- ▶ Prevent tax evasion and speculation attacks on France
- ▶ Stop the liberalization of public services (rail, energy, telecoms...)
- ▶ Bring the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) to an end
- ▶ Devalue the euro to return to an initial parity with the dollar
- ▶ Organize a European conference on sovereign debt
- ▶ Apply protectionist policies of solidarity
- ▶ Remake the Common Agricultural Policy
- ▶ Abandon carbon emissions trading
- ▶ Propose an alliance of Southern European countries to end austerity
- ▶ If the measures listed above fail: stop France’s contribution to the EU budget
- ▶ Undertake concerted policies to renew environmental and social activity
- ▶ Strengthen French participation in cooperation programs outside the EU



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ Present a new treaty to democratize economic governance in the Eurozone
- ▶ Establish a Parliamentary Assembly for the Eurozone
- ▶ This Assembly will rule on a budget specific to the Eurozone
- ▶ Establish a new Council of Finance Ministers of the Eurozone
- ▶ Modify the Dublin regulations on the right of asylum
- ▶ Eliminate obstacles to the integration of refugees
- ▶ Social convergence in Europe with a minimum salary equal to 60% of the average salary
- ▶ Revision of the directive on “posted workers”
- ▶ Tax harmonization in the EU
- ▶ A plan to invest €1,000 billion in the environmental transition
- ▶ Major Ecology-Prevention-Health conference
- ▶ Recognition of the status of climate refugees
- ▶ Pooling of European debt
- ▶ Facilitate the direct financing of state debt by the European Central Bank
- ▶ Deduct spending on defense and on accepting migrants from budget deficit calculations



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Launch democratic conventions across the whole EU from the end of 2017
- ▶ Create European lists to elect the 73 members of the European Parliament (MEP) to replace Britain’s departing MEPs
- ▶ A Europe that protects its borders while also respecting its values
- ▶ A Europe of defense based on concrete cooperation
- ▶ Police and judicial cooperation to allow effective action on a European scale
- ▶ Create a post of Minister of Economy and Finance for the Eurozone
- ▶ Establish a baseline of European social rights
- ▶ Strengthen anti-dumping instruments and defend a “Buy European Act”
- ▶ A more democratic trade policy that defends European values
- ▶ Reform the carbon trading market
- ▶ Make the Common Agricultural Policy more protective and reactive
- ▶ Strengthen a digital Europe
- ▶ Triple the number of French people who benefit from a university or professional exchange in the EU



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ Overhaul the Schengen agreement. Recover control over the EU’s external borders
- ▶ Give the Eurozone a political directorate that will ensure the Eurozone is monitored and managed
- ▶ Over the next ten years, make the euro a reserve currency and a currency of settlement, similar to the US dollar
- ▶ Coordinate the policies of the ECB with a global economic strategy
- ▶ Bring about tax convergence by harmonizing lower tax rates
- ▶ Create a European Monetary Fund to allow Europe to be independent of the IMF
- ▶ Reject agreements that are not in the interest of Europeans
- ▶ Renegotiate the directive on “posted workers”
- ▶ Make Europe a worldwide beacon of innovation and attractiveness
- ▶ Establish a true energy union
- ▶ Defend French interests, and those of the EU, in Brexit negotiations
- ▶ Halt the overproduction of legislation by the European Commission
- ▶ End the permanent enlargement of the EU
- ▶ Recognize, defend and promote the values of European civilization in Europe and around the world



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ Give the French people back their sovereignty
- ▶ Organize a referendum on France’s membership in the European Union
- ▶ Recover France’s monetary sovereignty by returning to the franc
- ▶ Re-establish national borders and exit Schengen
- ▶ Reject the privatization of the railways promoted by the EU

Franco-German Relations: Where to Next?

Barbara Kunz and Hans Stark

The French Presidential election will be followed in September by elections in Germany. The outcome of the French election will be crucial in defining France's place on the European stage and, by extension, in shaping its relations with Germany, which are in real danger of breaking down. Having been a matter of consensus across the French political class for decades, policy towards Germany is now the subject of deep disagreement. Some candidates would like to modify, or even abandon, France's existing network of alliances (NATO and EU) by cutting ties with Germany (notably Marine Le Pen who is in favor of leaving the EU, but also Jean-Luc Mélenchon). The economic program of Benoît Hamon is diametrically opposed to Germany's priorities and rests on the notion of a new balance of political power between Paris and Berlin. Meanwhile, it appears both that François Fillon and Emmanuel Macron would like to maintain the continuity of France's European stance and the link with Germany.

Franco-German cooperation depends on a multitude of factors relating to European politics, as well as to foreign policy and security. At the EU level, there is no shortage of crucial issues that require a common Franco-German position and a speedy response: regulation of the flow of refugees and guaranteed control over the EU's external borders, Brexit, the approach towards Greek debt and the Italian economic crisis, consolidation of the Eurozone, the challenges of the digital revolution (to industry and security), as well as the question of structuring the EU such that different members states can take their own approach to integration around the hard core of Franco-German cooperation. Yet these issues will remain unresolved until the German elections in September.

We should not deceive ourselves: France and Germany are divided not only by personal conflicts between their leaders but also by differences of approach that could be described as structural. Even if Germany might find it easier to manage these differences with a President who is committed to France's European engagements rather than with a leader intent on breaking with the past, they will continue to weigh on the next five-year term,

whatever happens. Different understandings of budgetary and monetary policy, for instance, are part of the DNA of the two countries. Different strategic cultures also reign on the two sides of the Rhine. It is not because **Berlin's approach to security policy is changing that Germany** is on the way to becoming more like France. There is therefore a danger that security **cooperation will remain troubled, not only because the two countries'** priorities do not always coincide, but also because they focus on different regions (Paris tends to look to the South and Germany, the East) and operate according to different doctrines. Recent Franco-German proposals to revisit **the "European Defence Union" deserve to be taken seriously. Moreover,** depending on who ends up being elected President, certain areas of consensus could be thrown into doubt, notably the sanctions against Russia.

In the past, a strong political will served to gloss over these structural differences. But considering what we have heard during the election campaign, it is worth asking ourselves whether the French political class now thinks it is necessary to paper over the cracks. Besides, the role that Germany plays in Europe is changing. It is true that German officials of all persuasions constantly stress their love of multilateralism and their desire to lead in cooperation with others. But do they actually need a partner anymore? Consequently, the foundations of Franco-German cooperation are shifting too. For some time, Berlin has lamented the weakness of France and felt that it stands alone, facing a rising tide of chaos at the gates of Europe. After the Brexit vote, though, and in view of the deterioration in relations between Germany and Poland, Berlin has nowhere else to turn.

In view of its economic situation, it remains to be seen whether France really has a choice when it comes to breaking with Germany and the EU. On the other hand, a deepening of the Franco-German relationship, while essential to the future of the European project, would entail profound structural reforms to make French companies more competitive, reindustrialize the economy, reduce debt and bring public spending under control. Only on the basis of an economic overhaul can Paris come together with Berlin to form the core of a multi-speed Europe. Only this type of Europe, in turn, would allow member states to unite in confronting challenges that Germany cannot handle alone, such as governance of the Eurozone, European defense, the fight against terrorism, immigration, the digital revolution, the energy shift, as well as dialogue with Washington, Moscow and Beijing, as much on the commercial level as in relation to security and defense. At the same time, the structural differences described above will not suddenly vanish the moment France implements structural reforms. Political will and, above all, an appreciation of what is possible will continue to be the bedrock of Franco-German relations.

Franco-German Cooperation in *Europe**



Jean-Luc Mélenchon

“La France insoumise”

- ▶ “No longer surrender over our freedom of action and sovereignty to either the European Commission or Germany”
- ▶ *Withdraw from the Stability Pact and from European laws limiting deficits*
- ▶ *Propose an alliance of Southern European countries to end austerity*
- ▶ *Bring the independence of the European Central Bank (ECB) to an end*
- ▶ *Devalue the euro to return to an initial parity with the dollar*
- ▶ *Organize a European conference on sovereign debt*
- ▶ *Apply protectionist policies of solidarity*
- ▶ *Remake the Common Agricultural Policy*
- ▶ *Abandon carbon emissions trading*
- ▶ *Strengthen French participation in cooperation programs outside the EU*



Benoît Hamon

“Parti socialiste”

- ▶ *Present a new treaty to democratize economic governance in the Eurozone*
- ▶ *Establish a Parliamentary Assembly for the Eurozone*
- ▶ *Establish a new Council of Finance Ministers of the Eurozone*
- ▶ *Social convergence in Europe with a minimum salary equal to 60% of the average salary*
- ▶ *Tax harmonization in the EU*
- ▶ *Pooling of European debt*
- ▶ *Facilitate the direct financing of state debt by the European Central Bank*
- ▶ *Modify the Dublin regulations on the right of asylum*
- ▶ *Deduct spending on defense and on accepting migrants from budget deficit calculations*



En Marche!

Emmanuel Macron

“En Marche”

- ▶ Renew Franco-German momentum
- ▶ Restore trust with Germany with regard to France’s European budgetary commitments
- ▶ European defense: strengthen partnerships between France and Germany
- ▶ Plead the case for Germany to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council
- ▶ *Police and judicial cooperation to allow effective action on a European scale*
- ▶ *Create a post of Minister of Economy and Finance for the Eurozone*
- ▶ *Establish a baseline of European social rights*
- ▶ *Strengthen anti-dumping instruments and defend a “Buy European Act”*
- ▶ *A more democratic trade policy that defends European values*
- ▶ *Reform the carbon trading market*
- ▶ *Make the Common Agricultural Policy more protective and reactive*



François Fillon

“Les Républicains”

- ▶ France and Germany must once again become the driving force behind the European project
- ▶ Launch a Franco-German initiative on corporate taxation
- ▶ Alongside Germany, establish a museum of European culture in Strasbourg
- ▶ Defense: pool the financing of external operations with Germany first of all, and with France’s other European partners
- ▶ Digital technology: with Germany, meet the ambition of creating European industrial and sector-specific digital platforms
- ▶ *Give the Eurozone a political directorate that will ensure the Eurozone is monitored and managed*
- ▶ *Coordinate the policies of the ECB with a global economic strategy*
- ▶ *Bring about tax convergence by harmonizing lower tax rates*
- ▶ *Create a European Monetary Fund to allow Europe to be independent of the IMF*
- ▶ *Defend French interests, and those of the EU, in Brexit negotiations*



Marine Le Pen

“Front National”

- ▶ *Organize a referendum on France’s membership in the European Union*
- ▶ *Recover France’s monetary sovereignty by returning to the franc*
- ▶ *Re-establish national borders and exit Schengen*
- ▶ *Reject the privatization of the railways promoted by the EU*

* Proposals related to Europe are in italics. They could have an impact on Franco-German relations.
Source: official candidates’ programmes posted on their respective websites, accessed March 20, 2017.

Multilateralism and Global Governance: Fast-paced Restructuring

Alice Ekman

In recent years, France has taken a multilateral approach when dealing with economic, climate or security issues. One of the challenges it now faces is how to react to the rapid restructuring of global governance driven by China. Determined to guide and control this process, Beijing is investing heavily in multilateral diplomacy and has increased the pace of its institutional initiatives since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012. The election of Donald Trump was a watershed in this regard. In his speeches in Davos and Geneva in January 2017, Xi Jinping distanced himself from Brexit, “America First” and the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) by positioning himself as the foremost defender of “economic globalisation”, a phrase which he repeated more than 30 times during his address.

China’s investment in multilateralism is different from that of France: China seeks to promote new norms and a new vision of contemporary issues, which often differ from those of France and Europe. More generally, Beijing would like to create a world that is no longer dominated by the Western democracies. In its *White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, published in January 2017, China confirmed its desire to build a new multilateral security architecture in Asia that would no longer rely on the system of American alliances in the region. And in its new *International Strategy for Cooperation on Cyberspace*, published at the beginning of March 2017, China affirmed its intention to play a more active role in cyber governance and to promote its idea of a sovereign internet – that is, an internet controlled by each state.

In time, China’s global governance activism risks weakening French and European influence in a number of institutions. Europeans might need to do more to defend their vision of the internet, of culture, security, international trade and even international law, as **China’s ambitions now** extend to global governance in all its different dimensions.

China is pragmatic and possesses the resources – both financial and human – to match its ambitions. It is increasing the pace of its institutional initiatives in three directions at the same time: integrating itself into existing institutions, such as the UN, reanimating bodies that have hitherto been ineffective (such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, of which China holds the Presidency until 2018), and creating new institutions. It has already succeeded, in recent years, in creating a number of large institutions and mechanisms for multilateral cooperation, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), new regional forums, including in Europe, and thematically-focused high-level forums (the Boao economic forums, the Xiangshan security forums and forums on the New Silk Road, among others).

In its strategy of reshaping multilateral organisations, China counts on the support of developing and emerging countries, foremost amongst them Russia, with whom it shares a vision of a post-Western world order, as well as a common approach to cyberspace or the fight against terrorism. **Nonetheless, China also invites the world's** most developed nations to join its newly minted institutions.

Whenever China launches a new institutional initiative, therefore, the question will always arise of whether France will take part and on what conditions, just as it arose when the AIIB was founded. This question deserves to be pondered in advance. It is in the interest of both France and Europe to pool their investment in multilateral institutions and to build a strategy for global governance that is not wholly defensive or simply a **reaction to China's strategy. This is particularly important in fields in which order is being established or adjusted (governance of the internet and of space, among others), and where different countries' visions are in opposition to each other.** In the aftermath of the US presidential elections, it is up to France and Europe to defend the existing institutions, norms and international standards that they seek to preserve.

France and Multilateralism

| |  Jean-Luc Mélenchon “La France insoumise” |  Benoît Hamon “Parti socialiste” |  Emmanuel Macron “En Marche” |  François Fillon “Les Républicains” |  Marine Le Pen “Front National” |
|--|---|--|---|--|--|
| United Nations | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reaffirm that the UN is the only legitimate body for collective security ▶ Reform the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ France will remain committed to the UN | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Ensure that the interests and common positions of the European Union prevail in the UN Security Council ▶ Advocate for the enlargement of the UN Security Council to new permanent members | | |
| Trade | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Withdraw from the World Trade Organization (WTO) ▶ Reject free trade agreements (TTIP, CETA, TISA) ▶ Integrate the fundamental rules of labor law in trade agreements | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reject free trade agreements (TTIP, CETA, TISA) ▶ Oppose China’s bid for Market Economy Status | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen anti-dumping instruments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reject agreements that are not in the interest of Europeans | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reject free trade agreements (TTIP, CETA, TISA) |
| Currency and finance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Support Chinese attempts to create a common global currency to liberate the world economy from the domination of the US dollar | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Over the next ten years, to make the Euro a reserve currency and a currency of settlement similar to the US dollar | |
| Europe | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Propose an alliance of Southern European countries to end austerity | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Put forward a new treaty to democratize economic governance of the Eurozone ▶ Establish a new Council of Finance Ministers of the Eurozone | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ A European defense union founded on concrete acts of cooperation ▶ Defend the “Buy European Act” | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Put in place a genuine energy union | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Referendum on France’s membership in the European Union ▶ Reject the privatization of the railways promoted by the EU |
| Emerging and developing countries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen cooperation with China, emerging countries and developing countries ▶ Join the BRICS development bank | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ A European initiative to negotiate a cross-cutting agreement with China | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Implement a policy of co-development with African countries |
| Migration crisis | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Create a global migration organization | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Recognize the status of climate refugees and create a humanitarian visa valid in Europe | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Restore national borders and leave the Schengen area |
| Environment and climate | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Create a global environmental organization within the framework of the UN | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Guarantee that COP21 is implemented ▶ Put forward proposals for the creation of a global office for common goods (air, water, space, biodiversity) ▶ Launch a major European conference on Ecology-Prevention-Health | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Introduce the draft Universal Pact on the Environment to the United Nations ▶ Create a global environment organization ▶ Step up action to combat climate change with the countries that signed the Paris Agreement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ See to it that the Paris climate agreement (COP21) is implemented and adhered to by all | |
| Digital | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Propose an international agreement to protect personal data and the neutrality of the internet | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Strengthen Europe’s digital union | | |
| Francophonie | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Defend <i>la Francophonie</i> around the world | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Defend <i>la Francophonie</i> around the world | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Promote <i>la Francophonie</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Support and advance <i>la Francophonie</i> around the world | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Reinforce links with francophone peoples |



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