

***Maghreb Facing
New Global Challenges***

**Political and Economic Effects
of Qaddafi's Death on Chad**



D^r Ketil Fred Hansen

December 2013

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The views expressed herein are those of the authors.

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Introduction

On 24 August 2011, President Idriss Déby Itno of Chad recognised the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the only legitimate authority in Libya.¹ Until then, the Chadian president had been a firm ally of the Guide of the Great Jahamiriya, President Qaddafi of Libya. Déby had sustained his long-time friend and helper with military equipment and soldiers from Chad from the beginning of the uprisings.² Qaddafi and Déby had been partners since Déby became the president of Chad in December 1990.

This paper discusses the political and economic impacts of the end of Qaddafi's regime on President Déby and his regime. We start by discussing the policies and events guiding Déby's and Qaddafi's relationship prior to Qaddafi's fall in August 2011 and then describe how Qaddafi served as an economic investor and political advisor to President Déby. Then we speculate how Qaddafi's fall has effected and may continue to affect the political and economic situation in Chad.

Three preliminary observations on the accuracy of the description and the analysis in this paper have to be made. First, in both Chad and Libya, the presidents have all-encompassing powers and govern the state as their personal property and draw freely from state resources. Both national and international politics in the two countries are based on personal relations.³ Thus, a change in leadership in one of the countries is more likely to influence its state relations with the other to a greater extent than would be the case in more formal, bureaucratic regimes.

Second, in both Chad and Libya, the state is weak but presidents are strong. Strong presidents of weak states often make opportunistic and ad hoc political decisions than do presidents of

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¹ http://www.presidencetchad.org/affichage_synthese.php?id=74&titre= Jeudi, le 25 aout 2011. The NTC in Libya was established already on 5 March 2011 and declared itself at once the legislative body of the interim government.

² As this paper will show, both US and French intelligence and Chadian oppositional press reported this.

³ Hansen, K.F. (2003). "The Politics of Personal Relations", *Africa* (73): 202-225.

bureaucratic and democratically strong states.⁴ Thus, if the analyses of shifts in relations between Déby and Qaddafi and Déby and the post-Qaddafi regime appear arbitrary and irrational, they may still be consistent with what is actually happening on the ground.⁵

Third, many of the sources used in this paper are weblogs and independent press reports from Chad. Triangulated with statements from state-owned and run newspapers, the accuracy and trustworthiness of these sources are often questioned, and sometimes rejected. Information is rudimentary and there has been a proliferation of rumours about the relationship between Chad and Libya, both under and after Qaddafi. Although the authors has benefitted from field visits to Chad and personal communication with numerous actors in Chad and in the diaspora, he admits the speculative nature of this analysis of the relationship between Chad and post-Qaddafi Libya.

⁴ See e.g. Joffe, G. & E. Paoletti (2011). "The Foreign Policy Process in Libya" in *Journal of North African Studies* (16) 183-213.

⁵ That international relations are changing quickly and official discourses contradicted rapidly in real life events are however, not abnormal. Just think of France's assurance a reassurance not to intervene militarily in Mali up to a few weeks before the French military deployment in Mali on 11 January 2013. (see e.g. Baghzouz, Amoar (2013) "Le Maghreb et l'Europe face à la crise du Sahel: Coopération ou rivalité ? ». *L'année du Maghreb IX*. Pp. 173-192.

Background

Qaddafi had been in power for 21 years when he helped Déby expel President Harbé from Chad in December 1990. Since then Qaddafi politically and economically supported Déby. Both presidents suppressed their opponents either by buying their loyalty or imprisoning them. Both men were notorious for their flagrant violations of the human rights of their political enemies.⁶

Shortly after the terror attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, Déby and Qaddafi became US allies in its War-On-Terror. Both regimes received military training and bought military equipment under favourable conditions from the US. After 2003, both countries rearmed. The Qaddafi regime bought weapons from Britain, France and Italy only months before those three countries bombed Libya in 2011.⁷ As late as November 2010, the Libdex arms fair in Tripoli attracted 100 companies from 24 countries, including the US, Britain, France and Italy.⁸ Less than three weeks before the uprisings in Libya, the UK government issued a licence for unlimited export of military communications equipment from a UK firm to the Qaddafi regime.⁹

The Chadian army and the US government formed the Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership which has been equipped and trained by the US Africom since 2007.¹⁰ On the eve of the Libyan uprisings, both Libya and Chad were among the most heavily armed countries in Africa, in both relative and absolute terms.¹¹

⁶ See various reports from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Freedom House e.g. <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR20/007/2013/en/4c943479-375e-421b-a522-e57421ae4f6a/afr200072013en.pdf>;

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/chad> ;
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya0106webwcover.pdf> ;
<http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/libya>

⁷ Wezeman, P.D. (2011). Libya: lessons in controlling the arms trade at <http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/march11>

⁸ <http://www.tripolipost.com/article/detail.asp?c=1&i=5116>

⁹ "UK Arms Sales to Qaddafi's Libya" at <http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/countries/libya/uk-gaddafi.php>

¹⁰ Moeller, R. (2010). "The Truth About Africom" in Foreign Policy. 21 July. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy; Wezeman, P. (2009). Arms Flow in the Conflict of Chad. Stockholm: SIPRI; www.africom.mil.

¹¹ For the case of Chad see e.g. <http://www.dw.de/the-importance-of-oil-revenue-for-chads-politics/a-17147493> and http://www.revenuewatch.org/training/resource_center/influence-petroleum-conflict-dynamics-chad

In addition, both countries are important oil producers. Libya has produced oil since 1961. Chad started producing oil in 2003. In both Libya and Chad, oil accounted for 90%-95% of their export earnings and around 50% of the total gross domestic product (GDP). Libya's oil production is about ten times higher than Chad's.¹²

¹² Radio France International indicates 1,6 million barrels/day in Libya and 126.000 barrels/day in Chad (RFI, 19.04.2013)

The international reputations of Déby and Qaddafi

In the early 1990s Déby was seen as a democratic hope for Chad. Soon after Déby overthrew President Harbé in a coup in December 1990, he introduced a democratic constitution and in 1996 held elections. While the transparency of these elections was criticized, they were considered free enough for the outcomes to receive international recognition. Many of Chad's presidential hopefuls just waited for Déby to complete the two terms that the constitution permitted him. However, as the end of his second term approached, Déby bribed and threatened the parliamentarians to change the constitution in 2005 so that he could stand for presidency as many times as he would like. In the wake of the constitutional change in 2005, many of Déby's ministers and supporters abandoned him to form armed opposition movements.¹³ Déby's dictatorial tendencies, together with Chad's active support of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), in Darfur, tarnished Déby's international reputation.¹⁴ For President Déby, however, Qaddafi remained a firm ally, a trustworthy business partner and a regional power broker. Déby used oil revenues to rearm and strengthen the army and to buy off political adversaries with sinecures.¹⁵

France and the US considered the political stability of Chad very important. France was interested in Chad, a former colony, given due to its strategic position in central Africa. The French government had launched Operation Epervier, in Chad in 1986 and had a military base there that trained French soldiers for deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US, had an interest in Chad because Chad exported most of its oil to the US and because the American company Exxon Chevron, extracted most of the oil in Chad.¹⁶ Thus,

¹³ For a discussion of these see e.g. Marielle Debos (2013). *Le métier des armes au Tchad. Le gouvernement de l'entre-guerres* Paris: Karthala; Hansen 2013.

¹⁴ Roland Marchal (2013) is very clear about President Déby's increasing personal power when he states that "À vrai dire au Tchad, le gouvernement ne gouverne pas depuis longtemps si bien qu'il vaut mieux considérer le Premier ministre comme un Secrétaire général de la présidence mettant simplement en forme les décisions du président, les ministres comme de simples collaborateurs" in « Le Tchad entre deux guerres ? » *Politique Africaine* 130 (2) p. 218.

¹⁵ See e.g. Hansen (forthcoming) "Oil for Education in Chad" in R. Issa Djesa and L. Holtedal (eds.) *Knowledge and Corruption* Paris: Karthala.

¹⁶ See e.g. Massey, S. and R. May. (2009). "Oil and War in Chad". in Eds, R. Southall and H. Melber. *A New Scramble for Africa?* Uppsala: NAI; Pegg, S.

no actions were taken to remove Déby from power despite his atrocious human rights records.

From the 1970s to the early 1990s, Qaddafi, in contrast, was regarded as one of the world's most unpredictable and cruel dictators and a supporter of indigenous and international rebel and terrorist movements. The long list of rebel movements that received support from Qaddafi includes the Palestine Liberation Organization, Foday Sanko and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the Tuareg-led liberation movement in Mali and Khalil Ibrahim's JEM in Sudan. Qaddafi never spoke of rebels of course, but of "freedom fighters" and "liberation movements". In addition, he supported dubious African regimes like that of military dictator Haile Mengistu in Ethiopia, the self-proclaimed emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Idi Amin in Uganda, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, Charles Taylor in Liberia and, until the bitter end, the democratic dictator President Déby in Chad.¹⁷ Qaddafi's anticolonial ideology was his rationale for backing these regimes and insurgent movements. In Qaddafi's opinion, many regimes in Africa were still influenced, if not controlled, by their former colonial powers and Libya's support was intended to make them more independent. An additional goal for Qaddafi to increase Libya's influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

The contradictions in these policy goals became clear twice in Qaddafi's relations with Chad. The first time was when Qaddafi invaded northern Chad, the Aozou strip, in 1973 and occupied it until 1994 with the aim of annexing the territory to Libya. In Qaddafi's view, this was not an invasion but a legitimate means of reclaiming Libyan territory. In 1994, however, the International Court of Justice ruled that the Aozou strip was part of Chad, and Qaddafi accepted the ruling.¹⁸

The second time that Qaddafi's anticolonial ideology clashed with his regional aspirations in Chad came in the 1980s when Qaddafi funded the Chadian liberation movement FROLINAT headed by Goukouni Oueddei.¹⁹ When FROLINAT ousted the ruling president Félix Malloum N'Gakoutou in 1980 and Goukouni Oueddei became president of Chad, Qaddafi tried to unite Chad and Libya into a single state.²⁰

(2009). "Chronicle of a death foretold: the collapse of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project." *African Affairs* 108 (431): 311-320.

¹⁷ See e.g. Joffé & Paoletti (2011); Hansen (2013).

¹⁸ <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/29251/Aozou-Strip>

¹⁹ See e.g. International Crisis Group (2010). *Libye/Tchad: au-dela d'une politique d'influence*. p. 5-6.

²⁰ Brecher, M. & J. Wilkenfeld (1997). *A Study of Crisis*. Chicago: University of Michigan Press. p. 89. The communiqué was issued on 6 January 1981. Joffé, G. (2005). "Libya's Saharan Destiny" in *Journal of North African Studies* (10): 605-617; Buijtenhuijs, R. (1998). "Chad in the age of warlords" in D. Birmingham and P.M. Martin (eds.) *History of Central Africa. The contemporary years*. London: Longman, 21-40.

The US and UN imposed sanctions on Libya in 1985 and 1992, respectively.²¹ The UN sanctions were lifted in 1999; US sanctions continued until 2003. Qaddafi blamed the embargo for Libya's economic problems and lack of development. However, the embargo, made it easier for Qaddafi to suppress Libyan dissidents²².

After accepting responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie bombings²³ and giving the US full support in the War On Terror after 11 September 2001, the West came to view Qaddafi as a possible business partner and international antiterrorist.

This turnaround resulted in huge foreign direct investments and a strong diplomatic presence in Libya by western powers and companies from the late 1990s. On his part, Qaddafi's turned his attention from Arabia to Africa.

²¹ US banned imports on oil from Libya in 1982 and ordered all American oil companies out of Libya in 1985 (St John, R.B. (2013) "The Post-Qadhafi Economy" in J. Pack (ed.) *The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Future* New York: Palgrave Macmillan p. 88. For the UN sanctions, see http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/libya/libya-1986/748

²² Martinez 1999: 8.

²³ See e.g. Ford, N. (2003). «Libya edges back into the fold» in *The Middle East* (October); Sidaway, J. (2012). «Libya in the mirror of Europe» in *The Geographical Journal*, (December) pp. 296 – 301.

Qaddafi's turn to Africa

Around 1997 Qaddafi shifted his political attention to sub-Saharan Africa. One reason is the Arabs nations' ambiguous attitude towards the international sanctions against Libya. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa were more interested in defending Libya against the sanctions than the Arab countries had been.²⁴ Another reason was Qaddafi's megalomania²⁵ and his wish to rule a United States of Africa.²⁶

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)

As an important start of Qaddafi's regional aspirations, he established the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in February 1998. The purpose of this organisation was to establish an economic community with easy transit of goods and people among member countries.²⁷ The organisation also had its own bank, *Banque Sahélo Saharienne pour l'Investissement et le Commerce* (BSIC) to promote investment and development in member states. Both CEN-SAD and BSIC were almost completely funded by the Qaddafi regime. Qaddafi proposed a free trade zone for member states in Libyan coastal town of Misrata.²⁸ To facilitate this, Qaddafi planned a railway from Central Chad through Libya to the Mediterranean Sea.²⁹ Initially a club with six members (Libya, Chad, Niger, Sudan, Mali and

²⁴ Joffé & Paoletti (2011): 206.

²⁵ On his megalomania there are numerous examples. One is Qaddafi talking at the Summit of Arab states, in Doha in March 2009, as the Chairman of the AU, when he was provoked and declared from the tribune before leaving the summit "I am an international leader, the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of Muslims" (<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1165858/Im-king-kings-Gaddafi-storms-Arab-summit-labels-Saudi-king-British-product.html>).

²⁶ <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-09-29-after-gaddafi-who-will-fund-the-au/#.UqwuWqVjC5M>

²⁷ <http://www.au.int/en/recs/censad>

²⁸ Joffe, G. & E. Paoletti (2011). "The Foreign Policy Process in Libya" in *Journal of North African Studies* (16) 183-213; p. 206.

²⁹ Joffé (2005).

Burkina Faso), by the start of the Libyan uprising, CEN-SAD numbered 28 member states from most of Africa.³⁰

Qaddafi was the undisputed leader and financial backer of CEN-SAD until the Libyan uprisings started in 2011. While Qaddafi was CEN-SAD's leader, Déby's Chad was a devoted member. Many of the organisation's annual meetings were held in N'Djamena in the Qaddafi-owned luxury hotel Kempinski. For the 12th summit of CEN-SAD in July 2010, the last summit before Qaddafi's death, President Déby and numerous Chadian ministers greeted Qaddafi at the N'Djamena airport.³¹ Qaddafi announced to his fellow heads of states that Libya was ready to invest \$90 billion in CEN-SAD member countries.³²

After Qaddafi's death, CEN-SAD ceased to be an organization of any significance. Neither the New Libya nor any other member states are willing to contribute financially to its functioning.³³ CEN-SAD will most probably become a meaningless acronym.

From Organisation of African Unity to African Union

Qaddafi was committed to creating a United States of Africa with a common army, currency and passport; an easy cross border for people, goods and services.³⁴ He was, in fact, the most prominent advocate of pan-African unity on the continent and was central in transforming the outdated *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) into the *African Union* (AU) in July 2000.³⁵ At that time Libya was still under bilateral US sanctions and Qaddafi's reputation was still dubious.³⁶ While his international image improved around this time it

³⁰ Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Togo and Tunisia. See <http://www.panapress.com/CEN-SAD-celebrates-13th-anniversary---12-756752-29-lang2-index.html> For a more academic discussion on the role of regional organizations in Africa see Møller, B. (2009) *Africa's sub-regional organisations: seamless web or patchwork?* LSE: Crisis States Working Papers Series no. 2.

³¹ http://www.infotchad.com/details.asp?item_id=2147&. On the signification of presence at airport arrivals, see Hansen 2003.

³² Reported in the *Tripoli Post* 24.07.2010

³³ Phone interview, Makaila, 30.12.2013.

³⁴ <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/gadhafis-dying-dream-for-african-unity/article567554/>

³⁵ See e.g. de Waal, A. (2013) "African roles in the Libyan conflict" in *International Affairs* (89): 365-379. Chief editor in the US Foreign Policy Association, Robert Nolan, specifies that "In 1999 at a summit in Sirte, Libya, Qaddafi helped convince 45 African heads of state to approve the creation of the African Union" Available at: <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/12/the-african-union-after-qaddafi/#sthash.iQxNJ660.dpuf>

³⁶ Some argue that Qaddafi's African turn gave quicker results. Yehudid Ronenen (2013: 5) argues in his article "Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on the eve of the Arab

was not until 2009 that he was seen as trustworthy enough to be elected Chairman of the AU, a position he had wanted since its creation.

Libya contributed some 15% of the African part of the AU budget.³⁷ Qaddafi also paid the membership contribution for numerous poor African countries, bringing Libya's payments to approximately \$40 million or one-third of Africa's yearly contribution to AU.³⁸ This made Qaddafi's position within the AU close to unassailable.

In addition to Libya's payments of membership fees for poor African countries to the AU, Qaddafi's investments in other parts of the continent made him a respected leader in most of Africa. He invested an estimated \$150 billion of Libyan oil money in building schools and mosques, roads and hospitals, hotels and resorts in many countries around the continent. Qaddafi also used Libya's oil money to buy political influence.³⁹ Chad enjoyed the benefits of Qaddafi's investments and political interest. When the 2011 uprisings erupted, it was payback time.

In contrast to Qaddafi's wish for a United States of Africa, Libya's immigration policy hardened when Qaddafi's turned his attention to Africa.

Spring and its aftermath: an anatomy of changing relations" in *Journal of North African Studies* that "At the turn of the 21st century, the relationship between Qaddafi's Libya and the African-Sahelian states appeared stronger and more binding than ever".

³⁷ The EU contributed with more than 50% of the AU budget, leaving less than 50% to be covered by the member states.

³⁸ <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/12/the-african-union-after-gaddafi/#sthash.iQxNJ660.dpuf> and <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-09-29-after-gaddafi-who-will-fund-the-au/#.UqwuWqVjC5M>

³⁹ <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/gadhafis-dying-dream-for-african-unity/article567554/>

Chadian immigration to Libya

At the beginning of Qaddafi's reign, his socialist ideology, anti-colonialism, and pan-Arabism made Libya receptive to immigration. In the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of thousands of immigrants arrived from neighbouring states to live and work in Libya. Most of these new arrivals were legal migrants. However, illegal migration and human trafficking into Libya were already serious problems.

During the 1990s, rising unemployment and a deteriorating Libyan economy due to international sanctions resulted in the spread of poverty among Libyans. Many Libyans blamed foreigners, especially sub-Saharan Africans, for the situation. Racism against blacks increased.⁴⁰ Many illegal immigrants worked in Libya's informal economy. Indeed, the state often hired illegal migrants to perform services that Libyan nationals would not.⁴¹

In response to public pressure, Qaddafi closed the country's open door to immigration in the 1995. In that year, 200.000 foreigners were forcibly deported and another 135.000 left voluntarily.⁴² In 2004, the Qaddafi regime increased penalties for smuggling and human trafficking. In 2007, the employment of migrant workers was heavily regulated. In 2010, new laws made it possible to fine illegal migrants in Libya 1000 dinars (800) or to imprison them indefinitely.⁴³

By the time of the 2011 uprisings, an estimated 300.000 Chadians lived in Libya, making Chadians the country's largest sub-Saharan community.⁴⁴ During and after the uprisings, Chadians were made to feel unwelcome in Libya because of the friendship between Qaddafi and President Déby.

⁴⁰ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/180%20LAfrique%20sans%20Kadhafi%20-%20le%20cas%20du%20Tchad%20ENGLISH.pdf>

⁴¹ Cole, P. (2012) *Borderline Chaos? Stabilizing Libya's Periphery*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowments (available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/stablizing_libya_periphery.pdf) P. 8-9.

⁴² Yong Ousman & Dale 2007. Darfurian Livelihoods and Libya: Trade, Migration, and Remittance Flows in *Times of Conflict and Crisis* IMR Vol. 41 No. 4: 826 – 849.

⁴³ Cole 2012: 5-6.

⁴⁴ IOM response to the Libyan crisis, 31 October 2011 (external situation report) and ISC (2010) available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/chad/op-eds/la-crise-libyenne-vue-de-ndjamena.aspx>

In 2011, approximately 765.000 migrants left Libya with the aid of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM).⁴⁵ Tunisians made up the largest contingent of returning migrants (345.000) followed by Egyptians (238.000) and Chadians and Nigerians (85.000 each). A UN specialised mission estimated, however, that the real number of people returning to Chad from Libya during 2011 was around 150.000, close to twice the confirmed figure.⁴⁶

Most returning Chadians were poor workers exhausted by a long flight, often suffering from dehydration, sickness and hunger.⁴⁷ Many communities in Northern Chad were also in distress; a combination of floods and drought in the Sahel destroyed parts of the 2011 harvest in northern Chad and food prices soared.⁴⁸ In addition, Chad was hit by a cholera epidemic.⁴⁹

Many families relied on remittances from their relatives working in Libya. In Kanem and Bahr el Ghazal, families reported having received an average of US\$220 each month from relatives in Libya.⁵⁰ These remittances stopped during the uprising. Thus, the uprisings in Libya imposed a double penalty on Northern Chad: the loss of remittances and the return of their now-unemployed relatives.

While Chadians living on the costal Libya faced racism, forced deportation or decided to flee the urban violence, Chadians and Libyans living on the border between the two countries experienced increasing ethnic strife in 2011.

Tribes at the border: Security and smuggling between Chad and Libya

The Chad-Libya border is a more than 1000 km long, straight and invisible line through a mountainous part of the Sahara. Only one unpaved road and a four-wheel drivable path connect Chad and Libya. Most of the border zone area is uninhabitable due to extreme temperatures (both low and high), high mountains and lack of water and arable land. Some tribes have lived in the oasis towns and villages on both sides of the border for generations. The most important are the Toubou and the Arab Zway. The Toubou (also

⁴⁵ IOM response to the Libyan crisis, 31 October 2011 (external situation report).

⁴⁶ UN Conseil de Sécurité, (S/2012/42) Rapport de la mission d'évaluation des incidences dans la crise libyenne sur la région du Sahel

⁴⁷ ECB *Disaster Needs Analysis, Chad Impact of Libyan Crisis*; 5 December 2011; ACAPS.

⁴⁸ http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/Chad_FSOU_2011_03_en.pdf and <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2012-global-hunger-index>

⁴⁹ <http://www.irinnews.org/report/93769/chad-niger-lean-season-awaits-migrants-escaping-libya>

⁵⁰ <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=3535>

called Tabu, Tebus, Tubu, Toubou, and Gorane)⁵¹ are clans and sub-clans of darker-skinned Africans numbering some 200.000 inhabitants of the border zones between Libya, Chad and Niger.⁵² In some ways the Toubou continue to live as if the borders did not exist. For example, the highest-ranking chief in a Toubou clan, the *Derdé*, is elected by the Toubous, regardless of whether they live in Libya, Niger or Chad⁵³. Marriages among Toubou do not make distinctions based on state borders. Toubou tend to marry their kin from another community and or even country.⁵⁴

In another sense the international borders are important to many Toubou. They take advantage of their knowledge of the desert and the lack of state presence on the border to control smuggling routes.⁵⁵ Smuggling has traditionally been one of the Toubou's main sources of income. Subsidised petrol from Libya towards Chad and alcohol, cigarettes and drugs from Chad to Libya are especially popular and lucrative, but all sorts of objects - and people - are smuggled. In July 2012, the *Libya Herald* reported that border guards from Kufra town had captured eight trucks loaded with gasoline and goods, power cables and a tractor, en route to Chad.⁵⁶

Qaddafi had a complicated and ambiguous relationship with the Toubou. King Idriss of Libya had employed mostly Toubou in his personal guard. Their strength and endurance, their familiarity with the desert, their reputation as warriors, made them ideal bodyguards.⁵⁷ When Qaddafi overthrew King Idriss in 1969, he had no use for the Toubou. Yet, when Libya occupied the Aouzou strip in northern Chad in 1973, Qaddafi needed the goodwill of the Toubou and conferred Libyan citizenship and identity cards on all Toubou living or settling in the contested region.⁵⁸

When the International Court of Justice in 1994 ruled that the Aouzou strip belonged to Chad, Qaddafi lost interest in the Toubou.

⁵¹ The Gorane/Toubou ethnic group is divided into various sub-groups (Daza, Teda, Kreda...) Both president G Waddai (1981-82) was Toubou (Teda) as well as the man who ousted him, Hissane Harbé (1982-1990) was Toubou (Daza). One of today's main military opposition leaders, Mahamat Nouri, is also Toubou. For a more specialised work on the Toubou, see Cathrine Baroin (ed.) 2002. *Gens du roc et du sable Les Toubou* Paris: CNRS

⁵² Zoubir & Rozsa (2012).

⁵³ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/French%20translations/B071%20Libya-Chad%20Beyond%20Political%20Influence%20French.pdf> footnote 7 and 11.

⁵⁴ Cole (2012)

⁵⁵ Cole (2012); Zaka, A. (2012) Libye: le sort des Toubous available at <http://news.abidjan.net/h/434854.html>

⁵⁶ <http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/07/28/kufra-border-guards-foil-chad-smugglers/#axzz2nYlzdMQ2>

⁵⁷ Bujitenijus (2001) "The Chadian Tubu: Contemporary nomads who conquered the state" *Africa*. (71). p: 152.

⁵⁸ In 1994 the International Court of Justice ruled that the Aouzou strip was a part of Chad, not Libya. In other words, many Chadian Toubou were given Libyan citizenships in the mid-1970s.

In the area around Kufra town, Qaddafi's preferential treatment shifted to the Arab Zway. In 2007 Qaddafi stripped all Libyan Toubou of their citizenship.⁵⁹ Racism towards black Africans and especially the Toubou spread.

The Toubou in the Post Qaddafi era

When the Libyan uprisings started in February 2011, most Toubou were neutral or on the side of the rebels. However, in May 2011 Qaddafi once more needed the collaboration of Toubou. On 23 May Qaddafi announced that all Toubou, whether living in Chad or Libya, would again receive Libyan citizenship and an identity card. Many Toubou in southern Libya then changed sides and started fighting for Qaddafi. Within a few months, the Toubou had gained control over large parts of the border zones between Libya and Chad, including many of the border posts.⁶⁰ In the town of Kufra, a Toubou military leader⁶¹ seized control of the smuggling routes from the Zway.⁶²

The relations between these two tribes have always been problematic. Both Qaddafi and Déby fanned the flames by supporting playing clans and sub-clans against each other. Local disputes kept these warriors so preoccupied that they were incapable of participating in the national power struggle. According to the Chadian exiled activist Makaila:

Dans sa volonté de préserver son pouvoir autocratique au Tchad, Idriss Déby allume le feu dans la bande sahélo- sahélienne en armant soit des groupes rebelles, soit, des pouvoirs anti-démocratiques comme le sien afin de créer l'instabilité sociopolitique

⁵⁹ Ronen (2013): 4

⁶⁰ The complex and changing situation for the Toubou is very well illustrated in this little extract from an article in the *Libyan Herald* in the midst of the uprisings. "The Libya Shield battalion based in Kufra deported 150 Chadians across the southern border on Saturday. It is the fourth group of Chadians to be deported in recent weeks. Two weeks ago, more than 140 Chadians said to be residing illegally in Kufra were deported. It was also announced yesterday that another group of Chadians had been arrested in the town with forged Libyan family registration books. Many of those expelled are Tebu. In their case, is difficult at times to distinguish exactly who is Chadian and who is Libyan. In 2007, Qaddafi stripped large numbers of Tebu of Libyan citizenship. Many were forced to flee to Chad. Those who remained in Libya still regard themselves as Libyan. Many Libyans, however, regards them as Chadian." *Libya Herald* 21.05.2011 available at:

<http://www.libyaherald.com/2012/05/21/chadians-deported-from-kufra/#ixzz2nMSRBYag>

⁶¹ Abdul Majid Issa

⁶² Cole 2012: 8 and

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/libya/130-divided-we-stand-libyas-enduring-conflicts.pdf>

*en Afrique et il interviendra plus tard en prétendu médiateur pour proposer un schéma de sortie de crise ou de résolution de conflit.*⁶³

Yet, the power vacuum on Libya's geographical peripheries was significant after the capture and death of Qaddafi. Gangs took the law and the state functions into their own hands as they patrolled parts of the Libya-Chad border.⁶⁴

⁶³ Makaila on 14 January 2014 at <http://makaila.over-blog.com/2014/01/idriss-deby-ouvre-un-autre-front-en-libye-des-affrontements-intercommunautaires-signal%C3%A9s.html>

⁶⁴ Cole (2012): 3-4.

Libyan investments in Chad

From 1997 onwards, Libya has made generous contributions to developmental investments in sub-Saharan Africa. Qaddafi's goal was to make political friends with rulers all over Africa.

The *Financial Times* speculates that the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) has invested around \$65 billion in Africa since its establishment in 2006. *The Economist* pays more attention to Qaddafi's own fortune and suggests that he looted his country of US\$30-80 billion.⁶⁵ It is also said that the Qaddafi family had some US\$200 billion in bank accounts at the beginning of the uprising in 2011.⁶⁶ These huge discrepancies indicate secrecy surrounding Libya's economic involvement in sub-Saharan Africa.

The President of Chad's Chamber of Commerce has stated that "it's not easy to clearly provide an accurate assessment as there is no tangible statistical data available".⁶⁷

One example illustrates the ambiguity of ownership. In November 2010 Libyan state-owned investment vehicle LAP Green Network signed a deal to buy a 60% stake in Société des Télécommunications du Tchad (SOTEL) for US\$90 million.⁶⁸ LAP Green network was part of the Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAP), included in the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) in 2006.⁶⁹ On paper, LIA was a government body. In reality, it was controlled by the Qaddafi family and close friends.⁷⁰ The question of ownership made the UN release frozen Libyan funds, starting in December 2011.⁷¹

In addition, it is not always clear whether an investment made by Qaddafi was a gift or an investment. In July 2009, Libya's ambassador in Chad handed over a 26 million Euro generator saying that

⁶⁵ "Recovering stolen assets. Making a hash of finding the cash", *The Economist*, 11 May 2013.

⁶⁶ Cadigan, L.T. & Prieston, L.C (2011) *Returning Libya's Wealth*. The Fletcher School, Tufts University. (available at <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/SWFI-OLD/~media/Fletcher/Microsites/swfi/pdfs/Libya.pdf>)

⁶⁷ "Libya can be Chad's best trade corridor" in *Tripoli Post* 24.10.2010 available at <http://www.tripolipost.com/articledetail.asp?c=2&i=5025>

⁶⁸ <http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2010/11/02/sotel-sold-to-lap-green/>

⁶⁹ <http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/libyan-investment-authority/>

⁷⁰ <http://allafrica.com/stories/201202190127.html>

⁷¹ <http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2012/02/20/un-panel-ends-lap-green-asset-freeze/>

the donation was part of the effort to strengthen cooperation between Chad and Libya.⁷² Yet, Qaddafi controlled the hippodrome in N'Djamena; had he bought it? Had Libya? Was it rented? Had it given to Qaddafi under specific conditions? No one knows.⁷³

Libyan investments after Qaddafi

Déby and his regime take advantage of these questions. The new Libyan authorities are unable to trace all former Libyan investments in Chad. Déby will not cooperate with the new regime in Libya, which he accuses of assisting Chadian rebels. Rumors in Chad maintain that Déby has taken control over Qaddafi's investments and gifts in Chad and that he uses some of these resources to take good care of 200-300 former collaborators of Qaddafi in the Chadian town of Moussoro, 200 km north of N'Djamena.⁷⁴

The regional interests of the New Libya remain unclear. Until now, the new Libyan authorities have been preoccupied more with internal problems than with making a consistent foreign policy. While the new Libyan leadership tries to appease its neighbours by arguing that Libya will continue its former foreign policy, it is clear that Libya will not continue investing heavily abroad, or being active in Sub-Saharan regional politics.⁷⁵ Alex de Waal claims that "the new Libya has largely turned its back on sub-Saharan Africa".⁷⁶

Libya's role as regional player has thus, changed completely. From being a powerful political player and the region's most generous benefactor, Libya has become a war-torn trouble spot that is kept busy with its own internal affairs. As we will see, Déby has turned this situation to his advantage.

⁷² *Tripoli Post* 24.07. 2009.

⁷³ See e.g. <http://observers.france24.com/fr/content/20111118-tchad-ndjamena-mouammar-kadhafi-libye-investissements-cooperation-economique-chantiers-suspendus> and <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN08068coupsrandid0/mouammar-kaddafi-libya-africa-portfolio-lafico-laaicoa-coups-de-petrodinars.html>

⁷⁴ Phone interview with Makaila, Paris, 30.12.2013

⁷⁵ *The Libya Herald*, 17 February 2013 available at: <http://www.libyaherald.com/2013/02/17/zeidan-reaffirms-libyas-commitment-to-africa/#axzz2nMBXCpba>; http://www.infotchad.com/details.asp?item_id=4131 and http://www.infotchad.com/details.asp?item_id=4132

⁷⁶ de Waal (2013): 379.

Libya and France helping Déby

Déby and Qaddafi collaborated closely. When Déby resigned as military adviser to President Hissen Habré of Chad 1989, he fled to Libya. Qaddafi financed Déby's rebel movement *Patriotic Salvation Movement* (MPS) and let the rebels train in Libya. In fact, Qaddafi saw Hissen Habré's government in Chad as too pro-French, and as a continuation of French colonialism in Chad.⁷⁷

France could easily have prevented Déby's coup in December 1990. France had its own military base in N'Djamena and a 1976 military agreement, still in vigour, to sustain the legitimate president.⁷⁸ France's decision not to interfere and its swift recognition of Déby as the legitimate president of Chad, prove France's passive collaboration in Déby's coup d'état.

When Déby was close to losing power in February 2008, France was more active. On 2 and 3 February 2008, when the rebels were extremely close to a successful coup d'état, Déby received help from France and Libya and managed to stay in power.⁷⁹ French military equipment was brought to N'Djamena by Libyan planes.⁸⁰ France had then been Déby's main international backer during his 20-year reign while Libya had been ally number two, financially and politically.⁸¹ Libya provided 40% of Chad's military equipment during the 1990s.⁸² From 2003 to 2008, Chad's budget for arms import increased fivefold and Ukraine and France took over as its main arms providers.⁸³ In 2008, France had no better military client in Africa than Chad.⁸⁴

During the Libyan uprising in 2011 the regime in Sudan and France supported the rebels in Libya, while the Chadian regime

⁷⁷ For more on this period of Chadian-Libyan relations, see e.g. Burr, M. & R. Collins (2008) *Africa's Thirty Years' War* (London: Zed).

⁷⁸ http://www.ambafrancetd.org/france_tchad/spip.php?article327#Les-accords-de-cooperation accessed 23.10.2010.

⁷⁹ Hansen (2013).

⁸⁰ Libye: L'arrière-cour tchadienne 30 mars 2011 at <http://www.ttu.fr/libye-larriere-cour-tchadienne/>

⁸¹ International Crisis Group 2011. *The Libyan crisis as seen from N'Djamena* available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/chad/opedd/la-crise-libyenne-vue-de-ndjamena.aspx>

⁸² Hansen (2013).

⁸³ Wezemann (2009).

⁸⁴ Chadian weekly paper *La Voix*, no. 22, 13-20 October, 2009 and "Vente d'armes: les bonnes affaires de la France au Tchad" at www.afrik.com

supported Qaddafi. Thus, Chad did not follow the anti-Qaddafi line of France and Sudan. Yet, Chad was on friendly terms with both France and Sudan. The Libyan uprising thus, complicated and worsened the relations between Chad and Libya and between Chad and Sudan. Partly to rebuild relations, in 2013 Déby sent troops to support the French military action in Mali.

Chad, France and Libya in the Post-Qaddafi era

When Qaddafi needed military help in 2011, Déby became one of his main sources of relief. Yet, this time France collaborated neither with Qaddafi nor with Déby. France was eager to pass United Nation Security Council Resolution 1973 against Qaddafi. When the resolution passed on 26 February 2011, France was one of the first nations to send bombers to Libya. On 10 March, France was the first country to recognise the National Transitional Council as Libya's legitimate governing body. It was thus clear that the uprisings in Libya had tested Franco-Chadian relations.

Déby supported his defender and saviour, Qaddafi. Diplomatically, Déby argued intensely against UNBSC Resolution 1973 and the bombing of Libya. He claimed that an international deployment could destabilise the entire region and result in increased terrorism.⁸⁵ To *Jeune Afrique* Déby insisted on his friendship and cooperation with Qaddafi:

"J'ai eu raison de faire de Kadhafi un ami. La Libye est un État voisin avec lequel nous avons une coopération que j'apprécie, dans le respect de nos souverainetés respectives. S'il le faut, je renforcerai encore cette coopération. Les Libyens et les Tchadiens ont des liens de sang."⁸⁶

Déby and Qaddafi were apparently in constant contact from the start of the hostilities until the beginning of August.⁸⁷ As late as 8 August 2011, at his own re-investiture as president of Chad, Déby told the 28 African heads of state or their representatives in N'Djamena that Qaddafi was the only legitimate ruler of Libya.⁸⁸ Invited by President Déby, a Libyan delegation celebrated Chad's 51st

⁸⁵ « Idriss Déby met en garde contre la déstabilisation de la Libye » available at <http://www.panapress.com/idriss-Deby-met-en-garde-contre-la-destabilisation-de-la-Libye--13-765849-17-lang4-index.html>

⁸⁶ *Jeune Afrique* 28.03.2011.

⁸⁷ <http://www.ttu.fr/libye-larriere-cour-tchadienne/>

⁸⁸ <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=2329>; This cannot be confirmed by official sources available on the internet as on the presidency's own web site <http://www.presidencetchad.org> all entries and presidential discourses normally published there between 1 August and 25 August 2011 have been removed and the regime's official news agency, ATP, web site www.infortchad.com did not publish Déby's speech on that particular day. For details on Déby's inauguration day in August 2011, see http://www.infortchad.com/details.asp?item_id=2901

anniversary as an independent state in N'Djamena on 11 August 2011.

While Déby diplomatically supported Qaddafi, he denied offering any military help to the Qaddafi regime. Most other sources, including the UN Mission on Mercenaries, confirm however, that Déby did give military help to Qaddafi during the 2011 uprising. A well-placed source⁸⁹ states that Qaddafi had asked Déby for military personnel as early as 21 February 2011. Déby answered by sending 300 troops by plane from Abeche and Amdjeress to support Qaddafi in the southern part of Libya. The Libyan ambassador to Chad, M. Greyne, had taken residence in the town of Sebha to organise the troops arriving from Chad. Déby charged his brother and Chad's ambassador to Libya, Daoussa Déby, the military attaché in Chad's Tripoli embassy, Mohamed Bechir Sawa, and General Bichara Bob Maham Adam with helping Qaddafi.⁹⁰ In March 2011, Déby was ready to send 110 vehicles loaded with mercenaries and military equipment to support Qaddafi's forces, but French intelligence discovered the plan and threatened to destroy the vehicles if Chad went ahead with it.⁹¹

Exactly how many mercenaries fought for Qaddafi during the uprisings is impossible to determine. Yet, motivated by money, many black Africans in Libya took up arms for Qaddafi. Other mercenaries arrived from Chad, Sudan, and Mali.⁹² An estimated 30.000 mercenaries fought for Qaddafi, many of whom were former rebels from Chad.⁹³

For the Libyan rebels it was clear that Déby supported Qaddafi militarily and diplomatically. Déby accused the Libyan rebels of using partisans of the military-political opposition in Chad against the Qaddafi regime.⁹⁴ Thus when Libyan insurgents formed the National Transitional Council (NTC) that was recognised as the legitimate government of Libya, relations with Déby's regime in Chad were cold.

Déby was one of Qaddafi's foremost allies and recognized the NTC only on 24 August, after the NTC had taken control of Tripoli. On 1 September 2011, Déby was in Paris at the Conférence de soutien à

⁸⁹ The name of the source is known by the author but kept secret for safety reasons, as will be the case with most unnamed sources hereafter in this paper.

⁹⁰ <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=3509> and <http://www.ttu.fr/libye-larriere-cour-tchadienne/>

⁹¹ <http://www.tchadactuel.com/?p=3509> and <http://www.ttu.fr/libye-larriere-cour-tchadienne/>. What actually happened is not known.

⁹² See e.g. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/gaddafi-mercenary-force-libya> and <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/former-qaddafi-mercenaries-describe-fighting-in-libyan-war/244356/>

⁹³ <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2090205,00.html> and www.liberte-alergie.com

⁹⁴ Denial for the Chadian rebels supporting the Libyan rebels see e.g. *Communiqué de Presse de l'Union des forces de la résistance sur les événements de la Libye*, signed A Koulamallah; 21 February 2011.

la Libye nouvelle.⁹⁵ As the conference was open to all heads of states supporting the new Libya, Déby was allowed to participate. While the official Chadian press bureau, Agence Tchadienne de Presse (ATP), made it look like Déby was at the conference at the invitation of British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy,⁹⁶ the opposition press in Chad made it clear that President Déby had gone to Paris on his own initiative.⁹⁷

On 16 September the UN General Assembly recognised the NTC as Libya's representative at the UN.⁹⁸ Four days later, on 20 September 2011, the African Union also recognised the NTC.⁹⁹ Thus, within months the friend of the West and US ally in the War-On-Terror, the aspiring African king of kings, Qaddafi, had been overthrown and humiliated.

⁹⁵ According to Déby, the relationship with the New Libya is excellent according to the official Chad's rhetoric. See the official Chadian Press at

http://www.infotchad.com/details.asp?item_id=4051.

⁹⁶ http://www.infotchad.com/details.asp?item_id=2995&

⁹⁷ The independent press in Chad report about a reluctant relationship between the new Libya and Chad. For example, Zoomtchad and TchadPages reported in May 2013 that there is a reciprocal ambiance of mistrust when the leaders of the two countries meet and that the new leadership in Tripoli has no confidence in President Déby. The independent press also reveals rusty transactions between presumably Déby's inner circles and pro- Qaddafi forces exiled in Egypt (see e.g.

http://www.zoomtchad.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:tchad-libye-egypte-les-50-milliards-convoyes-devaient-servir-a-destabiliser-la-libye-vives-tensions-entre-le-tchad-legypte-et-la-libye-&catid=1:politique&Itemid=2; and <http://tchadpages.com/2013/05/27/les-nouvelles-autorites-libyennes-et-idriss-deby-itno-le-je-taime-moi-non-plus-senracine/>).

⁹⁸ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/ga11137.doc.htm>

⁹⁹ <http://allafrica.com/stories/201109201513.html> ,and,

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/20/libya-safrica-idAFL5E7KK4BC20110920?rpc=401&feed&feedName=libyaNews&rpc=401>

Conclusion

Many sources speculate that Déby will lose power in Chad as a result of Qaddafi's fall.¹⁰⁰

Yet, Déby is economically and militarily, strong enough to stay in power. Profiting from the political vacuum created by Qaddafi's fall, Déby has managed to consolidate his regional power. Déby now has one of the best equipped national armies in Africa. He is actively supported by France and the US, both of whom have a national interest in the preservation of stability and predictability in Africa in terms of security, training and anti-terrorism and economic investments, especially in the oil sector. He controls the increasing revenues from the oil export and can use his petrodollars as he likes. In addition, Déby has taken control of the resources invested in Chad by Libya or Qaddafi because of the secrecy surrounding many of these investments. Thus, he is less dependent on foreign aid than before. He controls Chad's parliamentarians and makes changes ministers at will several times a year. These reshuffles make it very difficult for the Chadian elites to create their own power base. Déby uses much the same strategy outside the parliament fraction

He has formed alliances with different fractions; often those are opposing each other. For example, Déby is a trusted partner in the US War On Terror but at the same time it is rumoured that his regime sponsors the terrorist group Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. He is believed to support the JEM in Darfur while being political friends with the regime in Khartoum. He has interfered, apparently, on both sides in the conflict in the Central African Republic. He uses the internal strife in Libya to accuse the New Libyan regime of harbouring Chadian rebels and supporting Toubou communities on the Chad-Libya border, while at being diplomatically at ease with the New Libya.

Déby's alliances may seem contradictory, but they make sense to him. By supporting opposing groups in other countries he has drawn international attention away from Chad's internal politics towards the Central African Republic, Sudan and Nigeria. He also foments confusion and uncertainty about Chad's political priorities. Déby personally controls the army, the oil money and the parliament. A political mastermind, Déby has become more powerful since Qaddafi's death. The only way Déby could lose power is by an internal coup d'état.

¹⁰⁰ Eg. www.laposte.fr (20.08.2011); blog Makalia