Publié le 13/02/2011
David S. YOST

During the Cold War, the phrase “strategic stability” gained currency both as a foreign policy objective and as an apt way of describing the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union never actually went to war.

To what extent did U.S. analytical models concerning “crisis stability,” “first-strike stability,” and “arms race stability” - and policies based on these models - contribute to the avoidance of war between the United States and the Soviet Union? This paper argues that, in light of Soviet and U.S. behavior at the time and in view of what has subsequently been learned about Soviet policies and decision-making, the proponents of these models have overestimated their utility. Today, the expression “strategic stability” is still widely used, for example in the U.S. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. For this reason, and in the context of the forthcoming bilateral nuclear reductions, it may be useful to critically examine the cogency and relevance of these U.S. models from the Cold War period with a view to identifying lessons for current challenges.