Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: A Political-Strategic Break?
On February 24, 2022, eight years after deploying an integrated military and non-military indirect strategy against Kiev, Vladimir Putin decided to initiate an open war against Ukraine.
The launching of this war may have seemed paradoxical insofar as the Russian military-political elites have, for the past thirty years, conceptualized and promoted the bypassing of the interstate armed struggle in order to achieve political objectives considered vital. This raises the question: did Russia's president choose to start this war after careful consideration, or was it a snap decision? In any case, Russia's decision to invade Ukraine also questions the cognitive frameworks of the actors who devise and lead Moscow's strategies. With their radically hostile perception of the strategic environment, Russia’s military-political elites are susceptible to acting in ways that are unpredictable, impulsive and, ultimately, counterproductive.
Dimitri Minic is a Research Fellow at Ifri’s Russia/NIS Center. He holds a PhD in History of International Relations from the Sorbonne University (2021).
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Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: A Political-Strategic Break?
Author(s)
Dimitri MINIC
Research Fellow, Scientific Director of the Observatory on Russia, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Ifri's Russia/Eurasia Center
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Founded in 2005 within Ifri, the Russia/Eurasia Center conducts research and organizes debates on Russia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus. Its goal is to understand and anticipate the evolution of this complex and rapidly changing geographical area in order to enrich public discourse in France and Europe and to assist in strategic, political, and economic decision-making.
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