Let’s face it: while there are growing expectations for a French and European enhanced engagement in the Indo-Pacific, when Europeans step up their commitment, or express their willingness to do so, they are often met with disdain, on the ground that they would not make a big difference in front of China. Is that really so?

To respond to growing global competition, the EU has made notable progress on the internal dimension of technology policy over the past 3 years. It is now also seeking to adapt its foreign policy – from the transatlantic relationship to global partnerships – to technological challenges.

This paper argues that Russia’s soft power should be understood as a niche soft power, microtargeting some specific audiences based on four particularisms:

2020 marked the beginning of the total phasing out of electricity production based on coal, as well as coal extraction in Germany. Laws implemented in 2020 concluded a governmental process started in 2015, which itself resulted from a prior broader debate on the role of coal in a viable and sustainable energy and economic system.

In order to have any chance of limiting global warming to well below +2°C, there is no choice but to tackle coal-fired power plants head-on, around the world. 

The Trump administration has been very actively designing and implementing a new strategy for reliable supply of critical minerals which aims at reducing the country’s vulnerabilities and becoming a leader in this field. 

To adapt its foreign policy to new challenges, Germany must overcome certain taboos inherited from its history.

The global car market has been shrinking since 2018. This is a key economic sector for Germany whose producers belong to the Top 15 carmakers worldwide. Yet they are running the risk of being outclassed and eventually replaced, given emerging actors in the USA and China.