Tailoring Deterrence for the High North: Nuclear Consequences of Sweden’s Accession to NATO
The Finnish and Swedish accessions to NATO enable the Alliance to play a more active role in the Baltic region.
The underpinnings for a comprehensive NATO general deterrence posture in the High North with Sweden and Finland are, to a large degree, already in place.
Russian behavior is increasingly relying on its nuclear weapons to further its security political aims in order to establish a new security order in Europe: from its leadership’s rhetoric to its self-suspension from Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) and possible basing of nuclear weapons in Belarus.
For an integrated and tailored deterrence in the High North, Sweden and Finland must come to terms with the challenge of immediate deterrence with a nuclear dimension.
A strategy including participation in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), flying conventional support for nuclear operations (CSNO) and, for Sweden, enabling dispersed basing, would create the space needed for NATO to act in times of crisis. A more engaged approach would also add dual capable aircraft (DCA) and nuclear sharing arrangements (NSA) for Sweden and possibly for Finland, given that the latter makes the required adjustments to its current legislation.
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Tailoring Deterrence for the High North: Nuclear Consequences of Sweden’s Accession to NATO
Confronting Russia’s High-Velocity Arsenal: European Challenges and Solutions
Since February 2022, Russian missile and long-range drone strikes against Ukraine have served as near-daily reminders of what European states could face in a war with Russia. The same weapon systems battering Ukrainian infrastructure and population centers would be directed against European military and civilian targets in any confrontation between Russia and NATO. As Russian missile production expands and its arsenal diversifies, Europe must confront an uncomfortable question: how to deter, and if push comes to shove, fight Russia's long-range strike arsenal?
The War on Terrorism: Global Experts Reflect on Lessons Learned Twenty-Five Years After 9/11
Twenty-five years ago, the September 11 attacks prompted the invention of new security architectures that shaped the war on terrorism. Sixteen think tank experts from fifteen countries reflect on the successes, failures, and missed opportunities in the fight against terrorism—a fight that is still ongoing.
From Corsairs to Private Military Contractors. Nonmilitary Maritime Actors and the Historical Continuities of Naval Warfare
Since late 2023, several Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have involved privately contracted armed teams conducting defensive engagements and coordinating immediate response efforts, often in the relative absence of regular naval forces during the immediate hostilities at sea. These cases highlight a strategic tension that increasingly confronts modern navies. On the one hand, they are expected to conduct persistent, low-intensity maritime security tasks such as counterpiracy, maritime policing, and the protection of commercial shipping. On the other hand, they face renewed pressure to prepare for high-intensity conflict against peer and near-peer adversaries amid the return of great power competition.
Framework Nation: A European Challenge and French Ambition
First appearing in the early 2000s, the framework nation concept follows several distinct rationales, whether it refers to a country assuming the leadership of a military operation, directing a multinational capability project, or commanding a permanent force structure. In every case, the country that takes on this role fully intends to derive from it additional politico-military influence.