Kaliningrad in the Post-Crimea Russia. A Bastion or a Weak Link?

Since 2014, Russia’s policies toward Kaliningrad Oblast—its westernmost region located between Lithuania and Poland and physically cut off from Russia’s main body—have undergone notable transformation. One crucial change was the inception of a policy aimed at remilitarization, which has led toward Kaliningrad’s (re)emerging as Russia’s military bastion in the west.

However different overall, this policy is to a certain extent reiterating Kaliningrad’s path prior to 1991 and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). At the same time, because of the “sanctions war”, Moscow has tried to decrease Kaliningrad’s strategic dependence on third countries in such critical and previously underdeveloped domains as transportation, energy, and food security.
This paper explains the logic of Russia’s behavior in pursuit of these costly and in many ways rather dangerous—in relation to the remilitarization approach—strategies. The research also strives to maintain a balanced view on successes achieved by Russia as well as its continuing weaknesses.
Dr Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation and a Postdoctoral Fellow with North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network (Trent University, Canada).
This content is available in French: Kaliningrad, bastion ou maillon faible de la Russie post-Crimée ?
It is also available in Russian: Калининград: бастион или слабое звено посткрымской России?
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Kaliningrad in the Post-Crimea Russia. A Bastion or a Weak Link?
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analyses
How the Russian Army Changed its Concept of War, 1993-2022
The traditional and high-intensity war that has occurred in Ukraine since Russia decided to invade raises a key issue: did post-soviet Russian strategic thought really prepare Russia for waging this war?
Russia's Nuclear Deterrence Put to the Test by the War in Ukraine
From the outset of its “special military operation” (SVO) against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia, which possesses one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, has adopted aggressive deterrence measures and a resolutely menacing rhetorical stance.
Moldova's Crucial Parliamentary Election. What's at Stake?
On the occasion of Moldova’s National Day, August 27, 2025, Chișinău hosted a high-level European delegation composed of Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz and Donald Tusk, who sought to reaffirm their support for the country’s sovereignty and pro-European course. This unprecedented and highly symbolic visit took place at a pivotal moment. Moldova is preparing for decisive parliamentary elections on September 28, whose stakes extend far beyond the national framework.
War as Social Elevator: The Socioeconomic Impact of Russian Military Keynesianism
In order to finance its war effort, the Russian state has spent substantial sums of money and implemented a form of “military Keynesianism” that is transforming society at both the socioeconomic and cultural levels. This has partially rebalanced the wide disparities in wealth, levels of consumption, and social prestige in Russian society by granting significant financial and symbolic advantages to peripheral Russia, which has long been overlooked by the central government.