La fourmilière du général : le commandement opérationnel face aux enjeux de haute intensité
Focus stratégique, n° 89, June 2019
Operational command structures have always been able to adapt to the strategic context. However, they now face a new challenge: high intensity threats.
Modern operational command structures, although very different from their elders, perform more or less the same functions. These are systems of systems which allow military leaders to command and control armed forces in operation, from the highest strategic level to the lowest tactical level. Under the combined effect of new technology, multilateralism or in order to adapt to asymmetric conflicts, these structures have become increasingly complex and resource-intensive. But as high intensity threats are re-emerging, command structures will need to evolve and face new challenges, especially in terms of vulnerability. Even though inertia and resistance to change should not be downplayed, there is ample room for improvement, mixing technology and human factor, so as to better protect existing structures and adapt them to their new environment.
This content is only available in French: La fourmilière du général: le commandement opérationnel face aux enjeux de haute intensité.
Available in:
Regions and themes
ISBN / ISSN
Share
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analysesFury from the Skies. A Strategic Analysis of Air Campaign against Iran
What is the outcome of Operations Roaring Lion (RL) and Epic Fury (EF), launched by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran on February 28, 2026?
Finland: The Ally Who Came in from the Cold
Among all European countries, Finland is perhaps the one whose strategic culture and military model have changed the least since the end of the Cold War. Built after the end of the Second World War to deter a potential new Soviet invasion, this model enabled Finland to serve as an example of European rearmament.
Stability under Pressure. A Pakistani View on Nuclear Deterrence after Pahalgam
The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis after the Pahalgam attack has generated a familiar but incomplete debate: did nuclear deterrence work, or did it merely allow both sides to fight a limited war under the nuclear shadow? The better answer is that deterrence worked at the level at which it was designed to work. It prevented a general war and an uncontrolled vertical escalation, and kept nuclear weapons in the background. But it did not prevent India from attempting to carve out space for conventional action, nor did it prevent Pakistan from responding conventionally to restore deterrence credibility.