Maîtriser la puissance de feu. Un défi pour les forces terrestres
Over the last few decades, in order to limit the risk of collateral damage, tailoring the effects of firepower has become a main concern for Western armed forces.
The complexity of the task, however, can greatly vary according to the environment. Land forces have to use direct and indirect firepower in a complex terrain, for a diversity of missions, using a range of different systems, to achieve lethal and non-lethal effects. This thus raises the question of how land forces, and especially the French Army, confront this requirement. This study assesses land forces’ capabilities and needs in terms of tailoring the effects of firepower, according to the type of operation or to the environment they work in, and analyzes the risks and opportunities of a greater reliance on precision-guided fires.
This content is available in French: Maîtriser la puissance du feu. Un défi pour les forces terrestres
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