Cyber-influence : les nouveaux enjeux de la lutte informationnelle
The coming of age of a digital “info sphere” has dramatically changed the nature of military information support strategy.
Though information operations are as old as war itself, armed forces have had to adapt their strategies to establish themselves in cyberspace. On the top of non-state actors such as the Islamic State using in its asymmetrical warfare way, great powers like China, the United States and Russia have been particularly active in this field of cyberspace information operations. In the near future, the development of artificial intelligence and personalization techniques, the modification of content or the use of blockchain are likely to disrupt even more the military approaches to information warfare. The transformation of this domain therefore poses many challenges to the armed forces, which must adapt to a confrontation that goes well beyond their ordinary scope. It is now up to France to get the measure of these issues, and to adapt accordingly in terms of strategy and capabilities.
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