Guerre de l'information : le web russe dans le conflit en Ukraine
Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, Russia has been waging an information war.
Russian information warfare reflects its perception of its relationship towards the West as being that of a state of permanent conflict which needs the use of alternative tools to weaken both the enemy’s will and the capabilities. Up to this day, Russian information warfare has followed two main lines of actions: tightening the control over the Russian internet, in order to prevent any scenario of popular uprising coupled with an activist use of the web; and undermining the objectivity of Western and Ukrainian media coverage of the crisis. Despite some successes at the beginning of the conflict, Russian heavy-handed propaganda techniques did not allow the Kremlin to influence the international media as much as the alleged ambitions and the current means could lead to expect. They are, on the contrary, harming Russia's image both in its Near Abroad and in the West.
This content is available in French: Guerre de l'information : le web russe dans le conflit en Ukraine
Author(s)
Julien NOCETTI
Associate Fellow, Russia/Eurasia Center and Center for Geopolitics of Technology, Ifri
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