Web social et djihadisme : du diagnostic aux remèdes
From Al Qaeda to Islamic state, the international jihadist movement understands how to adapt to the web’s evolution, which it is using as an operating platform.
It uses the Internet not only to drive its propaganda but also to disseminate strategic orientations and tactical guidance, to recruit, and to raise funds. Formerly very active on dedicated forums, jihadist groups migrated a few years ago to social networks. States facing these groups reacted slowly and disorderly. Nowadays, the fight is taking two different shapes: the censorship of jihadist content on the Internet and the production of counter-propaganda.
This Focus Stratégique was published with the support of Conseil Supérieur de la Formation et de la Recherche Stratégiques.
This content is available in French: Web social et djihadisme : du diagnostic aux remèdes
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