The low-carbon energy transition in France, the European Union (EU) and the world is today taking place unevenly and too slowly to preserve the climate and biodiversity. CO₂ emissions are continuing to rise, while governments’ commitments are insufficient: in the long-term, the world is set to see temperatures increase by +3°C. Efforts to fund adaptation measures still need to be strengthened considerably.

Central Asia is conventionally seen as a conflicting space for great powers.

China increasingly sees its flagship foreign policy project as a tool for restructuring global governance and a vector for promoting a new form of globalization.

Russia’s comeback to Africa has been widely discussed since 2017.

Ten years after the January 2009 gas crisis, Russian-Ukrainian gas relations are at another turning point: the then concluded contracts are terminating on 31 December 2019. While trilateral talks brokered by the European Commission (EC) have started in July 2018, the real negotiations about the future of this relationship can be expected to start no earlier than in December, that is in the midst of the winter and a second to midnight. Crucial months lie ahead.

Japan’s policies in post-Soviet Central Asia, similarly to its actions in other Asian subregions, have often been interpreted recently as reactions to China’s advances – in particular, the Belt and Road Initiative. This first impression can be misleading.

At a time when the European Union (EU) is discussing its long-term climate strategy and drafting new legislation to foster the decarbonization of its gas sector, a close look at the experience of Denmark, Germany and Italy with renewable gas production can provide valuable lessons. 

Since mid-2012, in the wake of the global financial crisis, China has sought to reinvigorate relations with Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), notably through the creation of the 16+1 formula.