Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Temptations. Lessons Learned from Regional Instability
Saudi Arabia’s integration in the international arena and regional stability, notably through reducing its dependence on fossil energies, are crucial elements for the success of the Kingdom’s Vision 2030, the Crown Prince’s top priority. However, Mohammed bin Salman’s declarations in 2018 and 2021, indicating that “if Iran develops a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible”, combined with the recent strikes on key Iranian nuclear facilities, do not bode well for the future of the Kingdom, the region and the non-proliferation regime at large.
The regional context has shifted dramatically since June 2025, when Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear sites left the Iranian threat weakened but not eliminated. For Saudi Arabia, the 12-day war crystallized three lessons. First, nuclear latency—long seen as Iran’s strategic hedge—offers no guarantee against preventive strikes. Second, US security guarantees remain uncertain, as Gulf monarchies watched Washington’s reluctance to contain Israel’s maximalist war aims, and even its participation in the war despite the risks of escalation. Third, despite the 2023 China-brokered détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s symbolic retaliation on a US base in Qatar proved that Iran would not hesitate to put the Gulf monarchies on the front line, even the one with which it enjoys good relations, creating a dent in the ongoing confidence-building process. These developments heightened Riyadh’s anxiety of being sidelined in a new regional order shaped by Israeli power and Iranian resilience.
Moreover, as Riyadh doubts Washington’s reliability, it is exploring hedging strategies with Beijing, which replaced the US as the Saudis’ first commercial partner. That said, the Kingdom remains aware of China’s limitations in the geopolitical realm, as demonstrated by its aloofness during the 12-day war. Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia’s nuclear calculus is evolving.
This paper examines three dimensions. First, it assesses the Kingdom’s nuclear aspirations and technical limitations, focusing on uranium enrichment and the indigenous workforce gap. Second, it analyzes Riyadh’s ambiguous approach to the non-proliferation regime, marked by reluctance to adopt additional safeguards and a determination to preserve strategic flexibility. Finally, it draws lessons from the June 2025 war for Saudi nuclear thinking in the Middle East, highlighting how Iran’s trajectory and regional instability shape Riyadh’s and its neighbors’ options. The central argument is that while Saudi Arabia lacks the technical base for rapid proliferation, political will and regional insecurity could accelerate its nuclear temptations, testing the resilience of the global non-proliferation regime.
Key Takeaways
- If Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions are framed by energy diversification, security concerns are also to consider, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman repeatedly signaling that Riyadh would match an Iranian bomb.
- The June 2025 war between Israel and Iran exposed the limits of nuclear latency and the fragility of Gulf deterrence, heightening Saudi fears of being sidelined in a new regional order.
- Riyadh has consistently insisted on retaining the right to domestic enrichment and reprocessing (E&R), resisting U.S. “gold standard” restrictions and showing limited willingness to accept additional IAEA safeguards.
- While Saudi technical capacity remains insufficient for rapid proliferation, regional insecurity, doubts about U.S. guarantees, and fragile détente with Iran increase the temptation to hedge.
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Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Temptations. Lessons Learned from Regional Instability
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