The administrations of Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev have committed to a process of "resetting" US-Russian relations on a foundation of mutual interests and pragmatic collaboration.

It is now necessary to ask ourselves what place Europe holds in Russian foreign policy, given the recent developments in the latter. Indeed, Europe is by far Russia's most important partner. Nevertheless, Russia is developing a discourse of emerging state, in order to highlight the rapid loss of influence of Europeans in global affairs.

Over the past decade, there has been much talk about a new world order, in which American "unipolarity" would be superseded by more equal arrangements between the great powers. One such idea is a return to the Russia-China-US triangle.

The firmly entrenched stagnation of relations between Russia and the European Union is leading to mutual dissatisfaction and even distrust. The failure of current institutions and practices to adapt to the challenges of the international political and economic environment and the outdated (for both Russia and Europe) agenda, are responsible. 

Sweden and Russia are close neighors with a complicated relationship. They have normal political relations with growing economic and cultural exchanges, especially on a regional basis; however, they both foster an age-old distrust, and have diverging attitudes toward democracy and human rights. Furthermore, Sweden is not interested in Russian gas exports or a gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. During its EU Presidency in 2009, Sweden is likely to prioritize issues such as climate change, economic growth, and the Baltic Sea region. It will continue the efforts of previous Presidencies for a new partnership agreement with Russia, however. The adoption of an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region will be a key task, and it will be linked to the Northern Dimension policy, which focuses on regional cooperation with Russia. Sweden will also push the implementation of the Eastern Partnerhip with Russia's western and southern neighbors. This may, however, strain relations with Russia and lead to increased pressure on the prospective partners. In general, Sweden is interested in cooperation with Russia, but will not jettison its support for democratic values and human rights to attain it.

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is at a crossroads. Over the course of France's EU Presidency the Union of the Mediterranean will be launched and the Polish-Swedish proposal for an "Eastern Partnership" will be elaborated upon. These initiatives challenge the ENP and cast doubt over the EU's ability to keep the southern and eastern neighbourhoods together under one roof. This paper argues that whilst the EU should maintain its "balanced approach" to its neighbourhood, it should at the same time develop more differentiation within ENP, which will strengthen the policy. To this end, the EU should recognise, more sincerely and practically, the European aspirations of the eastern neighbours by stating explicitly that ENP is not an end in itself, but rather a route to possible membership.

The threat of a gas-OPEC, waved around by certain big producers, has given rise to much fear in consuming countries. The behavior of Russia, a key exporter, has made it seem as though gas sales could be used as a political weapon. In truth, the creation of an entente between exporting countries is not technically feasible. What is more, Russia remains reticent to join any association in order not to limit its room for maneuver. Seeking to dominate the world market, it has singed a certain number of agreements with other big producers. Nevertheless, the capitalistic constraints of the gas market jeopardize the chances of long-term coordination, which is incompatible with short-term political interests.

The visit by French President Nicolas Sarkozy to Russia (October 2007) and the future French Presidency of the European Union (in the second half of 2008) call for a reflection on Franco-Russian relations and their structure within the broader framework of Russia-Europe relations. In the coming years, the nature of the EU-Russian dialogue will become a crucial issue, while Franco-Russian bilateral relations are now relegated to second place. This discrepancy is forcing French policy-makers to resort to a pragmatic and realistic approach in order to better combine the two agendas. This article examines the immediate issues at stake in the EU-Russian dialogue, the EU's attitude toward Russia and, conversely, Russia's attitude toward the EU. For each point, this article will examine whether the French stance has been sustained or if it has evolved.