Francs-tireurs et Centurions : Les ambiguïtés de l'héritage contre-insurrectionnel français
The war in Afghanistan and David Galula’s reputation in the United States have revived France’s counterinsurgency legacy. This legacy must be divided into two separate periods: the colonial era and later on the wars of decolonization fought by France in Indochina and Algeria.
Although figures such as Bugeaud, Lyautey and Gallieni retained at the time the status of mavericks in the traditional military establishment, they greatly contributed to the development of a French ‘national style" in irregular warfare, both original and successful. On the contrary, theorists from the 1950s and 1960s (Lacheroy, Hogard, Trinquier) were to a large extent inspired by revolutionary warfare. Accordingly, they viewed counterinsurgency as a form of total war based on ‘psychological operations" and very coercive methods. Political drift in Algeria abruptly silenced these debates and turned counterinsurgency into a taboo for forty years. Judgment must be exercised before reactivating the debates and know-how of the past. Part of this legacy may constitute a legitimate and fruitful source of inspiration for current interventions. However, it is essential to take into account the political and strategic dimension of this type of warfare and not to lose sight of the limits of historical comparisons.
This paper is published in French only - Francs-tireurs et Centurions : Les ambiguïtés de l'héritage contre-insurrectionnel français
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