Penser son ennemi. Modélisations de l'adversaire dans les forces armées
The designation of an enemy is always the result of a political decision, which generally leads to the opening of hostilities.
If the enemy is the result of a political choice, it is though a military necessity for armed forces which have to carry out an analysis of the enemy at each level of analysis, be it strategic, operational or tactical. The military leader thus has a special bond with “his” enemy, taking him into account through his intelligence system in the unique context of his mission. If the fundamental principles of enemy study recur in most armies, differences in methods of analysis and modeling persist, even within NATO countries, showing the diversity of how to address an adversary. These traditional approaches could however soon be challenged by innovations in military intelligence and applications of artificial intelligence.
This content is available in French: Penser son ennemi. Modélisations de l'adversaire dans les forces armées.
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