How to Curb Investments in Chinese Technology: Initiatives and Debates in the United States
In a continuation of U.S. efforts to slow China's development and acquisition of strategic technologies, Washington has imposed new restrictions on American investment in Chinese technology sectors such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, and semiconductors.
Key Takeaways:
- On August 9, 2023, President Biden issued an unprecedented executive order, announcing notification requirements and prohibitions for U.S. tech investments in China.
- Three sectors are targeted: semiconductors, quantum information technology, and artificial intelligence.
- Washington’s main concern is that these investments are accompanied by technology transfers and “intangible benefits” contributing to the development of Chinese military capabilities.
- This concern, first voiced in the 1980s, has received a heightened political response since 2018.
- Considering the emerging consensus in Congress and the multiplication of bills, further measures are likely to be adopted in the coming months.
- The European Union and certain Member States are beginning to reflect on the consequences of U.S. measures, and on the relevance of adopting their own tools to control investment in China.
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How to Curb Investments in Chinese Technology: Initiatives and Debates in the United States
Author(s)
Mathilde VELLIET
Research Fellow, Center for Geopolitics of Technology, Ifri
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Center for Geopolitics of Technology
Artificial intelligence (AI), 5G, cybersecurity, robotics, semiconductors, space... Technology, especially in the digital domain, is now deeply affecting all human activities and, by extension, international relations. The resulting political, strategic, economic and social issues manifest themselves at multiple political scales involving states, international organizations and private companies. The dynamics of international competition and cooperation are transformed.
It is to respond to these challenges that Ifri is launching the Geopolitics of Technology program in the fall of 2020, which builds on the work it already carried out on these subjects for several years.
The program takes a resolutely European approach to international issues related to so-called critical technologies. Its work is organized around four cross-cutting themes:
- Power: redistributions of power caused by new technologies, in particular digital; military and dual innovations; transformations of international competition;
- Sovereignty: definition of critical infrastructures and technologies; industrial and innovation policies in strategic sectors; opportunities and risks associated with international value chains;
- Governance: ethical and legal issues; interactions between companies, states, international organizations and users; public-private partnerships and GovTech;
- Society: political and social impacts of technological innovations; risks and opportunities for the future of work, health, the fight against climate change; connectivity and economic development.
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