Practical information
As part of the Center for Energy at Ifri, a seminar with Anthony Livanios, CEO of Energy Stream CMG, Christoph Van Agt, Senior Fellow, Clingendael Internationa Energy Program, Netherlands, et Maciej Wozniak, Independent Energy Expert, Poland.
Chaired by: William C. Ramsay, Senior Advisor of the Center for Energy at Ifri and Jacques Lesourne, Chairman of the Scientific of the Center for Energy at Ifri.
Last November the Nord Stream project opened its first pipeline capable of providing 27,5 bcm of Russian gas to the Northern European market. Part of the TEN-E program, this new pipeline represents a strategic step for Europe in securing supply from alternatives routes.
But is this a true diversification, either for Russia or the EU? Will another route for Russian gas to Europe reinforce dependence or ease security of supply concerns?
Russian gas represents already almost 40% of EU"s gas imports (or 70% of Russia"s gas exports). From an Eastern European point of view, the pipeline will transport gas to the Czech Republic diverting continental gas flows through Poland and other countries in the energy community. While 55 bcm can flow through Nordstream to the European market by the end of the project, one wonders where Gazprom is going to get this gas.
If Russian gas production does not increase, alternative sources will have to be found. Gazprom faces several options: increase Russian production, divert its gas from other pipelines so as to fulfill Nord Stream capacity, or tap into central Asian resources.
This conference will address the following questions: what is the evolution in the security of supply strategy of Eastern and Southern Europe? What are the available Russian resources and the alternatives for Gazprom? What is the current situation of the Caspian resources and what developments might we expect in the next years?
Other events
Nuclear Sharing in Europe: A Contested Policy That Endures
Since the end of the Cold War, the number of US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe has fallen more than seventy-fold, yet their presence in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey remains a quiet pillar of NATO's deterrence posture. This "nuclear sharing" arrangement, central to the Alliance since its founding, has long been contested by public opinion, political parties, and civil society across Europe, without ever being abandoned by host governments. This paradox lies at the heart of the seminar: why does such an unpopular policy persist?