Are the new dynamics of power assertion, the redistribution of influence, and the emergence of new technologies changing both the place of war in the everyday life of our societies and the way war is waged when it occurs? Does the obsession with conflict, combined with technical efficiency, impose upon us a state of permanent latent war? And when weapons speak, does the involvement of modern technologies and the companies that produce them revolutionize both the political decision-making process and the way people are engaged in war? These are fundamental questions raised by the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and they are already shaping current thinking on military strategy and organization.

The frameworks—the tools we used to make sense of the world and try to organize it—are fading away one by one. How can we reshape and redefine them? Can the European Union—conceived for a different era—still play its role, and if so, what role? How does Trump’s America fit into the global landscape? And how are new technologies transforming both the fabric of our societies and the conditions of their international coexistence?

Since late 2023, several Houthi attacks on commercial shipping have involved privately contracted armed teams conducting defensive engagements and coordinating immediate response efforts, often in the relative absence of regular naval forces during the immediate hostilities at sea. These cases highlight a strategic tension that increasingly confronts modern navies. On the one hand, they are expected to conduct persistent, low-intensity maritime security tasks such as counterpiracy, maritime policing, and the protection of commercial shipping. On the other hand, they face renewed pressure to prepare for high-intensity conflict against peer and near-peer adversaries amid the return of great power competition.

Public sentiment is something decision-makers must contend with, especially in democratic states. However, the extent to which public opinion shapes foreign policy varies. Three Council of Councils experts in France, India, and Nigeria reflect on how public opinion does—and sometimes does not—affect foreign policy decisions.

Since the late 1950s, Japan’s nuclear weapons policy has been based on the coexistence of two competing normative rationales: the rejection of nuclear weapons, rooted in the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the recognition of the central role of US extended nuclear deterrence for Japan’s security.

Global imbalances have come back to the top of the policy agenda. Many analyses and reports have been produced over recent months. The standard prescription involves better coordination of macroeconomic policies, with three familiar recommendations: higher consumption in China, higher investment in Europe, and fiscal consolidation in the United States.

Over the past ten years, NATO has held almost as many summits as it did during the entirety of the Cold War. Are they still useful, or is it time to stop holding annual meetings?

The Franco-German “reset” launched with Friedrich Merz’s appointment as Chancellor in May 2025 and given concrete form at the Franco-German Council of Ministers (FGCM) in Toulon in August 2025 was intended to address the structural challenges affecting the bilateral relationship. Yet it is clear that these ambitions have only been partially translated into concrete action. Since the beginning of 2026, Franco-German relations have entered a phase in which short-term challenges have combined with deeper divergences over priorities, policy approaches, and strategic culture.