Russia and the West disagree over the future of Kosovo. While the European Union (EU) and United States (US) are keen to grant Kosovo de jure sovereignty under the Ahtisaari plan, Russia insists that no decision can be taken without Serbia's consent. Moreover, Russia insists that the Kosovo issue will set a precedent with long-term consequences for Eurasia and the world. These differences have exposed old divisions between Russia and the West, particularly acute during NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. However, today it is more difficult for the West to reach a compromise with an increasingly assertive and self-confident Russia which does not hesitate to oppose Western policies. This article looks at historic legacies, myths, concerns about precedents and other interests which guide Russia's policy over Kosovo's status.

One of the main problems in relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) is the absence of strategic goals. Russia, having played a critical role in ending the Cold War, has neither found its place in the strategy of EU expansion nor in that of NATO. In 2007, the active Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and the EU - which both sides agree has become outdated and is no longer able to meet today's challenges - is due to expire. The form that any new legal, contractual basis for relations between Russia and the EU may take will have implications not only for stability within Europe, but also for Russia's democratic future.

The relationships between the EU, NATO and Russia are of great significance for all their actors and for regional security more broadly. The overlapping remit of each is complementary, and provides a potentially beneficial way to address current military and soft security concerns. And indeed good progress has been made —formal relationships have been established and there has been some practical cooperation in a number of areas. This progress is particularly impressive when considered in appropriate historical context— i.e. against the backdrop of East-West confrontation. Few would have foreseen such progress fifteen or even ten years ago. However, there is no 'triangle' —ambiguity and contradiction mar all the relationships, which are dogged by a number of conflicting interests. Moreover, although the top leadership of all three entities profess the desire to enhance the relationships, it is clear that a number of constituencies on all sides do not seek similar developments, for a number of reasons. This has slowed cooperation significantly. EU-NATO cooperation therefore remains problematic, and the West's relations with Russia are by no means past some 'point of no return', to the confrontation of the past half century.