A little more than 60 years after its creation, questions about the future of the Alliance emerge at the intersection of three observations. First, the complexity of the world, which makes the Alliance ‘inevitable,' since it is a rare source of stability and solidarity in a world marked by uncertainty. Second, American doubt. If the United States was the global policeman for some simple minds at the start of the 1990s, others see the US as having used up its power in the adventurism of the Bush Administration. The future will wipe out these two caricatures. For members of the Alliance, the US will long continue to be a necessary friend, whose power and possible abandonment are feared. The third observation is, obviously, Europe's incurable ethnocentricity: if Europeans knew how to look at the world and their place in it, they would rapidly give up their mediocre powerlessness. History is moving on elsewhere and raises questions on its chaotic path to which others are replying more quickly. In the years ahead, therefore, the Alliance may lorge ahead without Europe or nearly without it, despite the fact that Europeans' specific know-how could be useful.

A new window of opportunity seems to be opening up for NATO and Russia, to re-think their relationship and how to institutionalize it through binding agreements and a permanent decision-making mechanism.

The proliferation of theaters (in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Far East, the Middle East and the Arctic) and cross-cutting issues (proliferation, disarmament, energy, arms sales) demonstrate the overall importance of the NATO/Russia relationship.

The French decision to re-enter NATO’s integrated military structure is merely the confirmation of a series of shifts that started a long time ago. But it is no less questionable a decision. It is a symbolic decision that affects France’s image internationally. It by no means guarantees that the Alliance will evolve in a way that corresponds to France’s national interests; nor does it shed light on France’s ambiguous future. It does, however, in a very real way, risk diminishing France’s will to defend itself.

The changes in the way that NATO operates raise the question of whether the nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would, in a time of crisis, be an instrument of solidarity, or lead instead to divisiveness.

The ultimate direction taken by the Alliance – be it a ‘return to home base,’ a ‘global expansion’ or the pursuit of ‘global missions’ – will be heavily influenced by perceptions of what happens in Afghanistan over the next two years.

With 50 years’ seniority over the ESDP, and despite its austere origins, NATO transformed itself during the 20th century into a political-bureaucratic machine in search of a more appropriate international role.

The question of how the Alliance can best meet the common security problems of its member states should determine the revision of the Strategic Concept and analysis of the future of NATO in general.