Since Poland first expressed its willingness to host a critical part of the US Ballistic Missile Defense architecture, in 2002, the program has undergone several setbacks. Today, while Poland is still expected to host key elements of the US BMD capabilities, contributing to NATO’s territorial defense against ballistic missile threats, Warsaw does not enjoy the kind of special bilateral relationship that it was trying to secure with Washington.

Since the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has been transformed and nuclear weapons have been marginalized in the West. However, the NATO security policies remain almost unchanged: deterrence is still considered as a principle guiding the Atlantic Alliance, even though the actual policy statements lack target, direction and urgency.

The 2011 insurgency in Libya brought about the demise of Supreme Leader Mouammar Qadhafi. A NATO-led coalition operated to meet a unique United Nations mandate including an arms embargo, no-fly zone, and the requirement to protect the population from armed attack.

Consistent attempts by the US and NATO to cooperate on ballistic missile defenses have long divided Russia and the West. The failed talks on this issue have built a foundation of frustration that has reinforced the general lack of trust among the parties on this issue.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the threat of cruise missile proliferation is as equally challenging to NATO as the threat of ballistic missiles. Over the last two decades, the emergence of cruise missiles and UAVs as a threat has been slow, and governments, particularly the United States, have invested much less in cruise missile defenses than in ballistic missile defenses.

"Escalation", the tendency of belligerents to increase the force or breadth of their attacks to gain advantage or avoid defeat, is not a new phenomenon. Systematic thought about how to manage it, however, did not crystallize until the Cold War and the invention of nuclear weapons. 

The new Strategic Concept takes stock of the past ten years but outlines only modest objectives for the future of NATO. Partnership falls under the third core task, cooperative security. A subsequent partnership policy was unveiled, but has provided little new impetus. 

More than 40 years after the unilateral decision by General de Gaulle to withdraw French forces from NATO's integrated military command, President Sarkozy decided that France would reintegrate the Atlantic Alliance’s military structure, based on "full and complete participation". The decision was endorsed by Parliament and has generated little debate in France, while a majority of French people appear to approve of it.