The Franco-German Tandem: Bridging the Gap on Nuclear Issues
The Franco-German couple has long been characterized by divergent trajectories on nuclear matters, and antagonist historical decisions still frame the current relationship.
In France, the creation of a national deterrent led to a will to preserve independence, including vis-a-vis NATO, and to uphold the importance of deterrence to maintain security. In Germany, after a late decision to abandon national nuclear ambitions, nuclear weapons were mainly considered through the prism of NATO. Under the influence of major pacifist movements at the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons became almost taboo. In recent years, however, the two partners have reconciled some of their views on this matter, which could enable them to act in tandem and become more influential in addressing contemporary challenges on strategic stability, arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.
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The Franco-German Tandem: Bridging the Gap on Nuclear Issues
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