Cruise Missiles and NATO Missile Defense: Under the Radar?
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the threat of cruise missile proliferation is as equally challenging to NATO as the threat of ballistic missiles. Over the last two decades, the emergence of cruise missiles and UAVs as a threat has been slow, and governments, particularly the United States, have invested much less in cruise missile defenses than in ballistic missile defenses.
Since 2004, however, several new land-attack cruise missile programs have been launched, after a new narrative formed around their strategic value, and as a response to progress achieved by ballistic missile defense systems. Recent cruise missile developments, together with global interest in armed and unarmed UAVs, have worsened the existing threat and may continue to do so. These emerging threats, combined with existing or developing ballistic missile capabilities, could plausibly endanger NATO population centers and forces. While cruise missile defense programs have faced severe cuts in the past years, a range of options could still be implemented to address NATO's myopic view of missile defense.
Available in:
Regions and themes
ISBN / ISSN
Share
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Cruise Missiles and NATO Missile Defense: Under the Radar?
Author(s)
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programs
Security Studies Center
Heir to a tradition dating back to the founding of Ifri, the Security Studies Center provides public and private decision-makers as well as the general public with the keys to understanding power relations and contemporary modes of conflict as well as those to come. Through its positioning at the juncture of politics and operations, the credibility of its civil-military team and the wide distribution of its publications in French and English, the Center for Security Studies constitutes in the French landscape of think tanks a unique center of research and influence on the national and international defense debate.
Find out more
Discover all our analyses
France has a new nuclear doctrine of ‘forward deterrence’ for Europe. What does it mean?
On Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a speech on France’s nuclear deterrence at the Île Longue naval base near Brest in Brittany, which hosts the country’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines. Such addresses are a well-established presidential ritual, typically delivered once per presidential term and receiving moderate attention. This one, however, was highly anticipated in France and abroad, given the profound geopolitical shifts since Macron’s first nuclear speech in February 2020.
Bundeswehr: From Zeitenwende (historic turning point) to Epochenbruch (epochal shift)
The Zeitenwende (historic turning point) announced by Olaf Scholz on February 27, 2022, is shifting into high gear. Financially supported by the March 2025 reform of Germany’s “debt break” and backed by a broad political and societal consensus to strengthen and modernize the Bundeswehr, Germany's military capabilities are set to rapidly increase over the coming years. Expected to assume a central role in the defense of the European continent in the context of changing transatlantic relations, Berlin’s military-political position on the continent is being radically transformed.
Main Battle Tank: Obsolescence or Renaissance?
Since February 2022, Russian and Ukrainian forces combined have lost more than 5,000 battle tanks, a much higher volume than all the European armor combined. Spearhead of the Soviet doctrine from which the two belligerents came, tanks were deployed in large numbers from the first day and proved to be a prime target for UAVs that became more numerous and efficient over the months. The large number of UAV strike videos against tanks has also led a certain number of observers to conclude, once again, that armor is obsolete on a modern battlefield. This approach must, however, be nuanced by a deeper study of the losses and their origin, UAVs rarely being the sole origin of the loss itself, often caused by a combination of factors such as mines, artillery or other anti-tank weapons.
Mapping the MilTech War: Eight Lessons from Ukraine’s Battlefield
This report maps out the evolution of key technologies that have emerged or developed in the last 4 years of the war in Ukraine. Its goal is to derive the lessons the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could learn to strengthen its defensive capabilities and prepare for modern war, which is large-scale and conventional in nature.