North Africa and Middle East

Before the 9/11 events, US-Maghreb relations were growing stronger, especially after the United States had long left the floor to the Maghreb’s “natural” European partner. Therefore, the American action in this region was in line with a mechanism previously set off by Clinton Administration member, Stuart Eizenstat, which aimed at reducing intra-regional obstacles and stimulating American investments towards an area where Americans were little-represented. Hence Washington seemed more involved in promoting the emergence of a strong, world-economy-integrated Maghrebi market.

Since Mohammed VI came into power, Morocco’s African policy has undergone notable change in comparison to his predecessor’s period.

While largely interrupted by the colonial period premise, trade relations between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa have enjoyed a new boom with the independence era. However, until the end of the 1990s, the African policy of the three Maghreb countries significantly impacted their economic projection.

This contribution consists in analyzing the unifying or opposing relations between the central State-power and the southern part of central-Saharan populations, mainly Arabs and Tuaregs, within the relational framework of colonial and Malian armed forces. The French Colonial State and the Malian independent State (from the 1960 independence movement) are both considered by Arabs and Tuaregs as external entities, whatever the form of their relation, good or bad.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional organization which was created in 1981, reassembling six Arab countries together: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Thanks to their oil income, GCC countries have enjoyed economic boom since 2002, hence breaking with the 1990s economic slow-down.

Our interest in this topic stems both from our annual visits to Mauritania which started fifteen years ago, and the tiny amount of research noticed on trafficking in this country.

Relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia have never been as friendly as they were in 2009. After years of tension over Saudi support for Islamist fundamentalism in the post-Soviet space and Russia's proximity to Iran and Iraq, Moscow and Riyadh have progressively moved closer to each other. 

Russia's foreign policy toward the Greater Middle East is not an aggressive, anti-Western one, but a defensive policy aimed more at protecting Russian economic interests, working with virtually any government that opposes Sunni radicalism, and preventing Moscow from becoming a target of Muslim anger as occurred during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and Chechnya (since 1994).

This contribution consists in analyzing the unifying or opposing relations between the central State-power and the southern part of central-Saharan populations, mainly Arabs and Tuaregs, within the relational framework of colonial and Malian armed forces.

On November 5th 2009, a cocaine-loaded Boeing 727 aircraft arriving from Venezuela was discovered torched and emptied on a makeshift airstrip in the Malian desert (Gao region). The sahel-saharan area is clearly a contact zone between very distant worlds.