The Oceania Factor in France’s Evolving Indo-Pacific Strategy
This paper examines the two-way relationship between France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and developments in Oceania. Oceania was not a priority in the initial years of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the region was largely treated as secondary to major strategic hotspots and key partnerships, while overseas territories were primarily handled as domestic issues and recipients of a top-down strategy.
However, political, strategic, and geopolitical shifts in the region—ranging from the AUKUS deal and the growing Chinese presence in the area to renewed independence movements in French overseas territories—have progressively shaped and reoriented France’s approach. As a result, Paris had to devote greater resources to Oceania, adopting a more balanced and comprehensive approach toward Pacific Island countries, while making stronger efforts to empower its overseas territories as co-constructors of, and beneficiaries from, the Indo-Pacific strategy. This evolution is reflected in the 2025 update of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. By doing so, the paper highlights how Oceania has evolved from a peripheral consideration into an increasingly influential factor in Paris’s Indo-Pacific thinking, and illustrates some of the tensions within France’s Indo-Pacific strategy: the interconnection between grand strategy and domestic politics and the gap between ambitions and limited means.
Introduction
France’s distinctive feature in the Indo-Pacific is that it is the only European state with a substantial territorial presence across the region. It possesses several overseas territories and around 90 percent of its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is located in the Indo-Pacific, alongside approximately 1.6 million French citizens and more than 7,000 prepositioned military personnel stationed in La Réunion, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia. This sustained presence makes France a genuine “resident power” of the Indo-Pacific and constitutes a central source of legitimacy for its position as the first European country to adopt a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy in 2019.
A significant proportion of France’s overseas territories in the region is located in the South Pacific, which alone accounts for roughly 60 percent of its total EEZ. Despite this structural reality, Oceania (meaning the Pacific Islands nations, including Australia and New Zealand) initially remained relatively marginal in French strategic thinking, which tended to prioritize broader power projection narratives rather than the specific political and geopolitical dynamics of the South Pacific.
However, this imbalance has shifted. The 2025 French updated Indo-Pacific strategy places a much stronger emphasis on overseas territories as central pillars of France’s regional identity and influence. At the same time, strategy-oriented policy publications on Oceania have increased significantly, reflecting a growing recognition of the region’s strategic importance. This evolution indicates a gradual rebalancing of French strategic thinking, moving from a primarily declaratory Indo-Pacific vision toward a more territorially grounded approach that integrates the South Pacific more fully into France’s overall regional posture.
This article thus examines the two-way relationship between France’s Indo-Pacific strategy and developments in Oceania and highlights how Oceania has evolved from peripheral consideration into an increasingly influential factor in Paris’s Indo-Pacific policy thinking.
Oceania was not a priority in the initial years of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the region was largely treated as secondary to major strategic hotspots and key partnerships, while overseas territories were primarily handled as domestic issues and recipients of a top-down strategy.
However, political, strategic, and geopolitical shifts in the region, ranging from the AUKUS deal and the growing Chinese presence in the area to renewed independence movements in French overseas territories, have progressively shaped and reoriented France’s approach.
As a result, Paris had to devote greater resources to Oceania, adopting a more balanced and comprehensive approach toward Pacific Island countries, while making stronger efforts to empower its overseas territories as co-constructors of, and beneficiaries from, the Indo-Pacific strategy. This evolution is reflected in the 2025 update of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
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Read the full article on the Torino World Affairs Institute's website.
Pajon, C. (2026). The Oceania factor in France’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy. Torino World Affairs Institute.
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